separation of powers doctrine in California

2022Such interrelationship, of course, lies at the heart of the constitutional theory of ‘checks and balances’ that the separation of powers doctrine is intended to serve.” (Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 52-53 .) As discussed above, plaintiff contends PAGA violates the separation of powers doctrine—i.e., defeats or materially impairs the executive branch’s exercise of its constitutional functions—by depriving the executive branch of (1) prosecutorial discretion in PAGA cases, and (2) control over PAGA prosecutions or settlements.

2020While there is some interdependence among the branches, the Constitution “does vest each branch with certain ‘core’ [citation] or ‘essential’ [citation] functions that may not be usurped by another branch.” (Id. at p. 14.) “‘Although the language of California Constitution article III, section 3, may suggest a sharp demarcation between the operations of the three branches of government, California decisions long have recognized that, in reality, the separation of powers doctrine “‘does not mean that the three departments of our government are not in many respects mutually dependent’” [citation

2016Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531 , 551, fn. 9, 174 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 629 P.2d 935 ["[B]y virtue of the separation of powers doctrine courts lack the power to order the Legislature to pass a prescribed legislative act"]; Sklar v .

2016Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531 , 551, fn. 9, 174 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 629 P.2d 935 ["[B]y virtue of the separation of powers doctrine courts lack the power to order the Legislature to pass a prescribed legislative act"]; Sklar v .

2026The dividing lines among branches is not sharp, and the branches are somewhat interdependent on each other. [Citations.]” (People v. Marquez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 40 , 49.) The separation of powers doctrine “ ‘ “does not mean that the three departments of our government are not in many respects mutually dependent.” ’ [Citations.]” (Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 117 .) Instead, “each department of government ‘for its own existence must in some degree exercise some of the functions of the others.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent one branch of gov

2026(Carmel Valley, supra, at p. 298 .) We distinguish the Legislature’s drafting of section 1000.7 from that in People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 59, 68 , where the California Supreme Court concluded a statute violated the separation of powers doctrine by requiring the prosecutor’s consent before a trial court could order drug treatment diversion.

2025VI, § 1 [judicial power]; see People v. Bunn (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1, 14 (Bunn).) The separation of powers doctrine is set forth in section 3 of article III of the California Constitution: “The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial.

2025Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.” Despite this provision, there is no sharp line between the operations of each branch; each branch has exercised all three kinds of powers; and the resulting balance underlying the system assumes a certain degree of mutual oversight and influence. ( Bunn, supra, at p. 14 .) Although some overlap is allowed, the separation of powers doctrine is violated when a branch usurps the core or essential functions vested in another branch.

2026(Carmel Valley, supra, at p. 298 .) We distinguish the Legislature’s drafting of section 1000.7 from that in People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 59, 68 , where the California Supreme Court concluded a statute violated the separation of powers doctrine by requiring the prosecutor’s consent before a trial court could order drug treatment diversion.

2026(Carmel Valley, supra, at p. 298 .) We distinguish the Legislature’s drafting of section 1000.7 from that in People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 59, 68 , where the California Supreme Court concluded a statute violated the separation of powers doctrine by requiring the prosecutor’s consent before a trial court could order drug treatment diversion.

2018III, § 3.) "Although ... article III, section 3, may suggest a sharp demarcation between the operations of the three branches of government, California decisions long have recognized that, in reality, the separation of powers doctrine ' "does not mean that the three departments of our government are not in many respects mutually dependent" ' [citation], or that the actions of one branch may not significantly affect those of another branch." ( Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45 , 52, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 837 , 913 P.2d 1046 .) "Of necessity the judicial department as well as t

2018III, § 3.) "Although ... article III, section 3, may suggest a sharp demarcation between the operations of the three branches of government, California decisions long have recognized that, in reality, the separation of powers doctrine ' "does not mean that the three departments of our government are not in many respects mutually dependent" ' [citation], or that the actions of one branch may not significantly affect those of another branch." ( Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45 , 52, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 837 , 913 P.2d 1046 .) "Of necessity the judicial department as well as t

