separation of powers doctrine in Nevada

2010Thus, "`the legislature may not enact a procedural statute that conflicts with a pre-existing procedural rule, without violating the doctrine of separation of powers, and ... such a statute is of no effect.'" Marshall, 116 Nev. at 959, 11 P.3d at 1213 (quoting State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345 , 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983)); see also Secretary of State, 120 Nev. at 465 , 93 P.3d at 752 (explaining that the Legislature cannot restrict, substantially impair, or defeat the exercise of this court's constitutional powers); Whitlock, 104 Nev. at 26 , 752 P.2d at 211 (concluding that a particular sta

2010Thus, "`the legislature may not enact a procedural statute that conflicts with a pre-existing procedural rule, without violating the doctrine of separation of powers, and ... such a statute is of no effect.'" Marshall, 116 Nev. at 959, 11 P.3d at 1213 (quoting State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345 , 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983)); see also Secretary of State, 120 Nev. at 465 , 93 P.3d at 752 (explaining that the Legislature cannot restrict, substantially impair, or defeat the exercise of this court's constitutional powers); Whitlock, 104 Nev. at 26 , 752 P.2d at 211 (concluding that a particular sta

2016Court, 116 Nev. 1213, 1218 , 14 P.3d 1275, 1279 (2000)).

2016Court, 116 Nev. 1213, 1218 , 14 P.3d 1275, 1279 (2000)).

2026State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345 , 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983); see Cornm'n on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. 285, 291-92 , 212 P.3d 1098, 1103 (2009) (the separation of powers doctrine prevents "one branch of government from encroaching on the powers of another branch"); Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1.

2026State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345 , 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983); see Cornm'n on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. 285, 291-92 , 212 P.3d 1098, 1103 (2009) (the separation of powers doctrine prevents "one branch of government from encroaching on the powers of another branch"); Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1.

2007See Secretary of State v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 465 , 93 P.3d 746, 752 (2004) (noting that the Legislature cannot by statute limit this court’s constitutional power to issue writs of quo warranto); Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26 , 422 P.2d 237, 246 (1967) (pointing out that, under the separation of powers doctrine, the Legislature is without power to change a constitutional power or function); State v. Baker and Josephs, 35 Nev. 300, 307 , 129 P. 452 , 453 (1912) (noting that this court allowed a writ of quo warranto proceeding to go forward). 9 See People ex rel.

2007See Secretary of State v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 465 , 93 P.3d 746, 752 (2004) (noting that the Legislature cannot by statute limit this court’s constitutional power to issue writs of quo warranto); Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26 , 422 P.2d 237, 246 (1967) (pointing out that, under the separation of powers doctrine, the Legislature is without power to change a constitutional power or function); State v. Baker and Josephs, 35 Nev. 300, 307 , 129 P. 452 , 453 (1912) (noting that this court allowed a writ of quo warranto proceeding to go forward). 9 See People ex rel.

2026Cf. Heller v. Legislature of Nev., 120 Nev. 456, 466 , 93 P.3d 746, 753 (2004) (stating that the separation of powers doctrine “is particularly applicable when [the] constitution expressly grants authority to one branch of government”).

2026Cf. Heller v. Legislature of Nev., 120 Nev. 456, 466 , 93 P.3d 746, 753 (2004) (stating that the separation of powers doctrine “is particularly applicable when [the] constitution expressly grants authority to one branch of government”).

2016See, e.g., Desert Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 95 Nev. 640, 644 , 600 P.2d 1189, 1191 (1979) ("[S]ince the statutes were assailed on constitutional grounds, it would be paradoxical for us to uphold the statutes on the grounds raised by the parties, yet ignore a clear violation of the separation of powers doctrine.").

2016See, e.g., Desert Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 95 Nev. 640, 644 , 600 P.2d 1189, 1191 (1979) ("[S]ince the statutes were assailed on constitutional grounds, it would be paradoxical for us to uphold the statutes on the grounds raised by the parties, yet ignore a clear violation of the separation of powers doctrine.").

