separation of powers doctrine in Alaska

2021Agency v. Superior Court, Third Judicial Dist., 534 P.2d 947, 950 (Alaska 1975) (“[I]t can fairly be implied [from the Constitution’s separate articles] that this state does recognize the separation of powers doctrine.”). 177 See County of Barnstable v. Commonwealth, 572 N.E.2d 548, 550 (Mass. 1991) (“The constitutional establishment of a tripartite form of government carries with it an implied assumption that sufficient funds will be provided to operate all three branches.”); In re Fiscal Year 2010 Judicial Branch Appropriations, 27 So. 3d 394, 395 (Miss. 2010) (“As part of the separation of

2021Interest Research Grp., 167 P.3d at 35 ; see also Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1976) (describing separation of powers doctrine’s underlying rationale as “the avoidance of tyrannical aggrandizement of power by a single branch of government”). 179 534 P.2d at 950-51 . 180 553 P.2d at 1-2, 7-8 (“In our view, the separation of powers doctrine requires that the blending of governmental powers will not be inferred in the absence of an express constitutional provision.”). 181 167 P.3d at 34-35 . -44- 7542 the creation of such quasi-judicial agencies, the Commission’s jurisdiction was lim

2022Plaintiffs’ injunctive relief claims and our non-justiciable political questions analysis We previously have explained that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits Alaska courts from resolving purely political questions.73 But “merely characterizing a case as political in nature will [not] render it immune from judicial scrutiny.”74 There are no “exact boundaries between the political and the justiciable,” but we identify political questions “by applying the test announced by the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr.”75 Baker lists six factors, at least one of which is “[p]rominent

2022Plaintiffs’ injunctive relief claims and our non-justiciable political questions analysis We previously have explained that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits Alaska courts from resolving purely political questions.73 But “merely characterizing a case as political in nature will [not] render it immune from judicial scrutiny.”74 There are no “exact boundaries between the political and the justiciable,” but we identify political questions “by applying the test announced by the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr.”75 Baker lists six factors, at least one of which is “[p]rominent

1978Wade v. Nolan, 414 P.2d 689, 698 (Alaska 1966).

1976Wade v. Nolan, 414 P.2d 689, 698 (Alaska 1966).” In reaching this conclusion that the doctrine of separation of powers is implicit in the Alaska Constitution, we cited Lira v. Billings, 196 Kan. 726 , 414 P.2d 13, 16 (1966), where the Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that the doctrine is implied from the existence of three separate constitutional provisions calling for three branches of government. 8 .

2024Servs., 530 P.3d 359, 373 (Alaska 2023). 41 See AS 47.10.087(b) (providing that court shall review placement at secure residential psychiatric treatment facility every 90 days). 42 “The separation of powers doctrine ‘prohibits this court from enacting legislation or redrafting defective statutes.’ ” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow, 403 P.3d 1116, 1131 (Alaska 2017) (quoting State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d 105, 111 (Alaska 1975) (citing Alaska Const. art.

2024Servs., 530 P.3d 359, 373 (Alaska 2023). 41 See AS 47.10.087(b) (providing that court shall review placement at secure residential psychiatric treatment facility every 90 days). 42 “The separation of powers doctrine ‘prohibits this court from enacting legislation or redrafting defective statutes.’ ” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow, 403 P.3d 1116, 1131 (Alaska 2017) (quoting State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d 105, 111 (Alaska 1975) (citing Alaska Const. art.

2022Plaintiffs’ injunctive relief claims and our non-justiciable political questions analysis We previously have explained that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits Alaska courts from resolving purely political questions.73 But “merely characterizing a case as political in nature will [not] render it immune from judicial scrutiny.”74 There are no “exact boundaries between the political and the justiciable,” but we identify political questions “by applying the test announced by the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr.”75 Baker lists six factors, at least one of which is “[p]rominent

2022Plaintiffs’ injunctive relief claims and our non-justiciable political questions analysis We previously have explained that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits Alaska courts from resolving purely political questions.73 But “merely characterizing a case as political in nature will [not] render it immune from judicial scrutiny.”74 There are no “exact boundaries between the political and the justiciable,” but we identify political questions “by applying the test announced by the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr.”75 Baker lists six factors, at least one of which is “[p]rominent

2021Interest Research Grp., 167 P.3d at 35 ; see also Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1976) (describing separation of powers doctrine’s underlying rationale as “the avoidance of tyrannical aggrandizement of power by a single branch of government”). 179 534 P.2d at 950-51 . 180 553 P.2d at 1-2, 7-8 (“In our view, the separation of powers doctrine requires that the blending of governmental powers will not be inferred in the absence of an express constitutional provision.”). 181 167 P.3d at 34-35 . -44- 7542 the creation of such quasi-judicial agencies, the Commission’s jurisdiction was lim

