separation of powers doctrine in Nevada

2026State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345 , 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983); see Cornm'n on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. 285, 291-92 , 212 P.3d 1098, 1103 (2009) (the separation of powers doctrine prevents "one branch of government from encroaching on the powers of another branch"); Nev.

2026State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345 , 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983); see Cornm'n on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. 285, 291-92 , 212 P.3d 1098, 1103 (2009) (the separation of powers doctrine prevents "one branch of government from encroaching on the powers of another branch"); Nev.

2016Court, 116 Nev. 1213, 1218 , 14 P.3d 1275, 1279 (2000)).

2016Court, 116 Nev. 1213, 1218 , 14 P.3d 1275, 1279 (2000)).

2026State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345 , 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983); see Cornm'n on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. 285, 291-92 , 212 P.3d 1098, 1103 (2009) (the separation of powers doctrine prevents "one branch of government from encroaching on the powers of another branch"); Nev.

2026State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345 , 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983); see Cornm'n on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. 285, 291-92 , 212 P.3d 1098, 1103 (2009) (the separation of powers doctrine prevents "one branch of government from encroaching on the powers of another branch"); Nev.

2016See, e.g., Desert Chrysler-Pl ymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 95 Nev. 640, 644, 600 P.2d 1189, 1191 (197 9) ("[S]ince the statutes were assailed on constitutional grounds, it would be paradoxical for us to uphold the statutes on the grounds raised by the part ies, yet ignore a clear violation of the separation of powers doctrine.").

2016See, e.g., Desert Chrysler-Pl ymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 95 Nev. 640, 644, 600 P.2d 1189, 1191 (197 9) ("[S]ince the statutes were assailed on constitutional grounds, it would be paradoxical for us to uphold the statutes on the grounds raised by the part ies, yet ignore a clear violation of the separation of powers doctrine.").

2007See Secretary of State v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 465 , 93 P.3d 746, 752 (2004) (noting that the Legislature cannot by statute limit this court’s constitutional power to issue writs of quo warranto); Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26 , 422 P.2d 237, 246 (1967) (pointing out that, under the separation of powers doctrine, the Legislature is without power to change a constitutional power or function); State v. Baker and Josephs, 35 Nev. 300, 307 , 129 P. 452 , 453 (1912) (noting that this court allowed a writ of quo warranto proceeding to go forward). 9 See People ex rel.

2007See Secretary of State v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 465 , 93 P.3d 746, 752 (2004) (noting that the Legislature cannot by statute limit this court’s constitutional power to issue writs of quo warranto); Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26 , 422 P.2d 237, 246 (1967) (pointing out that, under the separation of powers doctrine, the Legislature is without power to change a constitutional power or function); State v. Baker and Josephs, 35 Nev. 300, 307 , 129 P. 452 , 453 (1912) (noting that this court allowed a writ of quo warranto proceeding to go forward). 9 See People ex rel.

2022This court declined to reach the issue, finding that the Secretary lacked standing and also that the separation-of-powers clause barred the relief sought because only the Legislature may judge the qualifications of its members.3 Id. at 460-62, 466-72 , 93 P.3d at 749-50 , 752- In Heller, this court specifically noted that the dual service issue 3 would be justiciable if it were instead "raised as a separation-of-powers challenge to legislators working in the executive branch, as the SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) IS147A 44131,0. 10 56.

2022This court declined to reach the issue, finding that the Secretary lacked standing and also that the separation-of-powers clause barred the relief sought because only the Legislature may judge the qualifications of its members.3 Id. at 460-62, 466-72 , 93 P.3d at 749-50 , 752- In Heller, this court specifically noted that the dual service issue 3 would be justiciable if it were instead "raised as a separation-of-powers challenge to legislators working in the executive branch, as the SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) IS147A 44131,0. 10 56.

