elementary rule in Illinois

1961Law, secs. 164, 372; Kibs v. People, 81 Ill. 599 .’ ” There is no way for this court to tell whether the indictment was laid under paragraph 9-92 of chapter 24 (Cities and Villages Act) or under paragraph 449 of chapter 38 (Criminal Code) of the Illinois Eevised Statutes.

1942Law, secs. 164, 372; Kibs v. People, 81 Ill. 599 .” In People v. Barnes, 314 Ill. 140 , in discussing the same question, the following language was used: “It is not sufficient to charge an offense in the language of the statute, alone, where by its generality it may embrace acts which it was not the intent of the statute to punish.

1927(Hoyne v. Danisch, 264 Ill. 467 .) It is an elementary rule that-in ascertaining this contention all parts of a statute must be considered together, and not each part, phrase, clause, sentence or section by itself. (36 Cyc. 1131; Krome v. Halbert, 263 Ill. 172 ; Hoyne v. Danisch, supra.) ’ ’ Commenting further in that case the court say: “Such provisions are wholly irreconcilable with the idea that the right to such salary is also to depend upon the number of hours of service and to be calculated upon a per diem basis.” “The intention of the law-makers is the law, and this intention should be

1915(Hoyne v. Danisch, 264 Ill. 467 .) It is an elementary rule that in ascertaining this intention all parts of a statute must be considered together, and not each part, phrase, clause, sentence or section by itself. (36 Cyc. 1131; Krome v. Halbert, 263 Ill. 172 ; Hoyne v. Danisch, supra.) When this act is so construed the legislative intent is clear.

1921The court in the latter case at page 230 says :■ “The elementary rule is this: ‘But where the damages, through the natural consequences of the act complained of, are not the necessary result of it, they are termed special damages, which the law does not imply, and therefore, in order to prevent a surprise upon the defendant, they must be particularly specified in the declaration, or the plaintiff will not be permitted to give evidence of them on the trial. ’ 2 Gfreenleaf on Evidence, sec. 254; Teagarden v. Hetfield, 11 Ind. 522 .” It is next contended by appellant that appellee failed to show

1899There the same rule is again announced, though not in the same language thus (p. 230): “ The elementary rule is this: But where the damages, though the natural consequences of the act complained of, are not the necessary result of it, they are termed special damages, which the law does not imply, and therefore, in order to prevent a surprise upon the defendant, they must be particularly specified in the declaration, or the plaintiff will not be permitted to give evidence of them on the trial. 2 Greenleaf on Ev., Sec. 251; Teagarden v. Hetfield, 11 Ind. 522 .” To the same effect are: Chicago W.

2010The rule prohibiting royalty leases, while a well-known mineral law rule, is at its essence “an elementary principle of the law of contracts” (Miller, 153 Ill.

2010App. 1 (1910), in which a 50-year royalty lease in Randolph County was held to be void ab initio for a lack of mutuality, based upon “an elementary principle of the law of contracts that if one party to a contract is under no obligation to perform at all the contract is void.” Miller, 153 Ill.

2009Plaintiff cites Hicks , which stated: "It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that `[t]he addition of a new provision in a statute by amendment is an indication of the absence of its implied or prior existence.' [Citation.] Absent substantial considerations to the contrary, `an amendatory change in the language of a statute creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law as it theretofore existed.'" Hicks, 119 Ill.2d at 34 , 115 Ill.Dec. 623 , 518 N.E.2d 148 .

2009Plaintiff cites Hicks, which stated: “It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that ‘[t]he addition of a new provision in a statute by amendment is an indication of the absence of its implied or prior existence.’ [Citation.] Absent substantial considerations to the contrary, ‘an amendatory change in the language of a statute creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law as it theretofore existed.’ ” Hicks, 119 Ill. 2d at 34 .

2007Indeed, Reiter reached its holding in part by drawing comparisons to proceedings at law, noting that “[n]o one could contend in a law case that a plaintiff who had obtained a decision in an Appellate Court, reversing the ruling of a trial court which had taken his case away from the court or jury, would have the right to present his evidence from the first trial in transcript form at a new trial.” Reiter, 405 Ill. at 72-73 .

2007Indeed, Reiter reached its holding in part by drawing comparisons to proceedings at law, noting that "[n]o one could contend in a law case that a plaintiff who had obtained a decision in an Appellate Court, reversing the ruling of a trial court -9- No. 2--05--1212 which had taken his case away from the court or jury, would have the right to present his evidence from the first trial in transcript form at a new trial." Reiter, 405 Ill. at 72-73 .

1992People v. Bales (1985), 108 Ill.2d 182, 188 , 91 Ill.Dec. 171 , 483 N.E.2d 517 . "[I]t is an elementary rule of construction that all sections of an act relating to the same subject matter should be considered together unless to do so would be plainly contrary to the legislative intent." (2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.06, at 151 (5th ed. 1992).) Article I of the Code pertains to offenses relating to titles and registration and is part of the general statutory scheme entitled "ANTI-THEFT LAWS." (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 95½, par. 4-100 et seq. ) Section 3-100 et seq. of

1992People v. Bales (1985), 108 Ill.2d 182, 188 , 91 Ill.Dec. 171 , 483 N.E.2d 517 . "[I]t is an elementary rule of construction that all sections of an act relating to the same subject matter should be considered together unless to do so would be plainly contrary to the legislative intent." (2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.06, at 151 (5th ed. 1992).) Article I of the Code pertains to offenses relating to titles and registration and is part of the general statutory scheme entitled "ANTI-THEFT LAWS." (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 95½, par. 4-100 et seq. ) Section 3-100 et seq. of

1990Faith v. Martoccio (1974), 21 Ill.App.3d 999, 1003 , 316 N.E.2d 164 .