2021Interest Research Grp., 167 P.3d at 35 ; see also Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1976) (describing separation of powers doctrine’s underlying rationale as “the avoidance of tyrannical aggrandizement of power by a single branch of government”). 179 534 P.2d at 950-51 . 180 553 P.2d at 1-2, 7-8 (“In our view, the separation of powers doctrine requires that the blending of governmental powers will not be inferred in the absence of an express constitutional provision.”). 181 167 P.3d at 34-35 . -44- 7542 the creation of such quasi-judicial agencies, the Commission’s jurisdiction was lim

2022The separation of powers doctrine “limits the authority of each branch [of government] to interfere in the powers that have been delegated to the other branches.”85 81 Cowper, 874 P.2d at 932 . 82 Id. at 933-34 . 83 See id. 84 Id. at 935 , 936 n.32. 85 State v. Recall Dunleavy, 491 P.3d 343, 367 (Alaska 2021) (quoting Alaska Pub.

2022The separation of powers doctrine “limits the authority of each branch [of government] to interfere in the powers that have been delegated to the other branches.”85 81 Cowper, 874 P.2d at 932 . 82 Id. at 933-34 . 83 See id. 84 Id. at 935 , 936 n.32. 85 State v. Recall Dunleavy, 491 P.3d 343, 367 (Alaska 2021) (quoting Alaska Pub.

2021Interest Research Grp. v. State, 167 P.3d 27, 35 (Alaska 2007)). -42- 7542 have been delegated to the other branches.”175 Although not specifically named in the Constitution, “the separation of powers and its complementary doctrine of checks and balances are part of the constitutional framework of this state.”176 Other states’ courts have held that another branch’s blocking of court system funding violates the separation of powers doctrine if it results in underfunding the judicial branch to such an extent that the courts cannot continue to meet their constitutional mandates.177 The State agre

2021Interest Research Grp., 167 P.3d at 35 ; see also Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1976) (describing separation of powers doctrine’s underlying rationale as “the avoidance of tyrannical aggrandizement of power by a single branch of government”). 179 534 P.2d at 950-51 . 180 553 P.2d at 1-2, 7-8 (“In our view, the separation of powers doctrine requires that the blending of governmental powers will not be inferred in the absence of an express constitutional provision.”). 181 167 P.3d at 34-35 . -44- 7542 the creation of such quasi-judicial agencies, the Commission’s jurisdiction was lim

1988Cf. State v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Alaska 1987) (in a separation of powers challenge, this court found it was “under a duty to construe a statute to avoid constitutional infirmity where possible”).

1988Cf. State v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Alaska 1987) (in a separation of powers challenge, this court found it was "under a duty to construe a statute to avoid constitutional infirmity where possible").

1988See also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613 , 93 S.Ct. at 2916 , 37 L.Ed.2d at 841 (under the federal Constitution, “[fjacial overbreadth has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged statute”).

1988See also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613 , 93 S.Ct. at 2916 , 37 L.Ed.2d at 841 (under the federal Constitution, “[fjacial overbreadth has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged statute”).

2025We similarly considered the requested relief in Kanuk. 335 P.3d at 1096-1103 (analyzing justiciability of plaintiffs’ injunctive relief and declaratory relief claims under political question doctrine). -7- 7791 The separation of powers doctrine prohibits Alaska courts from reviewing nonjusticiable political questions.21 A claim is not justiciable if “deciding the claim would require us to answer questions that are better directed to the legislative or executive branches of government.”22 We use the test announced by the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr to determine when the politic

2022Plaintiffs’ injunctive relief claims and our non-justiciable political questions analysis We previously have explained that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits Alaska courts from resolving purely political questions.73 But “merely characterizing a case as political in nature will [not] render it immune from judicial scrutiny.”74 There are no “exact boundaries between the political and the justiciable,” but we identify political questions “by applying the test announced by the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr.”75 Baker lists six factors, at least one of which is “[p]rominent

2012In prior appellate litigation, the State has taken the position that AS 12.72.010(7) was intended to codify the Teague rule of retroac-tivity, and thus the Teague test is the governing rule of retroactivity for post-convietion relief litigation in Alaska. 19 As this Court noted in Smart I, 146 P.3d at 29 , the conflict between the Judd rule and the provisions of AS 12.72.010(7) potentially raises a question under the doctrine of separation of powers: specifically, whether the legislature's enactment of rules governing the retroactivity of judicial decisions improperly encroaches on a matter en

2009There is likewise no reason to discuss the comment of the court of appeals that the legislature's adoption of a Teague-like analysis in AS 12.72.010 "raise[s] serious questions under the doctrine of separation of powers." Smart v. State, 146 P.3d 15, 29 (Alaska App.2006).

