39 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Thriftgreen2 sentences2015V, § 24 ("The Attorney General shall be the chief prosecuting officer of the State with authority to supervise the prosecution of all criminal cases in courts of record."); State v. Thrift, 312 S.C. 282, 291-92 , 440 S.E.2d 341, 346-47 (1994) ("Under the separation of powers doctrine, which is the basis for our form of government, the Executive Branch is vested with the power to decide when and how to prosecute a case. 2015V, § 24 ("The Attorney General shall be the chief prosecuting officer of the State with authority to supervise the prosecution of all criminal cases in courts of record."); State v. Thrift, 312 S.C. 282, 291-92 , 440 S.E.2d 341, 346-47 (1994) ("Under the separation of powers doctrine, which is the basis for our form of government, the Executive Branch is vested with the power to decide when and how to prosecute a case. | 2 | 3 |
Ward v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Ward v. State, 343 S.C. 14, 18-19 , 538 S.E.2d 245, 247 (2000) (“Allowing ALJs to rule on the constitutionality of the statute would violate the separation of powers doctrine .... 2012See Ward v. State, 343 S.C. 14, 18-19 , 538 S.E.2d 245, 247 (2000) (“Allowing ALJs to rule on the constitutionality of the statute would violate the separation of powers doctrine .... | 2 | 3 |
Amisub of South Carolina, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Health & Environmental Controlgreen2 sentences2026Dep't of Health & Env't Control, 407 S.C. 583, 591 , 757 S.E.2d 408, 413 (2014) ("[T]he court's role in upholding the separation of powers doctrine is to maintain the three branches of government in positions of equality."); see generally McSherry v. Spartanburg Cnty. 2026Dep't of Health & Env't Control, 407 S.C. 583, 591 , 757 S.E.2d 408, 413 (2014) ("[T]he court's role in upholding the separation of powers doctrine is to maintain the three branches of government in positions of equality."); see generally McSherry v. Spartanburg Cnty. | 2 | 2 |
Hampton v. Haleygreen2 sentences2024Second, they argue that by delegating to the Director of the Department of Corrections the task of determining which particular drug protocol to use for carrying out an execution by lethal injection, and then not defining the extent of the Director's duty to seek and find those drugs, section 24-3-530 "impermissibly gives the Director unfettered discretion to determine what the law is in violation of the non-delegation principle." 21 See Hampton v. Haley, 403 S.C. 395, 407 , 743 S.E.2d 258, 264 (2013) 21 Initially, the inmates argued that what they call the Director's "unfettered discretion" p 2024Second, they argue that by delegating to the Director of the Department of Corrections the task of determining which particular drug protocol to use for carrying out an execution by lethal injection, and then not defining the extent of the Director's duty to seek and find those drugs, section 24-3-530 "impermissibly gives the Director unfettered discretion to determine what the law is in violation of the non-delegation principle." 21 See Hampton v. Haley, 403 S.C. 395, 407 , 743 S.E.2d 258, 264 (2013) 21 Initially, the inmates argued that what they call the Director's "unfettered discretion" p | 2 | 2 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2002See id. at 15 , 393 S.E.2d at 186 ; see also Jones, 344 S.C. at 56 , 543 S.E.2d at 545 (holding the mandatory nature of section 17-25-45 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine in light of a prosecutor’s discretion to pursue triggering offenses or plea down the charges) (citing State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34 , 515 S.E.2d 525 (1999)). 7 . 2002See id. at 15 , 393 S.E.2d at 186 ; see also Jones, 344 S.C. at 56 , 543 S.E.2d at 545 (holding the mandatory nature of section 17-25-45 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine in light of a prosecutor’s discretion to pursue triggering offenses or plea down the charges) (citing State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34 , 515 S.E.2d 525 (1999)). 7 . | 2 | 2 |
