29 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1895–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Stategreen2 sentences2007In Banks , this Court stated requirements to introduce a self-serving statement: As this Court stated in Davis v. State, 230 Miss. 183, 188 , 92 So.2d 359, 361 (1957): It is an elementary rule of law that when admissions of one on trial for the commission of a criminal offense are allowed in evidence against him, all that he said in that connection must be permitted to go to the jury either through the cross-examination of the witness who testified to the admission or through witnesses produced by the accused. 2007In Banks , this Court stated requirements to introduce a self-serving statement: As this Court stated in Davis v. State, 230 Miss. 183, 188 , 92 So.2d 359, 361 (1957): It is an elementary rule of law that when admissions of one on trial for the commission of a criminal offense are allowed in evidence against him, all that he said in that connection must be permitted to go to the jury either through the cross-examination of the witness who testified to the admission or through witnesses produced by the accused. | 4 | 4 |
Downey v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Though unnecessary here, “We are empowered by our state constitution to exceed federal minimum standards of constitutionality and more strictly enforce [constitutional rights].” Downey v. State, 144 So. 3d 146, 151 (Miss. 2014). 20 We therefore hold that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. 2019Though unnecessary here, “We are empowered by our state constitution to exceed federal minimum standards of constitutionality and more strictly enforce [constitutional rights].” Downey v. State, 144 So. 3d 146, 151 (Miss. 2014). 20 We therefore hold that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Despite this pronouncement, the elementary rule of law remains, "that for preservation of error for review, there must be contemporaneous objections." Smith v. State, 530 So.2d 155, 161-62 (Miss.1988) (collecting authorities). 1998Despite this pronouncement, the elementary rule of law remains, "that for preservation of error for review, there must be contemporaneous objections." Smith v. State, 530 So. 2d 155, 161-62 (Miss. 1988) (collecting authorities). | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Jones v. State, 920 So.2d 465, 471 (Miss.2006). 2015Jones v. State, 920 So. 2d 465, 471 (Miss. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. Acreegreen1 sentence2014As the Mississippi Supreme Court noted in Collins v. Aeree, 614 So.2d 391, 392 (Miss.1993): From time immemorial, we have adhered to the basic and elementary rule that our appellate affirmance ratifies, confirms, and declares that the trial court judgment was correct as if there had been no appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Spurgeon v. Eggergreen1 sentence2013This Court’s failure to follow this elementary principle of appellate review in Spurgeon v. Egger, 989 So.2d 901, 906 (¶ 18), 908 (¶ 27) (Miss.Ct.App.2007), does not change the law. | 1 | 1 |
Norris v. Norrisgreen1 sentence1992Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1189 (Miss. 1987); Norris v. Norris, 498 So.2d 809, 814 (Miss. 1986); Gilchrist Machinery Co., Inc. v. Ross, 493 So.2d 1288, 1292 (Miss. 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Mullins v. Ratcliffgreen1 sentence1992Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1189 (Miss. 1987); Norris v. Norris, 498 So.2d 809, 814 (Miss. 1986); Gilchrist Machinery Co., Inc. v. Ross, 493 So.2d 1288, 1292 (Miss. 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Gilchrist MacHinery Co., Inc. v. Rossgreen1 sentence1992Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1189 (Miss. 1987); Norris v. Norris, 498 So.2d 809, 814 (Miss. 1986); Gilchrist Machinery Co., Inc. v. Ross, 493 So.2d 1288, 1292 (Miss. 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Richardson v. Rileygreen1 sentence1988Richardson v. Riley, 355 So.2d 667, 668 (Miss. 1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Cruikshank
green
2 sentences1984The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking to the Sixth Amendment Right of an accused to be fully informed set forth the minimum constitutional requirements of an indictment drawn under a statute similar to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-11-31, being the one under which the defendant was charged, said in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 , 23 L.Ed. 588 (1876) that: It is an elementary principle of criminal pleading, that where the definition of an offense, whether it be at common law or by statute, "includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment shall char 1984The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking to the Sixth Amendment Right of an accused to be fully informed set forth the minimum constitutional requirements of an indictment drawn under a statute similar to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-11-31, being the one under which the defendant was charged, said in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 , 23 L.Ed. 588 (1876) that: It is an elementary principle of criminal pleading, that where the definition of an offense, whether it be at common law or by statute, "includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment shall char | 2 | 1984–2023 |
Masonite Corporation v. Hill
green
2 sentences1965This elementary requirement was pointed out in Masonite Corporation v. Hill, 170 Miss. 185 , 154 So. 295 (1934). 1965This elementary requirement was pointed out in Masonite Corporation v. Hill, 170 Miss. 158 , 154 So. 295 (1934). | 2 | 1965–1965 |
Federal Credit Co. v. Zepernick Grocery Co.
