separation of powers doctrine in Iowa

2022The separation of powers doctrine prohibits a department of the government “from exercising ‘powers that are clearly forbidden’ to it,” “from exercising ‘powers granted by the constitution to another branch,’ ” and from “impair[ing] another in the performance of its constitutional duties.” Thompson, 954 N.W.2d at 410 (quoting Klouda, 642 N.W.2d at 260 (emphasis omitted)). “[E]ach department of government must be and remain independent if the constitutional safeguards are to be maintained.” Id. (quoting Webster Cnty.

2022The separation of powers doctrine prohibits a department of the government “from exercising ‘powers that are clearly forbidden’ to it,” “from exercising ‘powers granted by the constitution to another branch,’ ” and from “impair[ing] another in the performance of its constitutional duties.” Thompson, 954 N.W.2d at 410 (quoting Klouda, 642 N.W.2d at 260 (emphasis omitted)). “[E]ach department of government must be and remain independent if the constitutional safeguards are to be maintained.” Id. (quoting Webster Cnty.

2021See State v. Phillips, 610 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Iowa 2000) (en banc).

2002The separation-of-powers doctrine is violated “if one branch of government purports to use powers that are clearly forbidden, or attempts to use powers granted by the constitution to another branch.” State v. Phillips, 610 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Iowa 2000).

2016Under the separation-of- powers doctrine, “electoral control [is] an important restraint on legislative conduct.” Teague v. Mosley, 552 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Iowa 1996).

2016Under the separation-of- powers doctrine, “electoral control [is] an important restraint on legislative conduct.” Teague v. Mosley, 552 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Iowa 1996).

2022Bd. of Supervisors v. Flattery, 268 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Iowa 1978) (en banc)).

2022Bd. of Supervisors v. Flattery, 268 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Iowa 1978) (en banc)).

2021We find Article V, § 14, of the Constitution, read with the separation of powers clause, Article III, § 1, does not manifest a plain intention to abrogate the inherent common-law power of courts to adopt rules of practice. 244 N.W.2d 564, 569 (Iowa 1976) (en banc).

2021We find Article V, § 14, of the Constitution, read with the separation of powers clause, Article III, § 1, does not manifest a plain intention to abrogate the inherent common-law power of courts to adopt rules of practice. 244 N.W.2d 564, 569 (Iowa 1976) (en banc).

2021At the same time we recognize the legislative department’s constitutional and historical authority to prescribe appellate jurisdiction, we note the authority is not unlimited. “[T]he legislature cannot exercise 15 judicial powers, and cannot reverse, vacate, or overrule the judgment or decree of a court.” Wilcox v. Miner, 201 Iowa 476, 478 , 205 N.W. 847, 848 (1925).

2021At the same time we recognize the legislative department’s constitutional and historical authority to prescribe appellate jurisdiction, we note the authority is not unlimited. “[T]he legislature cannot exercise 15 judicial powers, and cannot reverse, vacate, or overrule the judgment or decree of a court.” Wilcox v. Miner, 201 Iowa 476, 478 , 205 N.W. 847, 848 (1925).

2003See Klouda, 642 N.W.2d at 260 (citing People v. P.H., 145 Ill.2d 209 , 164 Ill.Dec. 137 , 582 N.E.2d 700, 706 (1991)).

2003See Klouda, 642 N.W.2d at 260 (citing People v. P.H., 145 Ill.2d 209 , 164 Ill.Dec. 137 , 582 N.E.2d 700, 706 (1991)).

2021“Section 814.7 is not a ‘statute [ ] controlling [an] appeal[ ]’ so much as it is a statute describing the procedure to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hannan v. State, 732 N.W.2d 45, 51 (Iowa 2007) (alterations in original).

2021“Section 814.7 is not a ‘statute [ ] controlling [an] appeal[ ]’ so much as it is a statute describing the procedure to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hannan v. State, 732 N.W.2d 45, 51 (Iowa 2007) (alterations in original).

2008See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 , 104 S.Ct. at 3324 , 82 L.Ed.2d at 569 .

2008See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 , 104 S.Ct. at 3324 , 82 L.Ed.2d at 569 .

1985Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1180 (E.D.Pa.1978) (federal discretionary function exception statutorily embodies separation of powers principle).

1983Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1180 (E.D.Pa.1978) (federal discretionary function exception statutorily embodies separation of powers principle).

2008The State argues that section 903B.2 does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine because the special sentence is not a “sentencing alternative.” See id.

2008The State argues that section 903B.2 does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine because the special sentence is not a “sentencing alternative.” See id.

