separation of powers doctrine in New Jersey

1994In the words of the late Chief Justice Vanderbilt, "[a] clear and unambiguous statute is not open to construction or interpretation, and to do so in a case where not required is to do violence to the doctrine of the separation of powers." Watt v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Franklin, 21 N.J. 274, 277 , 121 A. 2d 499 (1956).

1994In the words of the late Chief Justice Vanderbilt, "[a] clear and unambiguous statute is not open to construction or interpretation, and to do so in a case where not required is to do violence to the doctrine of the separation of powers." Watt v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Franklin, 21 N.J. 274, 277 , 121 A. 2d 499 (1956).

2014The separation of powers doctrine was designed to "maintain the balance between the three branches of government, preserve their respective independence and integrity, and prevent the concentration of unchecked power in the hands of any one branch." David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 326 (1965) (footnote and emphasis omitted).

2010Although a main objective of the separation-of-powers doctrine is to prevent the concentration of "unchecked power" in one branch of the government, David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 326 , 212 A. 2d 345 (1965), our courts have consistently recognized "that the doctrine requires not an absolute division of power but a cooperative accommodation among the three branches of government." Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Florio, 130 N.J. 439, 449 , 617 A. 2d 223 (1992).

1987It is far different to suggest, however, that the separation of powers doctrine is to be construed as creating "three mutually exclusive watertight compartments." Massett Building Co. v. Bennett 4 N.J. 53, 57 (1950).

1981While acknowledging that no rule of thumb will cover all cases, he stated that "in general it may be said that no deviation from the constitutional provisions incorporating the doctrine of the separation of powers will be tolerated which impairs the essential integrity of one of the great branches of government." Id. at 57 .

2025Indeed, although we found that “judicial review is consistent with applicable principles under the separation of powers doctrine” in State v. Leonardis, we simultaneously expressed “the opinion that the scope of such 18 review should be limited” and that a defendant should therefore have to “clearly and convincingly establish that the prosecutor’s refusal to sanction admission into the program was based on a patent and gross abuse of his discretion” in order for a court to overturn that decision. 73 N.J. 360, 381-82 (1977); accord State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503, 508 (1981) (finding that standa

1996We have determined that “the separation of powers doctrine should not be construed to prevent the Court from adopting rules which have some effect on matters which involve executive and legislative functions.” State v. Leonards (II), 73 N.J. 360, 370 , 375 A.2d 607 (1977).

2019Nonetheless, as the Court has explained, “the doctrine requires not an absolute division of power but a cooperative accommodation among the three branches of government.” Ibid.; see also In re P.L. 2001, Chapter 362, 186 N.J. 368, 379 (2006) (holding that the separation of powers doctrine exists “not to create three ‘watertight’ governmental compartments, stifling cooperative action among the executive, legislative and judicial branches,” but “to guarantee a system in which one 19 branch cannot ‘claim[] or receiv[e] an inordinate power’” (alterations in original) (quoting Commc’ns Workers, 130

2018The purpose of the separation of powers doctrine "is not to create three 'watertight' governmental compartments, stifling cooperative action among the executive, legislative and judicial branches," but to "guarantee a system in which one branch cannot claim or receive an inordinate power." In re P.L. 2001 , 186 N.J. at 379 , 895 A.2d 1128 (quoting Florio , 130 N.J. at 450 , 617 A.2d 223 (brackets removed) ).

2018Before our Constitution was amended to adopt the Legislative Review Clause, this Court invoked the separation of powers doctrine and the Presentment Clause to strike down an unrestricted legislative veto provision enacted by statute in General Assembly , 90 N.J. at 385 -95 , 448 A.2d 438 .

2018"Even where the Legislature is not using its veto power to effectively change the law," the Court noted, *660 "the veto can illegitimately interfere with executive attempts to enforce the law." Id. at 386 , 448 A.2d 438 . **512 The Court also held that the Act violated the separation of powers doctrine and the Presentment Clause "by giving the Legislature excessive power." Id. at 395-96 , 448 A.2d 438 .

2014Officers of Bergen Cnty., 58 N.J. 422, 425 (1971)), the separation of powers doctrine "requires . . . a cooperative accommodation among the three branches of government[,]" Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Florio, 130 N.J. 439, 449-50 (1992).

2009The Court instead has recognized that the separation of powers doctrine "was never intended to create . . . utterly exclusive spheres of competence." In re Salaries for Probation Officers, 58 N.J. 422, 425 , 278 A. 2d 417 (1971).