2018See, e.g., State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81 , 786 P.2d 932 , 936 (1989) ("But once the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion."); People v. Navarro, 7 Cal.3d 248 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 , 489 (1972) ("[A]lthough the Legislature was not required in the first instance to give the court power to commit persons in the status of [the defendant] to the treatment program, having conferred this power it cannot condition its exe

2018See, e.g., State v. Prentiss, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (Ariz. 1989) ("But once the legislature provides the court with the power to SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 6 (0) 1947A use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion."); People v. Navarro, 497 P.2d 481, 489 (Cal. 1972) ("[A]lthough the Legislature was not required in the first instance to give the court power to commit persons in the status of [the defendant] to the treatment program, having conferred this power it cannot condition its exercise

2018See, e.g., State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81 , 786 P.2d 932 , 936 (1989) ("But once the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion."); People v. Navarro, 7 Cal.3d 248 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 , 489 (1972) ("[A]lthough the Legislature was not required in the first instance to give the court power to commit persons in the status of [the defendant] to the treatment program, having conferred this power it cannot condition its exe

2018See, e.g., State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81 , 786 P.2d 932 , 936 (1989) ("But once the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion."); People v. Navarro, 7 Cal.3d 248 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 , 489 (1972) ("[A]lthough the Legislature was not required in the first instance to give the court power to commit persons in the status of [the defendant] to the treatment program, having conferred this power it cannot condition its exe

2018We recognize that the statute operates in a seemingly atypical fashion, but any prosecutorial power over the district court's disposition at this stage of the proceedings is offensive to the separation of powers. 6 See Navarro, 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d at 488-89 (finding a violation of the separation of powers doctrine where a statute required agreement by the prosecutor before the court could assign the defendant to a treatment program and reiterating "that the Legislature, of course, by general laws can control eligibility for probation, parole and the term of imprisonment, but it cannot

2018We recognize that the statute operates in a seemingly atypical fashion, but any prosecutorial power over the district court's disposition at this stage of the proceedings is offensive to the separation of powers. 6 See Navarro, 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d at 488-89 (finding a violation of the separation of powers doctrine where a statute required agreement by the prosecutor before the court could assign the defendant to a treatment program and reiterating "that the Legislature, of course, by general laws can control eligibility for probation, parole and the term of imprisonment, but it cannot

2024Once a court has been granted sentencing discretion, it "cannot be conditioned upon the prosecution's approval without running afoul of the separation of powers doctrine." Id. at 787, 432 P.3d at 158 .

2024In analyzing the application of the separation of powers doctrine in this context, we stated "the principle gleaned is that once a defendant's guilt has been determined, the prosecutor's charging discretion is complete and the judiciary's sentencing discretion, if any, is all that remains." Id.

2018See People v. Superior Court of San Mateo Cty., 520 P.2d 405, 410 (Cal. 1974) ("It is true that acquittal or sentencing is the typical choice open to the court, but in appropriate cases it is not the only termination.

2009Thus, while Bordenkircher certainly made clear that a prosecutor has broad discretion in charging a defendant, it did not offer any guidance on whether a provision similar to NRS 484.37941 invades that charging discretion. 5 Instead, we find the California Supreme Court’s decisions in Esteybar v. Municipal Court for Long Beach Judicial District, 485 P.2d 1140 (Cal. 1971), and People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 520 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1974), to be instructive on the issue of whether NRS 484.37941 is unconstitutional because it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.

2018We recognize that the statute operates in a seemingly atypical fashion, but any prosecutorial power over the district court's disposition at this stage of the proceedings is offensive to the separation of powers. 6 See Navarro, 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d at 488-89 (finding a violation of the separation of powers doctrine where a statute required agreement by the prosecutor before the court could assign the defendant to a treatment program and reiterating "that the Legislature, of course, by general laws can control eligibility for probation, parole and the term of imprisonment, but it cannot

2018We recognize that the statute operates in a seemingly atypical fashion, but any prosecutorial power over the district court's disposition at this stage of the proceedings is offensive to the separation of powers. 6 See Navarro, 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d at 488-89 (finding a violation of the separation of powers doctrine where a statute required agreement by the prosecutor before the court could assign the defendant to a treatment program and reiterating "that the Legislature, of course, by general laws can control eligibility for probation, parole and the term of imprisonment, but it cannot