2025In a prior version of section 340.1, the Legislature included language reviving claims that had not yet been “ ‘litigated to finality on the merits,’ ” and specifically provided that “[t]ermination of a prior action on the basis of the statute of limitations does not constitute a claim that has 10 been litigated to finality on the merits.’ ([Former] § 340.1, subd. (d)(1).)” (Perez v. Roe 1 (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 171, 175 (Perez); Stats. 2002, ch. 149, § 1.) In Perez, the appellate court determined that “the Legislature violated the separation of powers doctrine when it amended section 340.1 to

2025In a prior version of section 340.1, the Legislature included language reviving claims that had not yet been “ ‘litigated to finality on the merits,’ ” and specifically provided that “[t]ermination of a prior action on the basis of the statute of limitations does not constitute a claim that has 10 been litigated to finality on the merits.’ ([Former] § 340.1, subd. (d)(1).)” (Perez v. Roe 1 (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 171, 175 (Perez); Stats. 2002, ch. 149, § 1.) In Perez, the appellate court determined that “the Legislature violated the separation of powers doctrine when it amended section 340.1 to

2013In Cortez, the court construed its then-recent decision in People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89 , which had held that a statute prohibiting a trial court from striking a prior conviction allegation without the prosecutor’s agreement violated the separation of powers doctrine.

2002The Davis majority upheld this practice, distinguishing this court's earlier decisions in People v. Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 93 , 89 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 473 P.2d 993 and later cases on the ground that all of the prior cases concerned prosecutorial action after charges had been *216 filed. ( Davis, at p. 82, 249 Cal.Rptr. 300 , 757 P.2d 11 .) The separation of powers doctrine, Davis said, limits only prosecutorial action during the "`judicial phase'" of a criminal proceeding. ( Id. at p. 85, 249 Cal.Rptr. 300 , 757 P.2d 11 .) The majority here adopts that reasoning, holding that decisions occ

2026In Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 64, 69 , the court upheld a statute granting prosecutors “the authority to approve or disapprove a local diversion program” against a separation of powers challenge.

2026In Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 64, 69 , the court upheld a statute granting prosecutors “the authority to approve or disapprove a local diversion program” against a separation of powers challenge.

2026The dividing lines among branches is not sharp, and the branches are somewhat interdependent on each other. [Citations.]” (People v. Marquez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 40 , 49.) The separation of powers doctrine “ ‘ “does not mean that the three departments of our government are not in many respects mutually dependent.” ’ [Citations.]” (Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 117 .) Instead, “each department of government ‘for its own existence must in some degree exercise some of the functions of the others.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent one branch of gov

2026The dividing lines among branches is not sharp, and the branches are somewhat interdependent on each other. [Citations.]” (People v. Marquez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 40 , 49.) The separation of powers doctrine “ ‘ “does not mean that the three departments of our government are not in many respects mutually dependent.” ’ [Citations.]” (Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 117 .) Instead, “each department of government ‘for its own existence must in some degree exercise some of the functions of the others.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent one branch of gov

2026The separation of powers doctrine “has not been interpreted as requiring the rigid classification of all the incidental activities of government, with the result that once a technique or method of procedure is associated with a particular branch of the government, it can never be used thereafter by another.” (Parker v. Riley (1941) 18 Cal.2d 83, 90 .) Instead, “the separation of powers doctrine is violated only when the actions of a branch of government defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another branch.” (In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 662 .) “Under the separatio

2026The separation of powers doctrine “has not been interpreted as requiring the rigid classification of all the incidental activities of government, with the result that once a technique or method of procedure is associated with a particular branch of the government, it can never be used thereafter by another.” (Parker v. Riley (1941) 18 Cal.2d 83, 90 .) Instead, “the separation of powers doctrine is violated only when the actions of a branch of government defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another branch.” (In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 662 .) “Under the separatio