2007Id. at 111 ; Gottschalk, 575 P.2d at 296 . [55] Gottschalk, 575 P.2d at 296 (court cannot "step[ ] over the line of interpretation and engag[e] in legislation"). [56] U.S. CONST. amend.

2007Id. at 111 ; Gottschalk, 575 P.2d at 296 . [55] Gottschalk, 575 P.2d at 296 (court cannot "step[ ] over the line of interpretation and engag[e] in legislation"). [56] U.S. CONST. amend.

2025Subject to the “substantive/procedural” distinction we discuss in the final section of this discussion, we hold that retroactive application of the later statute is not allowed in such circumstances, based primarily on two constitutional precepts: the separation of powers doctrine and the prohibition on ex post facto laws. 72 Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1002-03 (Alaska 2008). 73 Dara v. Gish, 404 P.3d 154, 159 (Alaska 2017). 74 Doe, 189 P.3d at 1003 (quoting State v. Murtagh, 169 P.3d 602, 606 (Alaska 2007)). -17- 7768 A. Two Constitutional Principles — Separation Of Powers And The Prohibition

2025Subject to the “substantive/procedural” distinction we discuss in the final section of this discussion, we hold that retroactive application of the later statute is not allowed in such circumstances, based primarily on two constitutional precepts: the separation of powers doctrine and the prohibition on ex post facto laws. 72 Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1002-03 (Alaska 2008). 73 Dara v. Gish, 404 P.3d 154, 159 (Alaska 2017). 74 Doe, 189 P.3d at 1003 (quoting State v. Murtagh, 169 P.3d 602, 606 (Alaska 2007)). -17- 7768 A. Two Constitutional Principles — Separation Of Powers And The Prohibition

2025Subject to the “substantive/procedural” distinction we discuss in the final section of this discussion, we hold that retroactive application of the later statute is not allowed in such circumstances, based primarily on two constitutional precepts: the separation of powers doctrine and the prohibition on ex post facto laws. 72 Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1002-03 (Alaska 2008). 73 Dara v. Gish, 404 P.3d 154, 159 (Alaska 2017). 74 Doe, 189 P.3d at 1003 (quoting State v. Murtagh, 169 P.3d 602, 606 (Alaska 2007)). -17- 7768 A. Two Constitutional Principles — Separation Of Powers And The Prohibition

2025Subject to the “substantive/procedural” distinction we discuss in the final section of this discussion, we hold that retroactive application of the later statute is not allowed in such circumstances, based primarily on two constitutional precepts: the separation of powers doctrine and the prohibition on ex post facto laws. 72 Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1002-03 (Alaska 2008). 73 Dara v. Gish, 404 P.3d 154, 159 (Alaska 2017). 74 Doe, 189 P.3d at 1003 (quoting State v. Murtagh, 169 P.3d 602, 606 (Alaska 2007)). -17- 7768 A. Two Constitutional Principles — Separation Of Powers And The Prohibition

2024Servs., 530 P.3d 359, 373 (Alaska 2023). 41 See AS 47.10.087(b) (providing that court shall review placement at secure residential psychiatric treatment facility every 90 days). 42 “The separation of powers doctrine ‘prohibits this court from enacting legislation or redrafting defective statutes.’ ” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow, 403 P.3d 1116, 1131 (Alaska 2017) (quoting State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d 105, 111 (Alaska 1975) (citing Alaska Const. art.

2024Servs., 530 P.3d 359, 373 (Alaska 2023). 41 See AS 47.10.087(b) (providing that court shall review placement at secure residential psychiatric treatment facility every 90 days). 42 “The separation of powers doctrine ‘prohibits this court from enacting legislation or redrafting defective statutes.’ ” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow, 403 P.3d 1116, 1131 (Alaska 2017) (quoting State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d 105, 111 (Alaska 1975) (citing Alaska Const. art.

2024Servs., 530 P.3d 359, 373 (Alaska 2023). 41 See AS 47.10.087(b) (providing that court shall review placement at secure residential psychiatric treatment facility every 90 days). 42 “The separation of powers doctrine ‘prohibits this court from enacting legislation or redrafting defective statutes.’ ” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow, 403 P.3d 1116, 1131 (Alaska 2017) (quoting State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d 105, 111 (Alaska 1975) (citing Alaska Const. art.