2010See Eggers v. Kenny, 15 N.J. 107, 120-21 , 104 A. 2d 10 (1954) (noting that "[w]hile the separation doctrine is applicable to the Federal Government and to our State Government, it generally has no applicability to our city governments").

2010See Eggers v. Kenny, 15 N.J. 107, 120-21 , 104 A. 2d 10 (1954) (noting that "[w]hile the separation doctrine is applicable to the Federal Government and to our State Government, it generally has no applicability to our city governments").

1975This was the view adopted by this Court in Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 2 N.J. 356, 362-65 (1949). [1] *379 As this Court more recently observed: The doctrine of separation of powers must * * * be viewed not as an end in itself, but as a general principle intended to be applied so as to maintain the balance between the three branches of government, preserve their respective independence and integrity, and prevent the concentration of unchecked power in the hands of any one branch. [ David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 326 (1965) (emphasis in original).] Professor Davis is also

1975The doctrine of the separation of powers is the great contribution of Anglo-American lawyers to the prevention of absolutism and the preservation of the rights of the individual against the state. [ 2 N.J. at 363-64 .] [2] The Court's reliance on Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), is misplaced.

2019Nonetheless, as the Court has explained, “the doctrine requires not an absolute division of power but a cooperative accommodation among the three branches of government.” Ibid.; see also In re P.L. 2001, Chapter 362, 186 N.J. 368, 379 (2006) (holding that the separation of powers doctrine exists “not to create three ‘watertight’ governmental compartments, stifling cooperative action among the executive, legislative and judicial branches,” but “to guarantee a system in which one 19 branch cannot ‘claim[] or receiv[e] an inordinate power’” (alterations in original) (quoting Commc’ns Workers, 130

1982The issue in Brown was whether the Executive Reorganization Act of 1969 “so enhance[d] the executive power as to threaten the security against aggregated power which the separation-of-powers doctrine was designed to provide.” Id. at 10 .

2022The doctrine of separation of powers thus “contemplates that each branch of government will exercise fully its own powers without transgressing upon powers rightfully belonging to a cognate branch.” Knight, 86 N.J. at 388 .

2022The doctrine of separation of powers thus “contemplates that each branch of government will exercise fully its own powers without transgressing upon powers rightfully belonging to a cognate branch.” Knight, 86 N.J. at 388 .

2019In State v. Lagares, the Court considered a defendant’s separation of powers challenge to a statute that delegated sentencing discretion to prosecutors in certain drug cases. 127 N.J. 20, 24 (1992).

2019In Lagares, this Court considered a defendant’s separation of powers challenge to a statute that delegated sentencing discretion to prosecutors in certain drug cases. 127 N.J. at 24 .

1977It rejected all assertions that such review would violate the separation of power doctrine, 65 N.J. at 518 , stating: *378 It would indeed disserve our democratic processes if misconceptions with respect to the proper meaning and scope of the doctrine of separation of powers were to result in retrogressive restrictions on this and comparable judicial controls which are so well-designed towards curbing governmental improprieties and excesses. [ 65 N.J. at 520 ] [8] Even assuming arguendo that the prosecutor is entitled to the full protection which the Executive enjoys under the separation of po

1977It rejected all assertions that such review would violate the separation of power doctrine, 65 N.J. at 518 , stating: *378 It would indeed disserve our democratic processes if misconceptions with respect to the proper meaning and scope of the doctrine of separation of powers were to result in retrogressive restrictions on this and comparable judicial controls which are so well-designed towards curbing governmental improprieties and excesses. [ 65 N.J. at 520 ] [8] Even assuming arguendo that the prosecutor is entitled to the full protection which the Executive enjoys under the separation of po

1993A. As suggested by our decision in Gilbert v. Gladden, 87 N.J. 275 , 432 A. 2d 1351 (1981), the question of justiciability truly lies at the end and not at the beginning of the analysis.

1993A. As suggested by our decision in Gilbert v. Gladden, 87 N.J. 275 , 432 A. 2d 1351 (1981), the question of justiciability truly lies at the end and not at the beginning of the analysis.

2025The Court found that “[s]o interpreted, [N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12] does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.” Id. at 197 .

2022A-3746-20 14 Against a separation of powers challenge to the prosecutor's sole authority to waive mandatory minimum sentences in plea and post-conviction agreements, the Court in State v. Vasquez upheld the constitutionality of Section 12 by preserving "[j]udicial oversight . . . to protect against arbitrary and capricious prosecutorial decisions." 129 N.J. 189, 196 (1992).