2014Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.” 29 long recognized that [the] primary purpose [of the separation-of-powers doctrine] is to prevent the combination in the hands of a single person or group of the basic or fundamental powers of government.” ’ [Citations.]” (Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California (2001) 25 Cal.4th 287, 297-298 .) It goes without saying that “ ‘the power to collect and appropriate the revenue of the State is one peculiarly within the discretion of the Legislature.’ [

2014Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.” 29 long recognized that [the] primary purpose [of the separation-of-powers doctrine] is to prevent the combination in the hands of a single person or group of the basic or fundamental powers of government.” ’ [Citations.]” (Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California (2001) 25 Cal.4th 287, 297-298 .) It goes without saying that “ ‘the power to collect and appropriate the revenue of the State is one peculiarly within the discretion of the Legislature.’ [

2026(See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); Baricevic, at pp. 437–440 [adopting a procedure “patterned after” Batson for addressing a separation of powers challenge to Illinois’s analogous judicial disqualification statute].) Indeed, “the procedure for scrutinizing peremptory challenges set forth in Batson represents an effort by the Supreme Court to rectify (and prevent) the unconstitutional use of a constitutional statute (i.e., the use of a statutory right to exercise peremptory challenges for the purpose of discriminating against minorities).” (Baricevic, at p. 437.) In our view,

2016Solberg’s Separation of Powers Analysis As presented to the Supreme Court, the Solberg appellants’ principal contention was “that section 170.6 is unconstitutional because it violates the doctrine of separation of powers [citation] and impairs the independence of the judiciary [citation].” By not requiring any reasons for disqualification to be stated, “the statute in effect delegates . . . the judicial power to determine whether [a ground for disqualification] exists in the particular case in which it is invoked.” ( Solberg, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 190-191.) Solberg rejected appellants’ conte

2026The separation of powers doctrine “has not been interpreted as requiring the rigid classification of all the incidental activities of government, with the result that once a technique or method of procedure is associated with a particular branch of the government, it can never be used thereafter by another.” (Parker v. Riley (1941) 18 Cal.2d 83, 90 .) Instead, “the separation of powers doctrine is violated only when the actions of a branch of government defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another branch.” (In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 662 .) “Under the separatio

2026The separation of powers doctrine “has not been interpreted as requiring the rigid classification of all the incidental activities of government, with the result that once a technique or method of procedure is associated with a particular branch of the government, it can never be used thereafter by another.” (Parker v. Riley (1941) 18 Cal.2d 83, 90 .) Instead, “the separation of powers doctrine is violated only when the actions of a branch of government defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another branch.” (In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 662 .) “Under the separatio

2026The court concluded that a district attorney’s determination of eligibility under the statute “is not a judicial act.” (Id. at p. 73.) And in Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 545 (Manduley), our Supreme Court held a statute did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by broadening the circumstances in which a district attorney could file charges against minors 14 years old or older directly in criminal court rather than in juvenile court.

2026The court concluded that a district attorney’s determination of eligibility under the statute “is not a judicial act.” (Id. at p. 73.) And in Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 545 (Manduley), our Supreme Court held a statute did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by broadening the circumstances in which a district attorney could file charges against minors 14 years old or older directly in criminal court rather than in juvenile court.

2005In Esteybar v. Municipal Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 119, 122 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 524 , 485 P.2d 1140 ], this court held that a statute requiring a magistrate to secure a prosecutor’s consent to determine that an offense is a misdemeanor rather than a felony violates the separation of powers doctrine (see Pen.

2005In Esteybar v. Municipal Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 119, 122 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 524 , 485 P.2d 1140 ], this court held that a statute requiring a magistrate to secure a prosecutor’s consent to determine that an offense is a misdemeanor rather than a felony violates the separation of powers doctrine (see Pen.

2026The juvenile court’s visitation order did not improperly delegate authority to father Mother also fails to establish that the juvenile court improperly delegated visitation authority to father by failing to specify a monitor. “[T]he power to decide whether any visitation occurs belongs to the court alone. [Citations.] When the court abdicates its discretion in that regard and permits a third party, whether social worker, therapist or the child, to determine whether any visitation will occur, the court violates the separation of powers doctrine.” (In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310 , 317–318

2025(S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 319 .) When the court abdicates its discretion in that regard and permits a third party, including a child, to determine whether any visitation will occur, the court violates the separation of powers doctrine.