2024Servs., 530 P.3d 359, 373 (Alaska 2023). 41 See AS 47.10.087(b) (providing that court shall review placement at secure residential psychiatric treatment facility every 90 days). 42 “The separation of powers doctrine ‘prohibits this court from enacting legislation or redrafting defective statutes.’ ” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow, 403 P.3d 1116, 1131 (Alaska 2017) (quoting State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d 105, 111 (Alaska 1975) (citing Alaska Const. art.

2022Plaintiffs’ injunctive relief claims and our non-justiciable political questions analysis We previously have explained that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits Alaska courts from resolving purely political questions.73 But “merely characterizing a case as political in nature will [not] render it immune from judicial scrutiny.”74 There are no “exact boundaries between the political and the justiciable,” but we identify political questions “by applying the test announced by the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr.”75 Baker lists six factors, at least one of which is “[p]rominent

2021The Alaska Constitution “vest[s] ‘legislative power in the legislature; executive power in the governor; and judicial power’ in the courts.”174 Derived from this “distribution of power among the three branches of government” is the separation of powers doctrine, which “limits the authority of each branch to interfere in the powers that 167 (...continued) decision unless they act arbitrarily or unreasonably.”). 168 Misfeasance is “a lawful act performed in a wrongful manner.” Misfeasance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 169 832 P.2d 790, 792 (N.M. 1992). 170 See von Stauffenberg, 903 P.

2021The Alaska Constitution “vest[s] ‘legislative power in the legislature; executive power in the governor; and judicial power’ in the courts.”174 Derived from this “distribution of power among the three branches of government” is the separation of powers doctrine, which “limits the authority of each branch to interfere in the powers that 167 (...continued) decision unless they act arbitrarily or unreasonably.”). 168 Misfeasance is “a lawful act performed in a wrongful manner.” Misfeasance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 169 832 P.2d 790, 792 (N.M. 1992). 170 See von Stauffenberg, 903 P.

2021Retribution against the courts for unpopular decisions is an ongoing threat.[185] The governor’s primary argument in Jorgensen was that his veto was unreviewable because its use was committed to his discretion by the constitution.186 The Illinois Supreme Court held, however, that this position was “incompatible with the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances that are the foundation for our tripartite system of government.”187 A federal district court had similar concerns in a case involving the federal Line Item Veto Act, holding the Act unconstitutional in part because it

2021The Alaska Constitution “vest[s] ‘legislative power in the legislature; executive power in the governor; and judicial power’ in the courts.”174 Derived from this “distribution of power among the three branches of government” is the separation of powers doctrine, which “limits the authority of each branch to interfere in the powers that 167 (...continued) decision unless they act arbitrarily or unreasonably.”). 168 Misfeasance is “a lawful act performed in a wrongful manner.” Misfeasance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 169 832 P.2d 790, 792 (N.M. 1992). 170 See von Stauffenberg, 903 P.

2021The Alaska Constitution “vest[s] ‘legislative power in the legislature; executive power in the governor; and judicial power’ in the courts.”174 Derived from this “distribution of power among the three branches of government” is the separation of powers doctrine, which “limits the authority of each branch to interfere in the powers that 167 (...continued) decision unless they act arbitrarily or unreasonably.”). 168 Misfeasance is “a lawful act performed in a wrongful manner.” Misfeasance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 169 832 P.2d 790, 792 (N.M. 1992). 170 See von Stauffenberg, 903 P.

2021Durkin v. City Council of Youngstown, 459 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ohio 1984) (“The doctrine of separation of powers requires that the funds necessary for the administration of justice be provided to the courts.”); State ex rel.

2021Durkin v. City Council of Youngstown, 459 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ohio 1984) (“The doctrine of separation of powers requires that the funds necessary for the administration of justice be provided to the courts.”); State ex rel.

2021Servs., Inc. v. Courtney, 64 P.3d 1138, 1141 (Or. 2003) (“[W]ith respect to the judiciary, the separation of powers principle is not offended by choices that the other branches make, unless those choices unduly burden the capacity of the judiciary to perform its core function.”). -43- 7542 government.”178 One branch’s threat to the independence of another — well short of its elimination by underfunding — may therefore violate separation of powers.

2021The separation of powers doctrine prohibits this Court from enacting legislation or redrafting defective statutes.41 It is therefore up to the legislature in the first 39 Id. 40 Augustine v. State, 355 P.3d 573, 584-85 (Alaska App. 2015). 41 State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d 105, 111 (Alaska 1975) (citing Alaska Const. art.