2026See Whitlock v. Salmon, 104 Nev. 24, 26 , 752 P.2d 210, 211 (1988) (stating that a law permitting parties and their attorneys to participate in voir dire without “unreasonable restrictions” conferred a substantive right and therefore did not offend the separation of powers doctrine); Lyft, Inc. v. Eighth Jud.

2026See Whitlock v. Salmon, 104 Nev. 24, 26 , 752 P.2d 210, 211 (1988) (stating that a law permitting parties and their attorneys to participate in voir dire without “unreasonable restrictions” conferred a substantive right and therefore did not offend the separation of powers doctrine); Lyft, Inc. v. Eighth Jud.

2018See, e.g., State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81 , 786 P.2d 932 , 936 (1989) ("But once the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion."); People v. Navarro, 7 Cal.3d 248 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 , 489 (1972) ("[A]lthough the Legislature was not required in the first instance to give the court power to commit persons in the status of [the defendant] to the treatment program, having conferred this power it cannot condition its exe

2018See, e.g., State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81 , 786 P.2d 932 , 936 (1989) ("But once the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion."); People v. Navarro, 7 Cal.3d 248 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 , 489 (1972) ("[A]lthough the Legislature was not required in the first instance to give the court power to commit persons in the status of [the defendant] to the treatment program, having conferred this power it cannot condition its exe

2018We recognize that the statute operates in a seemingly atypical fashion, but any prosecutorial power over the district court's disposition at this stage of the proceedings is offensive to the separation of powers. 6 See Navarro, 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d at 488-89 (finding a violation of the separation of powers doctrine where a statute required agreement by the prosecutor before the court could assign the defendant to a treatment program and reiterating "that the Legislature, of course, by general laws can control eligibility for probation, parole and the term of imprisonment, but it cannot

2018We recognize that the statute operates in a seemingly atypical fashion, but any prosecutorial power over the district court's disposition at this stage of the proceedings is offensive to the separation of powers. 6 See Navarro, 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d at 488-89 (finding a violation of the separation of powers doctrine where a statute required agreement by the prosecutor before the court could assign the defendant to a treatment program and reiterating "that the Legislature, of course, by general laws can control eligibility for probation, parole and the term of imprisonment, but it cannot

2018See, e.g., State v. Prentiss, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (Ariz. 1989) ("But once the legislature provides the court with the power to SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 6 (0) 1947A use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion."); People v. Navarro, 497 P.2d 481, 489 (Cal. 1972) ("[A]lthough the Legislature was not required in the first instance to give the court power to commit persons in the status of [the defendant] to the treatment program, having conferred this power it cannot condition its exercise

2018See, e.g., State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81 , 786 P.2d 932 , 936 (1989) ("But once the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion."); People v. Navarro, 7 Cal.3d 248 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 , 489 (1972) ("[A]lthough the Legislature was not required in the first instance to give the court power to commit persons in the status of [the defendant] to the treatment program, having conferred this power it cannot condition its exe

2024In analyzing the application of the separation of powers doctrine in this context, we stated "the principle gleaned is that once a defendant's guilt has been determined, the prosecutor's charging discretion is complete and the judiciary's sentencing discretion, if any, is all that remains." Id.

2024Once a court has been granted sentencing discretion, it "cannot be conditioned upon the prosecution's approval without running afoul of the separation of powers doctrine." Id. at 787, 432 P.3d at 158 .

2018See People v. Superior Court of San Mateo Cty., 520 P.2d 405, 410 (Cal. 1974) ("It is true that acquittal or sentencing is the typical choice open to the court, but in appropriate cases it is not the only termination.

2009Thus, while Bordenkircher certainly made clear that a prosecutor has broad discretion in charging a defendant, it did not offer any guidance on whether a provision similar to NRS 484.37941 invades that charging discretion. 5 Instead, we find the California Supreme Court’s decisions in Esteybar v. Municipal Court for Long Beach Judicial District, 485 P.2d 1140 (Cal. 1971), and People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 520 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1974), to be instructive on the issue of whether NRS 484.37941 is unconstitutional because it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.