2010Thus, “‘the legislature may not enact a procedural statute that conflicts with a pre-existing procedural rule, without violating the doctrine of separation of powers, and . . . such a statute is of no effect.’” Marshall, 116 Nev. at 959, 11 P.3d at 1213 (quoting State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345 , 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983)); see also Secretary of State, 120 Nev. at 465 , 93 P.3d at 752 (ex plaining that the Legislature cannot restrict, substantially impair, or defeat the exercise of this court’s constitutional powers); Whitlock, 104 Nev. at 26 , 752 P.2d at 211 (concluding that a particular

2010Thus, "`the legislature may not enact a procedural statute that conflicts with a pre-existing procedural rule, without violating the doctrine of separation of powers, and ... such a statute is of no effect.'" Marshall, 116 Nev. at 959, 11 P.3d at 1213 (quoting State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345 , 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983)); see also Secretary of State, 120 Nev. at 465 , 93 P.3d at 752 (explaining that the Legislature cannot restrict, substantially impair, or defeat the exercise of this court's constitutional powers); Whitlock, 104 Nev. at 26 , 752 P.2d at 211 (concluding that a particular sta

1977In our view, NRS ch. 241, as applied to judicial bodies, is an unconstitutional infringement on the inherent powers of the judiciary which violates the doctrine of separation of powers. 2 “It is fundamental to our system of government that the separate powers granted the executive, legislative and judicial departments be exercised without intrusion.” City of No. Las Vegas v. Daines, 92 Nev. 292, 294 , 550 P.2d 399, 400 (1976).

1977In our view, NRS ch. 241, as applied to judicial bodies, is an unconstitutional infringement on the inherent powers of the judiciary which violates the doctrine of separation of powers. 2 “It is fundamental to our system of government that the separate powers granted the executive, legislative and judicial departments be exercised without intrusion.” City of No. Las Vegas v. Daines, 92 Nev. 292, 294 , 550 P.2d 399, 400 (1976).

2022See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52 , 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (recognizing that this court need not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317 , 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280 , 1288 n.38 2Collins held that the Housing Economic Recovery Act's for-cause restriction on the President's ability to remove the FHFA's Director violated the separation-of-powers doctrine, but also concluded that the Director still had authority to carry out the functions of the office. 141 S. Ct. at 1788. 3 (2006) (observing that it is appellant's re

2022See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52 , 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (recognizing that this court need not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317 , 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280 , 1288 n.38 2Collins held that the Housing Economic Recovery Act's for-cause restriction on the President's ability to remove the FHFA's Director violated the separation-of-powers doctrine, but also concluded that the Director still had authority to carry out the functions of the office. 141 S. Ct. at 1788. 3 (2006) (observing that it is appellant's re

2021In Whitlock, we examined whether NRS 16.030(6), which sets forth how voir dire is conducted, violated the separation of powers doctrine because it conflicted with the then-existing version of NRCP 47(a). 104 Nev. at 25-26 , 752 P.2d at 211 .

2021In Whitlock, we examined whether NRS 16.030(6), which sets forth how voir dire is conducted, violated the separation of powers doctrine because it conflicted with the then-existing version of NRCP 47(a). 104 Nev. at 25-26 , 752 P.2d at 211 .

2020Replacing the requirement that "the same [complained ofl action" be likely to repeat, Sanchez-Gomez, U.S. at , 138 S. Ct. at 1540 (emphasis added), with a mere "likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the future," Bisch, 129 Nev. 334 -35, 302 P.3d at 1113 , invites judicial review of questions that did not and cannot affect the parties to the original dispute, which the separation of powers doctrine forbids.

2020Replacing the requirement that "the same [complained ofl action" be likely to repeat, Sanchez-Gomez, U.S. at , 138 S. Ct. at 1540 (emphasis added), with a mere "likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the future," Bisch, 129 Nev. 334 -35, 302 P.3d at 1113 , invites judicial review of questions that did not and cannot affect the parties to the original dispute, which the separation of powers doctrine forbids.

