separation of powers doctrine in Hawaii

2025Cf. Alaka#i Na Keiki, Inc. v. Matayoshi, 127 Hawai#i 263, 278, 277 P.3d 988, 1003 (2012) (instructing that "to determine whether there is a separation of powers violation, it must be decided whether the legislature delegated a judicial function to an administrative agency").

2025Cf. Alaka#i Na Keiki, Inc. v. Matayoshi, 127 Hawai#i 263, 278, 277 P.3d 988, 1003 (2012) (instructing that "to determine whether there is a separation of powers violation, it must be decided whether the legislature delegated a judicial function to an administrative agency").

2012The separation of powers doctrine is intended “to preclude a commingling of ... essentially different powers of government in the same hands and thereby prevent a situation where one department would be controlled by, or subjected, directly or indirectly, to, the coercive influence of either of the other departments.” Pray v. Judicial Selection Comm’n of State, 75 Haw. 333 , 353, 861 P.2d 723, 732 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2012The separation of powers doctrine is intended “to preclude a commingling of essentially different powers of government in the same hands and thereby prevent a situation where one department would be controlled by, or subjected, directly or indirectly, to, the coercive influence of either of the other departments.” Pray v. Judicial Selection Comm’n of State, 75 Haw. 333 , 353, 861 P.2d 723, 732 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2012Cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 691 , 117 S.Ct. 1636 , 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997) (“[T]he doctrine of separation of powers ... restrains each of the three branches of the Federal Government from encroaching on the domain of the other two[.]”); see also Hawaii Insurers Council v. Lingle, 120 Hawai'i 51, 69 , 201 P.3d 564, 582 (2008) (explaining that the separation of powers doctrine preserves the checks and balances of our system of government where “sovereign power is divided and allocated among three co-equal branches”).

2012Cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 691 , 117 S.Ct. 1636 , 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997) (“[T]he doctrine of separation of powers ... restrains each of the three branches of the Federal Government from encroaching on the domain of the other two[.]”); see also Hawaii Insurers Council v. Lingle, 120 Hawai'i 51, 69 , 201 P.3d 564, 582 (2008) (explaining that the separation of powers doctrine preserves the checks and balances of our system of government where “sovereign power is divided and allocated among three co-equal branches”).

2008Separation of powers “The separation of powers doctrine is not expressly set forth in any single constitutional provision, ‘but like the federal government, [Hawaii’s government] is one in which the sovereign power is divided and allocated among three co-equal branches.’” *70 Biscoe v. Tanaka, 76 Hawai'i 380, 383 , 878 P.2d 719, 722 (1994) (quoting Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154, 170-71 , 737 P.2d 446, 456 (1987)) (brackets omitted).

2008Separation of powers “The separation of powers doctrine is not expressly set forth in any single constitutional provision, ‘but like the federal government, [Hawaii’s government] is one in which the sovereign power is divided and allocated among three co-equal branches.’” *70 Biscoe v. Tanaka, 76 Hawai'i 380, 383 , 878 P.2d 719, 722 (1994) (quoting Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154, 170-71 , 737 P.2d 446, 456 (1987)) (brackets omitted).

2008Separation of powers “The separation of powers doctrine is not expressly set forth in any single constitutional provision, ‘but like the federal government, [Hawaii’s government] is one in which the sovereign power is divided and allocated among three co-equal branches.’” *70 Biscoe v. Tanaka, 76 Hawai'i 380, 383 , 878 P.2d 719, 722 (1994) (quoting Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154, 170-71 , 737 P.2d 446, 456 (1987)) (brackets omitted).

2008Separation of powers “The separation of powers doctrine is not expressly set forth in any single constitutional provision, ‘but like the federal government, [Hawaii’s government] is one in which the sovereign power is divided and allocated among three co-equal branches.’” *70 Biscoe v. Tanaka, 76 Hawai'i 380, 383 , 878 P.2d 719, 722 (1994) (quoting Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154, 170-71 , 737 P.2d 446, 456 (1987)) (brackets omitted).