2018We recognize that the statute operates in a seemingly atypical fashion, but any prosecutorial power over the district court's disposition at this stage of the proceedings is offensive to the separation of powers. 6 See Navarro, 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d at 488-89 (finding a violation of the separation of powers doctrine where a statute required agreement by the prosecutor before the court could assign the defendant to a treatment program and reiterating "that the Legislature, of course, by general laws can control eligibility for probation, parole and the term of imprisonment, but it cannot

2018We recognize that the statute operates in a seemingly atypical fashion, but any prosecutorial power over the district court's disposition at this stage of the proceedings is offensive to the separation of powers. 6 See Navarro, 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d at 488-89 (finding a violation of the separation of powers doctrine where a statute required agreement by the prosecutor before the court could assign the defendant to a treatment program and reiterating "that the Legislature, of course, by general laws can control eligibility for probation, parole and the term of imprisonment, but it cannot

1977In our view, NRS ch. 241, as applied to judicial bodies, is an unconstitutional infringement on the inherent powers of the judiciary which violates the doctrine of separation of powers. 2 “It is fundamental to our system of government that the separate powers granted the executive, legislative and judicial departments be exercised without intrusion.” City of No. Las Vegas v. Daines, 92 Nev. 292, 294 , 550 P.2d 399, 400 (1976).

1977In our view, NRS ch. 241, as applied to judicial bodies, is an unconstitutional infringement on the inherent powers of the judiciary which violates the doctrine of separation of powers. 2 “It is fundamental to our system of government that the separate powers granted the executive, legislative and judicial departments be exercised without intrusion.” City of No. Las Vegas v. Daines, 92 Nev. 292, 294 , 550 P.2d 399, 400 (1976).

2025See State v. Hartzog, 635 P.2d 694, 701 (Wash. 1981) ("It is fundamental that a trial court is vested with the discretion to provide for courtroom security."); see Halverson, 123 Nev. at 262 , 163 P.3d at 441 ("[C]ourts have inherent authority to make certain that their courtrooms are secure."); Oade v. State, 114 Nev. 619, 621 , 960 P.2d 336, 338 (1998) ("A trial judge has a responsibility to maintain order and decorum in trial proceedings."); In re Petition of Governor, 846 A.2d 1148, 1153 (N.H. 2004) (recognizing "that the judiciary's exercise of administrative powers to control its courtro

2025See State v. Hartzog, 635 P.2d 694, 701 (Wash. 1981) ("It is fundamental that a trial court is vested with the discretion to provide for courtroom security."); see Halverson, 123 Nev. at 262 , 163 P.3d at 441 ("[C]ourts have inherent authority to make certain that their courtrooms are secure."); Oade v. State, 114 Nev. 619, 621 , 960 P.2d 336, 338 (1998) ("A trial judge has a responsibility to maintain order and decorum in trial proceedings."); In re Petition of Governor, 846 A.2d 1148, 1153 (N.H. 2004) (recognizing "that the judiciary's exercise of administrative powers to control its courtro

2022See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (recognizing that this court need not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 2Collins held that the Housing Economic Recovery Act's for-cause restriction on the President's ability to remove the FHFA's Director violated the separation-of-powers doctrine, but also concluded that the Director still had authority to carry out the functions of the office. 141 S. Ct. at 1788. 3 (2006) (observing that it is appellant's respo

2022See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (recognizing that this court need not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 2Collins held that the Housing Economic Recovery Act's for-cause restriction on the President's ability to remove the FHFA's Director violated the separation-of-powers doctrine, but also concluded that the Director still had authority to carry out the functions of the office. 141 S. Ct. at 1788. 3 (2006) (observing that it is appellant's respo

2022See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (recognizing that this court need not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 2Collins held that the Housing Economic Recovery Act's for-cause restriction on the President's ability to remove the FHFA's Director violated the separation-of-powers doctrine, but also concluded that the Director still had authority to carry out the functions of the office. 141 S. Ct. at 1788. 3 (2006) (observing that it is appellant's respo

