separation of powers doctrine in Illinois

2003Indeed, we would violate the separation-of-powers doctrine were we to read into the Act a provision preempting causes of action arising out of the construction and operation of livestock management facilities, for then, we truly would have "annex[ed] to [the Act] a provision or condition which the General Assembly did not see fit to impose." See Garner , 147 Ill. 2d at 476 .

2003Indeed, we would violate the separation-of-powers doctrine were we to read into the Act a provision preempting causes of action arising out of the construction and operation of livestock management facilities, for then, we truly would have “annex[ed] to [the Act] a provision or condition which the General Assembly did not see fit to impose.” Garner, 147 Ill. 2d at 476 .

2022Id. ¶ 30; see also Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 411 (holding that the separation of powers clause is not violated “merely because separate spheres of governmental authority may overlap”).

2022Although it is regrettable that the legislature focused its attention on the sale of alcohol rather than pandemic- 15 No. 1-21-0993 caused delays in a detained individual’s statutory right to a speedy trial, we are nonetheless bound by points of law that are crystal clear: (1) the separate spheres of authority exercised by each branch of government may overlap without violating the separation of powers clause (see Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 30 ; Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 411 ); and (2) in the event of a conflict between a supreme court rule on a matter within the court’s authority and a statute on

2025See People v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 465, 475 (1988). ¶ 42 In this case, sections 110-6 and 110-6.1 did not violate the separation of powers doctrine because they did not unduly infringe on respondent’s inherent authority to control his docket by limiting his ability to detain petitioner pending trial.

2018Then, in 1961, the court in People v. Kostos, 21 Ill. 2d 451, 455 (1961), tracked the exact language in Davis, 10 Ill. 2d 430 , and cited also to the court’s 1921 opinion in Rosenbaum, 299 Ill. 2d 93 . ¶ 29 Seventeen years later, in People v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 465 (1988), the court was asked to determine whether section 114-5(a) violated the separation of powers doctrine.

1997With regard to separation of powers violations resulting from conflicts between statutory provisions and court rules, this court has indicated that even where a statute, standing alone, does not violate the separation of powers clause, "the legislature is without authority to interfere with 'a product of this court’s supervisory and administrative responsibility.’ ” People v. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36, 45 (1986), quoting People v. Jackson, 69 Ill. 2d 252, 259 (1977).

1997With regard to separation of powers violations resulting from conflicts between statutory provisions and court rules, this court has indicated that even where a statute, standing alone, does not violate the separation of powers clause, “the legislature is without authority to interfere with `a product of this court's supervisory and administrative responsibility.' ” People v. Joseph , 113 Ill. 2d 36, 45 (1986), quoting People v. Jackson , 69 Ill. 2d 252, 259 (1977).

1992(See City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill.2d 170, 181-82 , 311 N.E.2d 146 .) However, where such authority is granted, the doctrine of separation of powers requires that the judiciary be given an adequate opportunity to review the agency's application of legal principles.

1992(See City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 170, 181-82 .) However, where such authority is granted, the doctrine of separation of powers requires that the judiciary be given an adequate opportunity to review the agency’s application of legal principles.

2025Stat. 1989, ch. 37, ¶ 805-4(3.1)), requiring a court to permit prosecution of juveniles under criminal law in specified circumstances where the Act was “a purely statutory creature whose parameters and application are defined solely by the legislature”); Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d 53, 61 (1979) (rejecting a separation of powers challenge to a provision in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill.

2010See Chicago National League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357, 364-66 (1985) (rejecting a separation of powers challenge to a statute subjecting night baseball games to noise emission standards); Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d 53, 57-60 (1979) (rejecting a separation of powers challenge to a statute which required a waiting period between the court’s determination that grounds exist for dissolution of the marriage and the court’s disposition of property).

1997In McAlister v. Schick, 147 Ill. 2d 84 , 588 N.E.2d 1151 (1992), the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of section 2—622 against a separation of powers challenge.

