separation of powers doctrine in New Hampshire

2004In in re Mone, 143 N.H. 128, 138 (1998), we determined that, a statute removing the responsibility for court security from the judiciary and vesting it with the executive branch, violated the separation of powers doctrine because it encroached upon the judiciary’s inherent power to control courtroom functions and ensure the fair adjudication of controversies.

2004We noted that the judiciary’s exercise of administrative powers to control its courtrooms specifically did not interfere with the separation of powers doctrine because “security is an integral part of the essential adjudicatory function of the courts.” Id. at 138 .

2014Dalianis, C.J., and HICKS, CONBOY, and BASSETT, JJ., concurred. 1 The State also relies upon State v. LaFrance, 124 N.H. 171 (1983), to argue that RSA 604:l-a violates the separation of powers doctrine because it interferes with the power of the courts to control their own proceedings.

2004See State v. LaFrance, 124 N.H. 171, 176 (1983) (“[Ajrticle 37 was adopted to protect the executive and judicial branches of the State government from legislative encroachment.”).

2016Duquette, 154 N.H. at 744-47 .

2011As stated by James Madison, “where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free Constitution are subverted.” Hunter, 865 A.2d at 391 (quotation omitted); see Duquette, 154 N.H. at 747 (explaining that separation of powers doctrine is violated only when one branch usurps essential power of another).

2025Accordingly, we begin by analyzing the State’s separation of powers challenge to the IPD as a matter of constitutional law. [¶106] “The separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government is an important part of [our] constitutional fabric.” Opinion of the Justices, 102 N.H. 195, 196 (1959).

1998See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 363 N.E.2d 652, 659-60 (Mass. 1977); LaChapelle v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 61 N.E.2d 8, 10-11 (Mass. 1945). “[Wjhere the power is intimately connected with and incidental or auxiliary to the exercise of strictly judicial powers, or related to officers whose duties are closely connected with the judicial work of the court, it may constitutionally be exercised by the courts.” Opinion of the Justices, 102 N.H. 195, 199 , 152 A.2d 878, 881 (1959) (Duncan, J.) (quotations omitted); cf. Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 492, 495 , 179 A. 344, 346

2012Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 376 N.W.2d 54, 55 (S.D. 1985) (reversing writ of prohibition preventing disciplinary proceedings against licensee; trial court had reasoned that it should make initial decision as to whether Board lacked jurisdiction to discipline licensee because of alleged invalidity of administrative rules; supreme court disagreed, citing Myers v. Bethlehem Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938), for proposition that “[u]nder the doctrine of separation of powers, an administrative agency, a branch of the executive department, is empowered to determine its own jurisdiction” in the first

2012Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 376 N.W.2d 54, 55 (S.D.1985) (reversing writ of prohibition preventing disciplinary proceedings against licensee; trial court had reasoned that it should make initial decision as to whether Board lacked jurisdiction to discipline licensee because of alleged invalidity of administrative rules; supreme court disagreed, citing Myers v. Bethlehem Corp., 303 U.S. 41 , 58 S.Ct. 459 , 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938), for proposition that "[u]nder the doctrine of separation of powers, an administrative agency, a branch of the executive department, is empowered to determine its o

2011As stated by James Madison, “where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free Constitution are subverted.” Hunter, 865 A.2d at 391 (quotation omitted); see Duquette, 154 N.H. at 747 (explaining that separation of powers doctrine is violated only when one branch usurps essential power of another).

2011As stated by James Madison, "where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free Constitution are subverted." Hunter, 865 A.2d at 391 (quotation omitted); see Duquette, 154 N.H. at 747 , 919 A.2d 767 (explaining that separation of powers doctrine is violated only when one branch usurps essential power of another).

2011The court observed that the separation of powers doctrine is implicit in the Alaska Constitution and is intended to “preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.” Fairbanks North Star Borough, 736 P.2d at 1142 (quotation omitted).