1990Faith v. Martoccio (1974), 21 Ill.App.3d 999, 1003 , 316 N.E.2d 164 .

1985(North Chicago Street R.R. v. Ackley, 171 Ill. 100, 111 , 49 N.E. 222 .) In any event, the assignee can obtain no greater right or interest than that possessed by the assignor, inasmuch as one cannot convey that which he does not have.

1976(North Chicago Street R.R. v. Ackley, 171 Ill. 100, 111 , 49 N.E. 222 .) In any event, the assignee can obtain no greater right or interest than that possessed by the assignor, inasmuch as one cannot convey that which he does not have.

1983In Sup v. Cervenka, 331 Ill. 459 , the rule to which we refer is thus stated: `It is an elementary rule in the construction of a statute that the intention of the legislature must primarily be determined from the language of the statute itself and not from conjectures aliunde.

1983In Sup v. Cervenka, 331 Ill. 459 , the rule to which we refer is thus stated: ‘It is an elementary rule in the construction of a statute that the intention of the legislature must primarily be determined from the language of the statute itself and not from conjectures aliunde.

1983(People v. Dixon (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 513 , 177 N.E.2d 224 .) However, where there is no evidence of addiction, the attempt to impeach a witness on that basis has been held to be “improper unless the examiner is prepared to make a showing to support the intended questions.” (People v. Brown (1966), 76 Ill.

1983(People v. Dixon (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 513 , 177 N.E.2d 224 .) However, where there is no evidence of addiction, the attempt to impeach a witness on that basis has been held to be “improper unless the examiner is prepared to make a showing to support the intended questions.” (People v. Brown (1966), 76 Ill.

1971"It is an elementary rule that where the court or jury can make their own deductions they shall not be made by those who testify." ( Mahlstedt v. Ideal Lighting Co., 271 Ill. 154, 171 .) This rule was not cast aside by the decisions cited by the majority.

1971“It is an elementary rule that where the court or jury can make their own deductions they shall not be made by those who testify.” (Mahlstedt v. Ideal Lighting Co., 271 Ill. 154, 171 .) This rule was not cast aside by the decisions cited by the majority.

1970Pierce v. Carpentier, 20 Ill2d 526, 169 NE2d 747 (1960).

1970Pierce v. Carpentier, 20 Ill2d 526, 169 NE2d 747 ; Washington Mfg.

1927(Hoyne v. Danisch, 264 Ill. 467 .) It is an elementary rule that-in ascertaining this contention all parts of a statute must be considered together, and not each part, phrase, clause, sentence or section by itself. (36 Cyc. 1131; Krome v. Halbert, 263 Ill. 172 ; Hoyne v. Danisch, supra.) ’ ’ Commenting further in that case the court say: “Such provisions are wholly irreconcilable with the idea that the right to such salary is also to depend upon the number of hours of service and to be calculated upon a per diem basis.” “The intention of the law-makers is the law, and this intention should be

1927(Hoyne v. Danisch, 264 Ill. 467 .) It is an elementary rule that-in ascertaining this contention all parts of a statute must be considered together, and not each part, phrase, clause, sentence or section by itself. (36 Cyc. 1131; Krome v. Halbert, 263 Ill. 172 ; Hoyne v. Danisch, supra.) ’ ’ Commenting further in that case the court say: “Such provisions are wholly irreconcilable with the idea that the right to such salary is also to depend upon the number of hours of service and to be calculated upon a per diem basis.” “The intention of the law-makers is the law, and this intention should be

1915(Evans v. People, 12 Mich. 27 .) Expert evidence is admissible when the witnesses offered as experts have peculiar knowledge or experience not common to the world, which renders their opinions founded on such knowledge or experience an aid to the court or jury in determining the question at issue.

1911(Evans v. People, 12 Mich. 27 .) Expert evidence is not confined to classed and specified professions, but is applicable wherever peculiar skill and judgment applied to a particular subject are required to explain results or to trace them to their causes.

1914(Sutherland on Stat. Const. sec. 215; Maiss v. Metropolitan Amusement Ass’n, 241 Ill. 177 ; Soby v. People, 134 id. 66.) In the construction of a statute the courts are not confined to a literal meaning of the words, but the intention may be collected from the necessity or objects of the act and its words may be enlarged or restricted according to its intent.

1914(Sutherland on Stat. Const, sec. 215; Maiss v. Metropolitan Amusement Ass’n, 241 Ill. 177 ; Soby v. People, 134 id. 66.) * * * The several provisions of the statute should be construed together in the light of the purpose and objects of the act, so as to give effect to the main intent, even though in so doing particular provisions are not construed according to their literal reading.” Krome v. Halbert, 263 Ill. 172 .

1905The allegation being that the defendant knew that his former wife was living, it is sought to be inferred, by way of argument, that she must have been in fact living, but it is an elementary rule of pleading, both civil and criminal, that allegations of fact in pleading should be direct and positive and not merely" argumentative or inferential. ” Prichard v. People, 149 Ill. 50, 54 .

1899Law, Secs. 164, 372; Kibs v. The People, 81 Ill. 599 .” In Prichard v. The People, 149 Ill. 50 , it seems to have been urged by counsel for the people, that if the offense was so plainly charged that its nature could be easily understood by the jury, that was sufficient, in respect to which the court say: “ Whether the description of the offense is so plain that its nature could be easily understood by the jury, must depend on whether it is described with at least a reasonable degree of certainty, using the term ‘ certainty ’ in its common law sense.” The indictment was for bigamy, and alleged

2026K4 Enterprises, Inc. 394 Ill. App. 3d at 313 .