1997In McAlister v. Schick, 147 Ill. 2d 84 , 588 N.E.2d 1151 (1992), the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of section 2—622 against a separation of powers challenge.

2002However, the doctrine of separation of powers "was not designed to achieve a complete divorce among the three branches of government" ( In re J.J., 142 Ill.2d at 7, 153 Ill.Dec. 239 , 566 N.E.2d 1345 ; Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill.2d 53, 58 , 27 Ill.Dec. 762 , 389 N.E.2d 1170 (1979)) and does not require "governmental powers to be divided into rigid, mutually exclusive compartments" ( In re J.J., 142 Ill.2d at 7, 153 Ill.Dec. 239 , 566 N.E.2d 1345 ; In re Estate of Barker, 63 Ill.2d 113, 119 , 345 N.E.2d 484 (1976)).

2002However, the doctrine of separation of powers "was not designed to achieve a complete divorce among the three branches of government" ( In re J.J., 142 Ill.2d at 7, 153 Ill.Dec. 239 , 566 N.E.2d 1345 ; Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill.2d 53, 58 , 27 Ill.Dec. 762 , 389 N.E.2d 1170 (1979)) and does not require "governmental powers to be divided into rigid, mutually exclusive compartments" ( In re J.J., 142 Ill.2d at 7, 153 Ill.Dec. 239 , 566 N.E.2d 1345 ; In re Estate of Barker, 63 Ill.2d 113, 119 , 345 N.E.2d 484 (1976)).

2014Put simply, the three branches of government are “ ‘parts of a single operating government, and *** the separation of powers clause was not designed to achieve a complete divorce between them.’ ” County of Kane, 116 Ill. 2d at 208 (quoting People v. Reiner, 6 Ill. 2d 337, 342 (1955)).

2014Put simply, the three branches of government are “ ‘parts of a single operating government, and *** the separation of powers clause was not designed to achieve a complete divorce between them.’ ” County of Kane, 116 Ill. 2d at 208 (quoting People v. Reiner, 6 Ill. 2d 337, 342 (1955)).

2002However, the doctrine of separation of powers "was not designed to achieve a complete divorce among the three branches of government" ( In re J.J., 142 Ill.2d at 7, 153 Ill.Dec. 239 , 566 N.E.2d 1345 ; Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill.2d 53, 58 , 27 Ill.Dec. 762 , 389 N.E.2d 1170 (1979)) and does not require "governmental powers to be divided into rigid, mutually exclusive compartments" ( In re J.J., 142 Ill.2d at 7, 153 Ill.Dec. 239 , 566 N.E.2d 1345 ; In re Estate of Barker, 63 Ill.2d 113, 119 , 345 N.E.2d 484 (1976)).

2002However, the doctrine of separation of powers "was not designed to achieve a complete divorce among the three branches of government" ( In re J.J., 142 Ill.2d at 7, 153 Ill.Dec. 239 , 566 N.E.2d 1345 ; Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill.2d 53, 58 , 27 Ill.Dec. 762 , 389 N.E.2d 1170 (1979)) and does not require "governmental powers to be divided into rigid, mutually exclusive compartments" ( In re J.J., 142 Ill.2d at 7, 153 Ill.Dec. 239 , 566 N.E.2d 1345 ; In re Estate of Barker, 63 Ill.2d 113, 119 , 345 N.E.2d 484 (1976)).

2001In re J.J., 142 Ill.2d at 8-9, 153 Ill.Dec. 239 , 566 N.E.2d 1345 ; see also In re D.S., 198 Ill.2d 309, 330 , 261 Ill.Dec. 281 , 763 N.E.2d 251 (2001) (holding that the duty and authority vested in the circuit court by the Juvenile Court Act does not violate the separation of powers doctrine).