Williams Ex Rel. G.A.L. v. Bordon's, Inc.green2 sentences1998Our supreme court concluded in Williams v. Bordon’s Inc., 274 S.C. 275 , 262 S.E.2d 881 (1980), that a statute which attempts to exercise ultimate authority over the inherent power of the court is unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers doctrine which is set forth in South Carolina Constitution Article 5, Section 1. 1998Our supreme court concluded in Williams v. Bordon’s Inc., 274 S.C. 275 , 262 S.E.2d 881 (1980), that a statute which attempts to exercise ultimate authority over the inherent power of the court is unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers doctrine which is set forth in South Carolina Constitution Article 5, Section 1. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Burdettegreen2 sentences2002See id. at 15 , 393 S.E.2d at 186 ; see also Jones, 344 S.C. at 56 , 543 S.E.2d at 545 (holding the mandatory nature of section 17-25-45 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine in light of a prosecutor’s discretion to pursue triggering offenses or plea down the charges) (citing State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34 , 515 S.E.2d 525 (1999)). 7 . 2002See id. at 15 , 393 S.E.2d at 186 ; see also Jones, 344 S.C. at 56 , 543 S.E.2d at 545 (holding the mandatory nature of section 17-25-45 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine in light of a prosecutor’s discretion to pursue triggering offenses or plea down the charges) (citing State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34 , 515 S.E.2d 525 (1999)). 7 . | 1 | 3 |
Gunter v. Blantongreen2 sentences1975I take the liberty of restating here my views as set forth in the dissenting opinion in Gunter v. Blanton , 259 S.C. 436 , 192 S.E. (2d) 473 , as follows: "The power vested in the judiciary to declare an act of the General Assembly unconstitutional and void is, indeed, a most delicate one to be exercised with the greatest of caution by the courts lest the judiciary itself encroach upon the legislative domain in violation of the separation of powers clause of the Constitution, which the General Assembly is here charged with violating. 1975I take the liberty of restating here my views as set forth in the dissenting opinion in Gunter v. Blanton , 259 S.C. 436 , 192 S.E. (2d) 473 , as follows: "The power vested in the judiciary to declare an act of the General Assembly unconstitutional and void is, indeed, a most delicate one to be exercised with the greatest of caution by the courts lest the judiciary itself encroach upon the legislative domain in violation of the separation of powers clause of the Constitution, which the General Assembly is here charged with violating. | 1 | 2 |
South Carolina Public Interest Foundation v. Judicial Merit Selection Commissiongreen2 sentences2026In SCPIF, our supreme court held that it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers for it to resolve the issue of residency of a judicial candidate because that authority was vested in the General Assembly by the South Carolina Constitution. 369 S.C. at 142–44, 632 S.E.2d at 278–79; see id. at 143, 632 S.E.2d at 278–79 (stating "this Court has declined to opine on issues where the Constitution delegates authority to the General Assembly"). 2026In SCPIF, our supreme court held that it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers for it to resolve the issue of residency of a judicial candidate because that authority was vested in the General Assembly by the South Carolina Constitution. 369 S.C. at 142–44, 632 S.E.2d at 278–79; see id. at 143, 632 S.E.2d at 278–79 (stating "this Court has declined to opine on issues where the Constitution delegates authority to the General Assembly"). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McKinneygreen2 sentences2025Initially, as to issue one, we hold this is not the proper proceeding to raise this issue and such an attack on the unknowing and involuntary nature of a guilty plea must be raised in a post-conviction relief (PCR) action.3 See Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 367 , 527 S.E.2d 742, 749 (2000) (holding PCR is the proper avenue for collateral attacks on a conviction or sentence); State v. McKinney, 278 S.C. 107, 108 , 292 S.E.2d 598, 599 (1982) ("Absent timely objection at a plea proceeding, the unknowing and involuntary nature of a guilty plea can only be attacked through the more appropriate 2025Initially, as to issue one, we hold this is not the proper proceeding to raise this issue and such an attack on the unknowing and involuntary nature of a guilty plea must be raised in a post-conviction relief (PCR) action.3 See Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 367 , 527 S.E.2d 742, 749 (2000) (holding PCR is the proper avenue for collateral attacks on a conviction or sentence); State v. McKinney, 278 S.C. 107, 108 , 292 S.E.2d 598, 599 (1982) ("Absent timely objection at a plea proceeding, the unknowing and involuntary nature of a guilty plea can only be attacked through the more appropriate | 1 | 1 |
In re Horry County Special Refereegreen1 sentence2025"A court must conduct a limited examination of the matter when it is argued a non-justiciable political question is presented." Alexander v. Houston, 403 S.C. 615, 619 , 744 S.E.2d 517, 520 (2013). | 1 | 1 |