2011The court observed that the separation of powers doctrine is implicit in the Alaska Constitution and is intended to "preclude the exercise of arbitrary power." Fairbanks North Star Borough, 736 P.2d at 1142 (quotation omitted).

2010"Particularly since the Supreme Court's abandonment of the Lochner [ v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 , 25 S.Ct. 539 , 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905)] era concept of economic due process as a justification for striking down regulatory legislation, courts have been mindful of this rule in recognition of the basic principle that under the doctrine of separation of powers, it is to their elected representatives, not to the members of the judiciary that the citizens have delegated the power to make the law." Chu, 569 N.Y.S.2d 364 , 571 N.E.2d at 690 (Hancock, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see Appeal of Bossela

2010“Particularly since the Supreme Court’s abandonment of the Lochner era concept of economic due process as a justification for striking down regulatory legislation, courts have been mindful of this rule in recognition of the basic principle that under the doctrine of separation of powers, it is to their elected representatives, not to the members of the judiciary that the citizens have delegated the power to make the law.” Chu, 571 N.E.2d at 690 (Hancock, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see Appeal of Bosselait, 180 N.H. 604 , 613 (1988) (observing, “legislation merely regulating economic be

2010"Particularly since the Supreme Court's abandonment of the Lochner [ v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 , 25 S.Ct. 539 , 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905)] era concept of economic due process as a justification for striking down regulatory legislation, courts have been mindful of this rule in recognition of the basic principle that under the doctrine of separation of powers, it is to their elected representatives, not to the members of the judiciary that the citizens have delegated the power to make the law." Chu, 569 N.Y.S.2d 364 , 571 N.E.2d at 690 (Hancock, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see Appeal of Bossela

2010“Particularly since the Supreme Court’s abandonment of the Lochner era concept of economic due process as a justification for striking down regulatory legislation, courts have been mindful of this rule in recognition of the basic principle that under the doctrine of separation of powers, it is to their elected representatives, not to the members of the judiciary that the citizens have delegated the power to make the law.” Chu, 571 N.E.2d at 690 (Hancock, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see Appeal of Bosselait, 180 N.H. 604 , 613 (1988) (observing, “legislation merely regulating economic be

2000The separation of powers clause prohibits each branch of government from “encroaching on the powers and functions of another branch,” Petition of Mone, 143 N.H. at 134 , 719 A.2d at 631 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 116 N.H. 406, 413 , 360 A.2d 116, 122 (1976)), and is “violated when one branch usurps an essential power of another,” Petition of Mone, 143 N.H. at 134 , 719 A.2d at 631 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. 552, 556 , 431 A.2d 783, 786 (1981); Opinion of the Justices, 110 N.H. 359, 363 , 266 A.2d 823, 826 (1970)).

2000The separation of powers clause prohibits each branch of government from “encroaching on the powers and functions of another branch,” Petition of Mone, 143 N.H. at 134 , 719 A.2d at 631 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 116 N.H. 406, 413 , 360 A.2d 116, 122 (1976)), and is “violated when one branch usurps an essential power of another,” Petition of Mone, 143 N.H. at 134 , 719 A.2d at 631 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. 552, 556 , 431 A.2d 783, 786 (1981); Opinion of the Justices, 110 N.H. 359, 363 , 266 A.2d 823, 826 (1970)).

2000The separation of powers clause prohibits each branch of government from “encroaching on the powers and functions of another branch,” Petition of Mone, 143 N.H. at 134 , 719 A.2d at 631 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 116 N.H. 406, 413 , 360 A.2d 116, 122 (1976)), and is “violated when one branch usurps an essential power of another,” Petition of Mone, 143 N.H. at 134 , 719 A.2d at 631 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. 552, 556 , 431 A.2d 783, 786 (1981); Opinion of the Justices, 110 N.H. 359, 363 , 266 A.2d 823, 826 (1970)).