2001In re J.J., 142 Ill.2d at 8-9, 153 Ill.Dec. 239 , 566 N.E.2d 1345 ; see also In re D.S., 198 Ill.2d 309, 330 , 261 Ill.Dec. 281 , 763 N.E.2d 251 (2001) (holding that the duty and authority vested in the circuit court by the Juvenile Court Act does not violate the separation of powers doctrine).

2023Id. at 529 . ¶ 44 In People v. Mayfield, 2021 IL App (2d) 200603 , the second district appellate court relied on Kunkel in addressing the same issue as the one here, whether the supreme court’s COVID-19 orders tolling the statutory time restrictions in section 103-5 of the Criminal Code violated the separation of powers doctrine.

2022Consequently, the separation of powers principle is violated when a legislative enactment unduly encroaches upon the inherent powers of the judiciary, or directly and irreconcilably conflicts with a rule of this court on a matter within the court’s authority.” Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 528 (1997). ¶ 40 The Illinois Supreme Court has not been reluctant to strike down statutory provisions when they both operate in the realm of the court’s administrative authority and conflict with a rule - 13 - No. 1-21-0913 of the court.

2022Although it is regrettable that the legislature focused its attention on the sale of alcohol rather than pandemic- 15 No. 1-21-0993 caused delays in a detained individual’s statutory right to a speedy trial, we are nonetheless bound by points of law that are crystal clear: (1) the separate spheres of authority exercised by each branch of government may overlap without violating the separation of powers clause (see Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 30 ; Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 411 ); and (2) in the event of a conflict between a supreme court rule on a matter within the court’s authority and a statute on

1989(People v. Cox (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 268, 274 , 412 N.E.2d 541, 544 .) The separation of powers clause in our constitution states: “The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate.

2008The court in West End applied the general rule that, “ ‘where authority has been conferred upon administrative agencies to perform functions of an executive nature, provisions for a trial de novo in courts of law violate the separation-of-powers principle’ ” (Devine, 181 Ill. 2d at 530 , quoting West End, 16 Ill. 2d at 525 ), held that the statute vested the courts with “ ‘a supervisory power which is not limited to a review of the administrative action but extends to a redetermination of factual issues’ ” (Devine, 181 Ill. 2d at 531 , quoting West End, 16 Ill. 2d at 525 ), and thus concluded

2008The court in West End applied the general rule that, “ ‘where authority has been conferred upon administrative agencies to perform functions of an executive nature, provisions for a trial de novo in courts of law violate the separation-of-powers principle’ ” (Devine, 181 Ill. 2d at 530 , quoting West End, 16 Ill. 2d at 525 ), held that the statute vested the courts with “ ‘a supervisory power which is not limited to a review of the administrative action but extends to a redetermination of factual issues’ ” (Devine, 181 Ill. 2d at 531 , quoting West End, 16 Ill. 2d at 525 ), and thus concluded

2010In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d 471, 486-87 , 677 N.E.2d 920, 927 (1997).

2010In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d 471, 486-87 , 677 N.E.2d 920, 927 (1997).

2001See also Michigan Avenue, 191 Ill.2d at 522 , 247 Ill.Dec. 473 , 732 N.E.2d 528 , quoting People v. Garner, 147 Ill.2d 467, 475-76 , 168 Ill.Dec. 833 , 590 N.E.2d 470 (1992) ("`Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts may not legislate, rewrite or extend legislation.

2001See also Michigan Avenue, 191 Ill. 2d at 522 , quoting People v. Gamer, 147 Ill. 2d 467, 475-76 (1992) (“ ‘Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts may not legislate, rewrite or extend legislation.

2015The separation of powers doctrine "insure[s] that each of the three branches of government retains its own sphere of authority, free from undue encroachment by the other branches." Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill. 2d 318, 334 (2006).

2015The separation of powers doctrine “insure[s] that each of the three branches of government retains its own sphere of authority, free from undue encroachment by the other branches.” Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill. 2d 318, 334 (2006).

