separation of powers doctrine in Florida

2015Art. 11, § 3, Fla. Const.; Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So.2d 321, 329 (Fla.2004); see also Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d 260, 264 (Fla.1991). 12 Where the Florida Constitution allocates power to a specific branch of government, any statute purporting to give the same power to another branch violates the separation of powers doctrine. [Ujnlike the apparent federal approach, Florida has not relied on implied powers, arguments of expedience or necessity, or any penumbral theory in gauging the contours of the separation of powers ...

2015L.J. 1, 19, 19 n. 60] (citing Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws (Newmann ed. 1949)).’’ B.H. v. State, 645 So.2d 987, 991 (Fla.1994). . ”[U]nder the doctrine of separation of powers, the legislature may not delegate the power to enact laws or to declare what the law shall be to any other branch.” Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d 260, 264 (Fla.1991).

2012See also Fla. Dep’t of State, Div. of Elections v. Martin, 916 So.2d 763, 769 (Fla.2005) (”[N]o branch may encroach upon the powers of another.”); State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345, 353 (Fla.2000) (observing that our courts have “traditionally applied a strict separation of powers doctrine”); Merkle v. Guardianship of Jacoby, 912 So.2d 595, 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (”[T]he limitation on the exercise of judicial power to the decision of justiciable controversies has been attributed to judicial adherence to the doctrine of separation of powers.

2012See also Fla. Dep’t of State, Div. of Elections v. Martin, 916 So.2d 763, 769 (Fla.2005) (”[N]o branch may encroach upon the powers of another.”); State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345, 353 (Fla.2000) (observing that our courts have “traditionally applied a strict separation of powers doctrine”); Merkle v. Guardianship of Jacoby, 912 So.2d 595, 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (”[T]he limitation on the exercise of judicial power to the decision of justiciable controversies has been attributed to judicial adherence to the doctrine of separation of powers.

2018The separation of powers doctrine prohibits one branch of government from "encroach[ing] upon the powers of another." Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 708 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 329 (Fla. 2004)).

2015Art. 11, § 3, Fla. Const.; Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So.2d 321, 329 (Fla.2004); see also Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d 260, 264 (Fla.1991). 12 Where the Florida Constitution allocates power to a specific branch of government, any statute purporting to give the same power to another branch violates the separation of powers doctrine. [Ujnlike the apparent federal approach, Florida has not relied on implied powers, arguments of expedience or necessity, or any penumbral theory in gauging the contours of the separation of powers ...

2001Further, "[o]ur supreme court has said that a statute which requires the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence if certain conditions are met does not violate the separation of powers clause by virtue of the fact that it removes sentencing discretion from the judiciary." Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citing Scott v. State, 369 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1979)).

2001Further, “[o]ur supreme court has said that a statute which requires the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence if certain conditions are met does not violate the separation of powers clause by virtue of the fact that it removes sentencing discretion from the judiciary.” Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citing Scott v. State, 369 So.2d 330 (Fla.1979)).

2020First, “under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, the judicial branch must not interfere with the discretionary functions of the legislative or executive branches of government absent a violation of 4 constitutional or statutory rights.” Id. at 918 (citing Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cty., 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979); Askew v. Schuster, 331 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1976); art.

2009Accordingly, we take this occasion to reaffirm that, in Florida, “[governmental immunity derives entirely from the doctrine of separation of powers, not from [the absence of] a duty of care or from any statutory basis.” Bowden, 737 So.2d at 538 (brackets omitted) (emphasis supplied) (quoting Kaisner, 543 So.2d at 737 ); see also Commercial Carrier, 371 So.2d at 1017-22 (holding that article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution (the separation-of-powers provision) requires the judicial application of a discretionary-function exception to the otherwise broad waiver of sovereign immunity pre

2025While the Legislature has the authority to adopt procedural provisions in statutes that are “intertwined with substantive rights,” see Caple v. Tuttle’s Design–Build, Inc., 753 So. 2d 49, 54 (Fla. 2000), this Court always has the authority to adopt rules of practice and procedure under article V, section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution, cf. Love v. State, 247 So. 3d 609, 610-12 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (concluding that statute setting burden of proof did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by invading the province of the judiciary because it was substantive enough, and noting in a parenth

2025While the Legislature has the authority to adopt procedural provisions in statutes that are “intertwined with substantive rights,” see Caple v. Tuttle’s Design–Build, Inc., 753 So. 2d 49, 54 (Fla. 2000), this Court always has the authority to adopt rules of practice and procedure under article V, section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution, cf. Love v. State, 247 So. 3d 609, 610-12 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (concluding that statute setting burden of proof did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by invading the province of the judiciary because it was substantive enough, and noting in a parenth

2018See Times Publ'g Co. v. Ake , 660 So.2d 255 , 257 (Fla. 1995) ; Locke v. Hawkes , 595 So.2d 32 , 36-37 (Fla. 1992).

2018See Times Publ'g Co. v. Ake , 660 So.2d 255 , 257 (Fla. 1995) ; Locke v. Hawkes , 595 So.2d 32 , 36-37 (Fla. 1992).

