separation of powers doctrine in Ohio

2026Thompkins at 560 . {¶ 50} In Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504 (2000), superseded by statute on other grounds, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that Ohio’s postrelease control scheme does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

2025The Ohio Supreme Court held that “because the [executive branch’s] discretion in managing post-release control does not impede the function of the judicial branch, we find no violation of the separation of powers doctrine.” Id.

2013No. 2007 CA 24, 2008-Ohio-1312, ¶ 36 (noting that a Daubert challenge or presentation of expert testimony is “forestalled by the ‘legislative mandate recognized in Vega’”) (citation omitted). {¶26} Mason finally argues that the delegation of authority to the director of health to determine the validity of testing methods and devices violates the separation of powers doctrine and infringes upon the trial court’s role as gatekeeper and its regulation of the admission of expert testimony under Evidence Rule 702. {¶27} “[T]he Ohio Rules of Evidence, which were promulgated by the Supreme Court purs

2013Accordingly, judicial notice of this factor dispenses with the necessity for expert testimony by the state in chief for the efficiency of the intoxilyzer machine.”); Miller at ¶ 29 , citing State v. Massie, 2nd Dist. No. 2007 CA 7 24, 2008-Ohio-1312, ¶ 36 (noting that a Daubert challenge or presentation of expert testimony is “forestalled by the ‘legislative mandate recognized in Vega’”) (citation omitted). {¶23} Bellard argues that the delegation of authority to the director of health to determine the validity of testing methods and devices violates the separation of powers doctrine and infri

2025State v. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956, ¶ 27, 37 . {¶14} Therefore, Hutchins’s first and second assignments of error are overruled. {¶15} In Hutchins’s third assignment of error, he argues that the trial court committed reversible error prejudicing appellant when it imposed an unconstitutional sentence upon him pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law, which is unconstitutional on its face. {¶16} In State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470 (8th Dist.), this court, sitting en banc, held that the indefinite sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, a defendant’s r

2025Reagan Tokes Law {¶18} In Bigbee’s third assignment of error, he argues that the Reagan Tokes Act Law is unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Ohio Constitution and his due- process rights. {¶19} In State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470 (8th Dist.), this court, sitting en banc, held that the indefinite sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, a defendant’s right to a jury trial, or due process of law.

2026Imagine if ODRC could choose which records are public records and override the statutory scheme that the General Assembly has created: the logical consequence of this court’s holding in Clark, 2025-Ohio-5552 , is that it can. {¶ 73} Under the separation-of-powers doctrine, it is incumbent upon the judiciary “to determine the . . . validity of acts by other branches of the government and to ensure that the boundaries between branches remain intact,” State v. Bodyke, 2010-Ohio-2424, ¶ 46 (lead opinion).

2022In fact, in Helpling, the court reached the merits of the relator’s claims, which would not have been appropriate if a jurisdictional bar had been applied. {¶ 25} In any case, it is not necessary to decide whether the separation-of- powers doctrine, which is implicitly embedded within the framework of the Ohio Constitution, see State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2010-Ohio-2424 , 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 42 , deprives this court of subject-matter jurisdiction notwithstanding the express grant of original jurisdiction to review mandamus actions set forth in Article IV, Section 2(B)(1)(b).

2022Montgomery No. 28644, 2020-Ohio-4153 and concluded that it does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. -11- We reached this conclusion because we found that the Law's scheme is consistent with established authority from the Supreme Court of Ohio, which held that “when the power to sanction is delegated to the executive branch, a separation-of-powers problem is avoided if the sanction is originally imposed by a court and included in its sentence.” Ferguson at ¶ 23, citing Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395 , 2006-Ohio-126 , 844 N.E.2d 301, ¶ 18-20 , citing State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio

2022Montgomery No. 28644, 2020-Ohio-4153, ¶ 20 . {¶ 10} In his first assignment of error, Leamman contends the Reagan Tokes Act unconstitutionally violates his right to due process, trial by jury, and the separation-of- powers doctrine.