2013Finally, our supreme court found that the Franchise Act impermissibly delegated to individual judges “the task of independently deciding what the public interest is in each case *** based upon whatever factors the judges consider pertinent, in addition to the competing public and private interests expressed in the [Franchise Act].” Id. at 478 . ¶ 64 The Act in this case does not suffer the same infirmities noted by our supreme court in Fields Jeep-Eagle, Inc. and does not violate the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution.

2013Finally, our supreme court found that the Franchise Act impermissibly delegated to individual judges “the task of independently deciding what the public interest is in each case *** based upon whatever factors the judges consider pertinent, in addition to the competing public and private interests expressed in the [Franchise Act].” Id. at 478 . ¶ 64 The Act in this case does not suffer the same infirmities noted by our supreme court in Fields Jeep-Eagle, Inc. and does not violate the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution.

2022Observing that the statute had such requirements to “facilitate appellate review of the court’s dismissal,” our supreme court stated that an interpretation of that section as mandating the entry of a written order and its contents “would violate the doctrine of separation of powers.” Id. at 82-83 .

2005Porter reasoned that the written-order requirement intruded upon the judicial function of the court, and therefore to read the written order requirement as mandatory would violate the doctrine of separation of powers. 343 Ill.App.3d at 920-921 , 278 Ill.Dec. 627 , 799 N.E.2d 345 , citing Porter, 122 Ill.2d at 82 , 118 Ill.Dec. 465 , 521 N.E.2d 1158 .

1989Lasecki v. Traeger (1940), 374 Ill. 355, 359 , 29 N.E.2d 519 (statute conferring “broad and comprehensive” rulemaking power); Diversey Liquidating Corp. v. Neunkirchen (1939), 370 Ill. 523, 526 , 19 N.E.2d 363 (statute authorizing court to make all rules “necessary or expedient for the proper administration of justice in that court”).) The chief judge’s rulemaking and administrative duties under the Act do not violate the doctrine of separation of powers because they do not “ ‘infringe upon the inherent powers of the judiciary.’ ” People v. Taylor (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 201, 207 , 464 N.E.2d 1059

1989Lasecki v. Traeger (1940), 374 Ill. 355, 359 , 29 N.E.2d 519 (statute conferring “broad and comprehensive” rulemaking power); Diversey Liquidating Corp. v. Neunkirchen (1939), 370 Ill. 523, 526 , 19 N.E.2d 363 (statute authorizing court to make all rules “necessary or expedient for the proper administration of justice in that court”).) The chief judge’s rulemaking and administrative duties under the Act do not violate the doctrine of separation of powers because they do not “ ‘infringe upon the inherent powers of the judiciary.’ ” People v. Taylor (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 201, 207 , 464 N.E.2d 1059

2014Put simply, the three branches of government are “ ‘parts of a single operating government, and *** the separation of powers clause was not designed to achieve a complete divorce between them.’ ” County of Kane, 116 Ill. 2d at 208 (quoting People v. Reiner, 6 Ill. 2d 337, 342 (1955)).

2014Put simply, the three branches of government are “ ‘parts of a single operating government, and *** the separation of powers clause was not designed to achieve a complete divorce between them.’ ” County of Kane, 116 Ill. 2d at 208 (quoting People v. Reiner, 6 Ill. 2d 337, 342 (1955)).

2014No. 508 v. Burris, 118 Ill. 2d 465, 479 , 515 N.E.2d 1244, 1250 (1987) (stating the comptroller’s disbursement of funds without legislative appropriation would “ ‘override’ the action of the legislature and the Governor in making these reductions in an appropriations bill” and “creat[e] obvious problems under the separation of powers doctrine”); American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Netsch, 216 Ill.

2014No. 508 v. Burris, 118 Ill. 2d 465, 479 , 515 N.E.2d 1244, 1250 (1987) (stating the comptroller’s disbursement of funds without legislative appropriation would “ ‘override’ the action of the legislature and the Governor in making these reductions in an appropriations bill” and “creat[e] obvious problems under the separation of powers doctrine”); American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Netsch, 216 Ill.

