separation of powers doctrine in District of Columbia

2025Rather, a party alleging a separation of powers violation has a “difficult burden” to show that an action results in “the whole power of one department being exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department.” Id. (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380-81 (alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 325-26 (James Madison) (J.

2025Rather, a party alleging a separation of powers violation has a “difficult burden” to show that an action results in “the whole power of one department being exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department.” Id. (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380-81 (alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 325-26 (James Madison) (J.

2025Cooke ed., 1961))); see also District of Columbia v. Fitzgerald, 953 A.2d 288, 292 (D.C. 2008) (quoting same), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 964 A.2d 1281 (D.C. 2009). 13 At the federal level, the “supremacy of the Executive Branch within its assigned area of constitutional responsibilities,” then, leads to an “implied executive privilege.” Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10 , 26 (D.C.

2023The separation-of-powers doctrine “is designed to preclude ‘encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch [of government] at the expense of the other.’” District of Columbia v. Fitzgerald, 953 A.2d 288, 298 (D.C. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699 (1997)).

2025Cooke ed., 1961))); see also District of Columbia v. Fitzgerald, 953 A.2d 288, 292 (D.C. 2008) (quoting same), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 964 A.2d 1281 (D.C. 2009). 13 At the federal level, the “supremacy of the Executive Branch within its assigned area of constitutional responsibilities,” then, leads to an “implied executive privilege.” Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10 , 26 (D.C.

2025Cooke ed., 1961))); see also District of Columbia v. Fitzgerald, 953 A.2d 288, 292 (D.C. 2008) (quoting same), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 964 A.2d 1281 (D.C. 2009). 13 At the federal level, the “supremacy of the Executive Branch within its assigned area of constitutional responsibilities,” then, leads to an “implied executive privilege.” Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10 , 26 (D.C.

2023The separation-of-powers doctrine “is designed to preclude ‘encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch [of government] at the expense of the other.’” District of Columbia v. Fitzgerald, 953 A.2d 288, 298 (D.C. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699 (1997)).

2023That does not occur where, under a particular measure, “the responsibility . . . conferred on [a branch of government] by Congress is left essentially intact.” Hessey v. Burden, 584 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C. 1990); see also Clinton, 520 U.S. at 702 (explaining that it is error to “presum[e] that . . . even quite burdensome interactions” between the branches of government “necessarily rise to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Executive’s ability to perform its constitutionally mandated functions”).

2023That does not occur where, under a particular measure, “the responsibility . . . conferred on [a branch of government] by Congress is left essentially intact.” Hessey v. Burden, 584 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C. 1990); see also Clinton, 520 U.S. at 702 (explaining that it is error to “presum[e] that . . . even quite burdensome interactions” between the branches of government “necessarily rise to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Executive’s ability to perform its constitutionally mandated functions”).

2009State v. Park, 55 Haw. 610 , 525 P.2d 586, 592 (1974).

2009State v. Park, 55 Haw. 610 , 525 P.2d 586, 592 (1974).

2008See, e.g., Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 12-13 (1st Cir.1986) (“Because rights in tort do not vest until there is a final, unreviewable judgment, Congress abridged no vested rights by ... retroactively abolishing [plaintiffs] cause of action in tort”; while “Congress must comply with due process when abolishing or substantially modifying a common law *177 cause of action,” citing Logan, supra, the enactment in question was not “arbitrary and irrational in purpose and effect” but rather “reasonably related to a legitimate congressional purpose”); In re TMI, 89 F.3d 1106, 1113-15 (3d Cir

2008See, e.g., Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 12-13 (1st Cir.1986) (“Because rights in tort do not vest until there is a final, unreviewable judgment, Congress abridged no vested rights by ... retroactively abolishing [plaintiffs] cause of action in tort”; while “Congress must comply with due process when abolishing or substantially modifying a common law *177 cause of action,” citing Logan, supra, the enactment in question was not “arbitrary and irrational in purpose and effect” but rather “reasonably related to a legitimate congressional purpose”); In re TMI, 89 F.3d 1106, 1113-15 (3d Cir

2008See, e.g., Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 12-13 (1st Cir.1986) (“Because rights in tort do not vest until there is a final, unreviewable judgment, Congress abridged no vested rights by ... retroactively abolishing [plaintiffs] cause of action in tort”; while “Congress must comply with due process when abolishing or substantially modifying a common law *177 cause of action,” citing Logan, supra, the enactment in question was not “arbitrary and irrational in purpose and effect” but rather “reasonably related to a legitimate congressional purpose”); In re TMI, 89 F.3d 1106, 1113-15 (3d Cir

2008See, e.g., Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 12-13 (1st Cir.1986) (“Because rights in tort do not vest until there is a final, unreviewable judgment, Congress abridged no vested rights by ... retroactively abolishing [plaintiffs] cause of action in tort”; while “Congress must comply with due process when abolishing or substantially modifying a common law *177 cause of action,” citing Logan, supra, the enactment in question was not “arbitrary and irrational in purpose and effect” but rather “reasonably related to a legitimate congressional purpose”); In re TMI, 89 F.3d 1106, 1113-15 (3d Cir