2022See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (recognizing that this court need not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 2Collins held that the Housing Economic Recovery Act's for-cause restriction on the President's ability to remove the FHFA's Director violated the separation-of-powers doctrine, but also concluded that the Director still had authority to carry out the functions of the office. 141 S. Ct. at 1788. 3 (2006) (observing that it is appellant's respo

2022SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 10) 1947A 41611CD ' • the judicial proceedings," Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 654, 119 P.3d 114, 118 (2002), despite it being their burden to do so, Jerernias, 134 Nev. at 50, 412 P.3d at 48-49.4 To the extent that Plumlee and Molen argue that a separation- of-powers violation cannot be forfeited, we disagree.5 We see no reason to treat a dual service separation-of-powers violation differently from the other constitutional errors that may be forfeited if not properly raised before the trial court.

2022SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 10) 1947A 41611CD ' • the judicial proceedings," Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 654, 119 P.3d 114, 118 (2002), despite it being their burden to do so, Jerernias, 134 Nev. at 50, 412 P.3d at 48-49.4 To the extent that Plumlee and Molen argue that a separation- of-powers violation cannot be forfeited, we disagree.5 We see no reason to treat a dual service separation-of-powers violation differently from the other constitutional errors that may be forfeited if not properly raised before the trial court.

2020Compare Degraw v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 134 Nev. 330 , 334, 419 P.3d 136, 140 (2018) (denying as moot an extraordinary writ petition where "interpreting the statute in the requested manner when it is unclear whether this issue is likely to reoccur in the future would render any opinion advisory at bese), with Personhood, 126 Nev. at 602 , 245 P.3d at 574 ("This court's duty is not to render advisory opinions but, rather, to resolve actual controversies by an enforceable judgment.").

2020Compare Degraw v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 134 Nev. 330 , 334, 419 P.3d 136, 140 (2018) (denying as moot an extraordinary writ petition where "interpreting the statute in the requested manner when it is unclear whether this issue is likely to reoccur in the future would render any opinion advisory at bese), with Personhood, 126 Nev. at 602 , 245 P.3d at 574 ("This court's duty is not to render advisory opinions but, rather, to resolve actual controversies by an enforceable judgment.").

2020Compare Degraw v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 134 Nev. 330 , 334, 419 P.3d 136, 140 (2018) (denying as moot an extraordinary writ petition where "interpreting the statute in the requested manner when it is unclear whether this issue is likely to reoccur in the future would render any opinion advisory at bese), with Personhood, 126 Nev. at 602 , 245 P.3d at 574 ("This court's duty is not to render advisory opinions but, rather, to resolve actual controversies by an enforceable judgment.").

2020Compare Degraw v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 134 Nev. 330 , 334, 419 P.3d 136, 140 (2018) (denying as moot an extraordinary writ petition where "interpreting the statute in the requested manner when it is unclear whether this issue is likely to reoccur in the future would render any opinion advisory at bese), with Personhood, 126 Nev. at 602 , 245 P.3d at 574 ("This court's duty is not to render advisory opinions but, rather, to resolve actual controversies by an enforceable judgment.").

2016Court, 93 Nev. 614, 615-16 , 572 P.2d 521 , 522 (1977) (citations omitted).

2016Court, 93 Nev. 614, 615-16, 572 P.2d 521, 522 (1977) (citations omitted).

2016Court, 93 Nev. 614, 615-16 , 572 P.2d 521 , 522 (1977) (citations omitted).

2016Court, 93 Nev. 614, 615-16, 572 P.2d 521, 522 (1977) (citations omitted).

1994For example, in Dunphy v. Sheehan, 92 Nev. 259 , 549 P.2d 332 (1976), this court held that the section of Nevada’s Ethics in Government law excluding members of the judiciary from regulation under that law was mandated by the separation of powers clause of the Nevada Constitution.

1994For example, in Dunphy v. Sheehan, 92 Nev. 259 , 549 P.2d 332 (1976), this court held that the section of Nevada’s Ethics in Government law excluding members of the judiciary from regulation under that law was mandated by the separation of powers clause of the Nevada Constitution.