2022See Hungate, 139 Hawaii at 406 , 391 P.3d at 13 (quoting Touche Ross & Co v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979)) (“[I]mplying a private right of action on the basis of [legislative] silence is a hazardous enterprise, at best.” (alterations in original)). 26 Flores contended that “by prohibiting the unauthorized and unlawful exercise of police powers outside an officer’s jurisdiction, [HRS §] 52D-5 implicitly created a private right of action to seek declaratory relief.” Additionally, Flores argued that “[i]f the legislature in fact intended to preclude judicial review, then that preclusion vi

2022See Hungate, 139 Hawaii at 406 , 391 P.3d at 13 (quoting Touche Ross & Co v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979)) (“[I]mplying a private right of action on the basis of [legislative] silence is a hazardous enterprise, at best.” (alterations in original)). 26 Flores contended that “by prohibiting the unauthorized and unlawful exercise of police powers outside an officer’s jurisdiction, [HRS §] 52D-5 implicitly created a private right of action to seek declaratory relief.” Additionally, Flores argued that “[i]f the legislature in fact intended to preclude judicial review, then that preclusion vi

2021Thus, as an imperative of the separation of powers doctrine, it is the province of this court, and not the legislature, ultimately to ascertain whether, for purposes of HRS § 707–733.5, multiple acts of sexual penetration or sexual contact may be deemed a "continuing offense." As previously discussed, we hold that such acts are, by nature, separate and discrete and therefore may not form the basis of a "continuing offense." Id. at 253, 81 P.3d at 1168 (cleaned up) (bolding added).

2021See Hussey v. Say, 139 Hawaiʻi 181, 188-89, 384 P.3d 1282, 1289-90 (2016) (holding that whether a legislator is qualified to hold office is nonjusticiable 13 Section 12 provides in relevant part: “Each house shall choose its own officers, determine the rules of its proceedings and keep a journal.” Haw.

2020No such privilege exists for reports that an entity is not required to make by law. 19 The reservation of criminal investigatory powers to the executive branch is consistent with the separation of powers doctrine inherent in the Hawaiʻi Constitution, which “is intended to preclude a commingling of essentially different powers of government in the same hands and thereby prevent a situation where one department would be controlled by, or subjected, directly or indirectly, to, the coercive influence of either of the other departments.” AlohaCare v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 127 Hawaiʻi 76, 85, 276 P

2012See E & J Lounge Operating Co., Inc. v. Liquor Comm’n of the City and Cty. of Honolulu, 118 Hawai#i 320, 347, 189 P.3d 432, 459 (2008). 21 ***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** invoking the separation of powers doctrine.

2012McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 49 Cal.3d 348 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 318 , 777 P.2d 91, 102 (1989), cogently explains the separation of powers doctrine when an administrative agency is given judicial power: Our constitutional provision confining “judicial powers” to the courts ... has counterparts in most other state constitutions, as well as the federal Constitution ....

2012McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 49 Cal.3d 348 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 318 , 777 P.2d 91, 102 (1989), cogently explains the separation of powers doctrine when an administrative agency is given judicial power: Our constitutional provision confining “judicial powers” to the courts ... has counterparts in most other state constitutions, as well as the federal Constitution ....

2012Cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 691 , 117 S.Ct. 1636 , 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997) (“[T]he doctrine of separation of powers ... restrains each of the three branches of the Federal Government from encroaching on the domain of the other two[.]”); see also Hawaii Insurers Council v. Lingle, 120 Hawai'i 51, 69 , 201 P.3d 564, 582 (2008) (explaining that the separation of powers doctrine preserves the checks and balances of our system of government where “sovereign power is divided and allocated among three co-equal branches”).

2012Cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 691 , 117 S.Ct. 1636 , 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997) (“[T]he doctrine of separation of powers ... restrains each of the three branches of the Federal Government from encroaching on the domain of the other two[.]”); see also Hawaii Insurers Council v. Lingle, 120 Hawai'i 51, 69 , 201 P.3d 564, 582 (2008) (explaining that the separation of powers doctrine preserves the checks and balances of our system of government where “sovereign power is divided and allocated among three co-equal branches”).