2023Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex.L.Rev. 1 (1986); The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Farrand Ed.1911). 26 January Term, 2023 {¶ 66} More than 20 years ago, we discussed the basis of the separation-of- powers doctrine expressed in the Ohio Constitution: This court has repeatedly affirmed that the doctrine of separation of powers is “implicitly embedded in the entire framework of those sections of the Ohio Constitution that define the substance and scope of powers granted to the three branches of state government.” S. Euclid v.

2023Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex.L.Rev. 1 (1986); The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Farrand Ed.1911). 26 January Term, 2023 {¶ 66} More than 20 years ago, we discussed the basis of the separation-of- powers doctrine expressed in the Ohio Constitution: This court has repeatedly affirmed that the doctrine of separation of powers is “implicitly embedded in the entire framework of those sections of the Ohio Constitution that define the substance and scope of powers granted to the three branches of state government.” S. Euclid v.

2023CA2020-06-034 and CA2020-06-035, 2021-Ohio-465, ¶ 25 (finding the Reagan Tokes Law does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine); State v Bloodworth, 12th Dist.

2023CA2020-06-034 and CA2020-06-035, 2021-Ohio-465, ¶ 25 (the Reagan Tokes Law does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine). - 31 -

2023Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex.L.Rev. 1 (1986); The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Farrand Ed.1911). 26 January Term, 2023 {¶ 66} More than 20 years ago, we discussed the basis of the separation-of- powers doctrine expressed in the Ohio Constitution: This court has repeatedly affirmed that the doctrine of separation of powers is “implicitly embedded in the entire framework of those sections of the Ohio Constitution that define the substance and scope of powers granted to the three branches of state government.” S. Euclid v.

2023Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex.L.Rev. 1 (1986); The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Farrand Ed.1911). 26 January Term, 2023 {¶ 66} More than 20 years ago, we discussed the basis of the separation-of- powers doctrine expressed in the Ohio Constitution: This court has repeatedly affirmed that the doctrine of separation of powers is “implicitly embedded in the entire framework of those sections of the Ohio Constitution that define the substance and scope of powers granted to the three branches of state government.” S. Euclid v.

2023We have invariably concluded that the indefinite sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law do not facially violate the separation-of-powers doctrine or infringe on defendants’ due process rights.” Id., citing e.g., State v. Crawford, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-20-05, 2021-Ohio-547, ¶ 10-11 ; State v. Hacker, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-20-01, 2020-Ohio-5048, ¶ 22 ; State v. Wolfe, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-21-16, 2022-Ohio-96 , ¶ 21.

2023We have invariably concluded that the indefinite sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law do not facially violate the separation-of-powers doctrine or infringe on defendants’ due process rights.” Id., citing e.g., State v. Crawford, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-20-05, 2021-Ohio-547, ¶ 10-11 ; State v. Hacker, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-20-01, 2020-Ohio-5048, ¶ 22 ; State v. Wolfe, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-21-16, 2022-Ohio-96 , ¶ 21.

2010Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 462 , 715 N.E.2d 1062 ; see also State v. Hochhausler (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 463 , 668 N.E.2d 457 . {¶ 89} Petitioners assert that R.C. 2745.01 violates the separation-of-powers doctrine because it “constitute[s] a legislative exercise of the judicial power to weigh proof and rule on evidence in civil actions” and that the statute “delegate[s] to the Industrial Commission of Ohio the exclusively judicial function of adjudicating the civil recovery of certain intentional tort victims.” {¶ 90} Because the General Assembly ha

2010Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 462 , 715 N.E.2d 1062 ; see also State v. Hochhausler (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 463 , 668 N.E.2d 457 . {¶ 89} Petitioners assert that R.C. 2745.01 violates the separation-of-powers doctrine because it “constitute[s] a legislative exercise of the judicial power to weigh proof and rule on evidence in civil actions” and that the statute “delegate[s] to the Industrial Commission of Ohio the exclusively judicial function of adjudicating the civil recovery of certain intentional tort victims.” {¶ 90} Because the General Assembly ha

2022Montgomery No. 28644, 2020-Ohio-4153 and concluded that it does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. -11- We reached this conclusion because we found that the Law's scheme is consistent with established authority from the Supreme Court of Ohio, which held that “when the power to sanction is delegated to the executive branch, a separation-of-powers problem is avoided if the sanction is originally imposed by a court and included in its sentence.” Ferguson at ¶ 23, citing Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395 , 2006-Ohio-126 , 844 N.E.2d 301, ¶ 18-20 , citing State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio

2022Montgomery No. 28644, 2020-Ohio-4153 and concluded that it does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. -11- We reached this conclusion because we found that the Law's scheme is consistent with established authority from the Supreme Court of Ohio, which held that “when the power to sanction is delegated to the executive branch, a separation-of-powers problem is avoided if the sanction is originally imposed by a court and included in its sentence.” Ferguson at ¶ 23, citing Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395 , 2006-Ohio-126 , 844 N.E.2d 301, ¶ 18-20 , citing State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio

2021Montgomery No. 28613, 2020-Ohio-4150, ¶ 36 (Reagan Tokes Law does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine); State v. Leet, 2nd Dist.

2020See also Barnes, 2020-Ohio-4150, at ¶ 37 . {¶18} Next we turn to Hacker’s assertions that the Reagan Tokes Law violates due process and the doctrine of separation of powers.

2001In State v. Jones (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 519 , the Supreme Court of Ohio, relying on Woods v. Telb (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 504 , reversed and remanded our holding in Cuyahoga App. No. 74247, declaring via Woods v. Telb, supra, that post-release controls pursuant to R.C. 2967.28 do not violate the separation of powers doctrine or due process.

2001R.C. 2967.28 (B) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE OR THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES OR OHIO CONSTITUTIONS ( Woods v. Telb (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 519 ; State v. Jones (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 594 , followed.) The Ohio Supreme Court overturned Jones based on its finding in Woods v. Telb (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 504 , that R.C. 2967.28 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine when a defendant is advised of discretionary post-release control , and that the statute does not violate the due process rights of defendants.

2023Therefore, [State ex rel.] Bray [v. Russell, 89 Ohio St.3d 132 , 729 N.E.2d 359 (2000)] does “not compel the conclusion that the Reagan Tokes Law violates the separation of powers doctrine.” Id.

2023Therefore, [State ex rel.] Bray [v. Russell, 89 Ohio St.3d 132 , 729 N.E.2d 359 (2000)] does “not compel the conclusion that the Reagan Tokes Law violates the separation of powers doctrine.” Id.

2023We have invariably concluded that the indefinite sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law do not facially violate the separation-of-powers doctrine or infringe on defendants’ due process rights.” Id., citing e.g., State v. Crawford, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-20-05, 2021-Ohio-547, ¶ 10-11 ; State v. Hacker, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-20-01, 2020-Ohio-5048, ¶ 22 ; State v. Wolfe, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-21-16, 2022-Ohio-96 , ¶ 21.

2023We have invariably concluded that the indefinite sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law do not facially violate the separation-of-powers doctrine or infringe on defendants’ due process rights.” Id., citing e.g., State v. Crawford, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-20-05, 2021-Ohio-547, ¶ 10-11 ; State v. Hacker, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-20-01, 2020-Ohio-5048, ¶ 22 ; State v. Wolfe, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-21-16, 2022-Ohio-96 , ¶ 21.

2021Cuyahoga No. 109507, 2021-Ohio-578 , ¶ 27 Under our form of government, the separation-of-powers doctrine “recognizes that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our government have their own unique powers and duties that are separate and apart from the others.” State v. Thompson, 92 Ohio St.3d 584, 586 , 752 N.E.2d 276 (2001).

2021Cuyahoga No. 109507, 2021-Ohio-578 , ¶ 27 Under our form of government, the separation-of-powers doctrine “recognizes that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our government have their own unique powers and duties that are separate and apart from the others.” State v. Thompson, 92 Ohio St.3d 584, 586 , 752 N.E.2d 276 (2001).