2018Id. at 6 , 200 P.3d at 512 .

2018Id. at 6 , 200 P.3d at 512 .

2010Thus, “‘the legislature may not enact a procedural statute that conflicts with a pre-existing procedural rule, without violating the doctrine of separation of powers, and . . . such a statute is of no effect.’” Marshall, 116 Nev. at 959, 11 P.3d at 1213 (quoting State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345 , 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983)); see also Secretary of State, 120 Nev. at 465 , 93 P.3d at 752 (ex plaining that the Legislature cannot restrict, substantially impair, or defeat the exercise of this court’s constitutional powers); Whitlock, 104 Nev. at 26 , 752 P.2d at 211 (concluding that a particular

2010Thus, "`the legislature may not enact a procedural statute that conflicts with a pre-existing procedural rule, without violating the doctrine of separation of powers, and ... such a statute is of no effect.'" Marshall, 116 Nev. at 959, 11 P.3d at 1213 (quoting State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345 , 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983)); see also Secretary of State, 120 Nev. at 465 , 93 P.3d at 752 (explaining that the Legislature cannot restrict, substantially impair, or defeat the exercise of this court's constitutional powers); Whitlock, 104 Nev. at 26 , 752 P.2d at 211 (concluding that a particular sta

2026Dist. Ct., 137 Nev. 832 , 833, 501 P.3d 994, 999 (2021) (“[I]n the context of a conflicting statute and court rule, our separation of powers analysis examines whether the challenged statutory provision is substantive or procedural.” (citation modified)).

2026Lyft, 137 Nev. at 838, 501 P.3d at 1000-01 .

2022See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (recognizing that this court need not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 2Collins held that the Housing Economic Recovery Act's for-cause restriction on the President's ability to remove the FHFA's Director violated the separation-of-powers doctrine, but also concluded that the Director still had authority to carry out the functions of the office. 141 S. Ct. at 1788. 3 (2006) (observing that it is appellant's respo

2022See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (recognizing that this court need not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 2Collins held that the Housing Economic Recovery Act's for-cause restriction on the President's ability to remove the FHFA's Director violated the separation-of-powers doctrine, but also concluded that the Director still had authority to carry out the functions of the office. 141 S. Ct. at 1788. 3 (2006) (observing that it is appellant's respo

2022SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 10) 1947A 41611CD ' • the judicial proceedings," Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 654 , 119 P.3d 114, 118 (2002), despite it being their burden to do so, Jerernias, 134 Nev. at 50, 412 P.3d at 48-49 .4 To the extent that Plumlee and Molen argue that a separation- of-powers violation cannot be forfeited, we disagree.5 We see no reason to treat a dual service separation-of-powers violation differently from the other constitutional errors that may be forfeited if not properly raised before the trial court.

2022SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 10) 1947A 41611CD ' • the judicial proceedings," Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 654, 119 P.3d 114, 118 (2002), despite it being their burden to do so, Jerernias, 134 Nev. at 50, 412 P.3d at 48-49.4 To the extent that Plumlee and Molen argue that a separation- of-powers violation cannot be forfeited, we disagree.5 We see no reason to treat a dual service separation-of-powers violation differently from the other constitutional errors that may be forfeited if not properly raised before the trial court.

2020Replacing the requirement that "the same [complained ofl action" be likely to repeat, Sanchez-Gomez, U.S. at , 138 S. Ct. at 1540 (emphasis added), with a mere "likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the future," Bisch, 129 Nev. 334 -35, 302 P.3d at 1113 , invites judicial review of questions that did not and cannot affect the parties to the original dispute, which the separation of powers doctrine forbids.

2020Replacing the requirement that "the same [complained ofl action" be likely to repeat, Sanchez-Gomez, U.S. at , 138 S. Ct. at 1540 (emphasis added), with a mere "likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the future," Bisch, 129 Nev. 334 -35, 302 P.3d at 1113 , invites judicial review of questions that did not and cannot affect the parties to the original dispute, which the separation of powers doctrine forbids.