2012It would seem that, to the extent HRS chapter 103F delegates to the DOE authority to interpret and to apply HRS chapter 103F and rules promulgated thereunder in deciding disputes raised by protesting parties, the legislature vested the DOE with judicial power. 36 For just as this court is the ultimate interpreter of our constitution, Bani, 97 Hawai'i at 291 n. 4, 36 P.3d at 1261 n. 4, this court is the final arbiter of our statutory law, see Rana v. Bishop Ins. of Hawaii, Inc., 6 Haw.App. 1, 10 , 713 P.2d 1363, 1369 (1985) (“The state courts are the final arbiters of the State’s own law.”) (Br

2012It would seem that, to the extent HRS chapter 103F delegates to the DOE authority to interpret and to apply HRS chapter 103F and rules promulgated thereunder in deciding disputes raised by protesting parties, the legislature vested the DOE with judicial power. 36 For just as this court is the ultimate interpreter of our constitution, Bani, 97 Hawai'i at 291 n. 4, 36 P.3d at 1261 n. 4, this court is the final arbiter of our statutory law, see Rana v. Bishop Ins. of Hawaii, Inc., 6 Haw.App. 1, 10 , 713 P.2d 1363, 1369 (1985) (“The state courts are the final arbiters of the State’s own law.”) (Br

2012In contrast, in Northern Pipeline , the Court held that the establishment of non-Article III Bankruptcy Courts was unconstitutional, where the Bankruptcy Court judges had “all of the ‘powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty,’ except that they ‘may not enjoin another court or punish a criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the judge of the court or warranting a punishment of imprisonment.’ ” 458 U.S. at 55, 76 , 102 S.Ct. 2858 .

2012In contrast, in Northern Pipeline , the Court held that the establishment of non-Article III Bankruptcy Courts was unconstitutional, where the Bankruptcy Court judges had "all of the `powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty,' except that they `may not enjoin another court or punish a criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the judge of the court or warranting a punishment of imprisonment.'" 458 U.S. at 55, 76 , 102 S.Ct. 2858 .

2012Laws Act 190, § 1 at 351 (stating that HRS chapter 103F was intended to facilitate “fair and equitable treatment of all persons who apply to,” provide services), and contrary to “full respect for due process,” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 478 U.S. at 855 , 106 S.Ct. 3245 , for an agency to determine the propriety of its own actions in a legal dispute with an adverse party. 41 Because the statute as construed does not exclude judicial review, it would not implicate the separation of powers doctrine, and, thus, HRS chapter 103F would not violate that doctrine, as Petitioner suggests.

2012Laws Act 190, § 1 at 351 (stating that HRS chapter 103F was intended to facilitate “fair and equitable treatment of all persons who apply to,” provide services), and contrary to “full respect for due process,” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 478 U.S. at 855 , 106 S.Ct. 3245 , for an agency to determine the propriety of its own actions in a legal dispute with an adverse party. 41 Because the statute as construed does not exclude judicial review, it would not implicate the separation of powers doctrine, and, thus, HRS chapter 103F would not violate that doctrine, as Petitioner suggests.

2009We have previously noted that the separation of powers doctrine “is intended to preclude a commingling of ... essentially different powers of government in the same hands and thereby prevent a situation where one department would be controlled by, or subjected, directly or indirectly to the coercive influence of either of the other departments.” See, e.g., Pray v. Judicial Selection Comm’n, 75 Haw. 333, 353 , 861 P.2d 723, 732 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. Bester v. Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, 779 So.2d 715, 721 (La.2001) (“the inherent p

2008In Maugaotega II, this court held that HRS § 706-662 (Supp.1996) was, in light of Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 , 127 S.Ct. 856 , 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007), unconstitutional on its face, insofar' as every subsection “authorize[d] the sentencing court to extend a defendant’s sentence beyond the ‘standard term’ authorized solely by the jury’s verdict ... by requiring the sentencing court, rather than the trier of fact, to make an additional necessity finding that ... does not fall under Apprendi 's prior-or-con current-convictions exception....” Maugaotega II, 115 Hawai'i at 446 , 168 P.3d

2008In Maugaotega II, this court held that HRS § 706-662 (Supp.1996) was, in light of Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 , 127 S.Ct. 856 , 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007), unconstitutional on its face, insofar as every subsection "authorize[d] the sentencing court to extend a defendant's sentence beyond the `standard term' authorized solely by the jury's verdict . . . by requiring the sentencing court, rather than the trier of fact, to make an additional necessity finding that . . . does not fall under Apprendi's prior-or-concurrent-convictions exception. . . ." Maugaotega II, 115 Hawai`i at 446, 168 P

