separation of powers doctrine in Connecticut

2021Unlike the separation of powers doctrine that has developed under the federal constitution, ‘‘the historical evolution of Connecticut’s governmental system [has] established a ‘tradition of harmony’ among the separate branches of government . . . .’’ State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378 , 419, 215 A.3d 1154 (2019). ‘‘Recognizing that executive, legislative and judicial powers frequently overlap, we have consistently held that the doctrine of the separation of powers cannot be applied rigidly.’’ Bartholomew v. Schweizer, 217 Conn. 671, 676 , 587 A.2d 1014 (1991).

2021Unlike the separation of powers doctrine that has developed under the federal constitution, ‘‘the historical evolution of Connecticut’s governmental system [has] established a ‘tradition of harmony’ among the separate branches of government . . . .’’ State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378 , 419, 215 A.3d 1154 (2019). ‘‘Recognizing that executive, legislative and judicial powers frequently overlap, we have consistently held that the doctrine of the separation of powers cannot be applied rigidly.’’ Bartholomew v. Schweizer, 217 Conn. 671, 676 , 587 A.2d 1014 (1991).

2016We further note that an interpretation of § 20-523 that would allow the prosecution of a person who has assisted the fact finder in judicial proceedings by testi- fying as an expert witness as to the value of real prop- erty would raise serious constitutional questions under the separation of powers doctrine.44 See State v. Cle- mente, 166 Conn. 501, 514 , 353 A.2d 723 (1974) (‘‘courts have an inherent power, independent of statutory authorization, to prescribe rules to regulate their pro- ceedings and [to] facilitate the administration of justice as they deem necessary’’); see also State v. C

2016We further note that an interpretation of § 20-523 that would allow the prosecution of a person who has assisted the fact finder in judicial proceedings by testi- fying as an expert witness as to the value of real prop- erty would raise serious constitutional questions under the separation of powers doctrine.44 See State v. Cle- mente, 166 Conn. 501, 514 , 353 A.2d 723 (1974) (‘‘courts have an inherent power, independent of statutory authorization, to prescribe rules to regulate their pro- ceedings and [to] facilitate the administration of justice as they deem necessary’’); see also State v. C

2018III Relying largely on this court's decision in State v. McCahill , 261 Conn. 492 , 811 A.2d 667 (2002), the defendant also contends that construing drug dependency as an affirmative defense under § 21a-278 (b), whose elements are "otherwise identical" to § 21a-277 (a), violates the separation of powers under article second of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by article **809 eighteen of the amendments, by improperly allocating the judicial power of sentencing to the prosecutor, an executive branch actor who chooses the charges to file. 27 In response, the state contends that this issu

2018III Relying largely on this court's decision in State v. McCahill , 261 Conn. 492 , 811 A.2d 667 (2002), the defendant also contends that construing drug dependency as an affirmative defense under § 21a-278 (b), whose elements are "otherwise identical" to § 21a-277 (a), violates the separation of powers under article second of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by article **809 eighteen of the amendments, by improperly allocating the judicial power of sentencing to the prosecutor, an executive branch actor who chooses the charges to file. 27 In response, the state contends that this issu

2025Held: The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that § 22-358 (c) violated the separation of powers doctrine because, pursuant to Bottone v. Westport ( 209 Conn. 652 ), the separation of powers doctrine does not pertain to delegations of powers from the state legislature to a municipality, and it was clear under the statute (§ 22-331) governing the appointment of munici- pal animal control officers that the legislature has delegated the enforcement of dog bite statutes to municipalities pursuant to § 22-331 (b), and the animal control officer who issued the disposal order regarding the p

2025In Bottone v. Westport, 209 Conn. 652, 664 , 553 A.2d 576 (1989), however, our Supreme Court explained: ‘‘The separation of powers doctrine . . . does not per- tain to delegations from the state legislature to a munici- pality.

2026Ed. 2d 271 (1993). “[I]n deciding whether one branch’s actions violate the constitutional mandate of the separation of powers doctrine, the court will consider if the actions constitute: (1) an assumption of power that lies exclusively under the control of another branch; or (2) a significant interfer- ence with the orderly conduct of the essential functions of another branch.” Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 234 Conn. 552–53; see also, e.g., Uni- versity of Connecticut Chapter, AAUP v. Governor, 200 Conn. 386 , 394–95, 512 A.2d 152 (1986).

