separation of powers doctrine in Tennessee

2009Peay v. Nolan, 157 Tenn. 222, 233-34 , 7 S.W.2d 815, 818 (1928).

2009Peay v. Nolan, 157 Tenn. 222, 233-34 , 7 S.W.2d 815, 818 (1928).

2006The Tennessee Supreme Court has held: The primary separation of powers provisions of the Tennessee Constitution are Article II, Section 1, which states that “the powers of the government shall be divided into three distinct departments: the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial,” and Article II, Section 2, which states that “no person or persons belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in the cases herein directed or permitted.” The doctrine of separation of powers, as set forth in these two sections of the Tenness

2003Separation of Powers The separation of powers doctrine, as set forth in article II, sections 1 and 2 of the Tennessee Constitution, “is a fundamental principle of American constitutional government.” Underwood v. State, 529 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn.1975).

2014Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 455 (“To vest an agency with the authority to determine the constitutionality of the legislation empowering the agency to act would violate the doctrine of the separation of powers.”).

2008Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 455 (“To vest an agency with the authority to determine the constitutionality of the legislation empowering the agency to act would violate the doctrine of the separation of powers.”).

2006Town of S. Carthage v. Barrett, 840 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn.1992).

1997The doctrine of separation of powers, as set forth in Article II of the Tennessee Constitution, is a fundamental principal of American constitutional government.3 Town of South Carthage v. Barrett, 840 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1992) (citation omitted).

2024Tennessee’s courts believed that “the province of a court is to decide, not advise, and to settle rights, not to give abstract opinions.” State v. Wilson, 70 Tenn. 204, 210 (1879); see also Gilreath v. Gilliland, 95 Tenn. 383 , 385- 86, 32 S.W. 250, 251 (1895); Prichitt v. Kirkman, 2 Tenn. Ch. 390, 393 (1875).

2024Tennessee’s courts believed that “the province of a court is to decide, not advise, and to settle rights, not to give abstract opinions.” State v. Wilson, 70 Tenn. 204, 210 (1879); see also Gilreath v. Gilliland, 95 Tenn. 383, 385-86 , 32 S.W. 250, 251 (1895); Prichitt v. Kirkman, 2 Tenn. Ch. 390, 393 (1875).

2024Tennessee’s courts believed that “the province of a court is to decide, not advise, and to settle rights, not to give abstract opinions.” State v. Wilson, 70 Tenn. 204, 210 (1879); see also Gilreath v. Gilliland, 95 Tenn. 383 , 385- 86, 32 S.W. 250, 251 (1895); Prichitt v. Kirkman, 2 Tenn. Ch. 390, 393 (1875).

2024Tennessee’s courts believed that “the province of a court is to decide, not advise, and to settle rights, not to give abstract opinions.” State v. Wilson, 70 Tenn. 204, 210 (1879); see also Gilreath v. Gilliland, 95 Tenn. 383, 385-86 , 32 S.W. 250, 251 (1895); Prichitt v. Kirkman, 2 Tenn. Ch. 390, 393 (1875).

2024Tennessee’s courts believed that “the province of a court is to decide, not advise, and to settle rights, not to give abstract opinions.” State v. Wilson, 70 Tenn. 204, 210 (1879); see also Gilreath v. Gilliland, 95 Tenn. 383 , 385- 86, 32 S.W. 250, 251 (1895); Prichitt v. Kirkman, 2 Tenn. Ch. 390, 393 (1875).

2024Tennessee’s courts believed that “the province of a court is to decide, not advise, and to settle rights, not to give abstract opinions.” State v. Wilson, 70 Tenn. 204, 210 (1879); see also Gilreath v. Gilliland, 95 Tenn. 383, 385-86 , 32 S.W. 250, 251 (1895); Prichitt v. Kirkman, 2 Tenn. Ch. 390, 393 (1875).

2016See State v. Schmeiderer, 319 S.W.3d 607, 636 (Tenn. 2010) (appendix)). (2) Section 39-13-204(c) mandates that a trial court permit a victim‘s representative to testify before the jury in sentencing and, therefore, is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine in Article II, section 2 of the Tennessee Constitution.

2016See State v. Schmeiderer, 319 S.W.3d 607, 636 (Tenn. 2010) (appendix)). (2) Section 39-13-204(c) mandates that a trial court permit a victim‟s representative to testify before the jury in sentencing and, therefore, is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine in Article II, section 2 of the Tennessee Constitution.