2023(Stevens, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092.) Thus, in addition to the separation of powers violation identified by the majority opinion, another article III, section 3, problem comes to the forefront if the Proposition 22 proponents’ reading of McPherson is correct: By destroying a mode of dispute resolution that app-based drivers are entitled to utilize within the judicial branch of government, Proposition 22 unconstitutionally usurps judicial power. 50 To uphold this initiative would “defeat or materially impair” the exercise of a judicial function (Hustedt, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 338) as w

2023(Stevens, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092 .) Thus, in addition to the separation of powers violation identified by the majority opinion, another article III, section 3, problem comes to the forefront if the Proposition 22 proponents’ reading of McPherson is correct: By destroying a mode of dispute resolution that app-based drivers are entitled to utilize within the judicial branch of government, Proposition 22 unconstitutionally usurps judicial power. 50 To uphold this initiative would “defeat or materially impair” the exercise of a judicial function (Hustedt, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 338 ) as

2019(See Professional Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016 , 1042, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 814 , 155 P.3d 226 ; see also San Francisco v. Cooper (1975) 13 Cal.3d 898 , 915 & fn. 7, 120 Cal.Rptr. 707 , 534 P.2d 403 [under the separation of powers doctrine, which applies to local legislative actions, "in the absence of some overriding constitutional, statutory or charter proscription, the judiciary has no authority to invalidate duly enacted legislation."] ) Accordingly, any action by PERB effectively invalidating the Initiative or assuming the Initiative is or will be invalid

2019(See Professional Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016 , 1042, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 814 , 155 P.3d 226 ; see also San Francisco v. Cooper (1975) 13 Cal.3d 898 , 915 & fn. 7, 120 Cal.Rptr. 707 , 534 P.2d 403 [under the separation of powers doctrine, which applies to local legislative actions, "in the absence of some overriding constitutional, statutory or charter proscription, the judiciary has no authority to invalidate duly enacted legislation."] ) Accordingly, any action by PERB effectively invalidating the Initiative or assuming the Initiative is or will be invalid

2020(Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 240 ; Bunn, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 24 .) While Plaut, in interpreting the separation of powers doctrine under the federal constitution, found it “irrelevant … that the final judgments reopened by [the statute at issue] rested on the bar of a statute of limitations” ( Plaut, supra, at p. 228 ), we decline to divorce the decision in Bunn from its context given that “[t]he purpose of separation of powers is to protect individual liberty by preventing concentration of powers in the hands of any one individual or body.” (Obrien v. Jones (2000) 23 Cal.4th 40, 65 .) Rel

2006Of necessity the judicial department as well as the executive must in most matters yield to the power of statutory enactments. [Citations.] The power of the legislature to regulate criminal and civil proceedings and appeals is undisputed." ( Brydonjack v. State Bar (1929) 208 Cal. 439, 442-443 , 281 P. 1018 ; see also Obrien v. Jones (2000) 23 Cal.4th 40, 48 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 205 , 999 P.2d 95 [the separation-of-powers doctrine "does not command `a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government'"]; Millholen v. Riley (1930) 211 Cal. 29, 34 , 293 P. 69 ["the [L]egislature may at all ti

2022Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.’” (Steen v. Appellate Division of Superior Court, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1053 .) “‘“Although the language of California Constitution article III, section 3, may suggest a sharp demarcation between the operations of the three branches of government, California decisions long have recognized that, in reality, the separation of powers doctrine ‘“does not mean that the three departments of our government are not in many respects mutually dependent”’ [citation], or that th