green
2 sentences1964In Federal Credit Co. v. Zepernick Grocery Co., 153 Miss. 489 , 120 So. 173 (1929), the Court held: “It is said to be a rule of almost universal application that the writ of certiorari will not issue in those cases in which there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal, which statement is no more than an application of the elementary rule of procedure that an extraordinary remedy will not he allowed when an ordinary remedy is, or has been, fully available. 1964In Federal Credit Co. v. Zepernick Grocery Co., 153 Miss. 489 , 120 So. 173 (1929), the Court held: “It is said to be a rule of almost universal application that the writ of certiorari will not issue in those cases in which there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal, which statement is no more than an application of the elementary rule of procedure that an extraordinary remedy will not he allowed when an ordinary remedy is, or has been, fully available. | 2 | 1959–1964 |
Russell v. United States
green
2 sentences2023Further, “[i]t is an elementary principle of criminal pleading, that where the definition of an offence, whether it be at common law or by statute, ‘includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment shall charge the offence in the same generic terms as in the definition; but it must state the species,—it must descend to particulars.’” Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765 , 82 S. Ct. 1038 , 8 L. 2023Further, “[i]t is an elementary principle of criminal pleading, that where the definition of an offence, whether it be at common law or by statute, ‘includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment shall charge the offence in the same generic terms as in the definition; but it must state the species,—it must descend to particulars.’” Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765 , 82 S. Ct. 1038 , 8 L. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In Re Bailey
green
1 sentence1998He neglected the elementary principle that judges, rather than acting like common ruffians, should "behave with judicial temperament and perform their duties according to the law and by reference to the process of adjudication." Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Duren v. Missouri
green
2 sentences1988In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the elements of a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement were set out: [T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community ; and (3) that this under representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. (emphasis added) Even the 1988In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the elements of a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement were set out: [T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community ; and (3) that this under representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. (emphasis added) Even the | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Billiot v. State
green
1 sentence1985Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1984); Tubbs v. State, 402 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1981); Harrigill v. State, 381 So.2d 619 (Miss. 1980); Myers v. State, 268 So.2d 353 (Miss. 1972); Parks v. State, 267 So.2d 302 (Miss. 1972); Gallego v. State, 222 Miss. 719 , 77 So.2d 321 (1955); Dalton v. State, 141 Miss. 841 , 105 So. 784 (1925). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Dalton v. State
green
2 sentences1985Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1984); Tubbs v. State, 402 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1981); Harrigill v. State, 381 So.2d 619 (Miss. 1980); Myers v. State, 268 So.2d 353 (Miss. 1972); Parks v. State, 267 So.2d 302 (Miss. 1972); Gallego v. State, 222 Miss. 719 , 77 So.2d 321 (1955); Dalton v. State, 141 Miss. 841 , 105 So. 784 (1925). 1985Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1984); Tubbs v. State, 402 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1981); Harrigill v. State, 381 So.2d 619 (Miss. 1980); Myers v. State, 268 So.2d 353 (Miss. 1972); Parks v. State, 267 So.2d 302 (Miss. 1972); Gallego v. State, 222 Miss. 719 , 77 So.2d 321 (1955); Dalton v. State, 141 Miss. 841 , 105 So. 784 (1925). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Myers v. State
green
1 sentence1985Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1984); Tubbs v. State, 402 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1981); Harrigill v. State, 381 So.2d 619 (Miss. 1980); Myers v. State, 268 So.2d 353 (Miss. 1972); Parks v. State, 267 So.2d 302 (Miss. 1972); Gallego v. State, 222 Miss. 719 , 77 So.2d 321 (1955); Dalton v. State, 141 Miss. 841 , 105 So. 784 (1925). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Parks v. State
green
1 sentence1985Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1984); Tubbs v. State, 402 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1981); Harrigill v. State, 381 So.2d 619 (Miss. 1980); Myers v. State, 268 So.2d 353 (Miss. 1972); Parks v. State, 267 So.2d 302 (Miss. 1972); Gallego v. State, 222 Miss. 719 , 77 So.2d 321 (1955); Dalton v. State, 141 Miss. 841 , 105 So. 784 (1925). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Harrigill v. State
green