1992Francis Hospital (1986), 112 Ill.2d 273, 281 , 97 Ill.Dec. 449 , 492 N.E.2d 1322 .) However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, legislative attempts at regulating judicial practice which "unduly infringe upon the inherent powers of the judiciary" are unconstitutional. ( Agran v. Checker Taxi Co. (1952), 412 Ill. 145, 149 , 105 N.E.2d 713 .) Section 2-622, in allowing health care professionals authority to usurp the inherently judicial function of applying legal principles to the facts of a case, unduly infringes upon the judiciary's inherent powers.

1992Francis Hospital (1986), 112 Ill.2d 273, 281 , 97 Ill.Dec. 449 , 492 N.E.2d 1322 .) However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, legislative attempts at regulating judicial practice which "unduly infringe upon the inherent powers of the judiciary" are unconstitutional. ( Agran v. Checker Taxi Co. (1952), 412 Ill. 145, 149 , 105 N.E.2d 713 .) Section 2-622, in allowing health care professionals authority to usurp the inherently judicial function of applying legal principles to the facts of a case, unduly infringes upon the judiciary's inherent powers.

2011As importantly, at that time, this court expressly recognized that the legislature had the authority "to prescribe new rules of evidence and alter existing ones" and that "[s]uch action does not offend the separation-of-powers clause of our constitution." First National Bank of Chicago v. King, 165 Ill.2d 533, 542 , 209 Ill.Dec. 199 , 651 N.E.2d 127 (1995); see also People v. Orange, 121 Ill.2d 364, 381 , 118 Ill.Dec. 1 , 521 N.E.2d 69 (1988) (holding that this court's previous refusal to allow the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements "did not preclude the legislature from doing so

2011As importantly, at that time, this court expressly recognized that the legislature had the authority "to prescribe new rules of evidence and alter existing ones" and that "[s]uch action does not offend the separation-of-powers clause of our constitution." First National Bank of Chicago v. King, 165 Ill.2d 533, 542 , 209 Ill.Dec. 199 , 651 N.E.2d 127 (1995); see also People v. Orange, 121 Ill.2d 364, 381 , 118 Ill.Dec. 1 , 521 N.E.2d 69 (1988) (holding that this court's previous refusal to allow the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements "did not preclude the legislature from doing so

1989Lasecki v. Traeger (1940), 374 Ill. 355, 359 , 29 N.E.2d 519 (statute conferring “broad and comprehensive” rulemaking power); Diversey Liquidating Corp. v. Neunkirchen (1939), 370 Ill. 523, 526 , 19 N.E.2d 363 (statute authorizing court to make all rules “necessary or expedient for the proper administration of justice in that court”).) The chief judge’s rulemaking and administrative duties under the Act do not violate the doctrine of separation of powers because they do not “ ‘infringe upon the inherent powers of the judiciary.’ ” People v. Taylor (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 201, 207 , 464 N.E.2d 1059

1989Finally, Bainter referred to our statement in People v. Davis (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 155, 161 , that this court must protect judicial powers from legislation, invalid under the separation of powers clause, that unduly infringes upon the inherent powers of the judiciary.

2010Such action does not offend the separation-of-powers clause of our constitution.” (Emphasis added.) First National Bank of Chicago v. King, 165 Ill. 2d 533, 542 (1995); see also People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 101 Ill. 2d 137, 140 (1984) (same); People v. Wells, 380 Ill. 347, 354 (1942) (same).

1995Such action does not offend the separation-of-powers clause of our constitution. ( People v. Rolfingsmeyer (1984), 101 Ill.2d 137, 140 , 77 Ill.Dec. 787 , 461 N.E.2d 410 .) Although the legislature cannot declare what shall be conclusive evidence ( Morrison v. Flowers (1923), 308 Ill. 189, 194 , 139 N.E. 10 ), the statute here does not purport to do so.