2026Ed. 2d 271 (1993). “[I]n deciding whether one branch’s actions violate the constitutional mandate of the separation of powers doctrine, the court will consider if the actions constitute: (1) an assumption of power that lies exclusively under the control of another branch; or (2) a significant interfer- ence with the orderly conduct of the essential functions of another branch.” Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 234 Conn. 552–53; see also, e.g., Uni- versity of Connecticut Chapter, AAUP v. Governor, 200 Conn. 386 , 394–95, 512 A.2d 152 (1986).

2013Our case law is clear that “adjudication of the constitutionality of legislative enactments is beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies.” Rayhall v. Akim Co., 263 Conn. 328, 337 , 819 A.2d 803 (2003); see also Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 344 , 464 A.2d 785 (1983) (noting that when “the constitutional challenge . . . addresses the constitutionality of a statute, not with respect to its application but on its face . . . [t]he legislature cannot confer upon an administrative agency the power to adjudicate facial unconstitutionality without doing violence to the separation o

2013Our case law is clear that “adjudication of the constitutionality of legislative enactments is beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies.” Rayhall v. Akim Co., 263 Conn. 328, 337 , 819 A.2d 803 (2003); see also Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 344 , 464 A.2d 785 (1983) (noting that when “the constitutional challenge . . . addresses the constitutionality of a statute, not with respect to its application but on its face . . . [t]he legislature cannot confer upon an administrative agency the power to adjudicate facial unconstitutionality without doing violence to the separation o

2013Our case law is clear that “adjudication of the constitutionality of legislative enactments is beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies.” Rayhall v. Akim Co., 263 Conn. 328, 337 , 819 A.2d 803 (2003); see also Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 344 , 464 A.2d 785 (1983) (noting that when “the constitutional challenge . . . addresses the constitutionality of a statute, not with respect to its application but on its face . . . [t]he legislature cannot confer upon an administrative agency the power to adjudicate facial unconstitutionality without doing violence to the separation o

2013Our case law is clear that “adjudication of the constitutionality of legislative enactments is beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies.” Rayhall v. Akim Co., 263 Conn. 328, 337 , 819 A.2d 803 (2003); see also Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 344 , 464 A.2d 785 (1983) (noting that when “the constitutional challenge . . . addresses the constitutionality of a statute, not with respect to its application but on its face . . . [t]he legislature cannot confer upon an administrative agency the power to adjudicate facial unconstitutionality without doing violence to the separation o

2018III Relying largely on this court's decision in State v. McCahill , 261 Conn. 492 , 811 A.2d 667 (2002), the defendant also contends that construing drug dependency as an affirmative defense under § 21a-278 (b), whose elements are "otherwise identical" to § 21a-277 (a), violates the separation of powers under article second of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by article **809 eighteen of the amendments, by improperly allocating the judicial power of sentencing to the prosecutor, an executive branch actor who chooses the charges to file. 27 In response, the state contends that this issu

2018III Relying largely on this court's decision in State v. McCahill , 261 Conn. 492 , 811 A.2d 667 (2002), the defendant also contends that construing drug dependency as an affirmative defense under § 21a-278 (b), whose elements are "otherwise identical" to § 21a-277 (a), violates the separation of powers under article second of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by article **809 eighteen of the amendments, by improperly allocating the judicial power of sentencing to the prosecutor, an executive branch actor who chooses the charges to file. 27 In response, the state contends that this issu

1998The constitution achieves this purpose by prescribing limitations and duties for each branch that are essential to each branch’s independence and performance of assigned powers. . . . [Thus, t]he separation of powers doctrine serves a dual function: it limits the exercise of power within each branch, yet ensures the independent exercise of that power. . . . [I]n deciding whether one branch’s actions violate the constitutional mandate of the separation of powers doctrine, the court will consider if the actions constitute: (1) an assumption of power that lies exclusively under the control of ano