2003That would be an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power." (Citations omitted.)); State v. Rodrigues, 63 Haw. 412 , 416 n. 7, 629 P.2d *408 1111, 1114 n. 7 (1981) ("Judicial legislation should be practiced only interstitially." (Citing Hayes v. Gill, 52 Haw. 251, 254 , 473 P.2d 872, 875 (1970).)); State v. Abellano, 50 Haw. 384, 386 , 441 P.2d 333, 335 (1968) ("For this court to attempt to rewrite the ordinance to cure the constitutional defect would be an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power."); cf. Biscoe v. Tanaka, 76 Hawai'i 380, 383 , 878 P.2d 719, 722 (1994) (recognizing

2003That would be an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power." (Citations omitted.)); State v. Rodrigues, 63 Haw. 412 , 416 n. 7, 629 P.2d *408 1111, 1114 n. 7 (1981) ("Judicial legislation should be practiced only interstitially." (Citing Hayes v. Gill, 52 Haw. 251, 254 , 473 P.2d 872, 875 (1970).)); State v. Abellano, 50 Haw. 384, 386 , 441 P.2d 333, 335 (1968) ("For this court to attempt to rewrite the ordinance to cure the constitutional defect would be an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power."); cf. Biscoe v. Tanaka, 76 Hawai'i 380, 383 , 878 P.2d 719, 722 (1994) (recognizing

2003That would be an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power." (Citations omitted.)); State v. Rodrigues, 63 Haw. 412 , 416 n. 7, 629 P.2d *408 1111, 1114 n. 7 (1981) ("Judicial legislation should be practiced only interstitially." (Citing Hayes v. Gill, 52 Haw. 251, 254 , 473 P.2d 872, 875 (1970).)); State v. Abellano, 50 Haw. 384, 386 , 441 P.2d 333, 335 (1968) ("For this court to attempt to rewrite the ordinance to cure the constitutional defect would be an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power."); cf. Biscoe v. Tanaka, 76 Hawai'i 380, 383 , 878 P.2d 719, 722 (1994) (recognizing

2003That would be an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power." (Citations omitted.)); State v. Rodrigues, 63 Haw. 412 , 416 n. 7, 629 P.2d *408 1111, 1114 n. 7 (1981) ("Judicial legislation should be practiced only interstitially." (Citing Hayes v. Gill, 52 Haw. 251, 254 , 473 P.2d 872, 875 (1970).)); State v. Abellano, 50 Haw. 384, 386 , 441 P.2d 333, 335 (1968) ("For this court to attempt to rewrite the ordinance to cure the constitutional defect would be an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power."); cf. Biscoe v. Tanaka, 76 Hawai'i 380, 383 , 878 P.2d 719, 722 (1994) (recognizing

2003That would be an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power." (Citations omitted.)); State v. Rodrigues, 63 Haw. 412 , 416 n. 7, 629 P.2d *408 1111, 1114 n. 7 (1981) ("Judicial legislation should be practiced only interstitially." (Citing Hayes v. Gill, 52 Haw. 251, 254 , 473 P.2d 872, 875 (1970).)); State v. Abellano, 50 Haw. 384, 386 , 441 P.2d 333, 335 (1968) ("For this court to attempt to rewrite the ordinance to cure the constitutional defect would be an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power."); cf. Biscoe v. Tanaka, 76 Hawai'i 380, 383 , 878 P.2d 719, 722 (1994) (recognizing

2003That would be an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power." (Citations omitted.)); State v. Rodrigues, 63 Haw. 412 , 416 n. 7, 629 P.2d *408 1111, 1114 n. 7 (1981) ("Judicial legislation should be practiced only interstitially." (Citing Hayes v. Gill, 52 Haw. 251, 254 , 473 P.2d 872, 875 (1970).)); State v. Abellano, 50 Haw. 384, 386 , 441 P.2d 333, 335 (1968) ("For this court to attempt to rewrite the ordinance to cure the constitutional defect would be an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power."); cf. Biscoe v. Tanaka, 76 Hawai'i 380, 383 , 878 P.2d 719, 722 (1994) (recognizing