2005We said: “Since the exercise of a judicial power may not be conditioned upon the approval of either the executive or legislative branches of government, requiring the district attorney’s consent in determining the charge on which a defendant shall be held to answer violates the doctrine of separation of powers.” (Esteybar v. Municipal Court, supra, at p. 127.) The next year, in People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 ], we held that requiring a trial court to obtain a prosecutor’s consent to order a posttrial commitment to a narcotic detention, treatment, and r

2003A statute conferring upon prosecutors the discretion to make certain decisions before the filing of charges, on the other hand, is not invalid simply because the prosecutor's exercise of such charging discretion necessarily affects the dispositional options available to the court." ( Manduley v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 553 , 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 .) "Because [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 707(d) does not confer upon the prosecutor any authority to interfere with the court's choice of legislatively specified sentencing alternatives after an action has been com

2003A statute conferring upon prosecutors the discretion to make certain decisions before the filing of charges, on the other hand, is not invalid simply because the prosecutor's exercise of such charging discretion necessarily affects the dispositional options available to the court." ( Manduley v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 553 , 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 .) "Because [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 707(d) does not confer upon the prosecutor any authority to interfere with the court's choice of legislatively specified sentencing alternatives after an action has been com

2005We said: “Since the exercise of a judicial power may not be conditioned upon the approval of either the executive or legislative branches of government, requiring the district attorney’s consent in determining the charge on which a defendant shall be held to answer violates the doctrine of separation of powers.” (Esteybar v. Municipal Court, supra, at p. 127.) The next year, in People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 ], we held that requiring a trial court to obtain a prosecutor’s consent to order a posttrial commitment to a narcotic detention, treatment, and r

2005We said: “Since the exercise of a judicial power may not be conditioned upon the approval of either the executive or legislative branches of government, requiring the district attorney’s consent in determining the charge on which a defendant shall be held to answer violates the doctrine of separation of powers.” (Esteybar v. Municipal Court, supra, at p. 127.) The next year, in People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 ], we held that requiring a trial court to obtain a prosecutor’s consent to order a posttrial commitment to a narcotic detention, treatment, and r

2023(Plaut, at p. 7 225.) The high court reasoned that such legislation is a “clear violation of the separation- of-powers principle” because, once a judgment becomes final, “Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very case was something other than what the courts said it was.” (Id. at pp. 225, 227, original italics.) Perez also based its holding on two California Supreme Court cases, People v. Bunn (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1 , and its companion case, People v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 29 .

2023(Plaut, at p. 7 225.) The high court reasoned that such legislation is a “clear violation of the separation- of-powers principle” because, once a judgment becomes final, “Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very case was something other than what the courts said it was.” (Id. at pp. 225, 227, original italics.) Perez also based its holding on two California Supreme Court cases, People v. Bunn (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1 , and its companion case, People v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 29 .

2004The separation of powers doctrine prevents us from rewriting statutes that do not conflict with the Constitution, other than to correct an obvious and minor drafting error where necessary to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. ( People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 14-15 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 114 , 980 P.2d 829 ; Cal. Const., art.

2004The separation of powers doctrine prevents us from rewriting statutes that do not conflict with the Constitution, other than to correct an obvious and minor drafting error where necessary to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. ( People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 14-15 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 114 , 980 P.2d 829 ; Cal. Const., art.

2026Although the doctrine does not prohibit one branch from taking action that might affect another, the doctrine is violated when the actions of one branch defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another.” (Steen v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1045, 1053 (Steen).) “The primary purpose of the separation of powers doctrine ‘ “is to prevent the combination in the hands of a single person or group of the basic or fundamental powers of government[,]” ’ [citation], as well as to avoid overreaching by one governmental branch against another.” (Case v. Lazben Fina

2024III, § 3.) Although the separation of powers doctrine ‘does not prohibit one branch from taking action that might affect another, the doctrine is violated when the actions of one branch defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another.’ (Steen v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1045, 1053 .) ‘Separation of powers does not mean an entire or complete separation of powers or functions, which would be impracticable, if not impossible.’ [Citation.]” (In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202 , 212.) “ ‘When one department or agency thereof exercises the complete power tha