Al-Shabazz v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Initially, as to issue one, we hold this is not the proper proceeding to raise this issue and such an attack on the unknowing and involuntary nature of a guilty plea must be raised in a post-conviction relief (PCR) action.3 See Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 367 , 527 S.E.2d 742, 749 (2000) (holding PCR is the proper avenue for collateral attacks on a conviction or sentence); State v. McKinney, 278 S.C. 107, 108 , 292 S.E.2d 598, 599 (1982) ("Absent timely objection at a plea proceeding, the unknowing and involuntary nature of a guilty plea can only be attacked through the more appropriate 2025Initially, as to issue one, we hold this is not the proper proceeding to raise this issue and such an attack on the unknowing and involuntary nature of a guilty plea must be raised in a post-conviction relief (PCR) action.3 See Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 367 , 527 S.E.2d 742, 749 (2000) (holding PCR is the proper avenue for collateral attacks on a conviction or sentence); State v. McKinney, 278 S.C. 107, 108 , 292 S.E.2d 598, 599 (1982) ("Absent timely objection at a plea proceeding, the unknowing and involuntary nature of a guilty plea can only be attacked through the more appropriate | 1 | 1 |
Hagy v. Pruittgreen2 sentences2012See Hagy v. Pruitt, 331 S.C. 213, 222 , 500 S.E.2d 168, 173 (Ct.App.1998) (Howard, J., concurring) (“[A] statute which attempts to exercise ultimate authority over the inherent power of the court is unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers doctrine....”), aff'd, 339 S.C. 425 , 529 S.E.2d 714 (2000). 2012See Hagy v. Pruitt, 331 S.C. 213, 222 , 500 S.E.2d 168, 173 (Ct.App.1998) (Howard, J., concurring) (“[A] statute which attempts to exercise ultimate authority over the inherent power of the court is unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers doctrine....”), aff'd, 339 S.C. 425 , 529 S.E.2d 714 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Hagy v. Pruittgreen2 sentences2012See Hagy v. Pruitt, 331 S.C. 213, 222 , 500 S.E.2d 168, 173 (Ct.App.1998) (Howard, J., concurring) (“[A] statute which attempts to exercise ultimate authority over the inherent power of the court is unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers doctrine....”), aff'd, 339 S.C. 425 , 529 S.E.2d 714 (2000). 2012See Hagy v. Pruitt, 331 S.C. 213, 222 , 500 S.E.2d 168, 173 (Ct.App.1998) (Howard, J., concurring) (“[A] statute which attempts to exercise ultimate authority over the inherent power of the court is unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers doctrine....”), aff'd, 339 S.C. 425 , 529 S.E.2d 714 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Law v. South Carolina Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2012Requiring a party to go before an agency or AL J who cannot rule on the constitutionality of a statute would be a futile act.”); Law v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 368 S.C. 424, 438 , 629 S.E.2d 642, 650 (2006) (“Futility, however, must be demonstrated by a showing comparable to the administrative agency taking a hard and fast position that makes an adverse ruling a certainty.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2012Requiring a party to go before an agency or AL J who cannot rule on the constitutionality of a statute would be a futile act.”); Law v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 368 S.C. 424, 438 , 629 S.E.2d 642, 650 (2006) (“Futility, however, must be demonstrated by a showing comparable to the administrative agency taking a hard and fast position that makes an adverse ruling a certainty.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Montgomerygreen2 sentences2009See cases collected in People v. Montgomery, 669 P.2d 1387 (Colo.1983) (no separation of powers issue in sentence structuring). 2009See cases collected in People v. Montgomery, 669 P.2d 1387 (Colo.1983) (no separation of powers issue in sentence structuring). | 1 | 1 |
Video Gaming Consultants, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Video Gaming, 358 S.C. at 652 , 595 S.E.2d at 892 . 2008See, e.g., Video Gaming, 358 S.C. at 652 , 595 S.E.2d at 892 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stevensgreen2 sentences2008We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authority: State v. Stevens , 373 S.C. 595, 598 , 646 S.E.2d 870, 871-72 (2007) (stating the Department may not add conditions of probation on probationers because it would violate the separation of powers doctrine). 2008We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authority: State v. Stevens , 373 S.C. 595, 598 , 646 S.E.2d 870, 871-72 (2007) (stating the Department may not add conditions of probation on probationers because it would violate the separation of powers doctrine). | 1 | 1 |