2006See Williams v. Carr, 218 Tenn. 564 , 404 S.W.2d 522 (1966); LaFever v. Ware, 211 Tenn. 393 , 365 S.W.2d 44, 47 (1963); Peay v. Nolan, 157 Tenn. 222 , 7 S.W.2d 815, 816 (1928).

2006See Williams v. Carr, 218 Tenn. 564 , 404 S.W.2d 522 (1966); LaFever v. Ware, 211 Tenn. 393 , 365 S.W.2d 44, 47 (1963); Peay v. Nolan, 157 Tenn. 222 , 7 S.W.2d 815, 816 (1928).

2006See Williams v. Carr, 218 Tenn. 564 , 404 S.W.2d 522 (1966); LaFever v. Ware, 211 Tenn. 393 , 365 S.W.2d 44, 47 (1963); Peay v. Nolan, 157 Tenn. 222 , 7 S.W.2d 815, 816 (1928).

2006See Williams v. Carr, 218 Tenn. 564 , 404 S.W.2d 522 (1966); LaFever v. Ware, 211 Tenn. 393 , 365 S.W.2d 44, 47 (1963); Peay v. Nolan, 157 Tenn. 222 , 7 S.W.2d 815, 816 (1928).

2005Despite the clear expression of the separation of powers doctrine in Article II and elsewhere, however, “it is impossible to preserve perfectly the ‘theoretical lines of demarcation between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government.’ Indeed there is, by necessity, a certain amount of overlap because the three branches of government are interdependent.” Petition of Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768, 774 (Tenn. 1995).

2001Despite the clear expression of the separation of powers doctrine in Article II and elsewhere, however, “it is impossible to preserve perfectly the ‘theoretical lines of demarcation between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government.’ Indeed there is, by necessity, a certain amount of overlap because the three branches of government are interdependent.” Petition of Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768, 774 (Tenn.1995).

2000Persons making selective enforcement claims have a heavy burden to overcome because the courts, in recognition of the doctrine of separation of powers, 7 presume that public officials have discharged their duties in good faith, see Williams v. American Plan Corp., 216 Tenn. 435, 441 , 392 S.W.2d 920, 923 (1965), and in accordance with the law.

2000Persons making selective enforcement claims have a heavy burden to overcome because the courts, in recognition of the doctrine of separation of powers, 7 presume that public officials have discharged their duties in good faith, see Williams v. American Plan Corp., 216 Tenn. 435, 441 , 392 S.W.2d 920, 923 (1965), and in accordance with the law.

2000See Reeder v. Holt, 220 Tenn. 428, 435-36 , 418 S.W.2d 249, 252 (1967).

2000See Reeder v. Holt, 220 Tenn. 428, 435-36 , 418 S.W.2d 249, 252 (1967).

1999Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the three departments of government are “coordinate, independent, coequal and potentially coextensive.” Anderson County Quarterly Court v. Judges of 28th Judicial Circuit, 579 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tenn.App.1978) (citation omitted).

1999Page 6 Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the three departments of government are “ coordinate, independent, coequal and potentially coextensive.” Anderson County Quarterly Court v. Judges of 28th Judicial Circuit, 579 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tenn. App. 1978)(citation omitted).

2020See, e.g., Harrison, 569 S.W.2d at 827–828 (holding that “[s]tatutes providing for the limitation of actions are, apart from equitable principles, ‘exclusively the creatures of the legislative branch[,]’” and “it is not the role of this Court to pass upon the wisdom or lack thereof of the legislation under review” (citation omitted)); Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105, 111 (Tenn. 1994) (“This Court has previously recognized that areas exist in which both the legislative and judicial branch have interests, and that in such areas both branches may exercise appropriate authority.”); Jackson v. HCA He

2013More akin to the instant case, in Jackson v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc., 383 S.W.3d 497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012), the middle section of this Court concluded that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122,which requires the contemporaneous filing of a certificate of good faith along with a medical malpractice complaint, did not conflict with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 3, and therefore, that it did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

2013The separation of powers clause “prohibits one branch from encroaching on the powers or functions of the other two branches.” Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 843 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Tenn. Const. art.

2011Id. at 583 ; but see Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827 (Tenn. 2008)(holding some applications of the statute to be unconstitutional in violation of the separation of powers doctrine).

2020See Lowe, 552 S.W.3d at 857 .

2018State v. Lowe , 552 S.W.3d 842 , 857 (Tenn. 2018).

