separation of powers doctrine in Virginia

2012However, appellant disregards the rationale articulated by the Court in Taylor and Epps , namely, that “nothing in the separation-of-powers doctrine suggests a court has the inherent power to acquit a defendant of a crime that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt [he] committed.” Taylor, 58 Va.App. at 440 , 710 S.E.2d at 520 ; see also id. at 441, 710 S.E.2d at 521 (“[A] court simply has no ‘authority to free guilty defendants,’ whose guilt was proved in a lawful trial.” (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 449 , 53 S.Ct. 210, 215 , 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932))); Epps, 59 Va.App.

2012However, appellant disregards the rationale articulated by the Court in Taylor and Epps , namely, that “nothing in the separation-of-powers doctrine suggests a court has the inherent power to acquit a defendant of a crime that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt [he] committed.” Taylor, 58 Va.App. at 440 , 710 S.E.2d at 520 ; see also id. at 441, 710 S.E.2d at 521 (“[A] court simply has no ‘authority to free guilty defendants,’ whose guilt was proved in a lawful trial.” (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 449 , 53 S.Ct. 210, 215 , 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932))); Epps, 59 Va.App.

2016See Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 370 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 70 (2001); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. ___ , ___, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (noting that federal standing doctrine “confines the federal courts to a properly judicial role”).

2016See Goldman v. Landsidle , 262 Va. 364 , 370, 552 S.E.2d 67 , 70 (2001) ; see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 578 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1540 , 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (noting that federal standing doctrine "confines the federal courts to a properly judicial role").

2016See Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 370 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 70 (2001); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. ___ , ___, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (noting that federal standing doctrine “confines the federal courts to a properly judicial role”).

2016See Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 370 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 70 (2001); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. ___ , ___, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (noting that federal standing doctrine “confines the federal courts to a properly judicial role”).

2012However, appellant disregards the rationale articulated by the Court in Taylor and Epps , namely, that “nothing in the separation-of-powers doctrine suggests a court has the inherent power to acquit a defendant of a crime that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt [he] committed.” Taylor, 58 Va.App. at 440 , 710 S.E.2d at 520 ; see also id. at 441, 710 S.E.2d at 521 (“[A] court simply has no ‘authority to free guilty defendants,’ whose guilt was proved in a lawful trial.” (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 449 , 53 S.Ct. 210, 215 , 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932))); Epps, 59 Va.App.

2012However, appellant disregards the rationale articulated by the Court in Taylor and Epps , namely, that “nothing in the separation-of-powers doctrine suggests a court has the inherent power to acquit a defendant of a crime that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt [he] committed.” Taylor, 58 Va.App. at 440 , 710 S.E.2d at 520 ; see also id. at 441, 710 S.E.2d at 521 (“[A] court simply has no ‘authority to free guilty defendants,’ whose guilt was proved in a lawful trial.” (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 449 , 53 S.Ct. 210, 215 , 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932))); Epps, 59 Va.App.

2014III, § 1; see also Taylor v. Worrell Enters., Inc., 242 Va. 219, 221 , 409 S.E.2d 136, 138 (1991) (explaining that the separation of powers doctrine “prevents one branch from engaging in the functions of another”).

2014III, § 1; see also Taylor v. Worrell Enters., Inc., 242 Va. 219, 221 , 409 S.E.2d 136, 138 (1991) (explaining that the separation of powers doctrine “prevents one branch from engaging in the functions of another”).

2014Rawls, 272 Va. at 347-48, 634 S.E.2d at 703 (emphasis added); see Johnson v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 244, 248-53 , 692 S.E.2d 651, 653-55 (2010) (rejecting a separation-of-powers challenge to the five-year mandatory minimum sentence in Code § 18.2-308.2).

2014Rawls, 272 Va. at 347-48, 634 S.E.2d at 703 (emphasis added); see Johnson v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 244, 248-53 , 692 S.E.2d 651, 653-55 (2010) (rejecting a separation-of-powers challenge to the five-year mandatory minimum sentence in Code § 18.2-308.2).

2016Owners Ass’n, 273 Va. 107, 120 , 639 S.E.2d 257, 265 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 1 The limited role of the judiciary, together with the fundamental constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, counsel that the standing inquiry must be particularly rigorous when a litigant seeks the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, by which courts may compel public officials, and particularly officials in co-equal branches of government, to perform their duties.

2016Owners Ass’n, 273 Va. 107, 120 , 639 S.E.2d 257, 265 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 1 The limited role of the judiciary, together with the fundamental constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, counsel that the standing inquiry must be particularly rigorous when a litigant seeks the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, by which courts may compel public officials, and particularly officials in co-equal branches of government, to perform their duties.