2019Nonetheless, as the Court has explained, “the doctrine requires not an absolute division of power but a cooperative accommodation among the three branches of government.” Ibid.; see also In re P.L. 2001, Chapter 362, 186 N.J. 368, 379 (2006) (holding that the separation of powers doctrine exists “not to create three ‘watertight’ governmental compartments, stifling cooperative action among the executive, legislative and judicial branches,” but “to guarantee a system in which one 19 branch cannot ‘claim[] or receiv[e] an inordinate power’” (alterations in original) (quoting Commc’ns Workers, 130

2018The purpose of the separation of powers doctrine "is not to create three 'watertight' governmental compartments, stifling cooperative action among the executive, legislative and judicial branches," but to "guarantee a system in which one branch cannot claim or receive an inordinate power." In re P.L. 2001 , 186 N.J. at 379 , 895 A.2d 1128 (quoting Florio , 130 N.J. at 450 , 617 A.2d 223 (brackets removed) ).

2019It deemed the allocation of authority in plea bargaining under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(d) to comport with the separation of powers doctrine because the statute “reserve[s] to the judiciary the power to approve or reject any agreement between the defendant and the State.” Id. at 252 (alteration in original) (quoting Todd, 238 N.J.

1992See State v. Todd, 238 N.J.

2006In this instance, plaintiff's challenge fails because "the formal doctrine of separation of powers has been held inapplicable to municipalities." In re Shain, 92 N.J. 524, 537 , 457 A. 2d 828 (1983).

2006In this instance, plaintiff's challenge fails because "the formal doctrine of separation of powers has been held inapplicable to municipalities." In re Shain, 92 N.J. 524, 537 , 457 A. 2d 828 (1983).

2018The court also noted, "[v]arious courts have observed that such action improperly assumes the executive or prosecutorial power and, therefore, violates the doctrine of separation of powers." Ibid.

1994See Com. v. Gordon, 410 Mass. 498 , 574 N.E. 2d 974, 975-76 (1991) (trial court's acceptance of plea to lesser included offense over prosecutor's objection violated state constitutional separation of powers provision and "effectively usurped the decision-making authority constitutionally allocated to the executive branch."); People v. Orin, 13 Cal. 3d 937 , 120 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69 , 533 P. 2d 193, 197 (1975) (plea bargain could not be executed without prosecutor's agreement and court lacks authority to substitute itself for prosecution); People v. Mikhail, 13 Cal. App. 4th 846 , 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d

2010Conversely, "`[e]mergency' executive power can be an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative authority either when the executive acts contrary to the expressed or implied will of the Legislature or when the Legislature has failed to act." Worthington, supra, 88 N.J. at 207 , 440 A .2d 1128 (citing Youngstown, supra, 343 U.S. at 635-38 , 72 S.Ct. at 870-71 , 96 L.Ed. at 1199-1200 (Jackson, J., concurring)); see also Communications Workers of Am. v. Christie, 413 N.J.Super. 229, 274 , 994 A .2d 545 (App.Div.2010) (slip op. at 62-68, 71-75) (holding that an executive order violated the separat

2010Conversely, "`[e]mergency' executive power can be an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative authority either when the executive acts contrary to the expressed or implied will of the Legislature or when the Legislature has failed to act." Worthington, supra, 88 N.J. at 207 , 440 A .2d 1128 (citing Youngstown, supra, 343 U.S. at 635-38 , 72 S.Ct. at 870-71 , 96 L.Ed. at 1199-1200 (Jackson, J., concurring)); see also Communications Workers of Am. v. Christie, 413 N.J.Super. 229, 274 , 994 A .2d 545 (App.Div.2010) (slip op. at 62-68, 71-75) (holding that an executive order violated the separat

2006Council of the City of Newark v. James, 183 N.J. 361, 371 , 873 A. 2d 544 (2005) (quoting Casamasino v. City of Jersey City, 158 N.J. 333, 343 , 730 A. 2d 287 *1244 (1999)) (alteration in original); see also In re Shain, supra, 92 N.J. at 537 , 457 A. 2d 828 .

2001The Court observed: Although the separation of powers doctrine applied to federal and state governments is not generally applicable to mayor-council plan of government, “the Faulkner Act plainly envisages some separation of functions between the Council (the legislative body) and the Mayor (the executive).” That separation of functions imposes “certain limits on the Mayor and local council in governing the municipality.” Id. at 538, 730 A.2d 287 .