2000The separation of powers clause prohibits each branch of government from “encroaching on the powers and functions of another branch,” Petition of Mone, 143 N.H. at 134 , 719 A.2d at 631 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 116 N.H. 406, 413 , 360 A.2d 116, 122 (1976)), and is “violated when one branch usurps an essential power of another,” Petition of Mone, 143 N.H. at 134 , 719 A.2d at 631 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. 552, 556 , 431 A.2d 783, 786 (1981); Opinion of the Justices, 110 N.H. 359, 363 , 266 A.2d 823, 826 (1970)).

2000The separation of powers clause prohibits each branch of government from “encroaching on the powers and functions of another branch,” Petition of Mone, 143 N.H. at 134 , 719 A.2d at 631 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 116 N.H. 406, 413 , 360 A.2d 116, 122 (1976)), and is “violated when one branch usurps an essential power of another,” Petition of Mone, 143 N.H. at 134 , 719 A.2d at 631 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. 552, 556 , 431 A.2d 783, 786 (1981); Opinion of the Justices, 110 N.H. 359, 363 , 266 A.2d 823, 826 (1970)).

2000The separation of powers clause prohibits each branch of government from “encroaching on the powers and functions of another branch,” Petition of Mone, 143 N.H. at 134 , 719 A.2d at 631 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 116 N.H. 406, 413 , 360 A.2d 116, 122 (1976)), and is “violated when one branch usurps an essential power of another,” Petition of Mone, 143 N.H. at 134 , 719 A.2d at 631 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. 552, 556 , 431 A.2d 783, 786 (1981); Opinion of the Justices, 110 N.H. 359, 363 , 266 A.2d 823, 826 (1970)).

1999Compare Pomponio, 106 N.H. 273 , 209 A.2d 733 (statute authorizing commissioner to determine entitlement to statutory unemployment benefits, including resolution of factual disputes, did not violate separation of powers doctrine) with Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 492 , 179 A. 357 (proposed statute that would empower commissioner to decide motor vehicle common law negligence claims would violate separation of powers doctrine).

1998See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 363 N.E.2d 652, 659-60 (Mass. 1977); LaChapelle v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 61 N.E.2d 8, 10-11 (Mass. 1945). “[Wjhere the power is intimately connected with and incidental or auxiliary to the exercise of strictly judicial powers, or related to officers whose duties are closely connected with the judicial work of the court, it may constitutionally be exercised by the courts.” Opinion of the Justices, 102 N.H. 195, 199 , 152 A.2d 878, 881 (1959) (Duncan, J.) (quotations omitted); cf. Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 492, 495 , 179 A. 344, 346

1997See Merrill v. Sherburne & al., 1 N.H. 199 (1818).

1981Opinion of the Justices, 110 N.H. 359, 363 , 266 A.2d 823, 826 (1970); Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199 (1818).

2012Bd. of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548, 554 , 645 A.2d 651 (1994) (reversing trial court's entry of injunction that prevented Board of Examiners of Psychologists from conducting disciplinary proceedings involving licensees).

2012Bd. of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548, 554 , 645 A.2d 651 (1994) (reversing trial court's entry of injunction that prevented Board of Examiners of Psychologists from conducting disciplinary proceedings involving licensees).

2011Id. at 14.

2011Id. at 14 , 381 A.2d 1204 .

2010"Particularly since the Supreme Court's abandonment of the Lochner [ v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 , 25 S.Ct. 539 , 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905)] era concept of economic due process as a justification for striking down regulatory legislation, courts have been mindful of this rule in recognition of the basic principle that under the doctrine of separation of powers, it is to their elected representatives, not to the members of the judiciary that the citizens have delegated the power to make the law." Chu, 569 N.Y.S.2d 364 , 571 N.E.2d at 690 (Hancock, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see Appeal of Bossela

2010“Particularly since the Supreme Court’s abandonment of the Lochner era concept of economic due process as a justification for striking down regulatory legislation, courts have been mindful of this rule in recognition of the basic principle that under the doctrine of separation of powers, it is to their elected representatives, not to the members of the judiciary that the citizens have delegated the power to make the law.” Chu, 571 N.E.2d at 690 (Hancock, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see Appeal of Bosselait, 180 N.H. 604 , 613 (1988) (observing, “legislation merely regulating economic be

2004Petition of Governor, 151 N.H. at 9 ; see also N.H.