| Evans v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| In the Matter of Gibsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Video Gaming Consultants, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Revenuegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Opinion of the Justicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society
green
2 sentences2025Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (stating the political question doctrine, which derives from the separation of powers doctrine, excludes from judicial review those controversies that revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of state legislatures or to the confines of the executive branch). 2010Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221 , 106 S.Ct. 2860 , 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (stating the political question doctrine, which derives from the separation of powers doctrine, excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of state legislatures or to the confines of the executive branch). | 3 | 2006–2025 |
State Ex Rel. Schneider v. Bennett
green
2 sentences1982Schneider v. Bennett , 219 Kan. 285 , 547 P. (2d) 786, 792 , as follows: The separation of powers doctrine does not in all cases prevent individual members of the legislature from serving on administrative boards or commissioned created by legislative enactments. 1982Schneider v. Bennett , 219 Kan. 285 , 547 P. (2d) 786, 792 , as follows: The separation of powers doctrine does not in all cases prevent individual members of the legislature from serving on administrative boards or commissioned created by legislative enactments. | 3 | 1977–1987 |
State v. Archie
green
2 sentences2007Specifically, appellant argued that such a revocation would violate the separation of powers doctrine as enunciated in State v. Archie, 322 S.C. 135 , 470 S.E.2d 380 (Ct.App.1996). 2007Specifically, appellant argued that such a revocation would violate the separation of powers doctrine as enunciated in State v. Archie, 322 S.C. 135 , 470 S.E.2d 380 (Ct.App.1996). | 2 | 2007–2014 |
McSherry v. Spartanburg County Council
green
2 sentences2026Council, 371 S.C. 586 , 590–91, 641 S.E.2d 431 , 433–34 (2007) (while not addressing the issue of nonjusticiability, finding that although a different methodology of enacting an ordinance may have been more effective, there was no governing statutory or constitutional requirement on which to "base an invalidation of Council's rules and procedures"). 2026Council, 371 S.C. 586 , 590–91, 641 S.E.2d 431 , 433–34 (2007) (while not addressing the issue of nonjusticiability, finding that although a different methodology of enacting an ordinance may have been more effective, there was no governing statutory or constitutional requirement on which to "base an invalidation of Council's rules and procedures"). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Alexander v. Houston
green
1 sentence2025"A court must conduct a limited examination of the matter when it is argued a non-justiciable political question is presented." Alexander v. Houston, 403 S.C. 615, 619 , 744 S.E.2d 517, 520 (2013). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bauer v. South Carolina State Housing Authority
green
2 sentences2024Second, they argue that by delegating to the Director of the Department of Corrections the task of determining which particular drug protocol to use for carrying out an execution by lethal injection, and then not defining the extent of the Director's duty to seek and find those drugs, section 24-3-530 "impermissibly gives the Director unfettered discretion to determine what the law is in violation of the non-delegation principle." 21 See Hampton v. Haley, 403 S.C. 395, 407 , 743 S.E.2d 258, 264 (2013) 21 Initially, the inmates argued that what they call the Director's "unfettered discretion" p 2024Second, they argue that by delegating to the Director of the Department of Corrections the task of determining which particular drug protocol to use for carrying out an execution by lethal injection, and then not defining the extent of the Director's duty to seek and find those drugs, section 24-3-530 "impermissibly gives the Director unfettered discretion to determine what the law is in violation of the non-delegation principle." 21 See Hampton v. Haley, 403 S.C. 395, 407 , 743 S.E.2d 258, 264 (2013) 21 Initially, the inmates argued that what they call the Director's "unfettered discretion" p | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Langford
