separation of powers doctrine in Pennsylvania

2014The separation of powers doctrine provides that “the executive, the legislature and the judiciary are independent, coequal branches of government.” Beckert v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137 , 439 A.2d 638, 642 (1981).

2014The separation of powers doctrine provides that “the executive, the legislature and the judiciary are independent, coequal branches of government.” Beckert v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137 , 439 A.2d 638, 642 (1981).

2017Indeed, even the most inflexible of this Court‟s decisions historically have recognized that the separation of powers doctrine contemplates “a degree of interdependence and reciprocity between the various branches.” Sutley, 474 Pa. at 262 , 378 A.2d at 783 . 10 Such prescription provides context to the explicit boundaries of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

2017Indeed, even the most inflexible of this Court‟s decisions historically have recognized that the separation of powers doctrine contemplates “a degree of interdependence and reciprocity between the various branches.” Sutley, 474 Pa. at 262 , 378 A.2d at 783 . 10 Such prescription provides context to the explicit boundaries of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

2021In support of the final issue, Counsel maintains that under Davidson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 33 A.3d 682, 686 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), the Board does not violate the separation of powers doctrine by recommitting a parolee without credit for time spent at liberty on parole.

2021In Davidson, this Court held that the Board did not violate the separation of powers doctrine when it was “acting pursuant to 61 Pa.C.S. §6138 and recommit[ted] [a parolee] as a [CPV] without credit for time served at liberty on parole.” 33 A.3d at 686 (citing Young, 409 A.2d at 848 ).

2023Trial, 12/6/21, at 13. 10 In Mockaitis, our Supreme Court found unconstitutional Act 63 on the grounds that it violated the Separation of Powers doctrine because it delegated to the courts the responsibility to determine whether and when repeat DUI offenders are entitled to conditional restoration of their operating privileges, which is a function of the executive branch of government. 834 A.2d at 503 .

2013Thus, under this doctrine, this Court may invalidate statutory provisions, which intrude on our judicial prerogative to regulate, among other things, “judicial officers.” See Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, 575 Pa. 5, 24-25 , 834 A.2d 488, 499-500 (2003) (holding this Court has supervisory powers over its employees, and “[t]his Court has not hesitated to strike down legislation that clearly violates the separation of powers doctrine.”) (citations omitted); Snyder, supra (holding that legislative attempt to authorize political activity by court employees was an unconstitutional infringement upon the

2018Just as "the [PHRC] has no jurisdiction, because of the separation of powers doctrine, to adjudicate any complaints against the judicial branch[,]" First Judicial Dist. , 727 A.2d at 1112 , "[u]nder the doctrine of separation of powers, the legislature may not exercise any power specifically entrusted to the judiciary[.]" Kremer v. State Ethics Comm'n , 503 Pa. 358 , 469 A.2d 593 , 595 (1983).

2018Just as "the [PHRC] has no jurisdiction, because of the separation of powers doctrine, to adjudicate any complaints against the judicial branch[,]" First Judicial Dist. , 727 A.2d at 1112 , "[u]nder the doctrine of separation of powers, the legislature may not exercise any power specifically entrusted to the judiciary[.]" Kremer v. State Ethics Comm'n , 503 Pa. 358 , 469 A.2d 593 , 595 (1983).

2018Renner appealed to this Court. 7 Discussion Initially, Renner intertwines his arguments by relying on Court of Common Pleas of Erie County v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission , 546 Pa. 4 , 682 A.2d 1246 (1996), as support for his position that the General Assembly in its enactment of the PHRA waived immunity for the common pleas courts and that the PHRA does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

2018Renner appealed to this Court. 7 Discussion Initially, Renner intertwines his arguments by relying on Court of Common Pleas of Erie County v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission , 546 Pa. 4 , 682 A.2d 1246 (1996), as support for his position that the General Assembly in its enactment of the PHRA waived immunity for the common pleas courts and that the PHRA does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

2022Comm’n, 727 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Pa. 1999)).) Petitioners also argue that Common Pleas did not waive its supervisory rights when entering into the CBA or incorporating its internal grievance system into the CBA and “[it] certainly did not agree to any administrative agency oversight of its operations.” (Id. at 24.) Even if this was not the case, Petitioners argue that their agreement to follow an internal grievance process did not waive their protection under the separation of powers doctrine.