1 sentence1985Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1984); Tubbs v. State, 402 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1981); Harrigill v. State, 381 So.2d 619 (Miss. 1980); Myers v. State, 268 So.2d 353 (Miss. 1972); Parks v. State, 267 So.2d 302 (Miss. 1972); Gallego v. State, 222 Miss. 719 , 77 So.2d 321 (1955); Dalton v. State, 141 Miss. 841 , 105 So. 784 (1925). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Gallego v. State
green
2 sentences1985Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1984); Tubbs v. State, 402 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1981); Harrigill v. State, 381 So.2d 619 (Miss. 1980); Myers v. State, 268 So.2d 353 (Miss. 1972); Parks v. State, 267 So.2d 302 (Miss. 1972); Gallego v. State, 222 Miss. 719 , 77 So.2d 321 (1955); Dalton v. State, 141 Miss. 841 , 105 So. 784 (1925). 1985Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1984); Tubbs v. State, 402 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1981); Harrigill v. State, 381 So.2d 619 (Miss. 1980); Myers v. State, 268 So.2d 353 (Miss. 1972); Parks v. State, 267 So.2d 302 (Miss. 1972); Gallego v. State, 222 Miss. 719 , 77 So.2d 321 (1955); Dalton v. State, 141 Miss. 841 , 105 So. 784 (1925). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Tubbs v. State
green
1 sentence1985Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1984); Tubbs v. State, 402 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1981); Harrigill v. State, 381 So.2d 619 (Miss. 1980); Myers v. State, 268 So.2d 353 (Miss. 1972); Parks v. State, 267 So.2d 302 (Miss. 1972); Gallego v. State, 222 Miss. 719 , 77 So.2d 321 (1955); Dalton v. State, 141 Miss. 841 , 105 So. 784 (1925). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Merchants Co. v. Tracy
green
2 sentences1982Atwood v. Garcia, 167 Miss. 144 , 147 So. 813 (1933); Merchants Co. v. Tracey, 175 Miss. 49 , 166 So. 340 (1936). 1982Atwood v. Garcia, 167 Miss. 144 , 147 So. 813 (1933); Merchants Co. v. Tracey, 175 Miss. 49 , 166 So. 340 (1936). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Atwood v. Garcia
neutral
2 sentences1982Atwood v. Garcia, 167 Miss. 144 , 147 So. 813 (1933); Merchants Co. v. Tracey, 175 Miss. 49 , 166 So. 340 (1936). 1982Atwood v. Garcia, 167 Miss. 144 , 147 So. 813 (1933); Merchants Co. v. Tracey, 175 Miss. 49 , 166 So. 340 (1936). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Johnson v. State
neutral
1 sentence1977In Lambert v. State, 171 Miss. 474 , 158 So. 139 (1934), this Court quoted the following statement from Johnson v. State, 85 Miss. 572 , 37 So. 926 (1904): “It is an elementary principle that the acts, conduct, and words of a party accused are admissible in all cases where they tend to show either a motive for the commission of the crime or evince malice towards the party afterwards killed.” 171 Miss. at 480 , 158 So. at 141 . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Lambert v. State
neutral
2 sentences1977In Lambert v. State, 171 Miss. 474 , 158 So. 139 (1934), this Court quoted the following statement from Johnson v. State, 85 Miss. 572 , 37 So. 926 (1904): “It is an elementary principle that the acts, conduct, and words of a party accused are admissible in all cases where they tend to show either a motive for the commission of the crime or evince malice towards the party afterwards killed.” 171 Miss. at 480 , 158 So. at 141 . 1977In Lambert v. State, 171 Miss. 474 , 158 So. 139 (1934), this Court quoted the following statement from Johnson v. State, 85 Miss. 572 , 37 So. 926 (1904): “It is an elementary principle that the acts, conduct, and words of a party accused are admissible in all cases where they tend to show either a motive for the commission of the crime or evince malice towards the party afterwards killed.” 171 Miss. at 480 , 158 So. at 141 . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State v. Labella
green
1 sentence1977State v. Labella, 232 So.2d 354 (Miss. 1970). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. Brumfield
green
2 sentences1964Certiorari cannot be made to serve the office of an appeal, and the rule is not altered by the fact that a party entitled to an appeal has allowed the time for taking it to elapse without availing himself of that right.” See also Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. Brumfield, 159 Miss. 175 , 130 So. 98 (1930). 1964Certiorari cannot be made to serve the office of an appeal, and the rule is not altered by the fact that a party entitled to an appeal has allowed the time for taking it to elapse without availing himself of that right.” See also Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. Brumfield, 159 Miss. 175 , 130 So. 98 (1930). | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Nesbitt v. City of Greenville
neutral
1 sentence1959In the case of Nesbitt v. City of Greenville, 69 Miss. 22 , 10 So. 452 , where a water tank erected in one of the streets fell and killed one Nesbitt, as to the duty of the city, the Court held: “We do not dissent from the elementary principle that before the municipality can be held liable for injuries resulting from nuisances or defects in its streets, it must have knowledge of the nuisance or the defect, and its danger. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Theobald v. Deslonde green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Vicksburg & Meridian Railroad v. McGowan neutral | 1 | 1905–1905 |
| Hobbs v. . the City of Yonkers green | 1 | 1895–1895 |
| Boardman v. Thompson green | 1 | 1895–1895 |
| Hawkeye Ins. v. Brainard green | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.