green
2 sentences2014ORDER In State v. Langford, 400 S.C. 421 , 735 S.E.2d 471 (2012), this Court ruled that S.C.Code Ann. § 1-7-330 (2005), which vests exclusive control of the criminal docket in the circuit solicitor, violates the separation of powers principle embodied in Article 1, Section 8 of the South Carolina Constitution. 2014ORDER In State v. Langford, 400 S.C. 421 , 735 S.E.2d 471 (2012), this Court ruled that S.C.Code Ann. § 1-7-330 (2005), which vests exclusive control of the criminal docket in the circuit solicitor, violates the separation of powers principle embodied in Article 1, Section 8 of the South Carolina Constitution. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Tall Tower, Inc. v. South Carolina Procurement Review Panel
green
2 sentences2013There, we identified two major criteria to determine whether a “creature of legislative enactment” which draws membership from different branches of government, like the Board, is constitutional under a separation of powers challenge: “(1) the legislators should be a numerical minority, and (2) the body should represent a cooperative effort to make available to the executive department the special knowledge and expertise of designated legislators in matters related to their function as legislators.” Id. at 230 , 363 S.E.2d at 685 -86 In arguing that the Board does not have a legislative minori 2013There, we identified two major criteria to determine whether a “creature of legislative enactment” which draws membership from different branches of government, like the Board, is constitutional under a separation of powers challenge: “(1) the legislators should be a numerical minority, and (2) the body should represent a cooperative effort to make available to the executive department the special knowledge and expertise of designated legislators in matters related to their function as legislators.” Id. at 230 , 363 S.E.2d at 685 -86 In arguing that the Board does not have a legislative minori | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2012After a thorough review of the record and all briefs pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Williams , 305 S.C. 116 , 406 S.E.2d 357 (1991), we dismiss the appeal and grant counsel's motion to be relieved.[1] APPEAL DISMISSED. 2012After a thorough review of the record and all briefs pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Williams , 305 S.C. 116 , 406 S.E.2d 357 (1991), we dismiss the appeal and grant counsel's motion to be relieved.[1] APPEAL DISMISSED. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Anders v. California
green
1 sentence2012After a thorough review of the record and all briefs pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Williams , 305 S.C. 116 , 406 S.E.2d 357 (1991), we dismiss the appeal and grant counsel's motion to be relieved.[1] APPEAL DISMISSED. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Atkins
green
2 sentences2009Moreover, the Department's construction of the sentencing judge's intent and interpretation of the law contradicts this Court's pronouncement and rationale announced in State v. Atkins, 303 S.C. 214 , 399 S.E.2d 760 (1990). 2009Moreover, the Department's construction of the sentencing judge's intent and interpretation of the law contradicts this Court's pronouncement and rationale announced in State v. Atkins, 303 S.C. 214 , 399 S.E.2d 760 (1990). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Knotts v. S.C. Department of Natural Resources
green
2 sentences2005Knotts v. South Carolina Dep't of Natural Resources, 348 S.C. 1 , 558 S.E.2d 511 (2002). 2005Knotts v. South Carolina Dep't of Natural Resources, 348 S.C. 1 , 558 S.E.2d 511 (2002). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Moore v. Berkeley County green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Commonwealth Ex Rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson red | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Brannon green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| The South Carolina Education Association v. Campbell green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State Ex Rel. McLeod v. McInnis green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| State Ex Rel. McLeod v. Edwards green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Carolina Glass Co. v. State green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Harper v. Schooler green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Dean v. Timmerman green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer Dist. green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.