2004In reviewing a legislative act, we presume it to be constitutional and will not declare it invalid “except upon inescapable grounds.” Petition of Governor and Executive Council, 151 N.H. 1, 4 (2004) (quotations and brackets omitted).

1997Gardner, 137 N.H. at 256 , 624 A.2d at 1339 ; see Peavler v. Monroe Cty.

1997Gardner, 137 N.H. at 256 , 624 A.2d at 1339 ; see Peavler v. Monroe Cty.

1970The separation of powers requirement in the Constitution is violated by an improper imposition upon one branch of constitu - tional duties belonging to another (Attorney General v. Morin, 93 N.H. 40 , 35 A.2d 513 ; Ferretti v. Jackson, 88 N.H. 296, 300 , 188 A. 474, 477 ; Opinion of the Justices, 85 N.H. 562, 154 A. 217 ), or, an encroachment by one branch upon a constitutional function of another branch of government.

1970The separation of powers requirement in the Constitution is violated by an improper imposition upon one branch of constitu - tional duties belonging to another (Attorney General v. Morin, 93 N.H. 40 , 35 A.2d 513 ; Ferretti v. Jackson, 88 N.H. 296, 300 , 188 A. 474, 477 ; Opinion of the Justices, 85 N.H. 562, 154 A. 217 ), or, an encroachment by one branch upon a constitutional function of another branch of government.

2025Cf. Private Truck Council of America, Inc. v. State, 128 N.H. 466, 477 (1986) (indicating that the doctrine of separation of powers is an appropriate consideration when contemplating injunctive relief).

2025Trial courts have “considerable discretion” in determining whether to grant injunctive relief and what form it should take, id. (quotation omitted); however, “[a] trial court unsustainably exercises its discretion when a relevant factor deserving of significant weight is overlooked, or when an improper factor is accorded significant weight, or when the court considers the appropriate mix of factors, but commits a palpable error of judgment in calibrating the decisional scales.” Lawrence v. Philip Morris USA, 164 N.H. 93, 96 (2012) (quotation omitted). [¶71] Although we have rejected the propos

2025The retention of sovereign immunity for discretionary functions stems from the separation of powers doctrine, and “reflects judicial reluctance to evaluate the wisdom of an executive or legislative choice of public policy goals or the means to accomplish those goals.” Mahan, 141 N.H. at 749-50 .

2025It recognizes that “certain essential, fundamental activities of government must remain immune from tort liability so that our government can govern.” Id. at 750 (brackets omitted).

2025Trial courts have “considerable discretion” in determining whether to grant injunctive relief and what form it should take, id. (quotation omitted); however, “[a] trial court unsustainably exercises its discretion when a relevant factor deserving of significant weight is overlooked, or when an improper factor is accorded significant weight, or when the court considers the appropriate mix of factors, but commits a palpable error of judgment in calibrating the decisional scales.” Lawrence v. Philip Morris USA, 164 N.H. 93, 96 (2012) (quotation omitted). [¶71] Although we have rejected the propos

2025See Cleaveland, 167 N.H. at 742 (explaining that an injunction will be upheld absent an “error of law” or “an unsustainable exercise of discretion”).

2021Bd. of Com’rs, 528 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ind. 1988) (“The separation of powers doctrine forecloses the courts from reviewing political, social and economic actions within the province of coordinate branches of government.”).

2012“Separation of powers is an integral part of our governmental system of checks and balances: each branch of government acts as a check on the other, protecting the sovereignty and freedom of those governed by preventing the tyranny of any one branch of the government being supreme.” Opinion of the Justices (Prior Sexual Assault Evidence), 141 N.H. 562, 568 (1997).

2012Opinion of the Justices (Prior Sexual Assault Evidence), 141 N.H. at 569 .

2011See Opinion of the Justices, 129 N.H. 714, 718-19 (1987).