2014In fact, the Supreme Court of Virginia expressly identified the separation of powers doctrine in Moreau v. Fuller, 276 Va. 127 , 661 S.E.2d 841 (2008), which preceded Hernandez and Starrs.

2014In fact, the Supreme Court of Virginia expressly identified the separation of powers doctrine in Moreau v. Fuller, 276 Va. 127 , 661 S.E.2d 841 (2008), which preceded Hernandez and Starrs.

2010Under Code § 53.1-231.2, “any person . . . may petition the circuit court . . . for restoration of his civil right to be eligible to register to vote through the process set out in this section.” The circuit court declined to consider Phillips’ petition, holding that Code § 53.1-231.2 violated the separation of powers doctrine because the statute usurped the Governor’s power to remove political disabilities resulting from criminal convictions. 265 Va. at 84-85 , 574 S.E.2d at 272 .

2010Under Code § 53.1-231.2, “any person . . . may petition the circuit court . . . for restoration of his civil right to be eligible to register to vote through the process set out in this section.” The circuit court declined to consider Phillips’ petition, holding that Code § 53.1-231.2 violated the separation of powers doctrine because the statute usurped the Governor’s power to remove political disabilities resulting from criminal convictions. 265 Va. at 84-85 , 574 S.E.2d at 272 .

2024This is because “[a] prosecutor has the discretion to decide under which of several applicable statutes the charges shall be instituted.” Id. (quoting Hensley v. City of Norfolk, 216 Va. 369, 373 (1975)). - 19 - when, what, and how to charge a defendant is neither the exercise of sentencing authority, nor a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.

2024Johnson, 56 Va. App. at 253 ; see Lilly, 50 Va. App. at 184 (“‘[S]pecification of punishments’ [are] matters ordinarily understood as ‘peculiarly questions of legislative policy.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Gray v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 290, 311 (2007))).

2024Johnson, 56 Va. App. at 253 ; see Lilly, 50 Va. App. at 184 (“‘[S]pecification of punishments’ [are] matters ordinarily understood as ‘peculiarly questions of legislative policy.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Gray v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 290, 311 (2007))).

2017Va. App. 255, 265, 578 S.E.2d 833, 838 (2003).

2014Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 , 37 S.Ct. 72, 74 , 61 L.Ed. 129 (1916); see also Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 450 , 53 S.Ct. 210, 215 , 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932) (explaining that the judiciary lacks any power to refuse “to perform a duty resting upon it” and *535 interfere with the constitutional “legislative and executive authority” by declining to adjudicate a criminal case “because it desires to let the defendant go free”); Richardson v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 802, 809 , 109 S.E. 460, 462 (1921) (stating that a trial court is not permitted to agree “with the prisoner to excuse

2014Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 , 37 S.Ct. 72, 74 , 61 L.Ed. 129 (1916); see also Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 450 , 53 S.Ct. 210, 215 , 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932) (explaining that the judiciary lacks any power to refuse “to perform a duty resting upon it” and *535 interfere with the constitutional “legislative and executive authority” by declining to adjudicate a criminal case “because it desires to let the defendant go free”); Richardson v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 802, 809 , 109 S.E. 460, 462 (1921) (stating that a trial court is not permitted to agree “with the prisoner to excuse

2014Rawls, 272 Va. at 347-48, 634 S.E.2d at 703 (emphasis added); see Johnson v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 244, 248-53 , 692 S.E.2d 651, 653-55 (2010) (rejecting a separation-of-powers challenge to the five-year mandatory minimum sentence in Code § 18.2-308.2).

2014Rawls, 272 Va. at 347-48, 634 S.E.2d at 703 (emphasis added); see Johnson v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 244, 248-53 , 692 S.E.2d 651, 653-55 (2010) (rejecting a separation-of-powers challenge to the five-year mandatory minimum sentence in Code § 18.2-308.2).

2014See In re Horan, 271 Va. 258 , 263-64, 634 S.E.2d 675, 679 (2006). 22 meaningless formality reversible at the defendant's whim.

2013Common Law Legislative Immunity Despite the inapplicability of Constitutional legislative immunity to the case at bar, state and local legislators have nevertheless been found to be protected because "common law legislative immunity . . . protect[s] the integrity of the legislative process by [e]nsuring the independence of individual legislators." Miles-Un-Ltd. v. Town of New Shoreham, 917 F.Supp. 91, 98 (D.N.H. 1996) (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972)); see also Steiner v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 668, 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) 8 (stating that "[t]hese corollari

2013Constitutional Legislative Immunity Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution of Virginia mandates that "legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct, so that none exercise the powers properly belonging to the others." The principles of separation of powers generally "preclude[] judicial inquiry 6 into the motives of legislative bodies elected by the people." Ames v. Painter, 239 Va. 343, 349 , 389 S.E.2d 702, 705 (1990); see also Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 55 (1998).