2010Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 462 , 715 N.E.2d 1062 ; see also State v. Hochhausler (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 463 , 668 N.E.2d 457 . {¶ 89} Petitioners assert that R.C. 2745.01 violates the separation-of-powers doctrine because it “constitute[s] a legislative exercise of the judicial power to weigh proof and rule on evidence in civil actions” and that the statute “delegate[s] to the Industrial Commission of Ohio the exclusively judicial function of adjudicating the civil recovery of certain intentional tort victims.” {¶ 90} Because the General Assembly ha

2010Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 462 , 715 N.E.2d 1062 ; see also State v. Hochhausler (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 463 , 668 N.E.2d 457 . {¶ 89} Petitioners assert that R.C. 2745.01 violates the separation-of-powers doctrine because it “constitute[s] a legislative exercise of the judicial power to weigh proof and rule on evidence in civil actions” and that the statute “delegate[s] to the Industrial Commission of Ohio the exclusively judicial function of adjudicating the civil recovery of certain intentional tort victims.” {¶ 90} Because the General Assembly ha

2024The State filed its appellate brief on August 2, 2023. {¶9} “This Court and others have upheld the general constitutionality of the Reagan-Tokes Act, particularly with respect to due process, jury trial, separation of powers, and equal protection.” Id., citing State v. Rose, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 21 JE 0014, 2022-Ohio-3529 ; State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio- 470; State v. Ratliff, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 21CA000016, 2022-Ohio-1372 ; see also State v. Runner, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 22 BE 0004, 2022-Ohio-4756 , ¶ 67 (“Ohio’s indefinite sentencing structure does not vi

2023Appellant argues that the Act violates the separation of powers doctrine, the constitutional right to trial by jury, due process and equal protection. {¶13} Spears arguments regarding the Reagan Tokes Act were presented to this court in State v. Burris, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 21CA000021, 2022-Ohio-1481 , State v. Ratliff, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 21CA000016, 2022-Ohio-1372 and State v. K'marr M.

2023Lucas No. L-20-1074, 2022-Ohio-2072 , and State v. Eaton, 2022-Ohio-2432 , 192 N.E.3d 1236 (6th Dist.), in which we found that the Reagan Tokes Law does not violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.

2022See State v. Stenson, 2022-Ohio-2072 , 190 N.E.3d 1240 (6th Dist.) In Stenson, rejecting the argument that the ODRC’s ability to rebut the presumptive minimum sentence violates the separation of powers doctrine, we found that like the discretionary system of parole and postrelease control controlled by the parole board and found constitutional, the ODRC has the ability to extend the minimum sentence of a defendant up to but not exceeding the maximum sentence that was imposed by the court.

2022Montgomery No. 28644, 2020-Ohio-4153 and concluded that it does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. -11- We reached this conclusion because we found that the Law's scheme is consistent with established authority from the Supreme Court of Ohio, which held that “when the power to sanction is delegated to the executive branch, a separation-of-powers problem is avoided if the sanction is originally imposed by a court and included in its sentence.” Ferguson at ¶ 23, citing Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395 , 2006-Ohio-126 , 844 N.E.2d 301, ¶ 18-20 , citing State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio

2022Montgomery No. 28644, 2020-Ohio-4153 and concluded that it does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. -11- We reached this conclusion because we found that the Law's scheme is consistent with established authority from the Supreme Court of Ohio, which held that “when the power to sanction is delegated to the executive branch, a separation-of-powers problem is avoided if the sanction is originally imposed by a court and included in its sentence.” Ferguson at ¶ 23, citing Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395 , 2006-Ohio-126 , 844 N.E.2d 301, ¶ 18-20 , citing State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio

2012Specifically, she argues that mandatory minimum sentences violate the separation of powers doctrine, ignore proportionality, violate notions of due process, and amount to cruel and unusual punishment. {¶23} At the outset, we note that “[a]n enactment of the General Assembly is presumed to be constitutional, and before a court may declare it unconstitutional it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.” State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 409 (1998), quoting State ex rel.

2000The court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional because it "violate[d] the doctrine of the separation of powers because it allow[ed] a non-judicial agency [the parole board] to perform the judicial function of trying an individual for a criminal offense and imposing sentence." Id.

2023Lucas No. L-20-1074, 2022-Ohio-2072 , and State v. Eaton, 2022-Ohio-2432 , 192 N.E.3d 1236 (6th Dist.), in which we found that the Reagan Tokes Law does not violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.

2023Lucas No. L-20-1074, 2022-Ohio-2072 , and State v. Eaton, 2022-Ohio-2432 , 192 N.E.3d 1236 (6th Dist.), in which we found that the Reagan Tokes Law does not violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.