2017To the extent that Lambrix is challenging the decision reached by the executive branch, we have consistently held, “clemency is an executive function and ..., in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers, we will not generally second-guess the executive’s determination that clemency is not warranted.” Id.; see also Johnston, 27 So.3d at 26 (“[W]e decline to depart from the Court’s precedent, based on the doctrine of separation of powers, in which we have held that it is not our prerogative to second-guess the executive on matters of clemency in capital cases.”); Rutherford v. State,

2017To the extent that Lambrix is challenging the decision reached by the executive branch, we have consistently held, “clemency is an executive function and . . . , in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers, we will not generally second-guess the executive’s determination that clemency is not warranted.” Id.; see also Johnston, 27 So. 3d at 26 (“[W]e decline to depart from the Court’s precedent, based on the doctrine of separation of powers, in which we have held that it is not our prerogative to second-guess the executive on matters of clemency in capital cases.”); Rutherford v. St

2012Servs. v. Brooke, 573 So.2d 363, 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (observing that the legislature’s appropriations power was "off limits to the courts” and "had the [court’s] orders ... required the Department to make placements that would exceed the amounts set forth in the annual appropriations act by the legislature, or ... encroached upon the legislature’s power of appropriation, they would have been rendered in excess of the judges' jurisdiction”); State, ex ret Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Nourse, 437 So.2d 221, 222 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (”[T]he court does not have jurisdiction to man

1998See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Brooke, 573 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); In Interest of N.W., 506 So.2d 80, 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).

2010Thus, "[t]he fairly debatable standard of review is a highly deferential standard requiring approval of a planning action if reasonable persons could differ as to its propriety." Martin County v. Yusem, 690 So.2d 1288, 1295 (Fla.1997).

2010Thus, “[t]he fairly debatable standard of review is a highly deferential standard requiring approval of a planning action if reasonable persons could differ as to its propriety.” Martin County v. Yusem, 690 So.2d 1288, 1295 (Fla.1997).

2010"The fairly debatable rule has its basis in the deference that the judicial power owes the legislative function under *633 the separation of powers doctrine inherent in our form of government and expressly embodied in our state and federal constitutions." Albright v. Hensley, 492 So.2d 852, 856 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (Cowart, J., dissenting).

2010“The fairly debatable rule has its basis in the deference that the judicial power owes the legislative function under the separation of powers doctrine inherent in our form of government and expressly embodied in our state and federal constitutions.” Albright v. Hensley, 492 So.2d 852, 856 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (Cowart, J., dissenting).

1999See, e.g., State v. Benitez, 395 So.2d 514, 519 (Fla. 1981) (rejecting a separation of powers challenge to a statute requiring mandatory minimum sentences for drug trafficking because the sentencing judge retained discretion to reduce or suspend the sentence upon the request of the state attorney for substantial assistance by the defendant, and citing a New York case for the proposition that, "`[s]o long as a statute does not wrest from courts the final discretion to impose sentence, it does not infringe upon the constitutional division of responsibilities'"); London v. State, 623 So.2d 527, 5

1999See London v. State, 623 So.2d 527, 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (referring to habitual offender statute).

2026Naso v. Hall, 338 So. 3d 283 , 286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). “[I]n Florida, ‘[g]overnmental immunity derives entirely from the doctrine of separation of powers, not from [the absence of] a duty of care or from any statutory basis.’” Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 3d 1035, 1045 (Fla. 2009) (alterations in original) (emphases omitted) (quoting Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So. 2d 532, 538 (Fla. 1999)).

2013The governmental immunity at issue here “derives entirely from the doctrine of separation of powers, not from [the absence of] a duty of care or from any statutory basis.” 4 Wallace, 3 So.3d at 1045 (emphasis and brackets in original).

2015The court concluded that “applying chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, to all juvenile offenders whose sentences are unconstitutional under Miller is the remedy most faithful to the Eighth Amendment principles established by the United States Supreme Court, to the intent of the Florida Legislature, and to the doctrine of separation of powers.” Id. at 406.

2015The court concluded that “applying chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, to all juvenile offenders whose sentences are unconstitutional under Miller is the remedy most faithful to the Eighth Amendment principles established by the United States Supreme Court, to the intent of the Florida Legislature, and to the doctrine of separation of powers.” Horsley II, 160 So.3d at 406 .

2026The circuit court then addressed article VIII, section 2(b), concluding that while it "allows a municipality to 'exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law,' the legislative branch of municipal government cannot exercise all the powers of the municipality." The circuit court's reasoning is flawed at the outset because the separation of powers clause in the Florida Constitution "was not intended to apply to local governmental entities and officials." Locke v. Hawkes, 595 So. 2d 32, 36 (Fla. 1992); see also Miami-Dade County v. City of Miami, 315 So. 3d 115 , 1

2018See Times Publ'g Co. v. Ake , 660 So.2d 255 , 257 (Fla. 1995) ; Locke v. Hawkes , 595 So.2d 32 , 36-37 (Fla. 1992).