2013Common Law Legislative Immunity Despite the inapplicability of Constitutional legislative immunity to the case at bar, state and local legislators have nevertheless been found to be protected because "common law legislative immunity . . . protect[s] the integrity of the legislative process by [e]nsuring the independence of individual legislators." Miles-Un-Ltd. v. Town of New Shoreham, 917 F.Supp. 91, 98 (D.N.H. 1996) (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972)); see also Steiner v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 668, 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) 8 (stating that "[t]hese corollari

2013Common Law Legislative Immunity Despite the inapplicability of Constitutional legislative immunity to the case at bar, state and local legislators have nevertheless been found to be protected because "common law legislative immunity . . . protect[s] the integrity of the legislative process by [e]nsuring the independence of individual legislators." Miles-Un-Ltd. v. Town of New Shoreham, 917 F.Supp. 91, 98 (D.N.H. 1996) (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972)); see also Steiner v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 668, 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) 8 (stating that "[t]hese corollari

2013Common Law Legislative Immunity Despite the inapplicability of Constitutional legislative immunity to the case at bar, state and local legislators have nevertheless been found to be protected because "common law legislative immunity . . . protect[s] the integrity of the legislative process by [e]nsuring the independence of individual legislators." Miles-Un-Ltd. v. Town of New Shoreham, 917 F.Supp. 91, 98 (D.N.H. 1996) (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972)); see also Steiner v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 668, 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) 8 (stating that "[t]hese corollari

2013Constitutional Legislative Immunity Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution of Virginia mandates that "legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct, so that none exercise the powers properly belonging to the others." The principles of separation of powers generally "preclude[] judicial inquiry 6 into the motives of legislative bodies elected by the people." Ames v. Painter, 239 Va. 343, 349 , 389 S.E.2d 702, 705 (1990); see also Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 55 (1998).

2013Constitutional Legislative Immunity Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution of Virginia mandates that "legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct, so that none exercise the powers properly belonging to the others." The principles of separation of powers generally "preclude[] judicial inquiry 6 into the motives of legislative bodies elected by the people." Ames v. Painter, 239 Va. 343, 349 , 389 S.E.2d 702, 705 (1990); see also Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 55 (1998).

2012Here, appellant’s “ ‘voluntary and intelligent plea[s] of guilty ... [were], in reality, a self-supplied conviction authorizing imposition of the punishment fixed by law.’ ” Kibert v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 660, 664 , 222 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1976) (quoting Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 196 , 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1969)).

2012Here, appellant’s “ ‘voluntary and intelligent plea[s] of guilty ... [were], in reality, a self-supplied conviction authorizing imposition of the punishment fixed by law.’ ” Kibert v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 660, 664 , 222 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1976) (quoting Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 196 , 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1969)).

2012Here, appellant’s “ ‘voluntary and intelligent plea[s] of guilty ... [were], in reality, a self-supplied conviction authorizing imposition of the punishment fixed by law.’ ” Kibert v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 660, 664 , 222 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1976) (quoting Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 196 , 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1969)).

2012Here, appellant’s “ ‘voluntary and intelligent plea[s] of guilty ... [were], in reality, a self-supplied conviction authorizing imposition of the punishment fixed by law.’ ” Kibert v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 660, 664 , 222 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1976) (quoting Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 196 , 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1969)).

2012However, appellant disregards the rationale articulated by the Court in Taylor and Epps , namely, that “nothing in the separation-of-powers doctrine suggests a court has the inherent power to acquit a defendant of a crime that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt [he] committed.” Taylor, 58 Va.App. at 440 , 710 S.E.2d at 520 ; see also id. at 441, 710 S.E.2d at 521 (“[A] court simply has no ‘authority to free guilty defendants,’ whose guilt was proved in a lawful trial.” (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 449 , 53 S.Ct. 210, 215 , 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932))); Epps, 59 Va.App.

2012However, appellant disregards the rationale articulated by the Court in Taylor and Epps , namely, that “nothing in the separation-of-powers doctrine suggests a court has the inherent power to acquit a defendant of a crime that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt [he] committed.” Taylor, 58 Va.App. at 440 , 710 S.E.2d at 520 ; see also id. at 441, 710 S.E.2d at 521 (“[A] court simply has no ‘authority to free guilty defendants,’ whose guilt was proved in a lawful trial.” (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 449 , 53 S.Ct. 210, 215 , 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932))); Epps, 59 Va.App.