2018This holding is only a logical extension of the holding in [ Erie County ] that 'the separation of powers doctrine requires that judges retain the authority to select, discharge and supervise court employees.' [ Id. ] at 1247, citing Bradley v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., ... 479 Pa. 440 , 388 A.2d 736 ( [Pa.] 1978).

2013In maintaining that Pennsylvania case law recognizes this natural-rights theory, as well as its corollary — that a duly-enacted constitutional amendment can be deemed unconstitutional — Petitioners rely heavily on Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406 , 250 A.2d 474 (1969), a controversy in which several taxpayers challenged the validity of the 1968 version of Article V as violative of the separation of powers doctrine.

2013In maintaining that Pennsylvania case law recognizes this natural-rights theory, as well as its corollary — that a duly-enacted constitutional amendment can be deemed unconstitutional — Petitioners rely heavily on Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406 , 250 A.2d 474 (1969), a controversy in which several taxpayers challenged the validity of the 1968 version of Article V as violative of the separation of powers doctrine.

2021In Davidson, this Court held that the Board did not violate the separation of powers doctrine when it was “acting pursuant to 61 Pa.C.S. §6138 and recommit[ted] [a parolee] as a [CPV] without credit for time served at liberty on parole.” 33 A.3d at 686 (citing Young, 409 A.2d at 848 ).

2018Young v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 409 A.2d 843, 848 (Pa. 1979) (“a denial of credit does not constitute an enhancement of a sentence so as to raise federal constitutional implications [and]…does not effect the sentence in such a manner as would be offensive to the doctrine of separation of powers.”).

2017Comm’n, 546 Pa. 4 , 682 A.2d 1246, 1248 (1996) (holding that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission is prohibited from hearing a discharged court employee’s discrimination claim under the separation of powers doctrine); Matter of Antolik, 93 Pa.Cmwlth. 258 , 501 A.2d 697, 701 (1985) (holding that a county nepotism rule encroached upon the Judiciary’s right to hire, fire, and supervise court employees, and the application of the rule to a promotion decision violated the separation of powers doctrine); Eshelman v. Comm’rs of Berks Cnty., 62 Pa.Cmwlth. 310 , 436 A.2d 710, 713 (1981) (holding

2017Comm’n, 546 Pa. 4 , 682 A.2d 1246, 1248 (1996) (holding that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission is prohibited from hearing a discharged court employee’s discrimination claim under the separation of powers doctrine); Matter of Antolik, 93 Pa.Cmwlth. 258 , 501 A.2d 697, 701 (1985) (holding that a county nepotism rule encroached upon the Judiciary’s right to hire, fire, and supervise court employees, and the application of the rule to a promotion decision violated the separation of powers doctrine); Eshelman v. Comm’rs of Berks Cnty., 62 Pa.Cmwlth. 310 , 436 A.2d 710, 713 (1981) (holding

2020Cf. Commonwealth v. Buonopane, 599 A.2d 681 (Pa. Super. 1991) (absent a finding of bad faith, the separation of powers doctrine requires courts to refrain from reviewing a prosecutor’s discretionary acts).

2017This Court, however, has ruled that Pennsylvania courts have no power of review over the actions of the executive branch involving acts of discretion in the absence of bad faith, fraud, capricious action or abuse of power. 6 Pennsylvania Social Services Local 668 v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 481 Pa. 81 , 392 A.2d 256 (1978) (“nor will [courts] inquire into the wisdom of such actions or into the details of the manner adopted to carry them into execution”) (citing United States v. Sanchez, 908 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[s]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe t

2018See L.J.S. v. State Ethics Comm'n , 744 A.2d 798 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (A probation officer is a judicial employee, thus, under the separation of powers doctrine, is not subject to the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act. 10 ); Russo , 125 A.3d at 121 ("[T]he General Assembly did not intend the judiciary to be included within the definition of an employer subject to the Whistleblower Law. [ 11 ] " 12 The common pleas court is a part of the judiciary, thus, under the separation of powers doctrine, is not subject to the Whistleblower Law.).