2024First, and perhaps most importantly, it preserves the “constitutional principle of separation of powers.” Id.; Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 737 (Fla. 1989) (reaffirming “that governmental immunity derives entirely from the doctrine of separation of powers”); Com.

2017Sovereign Immunity As stated earlier, even where a duty is owed, sovereign immunity may bar an action for an alleged breach of that duty, see Pollock 882 So. 2d at 932-33 ; Henderson, 737 So. 2d at 535 ; Kaisner, 543 So. 2d at 734 , because in Florida, “governmental immunity derives entirely from the doctrine of separation of powers, not from a duty of care or from any statutory basis.” Kaisner, 543 So. 2d 22 at 737.

1999See also Turner v. State, 745 So.2d 351, 352-54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (rejecting the argument that the Act violates the separation of powers clause because it restricts plea bargaining).

1999We have previously rejected several of the appellant's constitutional challenges, including the single subject challenge, see Jackson v. State, 744 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); the separation of powers challenge, see Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); the cruel or unusual punishment challenge, see Turner v. State, 745 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); the due process challenges, see Turner v. State , Woods v. State ; and the equal protection challenge, see Woods v. State .

2023Solares v. City of Miami, 166 So. 3d 887, 888 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“For a court of law operating as one of the three branches of government under the doctrine of the separation of powers, standing is a threshold issue which must be resolved before reaching the merits of a case.

2015Solares v. City of Miami, 166 So.3d 887, 888 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“For a court of law operating as one of the three branches of government under the doctrine of the separation of powers, standing is a threshold issue which must be resolved before reaching the merits of a case.

2017To the extent that Lambrix is challenging the decision reached by the executive branch, we have consistently held, “clemency is an executive function and ..., in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers, we will not generally second-guess the executive’s determination that clemency is not warranted.” Id.; see also Johnston, 27 So.3d at 26 (“[W]e decline to depart from the Court’s precedent, based on the doctrine of separation of powers, in which we have held that it is not our prerogative to second-guess the executive on matters of clemency in capital cases.”); Rutherford v. State,

2017To the extent that Lambrix is challenging the decision reached by the executive branch, we have consistently held, “clemency is an executive function and . . . , in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers, we will not generally second-guess the executive’s determination that clemency is not warranted.” Id.; see also Johnston, 27 So. 3d at 26 (“[W]e decline to depart from the Court’s precedent, based on the doctrine of separation of powers, in which we have held that it is not our prerogative to second-guess the executive on matters of clemency in capital cases.”); Rutherford v. St

2020The City and the City Employees filed two separate motions to dismiss the complaint. 2 The City argued in its motion that all five counts failed to state a cause of action because, under the separation-of-powers doctrine set forth in Trianon Park Condominium Association v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985), courts cannot interfere with a municipality’s discretionary function of enforcing its zoning code.

2020First, “under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, the judicial branch must not interfere with the discretionary functions of the legislative or executive branches of government absent a violation of 4 constitutional or statutory rights.” Id. at 918 (citing Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cty., 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979); Askew v. Schuster, 331 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1976); art.

2001We agree with the reasoning of our sister court, the Third District, which addressed the same issue in McKnight v. State, 727 So.2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), and affirm.

2001We agree with the reasoning of our sister court, the Third District, which addressed the same issue in McKnight v. State, 727 So.2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), and affirm.

2026Naso v. Hall, 338 So. 3d 283 , 286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). “[I]n Florida, ‘[g]overnmental immunity derives entirely from the doctrine of separation of powers, not from [the absence of] a duty of care or from any statutory basis.’” Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 3d 1035, 1045 (Fla. 2009) (alterations in original) (emphases omitted) (quoting Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So. 2d 532, 538 (Fla. 1999)).

2018Sovereign Immunity As stated earlier, even where a duty is owed, sovereign immunity may bar an action for an alleged breach of that duty, see Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 932-33 ; Henderson, 737 So. 2d at 535 ; Kaisner, 543 So. 2d at 734, because in Florida, “governmental immunity derives entirely from the doctrine of separation of powers, not from a duty of care or from any statutory basis.” Kaisner, 543 So. 2d at 737.

2025I would be less than candid if I did not admit that I have serious concerns about the majority opinion’s impact on “the doctrine of separation of powers, one of the structural pillars upon which American freedoms rest.” Detournay v. City of Coral Gables, 127 So. 3d 869, 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

2021Over a dissent, the Detournay majority had held: “Under the doctrine of separation of powers, [a city’s] discretion to file, prosecute, abate, settle, or voluntarily dismiss a building and zoning enforcement action is a purely executive function that cannot be supervised by the courts, absent the violation of a specific constitutional provision or law.” 127 So. 3d at 870-71 .

2017See Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 613 So. 2d at 418-19 (refusing to elevate the collective bargaining rights of public employees and thus alter “years of strict adherence to the separation of powers doctrine”).

2017The court held that the separation of powers doctrine in Article II, section 3 and the provision of Article VII, section 1(c) of the state constitution requires that “exclusive control over public funds rests solely with the legislature.” Id.