2016See Mallard, 40 S.W. 3d at 481 (recognizing that the General Assembly‟s constitutional authority to enact substantive laws does not violate the separation of powers doctrine); see also Caudill, 21 S.W. 3d at 210-211 (holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-108 is remedial in nature and therefore does not violate the separation of powers doctrine); In re C.M. v. Phillips, No E2001-00211- COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 920209 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2001) (holding that the attorneys‟ fee-award provision in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-3-617(a)(1) is remedial in nature and, therefore, does

2002In other words, it interprets the supreme court’s analysis in State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473 (Tenn. 2001), regarding the inherent power of the courts relative to the separation of powers doctrine, to be limited to trial matters.

2013Therefore, they argue that the trial court erred in holding that Section 29-26-121 violates the separation of powers clause of the Tennessee Constitution. -8- At the outset, we note the standard utilized in evaluating the constitutionality of Section 29- 26-121 in this appeal.4 “[I]t is well-established in Tennessee that when considering the constitutionality of a statute, we start with a strong presumption that acts passed by the legislature are constitutional.” Lynch, 205 S.W.3d at 390 (citing Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 740-41 (Tenn. 2004)).

2013In Lynch v. City of Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384, 390, 393 (Tenn. 2006) the Court determined that requiring parties involved in a workers’ compensation dispute to participate in a benefit review conference prior to filing suit did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

2001Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 732 , 100 S.Ct. 1967 , 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980).

2001Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 732 , 100 S.Ct. 1967 , 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980).

2026Although counsel for the Petitioner argued the potential implications if there were to be a conflict of interest during the September 5 hearing, that issue is not ripe for consideration by this Court See State v. Price, 579 S.W.3d 332, 338 (Tenn. 2019) (“An issue is not fit for judicial decision if it is based ‘on hypothetical and contingent future events that may never occur.’”). 4 and appropriately applied the “strong presumption that acts passed by the legislature are constitutional.” See State v. Decosimo, 555 S.W.3d 494, 506 (Tenn. 2018).

2026Although counsel for the Petitioner argued the potential implications if there were to be a conflict of interest during the September 5 hearing, that issue is not ripe for consideration by this Court See State v. Price, 579 S.W.3d 332, 338 (Tenn. 2019) (“An issue is not fit for judicial decision if it is based ‘on hypothetical and contingent future events that may never occur.’”). 4 and appropriately applied the “strong presumption that acts passed by the legislature are constitutional.” See State v. Decosimo, 555 S.W.3d 494, 506 (Tenn. 2018).

2025Mr. Finch also alleges that the trial judge violated several rules of the Code of Judicial Conduct by entering some sort of contract “with the IV-D agency” and “violat[ing] the separation of powers doctrine.” So he gives this court “notice . . . of the unalienable and God given rights violations caused by the chancery court” and asks us “to require [the trial judge] to either grant or deny [the judge’s] recusal because of interlocutory issues revolving around this case.” Mr. Finch reminds us that he “is not a lawyer” and asks us to hold him “to less stringent standards than formal pleading dra

2025See Norma Faye, 301 S.W.3d at 202–03 (explaining that Tennessee’s justiciability doctrines “are based on the judiciary’s understanding of the intrinsic role of judicial power” and “respect for the separation of powers doctrine”).

2020See, e.g., Harrison, 569 S.W.2d at 827–828 (holding that “[s]tatutes providing for the limitation of actions are, apart from equitable principles, ‘exclusively the creatures of the legislative branch[,]’” and “it is not the role of this Court to pass upon the wisdom or lack thereof of the legislation under review” (citation omitted)); Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105, 111 (Tenn. 1994) (“This Court has previously recognized that areas exist in which both the legislative and judicial branch have interests, and that in such areas both branches may exercise appropriate authority.”); Jackson v. HCA He

2020See, e.g., Harrison, 569 S.W.2d at 827–828 (holding that “[s]tatutes providing for the limitation of actions are, apart from equitable principles, ‘exclusively the creatures of the legislative branch[,]’” and “it is not the role of this Court to pass upon the wisdom or lack thereof of the legislation under review” (citation omitted)); Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105, 111 (Tenn. 1994) (“This Court has previously recognized that areas exist in which both the legislative and judicial branch have interests, and that in such areas both branches may exercise appropriate authority.”); Jackson v. HCA He

2016Substantive laws create, define, and regulate legal rights, Solomon v. FloWarr Management, Inc., 777 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)(citing Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Lobban, 204 Tenn. 79, 89 , 315 S.W.2d 514, 518 (1958)), and remedial laws are defined as “providing means or method whereby causes of action may be effectuated, wrongs redressed and relief obtained....” Tenn. Dep’t of Human Services v. Defriece, 937 S.W. 2d 954, 958 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).