2026Co. v. Dwyer, 542 N.W.2d 491 , 494–95 (Iowa 1996) (en banc) (explaining that the nonjusticiable “ ‘political question[s]’ . . . principle stems primarily from the separation of powers doctrine which requires we leave intact the respective roles and regions of independence of the coordinate branches of government”). 4.

2012The nonjusticia-bility of “political questions” is primarily rooted in the separation of powers doctrine, “which requires we leave intact the respective roles and regions of independence of the coordinate branches of government.” Dwyer, 542 N.W.2d at 495 (citations omitted).

2025“In determining the balance of power between our branches of government,” we have said, “it is important to understand that the separation of powers doctrine does not have rigid boundaries.” State v. Hoegh, 632 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 2001).

2025We have long recognized that “some acts can be properly entrusted to more than one branch 15 of government” and that “some functions inevitably intersect.” Id.; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that “interdependence” and “reciprocity” characterize the relationship between the branches as much as “separateness” and “autonomy”).

2025Union v. Critelli, 244 N.W.2d 564, 569 (Iowa 1976) (en banc); see also Thompson, 954 N.W.2d at 415 (“Pursuant to the constitutional text and historical practice, our precedents continue to recognize the ‘legislature possesses the fundamental responsibility to adopt rules of practice for our courts.’ ” (quoting Butler v. Woodbury County, 547 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996))).

2024Id. (“[The] privilege is based on the principle that ‘no branch may encroach upon the powers of another,’ and on inherent principles of comity that exist between the coequal branches of government.” (citation omitted) (quoting Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1991))).

2018Advisory Comm., LLC v. Dyersville City Council, 888 N.W.2d 24, 51 (Iowa 2016) (Wiggins, J., concurring specially) (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Teague v. Mosley, 552 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Iowa 1996)).

2018Advisory Comm., LLC v. Dyersville City Council , 888 N.W.2d 24 , 51 (Iowa 2016) (Wiggins, J., *847 concurring specially) (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Teague v. Mosley , 552 N.W.2d 646 , 650 (Iowa 1996) ).

2016See Iowa Code § 903.12 (3). 3 section 902.11 unconstitutionally violate the separation of powers); State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Iowa 1979) (rejecting a separation of powers challenge to mandatory minimum sentences for use of a firearm).

2016Although Pennell invites us to reconsider and overrule these rulings, “[w]e are not at liberty to overturn Iowa Supreme Court precedent.” State v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).

2015See Binette v. Sabo, 710 A.2d 688 , 690–700 (Conn. 1998) (holding a private cause of action existed for the state’s violation of the constitution’s search-and-seizure provision); Peper v. Princeton Univ.

2015See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107 , 117–18 (Iowa 2013).

2015See Lewis v. State, 629 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Mich. 2001) (holding the court could not create a judicial remedy for the violation of the Michigan Constitution because to do so would violate the separation-of- powers doctrine, given its constitution granted the legislature the power to enact laws putting the constitutional provisions into effect); Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 595 (R.I. 1998) (relying on a provision in the Rhode Island Constitution very similar to article XII, and concluding, “we are of the opinion that the creation of a remedy in the circumstances presented by this case should be

2015See Lewis v. State, 629 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Mich. 2001) (holding the court could not create a judicial remedy for the violation of the Michigan Constitution because to do so would violate the separation-of- powers doctrine, given its constitution granted the legislature the power to enact laws putting the constitutional provisions into effect); Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 595 (R.I. 1998) (relying on a provision in the Rhode Island Constitution very similar to article XII, and concluding, “we are of the opinion that the creation of a remedy in the circumstances presented by this case should be

2014P. 2.33(1); State v. Taeger, 781 N.W.2d 560, 566 (Iowa 2010) (stating a court may overrule a motion to dismiss by the prosecution when there is an abuse of prosecutorial discretion, the dismissal is sought in bad faith, or the dismissal was sought “on grounds far afield of the law or facts”); Manning v. Engelkes, 281 N.W.2d 7, 11 (Iowa 1979) (stating Iowa courts must act “in the furtherance of justice” when dismissing pending criminal charges). 8 To determine this issue, we must balance the separation of powers doctrine and the court’s discretionary function.

2014P. 2.33(1); State v. Taeger, 781 N.W.2d 560, 566 (Iowa 2010) (stating a court may overrule a motion to dismiss by the prosecution when there is an abuse of prosecutorial discretion, the dismissal is sought in bad faith, or the dismissal was sought “on grounds far afield of the law or facts”); Manning v. Engelkes, 281 N.W.2d 7, 11 (Iowa 1979) (stating Iowa courts must act “in the furtherance of justice” when dismissing pending criminal charges). 8 To determine this issue, we must balance the separation of powers doctrine and the court’s discretionary function.