2008The trial court quoted L.J.S. v. State Ethics Commission, 744 A.2d 798, 800-801 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), which states that the Pennsylvania Constitution establishes three separate, equal and independent branches of government and that the courts "have certain inherent rights and powers to do all such things as are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice" and that "[t]hat power may not, consistent with the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, be policed, encroached upon or diminished by another branch of government." The PERA states the public policy of the Commonwealth to p

2024Cos., 883 A.2d 562 , 570 n.7 (Pa. 2005) (observing that legislation “may be harsh, so long as [it] is constitutional[;]” “policy determinations . . . are within the exclusive purview of the legislature[;] and it would be a gross violation of the separation of powers doctrine for us to intrude into that arena” (quoting Glenn Johnston, Inc. v. Dep’t of Rev., 726 A.2d 384, 388 (Pa. 1998.))). 8 Villani v. Seibert, 159 A.3d 478, 492 (Pa. 2017) (“[J]udges plainly stand at a disadvantage in the substantive lawmaking process, which also, quite frankly, is often steeped in difficult political judgments

2012Auth., 593 Pa. 184, 192 , 928 A.2d 1013, 1017-18 (2007) ("[I]t is the Legislature's chief function to set public policy and the courts' role to enforce that policy, subject to constitutional limitations."); Glenn Johnston, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Revenue, 556 Pa. 22, 30 , 726 A.2d 384, 388 (1999) (noting, in the context of applying a different tax exemption, that "[s]uch policy determinations, however, are within the exclusive purview of the legislature, and it would be a gross violation of the separation of powers doctrine for us to intrude into that arena").

2015While no governmental branch “should exercise the functions exclusively committed to another branch[,]” Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 14 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quoting Sweeney v. Tucker, 375 A.2d 698, 706 (Pa. 1977)), a constitutional violation does not automatically occur when one governmental branch exercises a power specifically delegated to it.

2000Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493 , 375 A.2d 698 (1977).

1999In those cases, the Commonwealth Court stated, “it has been consistently held that the separation of powers doctrine deprives the Commission of jurisdiction to hear the merits of the underlying complaint.” First Judicial District v. PHRC, 702 A.2d 592, 593 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), citing County of Allegheny v. Wilcox, 76 Pa.Cmwlth. 584 , 465 A.2d 47 (1983), appeal dismissed, 507 Pa. 66 , 488 A.2d 277 (1985).

1999In those cases, the Commonwealth Court stated, “it has been consistently held that the separation of powers doctrine deprives the Commission of jurisdiction to hear the merits of the underlying complaint.” First Judicial District v. PHRC, 702 A.2d 592, 593 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), citing County of Allegheny v. Wilcox, 76 Pa.Cmwlth. 584 , 465 A.2d 47 (1983), appeal dismissed, 507 Pa. 66 , 488 A.2d 277 (1985).

2017“Because of the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts will not lightly interfere with an executive’s decision of whom to prosecute.” Commonwealth v. Murphy, 795 A.2d 997 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted).

2014In order to establish a prima facie case of selective prosecution, [an a]ppellant must establish, first, that others similarly situated were not prosecuted for similar conduct, and, selection was based on impermissible grounds such as race, religion, the exercise of some constitutional right, or any other such arbitrary classification. the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts will not lightly interfere with an Commonwealth v. Murphy, 795 A.2d 997, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted).

2020Subsequently, M.G. filed the instant application for summary relief.7 Therein, M.G. asserts that he is entitled to relief because the lifetime registration requirement set forth in subchapter I of SORNA II violates the prohibition against 6 M.G. also argues that SORNA II, as applied to him, violates the separation of powers doctrine, places him in double jeopardy, and is fundamentally unfair. 7 “An application for summary relief may be granted if a party’s right to judgment is clear and no material issues of fact are in dispute.” Hospital & Healthsystem Association of Pennsylvania v. Commonwea

2011It is well settled that under the doctrine of separation of powers, no branch of the government is permitted to exercise the "functions exclusively committed to another branch." Jubelirer v. Rendell, 598 Pa. 16, 41 , 953 A.2d 514, 529 (2008). [9] In In re Weaverland Independent School District, 378 Pa. 449, 456 , 106 A.2d 812, 815 (1954), the Supreme Court observed that the Secretary did not have to hold a hearing because the Public School Code of 1949 did not explicitly require it.