1998The constitution achieves this purpose by prescribing limitations and duties for each branch that are essential to each branch’s independence and performance of assigned powers. . . . [Thus, t]he separation of powers doctrine serves a dual function: it limits the exercise of power within each branch, yet ensures the independent exercise of that power. . . . [I]n deciding whether one branch’s actions violate the constitutional mandate of the separation of powers doctrine, the court will consider if the actions constitute: (1) an assumption of power that lies exclusively under the control of ano

2001The standard to be applied is stated in Massameno as follows: "Consequently, we have stated that in deciding whether one branch's actions violate the constitutional mandate of the separation of powers doctrine, the court will consider if the actions constitute: (1) an assumption of power that lies exclusively under the control of another branch; or (2) a significant interference with the orderly conduct of the essential functions of another branch." Specifically, a statute violates a constitutional mandate for separate judicial magistery only if "`it represents an effort by the legislature to

2000Decisions construing substantive liberty interests protected by the due process clause emphasize the fact-bound and relative nature both of the interests protected and of the procedural protections required by the constitution.”); Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 527 , 461 A.2d 938 (1983) (“[This] case [involves] a facial attack [premised on the separation of powers doctrine of the state constitution] on the constitutionality of a statute which has a sphere of operation that need never intrude upon the exclusive province of the judiciary to control the co

1985See, e.g., Szarwak v. Warden, 167 Conn. 10 , 355 A.2d 49 (1974); State v. Clemente, supra; Adams v. Rubinow, supra. Suffice it to say that the judicial historians who have so ably reviewed that history generally recognize the watershed significance of Norwalk Street Ry.

1985See, e.g., Szarwak v. Warden, 167 Conn. 10 , 355 A.2d 49 (1974); State v. Clemente, supra; Adams v. Rubinow, supra. Suffice it to say that the judicial historians who have so ably reviewed that history generally recognize the watershed significance of Norwalk Street Ry.

2025Accordingly, a nondelegation doc- trine founded upon the separation of powers doctrine does not pertain by jurisprudential necessity to the dele- gation of power from the state legislature to a munici- pality.’’ (Footnote omitted.) The court went on to state that ‘‘the rule limiting the delegation of legislative power between coequal branches of state government is not the appropriate rule to govern the delegation of legisla- tive power from the state to a municipality.’’ Id., 667 ; see also Stafford Higgins Industries, Inc. v. Norwalk, 245 Conn. 551, 566 , 715 A.2d 46 (1998).

2025Accordingly, a nondelegation doc- trine founded upon the separation of powers doctrine does not pertain by jurisprudential necessity to the dele- gation of power from the state legislature to a munici- pality.’’ (Footnote omitted.) The court went on to state that ‘‘the rule limiting the delegation of legislative power between coequal branches of state government is not the appropriate rule to govern the delegation of legisla- tive power from the state to a municipality.’’ Id., 667 ; see also Stafford Higgins Industries, Inc. v. Norwalk, 245 Conn. 551, 566 , 715 A.2d 46 (1998).

2023See Washington v. Commissioner of Correction, 287 Conn. 792 , 826–29, 950 A.2d 1220 (2008). 8 In Gooden, the petitioner had been sentenced in accordance with a plea agreement that included an agreed upon sentence of ten years of incarceration followed by five years of special parole.

2023See Washington v. Commissioner of Correction, 287 Conn. 792 , 826–29, 950 A.2d 1220 (2008). 8 In Gooden, the petitioner had been sentenced in accordance with a plea agreement that included an agreed upon sentence of ten years of incarceration followed by five years of special parole.