2017See State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345, 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983) ("[Tthe legislature may not enact a procedural statute that conflicts with a pre- existing procedural rule, without violating the doctrine of separation of powers . ."); see also Seisinger v. Siebel, 203 P.3d 483, 489 (Ariz. 2009) ("[A] determination that a statute and court rule cannot be harmonized is but the first step in a separation of powers analysis.

2017See State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345, 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983) ("[Tthe legislature may not enact a procedural statute that conflicts with a pre- existing procedural rule, without violating the doctrine of separation of powers . ."); see also Seisinger v. Siebel, 203 P.3d 483, 489 (Ariz. 2009) ("[A] determination that a statute and court rule cannot be harmonized is but the first step in a separation of powers analysis.

2017Court, 113 Nev. 435, 440, 935 P.2d 1148, 1150-51 (1997) (observing that a district court runs SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA e 8 (0) 1947A afoul of the separation-of-powers doctrine when it invades the prosecutor's legitimate charging authority). 2 The State exercised its charging authority in this case by alleging that Righetti was guilty of first-degree murder because the killing was (1) willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and/or (2) committed by means of torture, and/or (3) committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of robbery and/or kidnapping and/or sexual assault.

2017Court, 113 Nev. 435, 440, 935 P.2d 1148, 1150-51 (1997) (observing that a district court runs SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA e 8 (0) 1947A afoul of the separation-of-powers doctrine when it invades the prosecutor's legitimate charging authority). 2 The State exercised its charging authority in this case by alleging that Righetti was guilty of first-degree murder because the killing was (1) willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and/or (2) committed by means of torture, and/or (3) committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of robbery and/or kidnapping and/or sexual assault.

2016See City of Reno v. Washoe Cty., 94 Nev. 327, 331-32 , 580 P.2d 460, 463 (1978) (refusing to give standing to political subdivisions to enforce constitutional provisions that were not created to protect political subdivisions, but allowing standing for challenges to legislation as a local or special law); State ex rel.

2016See City of Reno v. Washoe Cty., 94 Nev. 327, 331-32 , 580 P.2d 460, 463 (1978) (refusing to give standing to political subdivisions to enforce constitutional provisions that were not created to protect political subdivisions, but allowing standing for challenges to legislation as a local or special law); State ex rel.

2016Court, 93 Nev. 614, 615-16 , 572 P.2d 521 , 522 (1977) (citations omitted).

2016Court, 93 Nev. 614, 615-16, 572 P.2d 521, 522 (1977) (citations omitted).

2016Court, 93 Nev. 614, 615-16 , 572 P.2d 521 , 522 (1977) (citations omitted).

2016Court, 93 Nev. 614, 615-16, 572 P.2d 521, 522 (1977) (citations omitted).

1994For example, in Dunphy v. Sheehan, 92 Nev. 259 , 549 P.2d 332 (1976), this court held that the section of Nevada’s Ethics in Government law excluding members of the judiciary from regulation under that law was mandated by the separation of powers clause of the Nevada Constitution.

1994For example, in Dunphy v. Sheehan, 92 Nev. 259 , 549 P.2d 332 (1976), this court held that the section of Nevada’s Ethics in Government law excluding members of the judiciary from regulation under that law was mandated by the separation of powers clause of the Nevada Constitution.

2018Id. at 6 , 200 P.3d at 512 .

2018Id. at 6 , 200 P.3d at 512 .