2003The separation of powers doctrine has “historically protected the judiciary against incursions into areas other than its conduct of adversary litigation.” In re 42 Pa.C.S. 1703, 482 Pa. 522 , 394 A.2d 444, 449 (1978).

2003The separation of powers doctrine has “historically protected the judiciary against incursions into areas other than its conduct of adversary litigation.” In re 42 Pa.C.S. 1703, 482 Pa. 522 , 394 A.2d 444, 449 (1978).

1991Additionally, in Commonwealth v. Wright, 508 Pa. 25 , 494 A.2d 354 (1985), the supreme court noted: ... the argument that section 9712 violates the separation of powers principle by depriving the sentencing court of discretion may be rejected out of hand.

1991Additionally, in Commonwealth v. Wright, 508 Pa. 25 , 494 A.2d 354 (1985), the supreme court noted: ... the argument that section 9712 violates the separation of powers principle by depriving the sentencing court of discretion may be rejected out of hand.

2018(Counsel’s Amended No-Merit Letter at 2.) 5 maxim was reiterated in Gaito v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 412 A.2d 568, 570 (Pa. 1980), where our Supreme Court opined: “[W]hen the Board refuses to credit a convicted parole violator with time spent free on parole there is neither a usurpation of the judicial function of sentencing nor a denial of the procedural safeguards to which persons are entitled.” Further, this Court in Davidson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 33 A.3d 682 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), determined that “the Board did not violate the separation of powers

2018Gaito v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 412 A.2d 568 (Pa. 1980). 4 In the brief filed on his own behalf, Coker argues the Board violated statutory and constitutional law pursuant to the separation of powers doctrine and due process when it added 797 days to his original sentence.

2020See, e.g., Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 489 (1849) (finding the separation of powers doctrine, and the inherent powers of the judicial branch, were distributed in the Constitution in such a way that the legislature could not exercise any judicial power).

2020See, e.g., Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 489 (1849) (finding the separation of powers doctrine, and the inherent powers of the judicial branch, were distributed in the Constitution in such a way that the legislature could not exercise any judicial power).

2026That power may not, consistent with the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, be policed, encroached upon, or diminished by another branch of government.” Id. at 862 . 8 We agreed with Teamsters Local 115 that Beckert was not controlling because in Beckert, the rights of judicial employees to organize under the PERA was not at issue.

2019That power may not, consistent with the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, be policed, encroached upon, or diminished by another branch of government." Beckert v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees , 56 Pa.Cmwlth. 572 , 425 A.2d 859 , 862-63 (1981), aff'd , 501 Pa. 70 , 459 A.2d 756 (1983). 5 Nonetheless, while the courts of common pleas are considered the employers of judicial personnel, including probation officers, "this fact does not preclude the possibility that a county may share co-employer or joint employer status with the courts." Graves , 117 F

2023In reviewing the trial court’s order, the Torsilieri Court separated the defendant’s claims into two categories: (1) the irrebuttable presumption challenge; and (2) whether Subchapter H’s lifetime registration provisions violated the requirements of Apprendi and Alleyne, imposed sentences in excess of the statutory maximum sentence, constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and violated the separation of powers doctrine by preventing trial ____________________________________________ 5 See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). - 11 - J-S

2023Overall, Appellant alleges Revised Subchapter H unduly relies upon an irrebuttable presumption that all sexual offenders are dangerous and “pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses[.]” Appellant’s brief at 20. ____________________________________________ 2 “Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Alleyne v. U.S., 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 483 n.10, 490 (2000)). 3 In addition to these two categories of claims, Appellant has advan