2021See We the People of Connecti- cut, Inc. v. Malloy, 150 Conn. App. 576 , 581–82, 92 A.3d 961 (2014) (separation of powers challenge to gover- nor’s executive orders allowing personal care atten- dants to bargain collectively was rendered moot by passage of legislation that ‘‘entirely replaced’’ executive orders); Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 859 (Ky. 2005) (challenge to governor’s emergency budget action as violating legislature’s appropriations power was rendered moot by legislature’s enactment of bill ratifying governor’s actions but reaching issue as capa- ble of repetition, ye

2021See We the People of Connecti- cut, Inc. v. Malloy, 150 Conn. App. 576 , 581–82, 92 A.3d 961 (2014) (separation of powers challenge to gover- nor’s executive orders allowing personal care atten- dants to bargain collectively was rendered moot by passage of legislation that ‘‘entirely replaced’’ executive orders); Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 859 (Ky. 2005) (challenge to governor’s emergency budget action as violating legislature’s appropriations power was rendered moot by legislature’s enactment of bill ratifying governor’s actions but reaching issue as capa- ble of repetition, ye

2021Observ- ing that there is no stand-alone federal constitutional right to an absentee ballot; see, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802 , 809–10, 89 S. Ct. 1404 , 22 L.

2021Observ- ing that there is no stand-alone federal constitutional right to an absentee ballot; see, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802 , 809–10, 89 S. Ct. 1404 , 22 L.

2021See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 328 Conn. 444 , 463–66, 180 A.3d 882 (2018) (dismissing penalty phase challenge in death penalty appeal as rendered moot by abolition of death penalty and unripe by virtue of fact that defendant had not yet been resentenced). 26 To this end, the plaintiffs observe that there have been numerous failed attempts to amend the state constitution to expand the use of absentee ballots, including the electorate’s rejection in 2014 by a 40,000 vote margin of an amendment that would have ‘‘remove[d] restrictions concerning absentee ballots and . . . permit[ted] a person to

2021See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 328 Conn. 444 , 463–66, 180 A.3d 882 (2018) (dismissing penalty phase challenge in death penalty appeal as rendered moot by abolition of death penalty and unripe by virtue of fact that defendant had not yet been resentenced). 26 To this end, the plaintiffs observe that there have been numerous failed attempts to amend the state constitution to expand the use of absentee ballots, including the electorate’s rejection in 2014 by a 40,000 vote margin of an amendment that would have ‘‘remove[d] restrictions concerning absentee ballots and . . . permit[ted] a person to

2021See We the People of Connecti- cut, Inc. v. Malloy, 150 Conn. App. 576 , 581–82, 92 A.3d 961 (2014) (separation of powers challenge to gover- nor’s executive orders allowing personal care atten- dants to bargain collectively was rendered moot by passage of legislation that ‘‘entirely replaced’’ executive orders); Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 859 (Ky. 2005) (challenge to governor’s emergency budget action as violating legislature’s appropriations power was rendered moot by legislature’s enactment of bill ratifying governor’s actions but reaching issue as capa- ble of repetition, ye

2017See, e.g., State v. Snowden , 171 Conn. App. 608 , 614-19, 157 A.3d 1209 (defendant failed to preserve claim because his objection at trial to joinder of charges of murder, criminal possession of pistol or revolver, and attempt to tamper with witness was different from claim asserted on appeal), cert. denied, 326 Conn. 903 , 163 A.3d 1204 (2017) ; see also Practice Book § 60-5.

2017See, e.g., State v. Snowden , 171 Conn. App. 608 , 614-19, 157 A.3d 1209 (defendant failed to preserve claim because his objection at trial to joinder of charges of murder, criminal possession of pistol or revolver, and attempt to tamper with witness was different from claim asserted on appeal), cert. denied, 326 Conn. 903 , 163 A.3d 1204 (2017) ; see also Practice Book § 60-5.

2017See, e.g., State v. Snowden , 171 Conn. App. 608 , 614-19, 157 A.3d 1209 (defendant failed to preserve claim because his objection at trial to joinder of charges of murder, criminal possession of pistol or revolver, and attempt to tamper with witness was different from claim asserted on appeal), cert. denied, 326 Conn. 903 , 163 A.3d 1204 (2017) ; see also Practice Book § 60-5.

2017See, e.g., State v. Snowden , 171 Conn. App. 608 , 614-19, 157 A.3d 1209 (defendant failed to preserve claim because his objection at trial to joinder of charges of murder, criminal possession of pistol or revolver, and attempt to tamper with witness was different from claim asserted on appeal), cert. denied, 326 Conn. 903 , 163 A.3d 1204 (2017) ; see also Practice Book § 60-5.