2010Thus, “‘the legislature may not enact a procedural statute that conflicts with a pre-existing procedural rule, without violating the doctrine of separation of powers, and . . . such a statute is of no effect.’” Marshall, 116 Nev. at 959, 11 P.3d at 1213 (quoting State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345 , 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983)); see also Secretary of State, 120 Nev. at 465 , 93 P.3d at 752 (ex plaining that the Legislature cannot restrict, substantially impair, or defeat the exercise of this court’s constitutional powers); Whitlock, 104 Nev. at 26 , 752 P.2d at 211 (concluding that a particular

2010Thus, "`the legislature may not enact a procedural statute that conflicts with a pre-existing procedural rule, without violating the doctrine of separation of powers, and ... such a statute is of no effect.'" Marshall, 116 Nev. at 959, 11 P.3d at 1213 (quoting State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345 , 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983)); see also Secretary of State, 120 Nev. at 465 , 93 P.3d at 752 (explaining that the Legislature cannot restrict, substantially impair, or defeat the exercise of this court's constitutional powers); Whitlock, 104 Nev. at 26 , 752 P.2d at 211 (concluding that a particular sta

2022See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52 , 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (recognizing that this court need not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317 , 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280 , 1288 n.38 2Collins held that the Housing Economic Recovery Act's for-cause restriction on the President's ability to remove the FHFA's Director violated the separation-of-powers doctrine, but also concluded that the Director still had authority to carry out the functions of the office. 141 S. Ct. at 1788. 3 (2006) (observing that it is appellant's re

2022See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52 , 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (recognizing that this court need not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317 , 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280 , 1288 n.38 2Collins held that the Housing Economic Recovery Act's for-cause restriction on the President's ability to remove the FHFA's Director violated the separation-of-powers doctrine, but also concluded that the Director still had authority to carry out the functions of the office. 141 S. Ct. at 1788. 3 (2006) (observing that it is appellant's re

2022SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 10) 1947A 41611CD ' • the judicial proceedings," Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 654 , 119 P.3d 114, 118 (2002), despite it being their burden to do so, Jerernias, 134 Nev. at 50, 412 P.3d at 48-49 .4 To the extent that Plumlee and Molen argue that a separation- of-powers violation cannot be forfeited, we disagree.5 We see no reason to treat a dual service separation-of-powers violation differently from the other constitutional errors that may be forfeited if not properly raised before the trial court.

2022SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 10) 1947A 41611CD ' • the judicial proceedings," Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 654 , 119 P.3d 114, 118 (2002), despite it being their burden to do so, Jerernias, 134 Nev. at 50, 412 P.3d at 48-49 .4 To the extent that Plumlee and Molen argue that a separation- of-powers violation cannot be forfeited, we disagree.5 We see no reason to treat a dual service separation-of-powers violation differently from the other constitutional errors that may be forfeited if not properly raised before the trial court.

2022SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 10) 1947A 41611CD ' • the judicial proceedings," Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 654 , 119 P.3d 114, 118 (2002), despite it being their burden to do so, Jerernias, 134 Nev. at 50, 412 P.3d at 48-49 .4 To the extent that Plumlee and Molen argue that a separation- of-powers violation cannot be forfeited, we disagree.5 We see no reason to treat a dual service separation-of-powers violation differently from the other constitutional errors that may be forfeited if not properly raised before the trial court.

2022SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 10) 1947A 41611CD ' • the judicial proceedings," Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 654 , 119 P.3d 114, 118 (2002), despite it being their burden to do so, Jerernias, 134 Nev. at 50, 412 P.3d at 48-49 .4 To the extent that Plumlee and Molen argue that a separation- of-powers violation cannot be forfeited, we disagree.5 We see no reason to treat a dual service separation-of-powers violation differently from the other constitutional errors that may be forfeited if not properly raised before the trial court.

2020Replacing the requirement that "the same [complained ofl action" be likely to repeat, Sanchez-Gomez, U.S. at , 138 S. Ct. at 1540 (emphasis added), with a mere "likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the future," Bisch, 129 Nev. 334 -35, 302 P.3d at 1113 , invites judicial review of questions that did not and cannot affect the parties to the original dispute, which the separation of powers doctrine forbids.

2020Replacing the requirement that "the same [complained ofl action" be likely to repeat, Sanchez-Gomez, U.S. at , 138 S. Ct. at 1540 (emphasis added), with a mere "likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the future," Bisch, 129 Nev. 334 -35, 302 P.3d at 1113 , invites judicial review of questions that did not and cannot affect the parties to the original dispute, which the separation of powers doctrine forbids.