2008See, e.g., Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 12-13 (1st Cir.1986) (“Because rights in tort do not vest until there is a final, unreviewable judgment, Congress abridged no vested rights by ... retroactively abolishing [plaintiffs] cause of action in tort”; while “Congress must comply with due process when abolishing or substantially modifying a common law *177 cause of action,” citing Logan, supra, the enactment in question was not “arbitrary and irrational in purpose and effect” but rather “reasonably related to a legitimate congressional purpose”); In re TMI, 89 F.3d 1106, 1113-15 (3d Cir

2008See also Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 , 1090-91 (8th Cir.1997) (“The doctrine of vested rights ... like the separation-of-powers doctrine expounded in Plant , depends on the existence of a final judgment....

2008See, e.g., Schism v. United States, 316 F.3d 1259, 1288 (Fed.Cir.2002) (“To say that the Executive Branch could promise future funds for activities that Congress itself had not authorized would also violate both the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (a)(1)(B) ... and the Separation of Powers doctrine, for it would allow the Executive Branch to commandeer the power of the Legislative Branch.”); Public Works-Contracts, 21 Op. Atty.

2007Respondent’s first contention, that D.C.Code § ll-2503(a) violates the doctrine of separation of powers under Articles I and III of the United States Constitution, was specifically rejected by this court in In re Kerr., 424 A.2d 94, 98-99 (D.C.1980).

1999See District of Columbia Nat'l Bank v. District of Columbia, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 196, 198 , 348 F.2d 808, 810 (1965).

1999See District of Columbia Nat'l Bank v. District of Columbia, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 196, 198 , 348 F.2d 808, 810 (1965).

1996However, "[e]very court of appeals which has considered the question [of court granted immunity] has rejected the Third Circuit's Smith holding as being a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers." Capozzi, supra, 883 F.2d at 614 (citing cases); accord United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1191 (1st Cir.) ("[t]his theory has been rejected by virtually every other court that has considered the issue" (citing cases)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 , 111 S.Ct. 130 , 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). [2] V.

1996However, “[e]very court of appeals which has considered the question [of court granted immunity] has rejected the Third Circuit’s Smith holding as being a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.” Capozzi, supra, 883 F.2d at 614 (citing cases); accord United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1191 (1st Cir.) (“[t]his theory has been rejected by virtually every other court that has considered the issue” (citing cases)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 , 111 S.Ct. 130 , 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). 2 y.

1996However, "[e]very court of appeals which has considered the question [of court granted immunity] has rejected the Third Circuit's Smith holding as being a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers." Capozzi, supra, 883 F.2d at 614 (citing cases); accord United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1191 (1st Cir.) ("[t]his theory has been rejected by virtually every other court that has considered the issue" (citing cases)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 , 111 S.Ct. 130 , 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). [2] V.

1996However, “[e]very court of appeals which has considered the question [of court granted immunity] has rejected the Third Circuit’s Smith holding as being a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.” Capozzi, supra, 883 F.2d at 614 (citing cases); accord United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1191 (1st Cir.) (“[t]his theory has been rejected by virtually every other court that has considered the issue” (citing cases)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 , 111 S.Ct. 130 , 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). 2 y.

1996However, "[e]very court of appeals which has considered the question [of court granted immunity] has rejected the Third Circuit's Smith holding as being a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers." Capozzi, supra, 883 F.2d at 614 (citing cases); accord United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1191 (1st Cir.) ("[t]his theory has been rejected by virtually every other court that has considered the issue" (citing cases)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 , 111 S.Ct. 130 , 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). [2] V.

1996However, “[e]very court of appeals which has considered the question [of court granted immunity] has rejected the Third Circuit’s Smith holding as being a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.” Capozzi, supra, 883 F.2d at 614 (citing cases); accord United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1191 (1st Cir.) (“[t]his theory has been rejected by virtually every other court that has considered the issue” (citing cases)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 , 111 S.Ct. 130 , 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). 2 y.

1996However, "[e]very court of appeals which has considered the question [of court granted immunity] has rejected the Third Circuit's Smith holding as being a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers." Capozzi, supra, 883 F.2d at 614 (citing cases); accord United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1191 (1st Cir.) ("[t]his theory has been rejected by virtually every other court that has considered the issue" (citing cases)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 , 111 S.Ct. 130 , 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). [2] V.

1996However, “[e]very court of appeals which has considered the question [of court granted immunity] has rejected the Third Circuit’s Smith holding as being a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.” Capozzi, supra, 883 F.2d at 614 (citing cases); accord United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1191 (1st Cir.) (“[t]his theory has been rejected by virtually every other court that has considered the issue” (citing cases)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 , 111 S.Ct. 130 , 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). 2 y.