separation of powers doctrine in Colorado

1994In construing Article III, we have held that the separation-of-powers doctrine “imposes on the judiciary both a proscription against interfering with the executive or legislative branches, and a duty to perform its constitutional and statutory obligations with complete independence.” People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Colo.1994); Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953, 956 (Colo.1984).

1994Article III of the Colorado Constitution provides "[t]he powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments,—the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted." This court has stated "[t]he fundamental meaning of the separation of powers doctrine is that the three branches of government are separate, coordinate, and equal

2023See People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36, ¶ 42 ; see also Scott v. People, 2017 CO 16, ¶ 17 (“[A]n error will not ordinarily be deemed ‘obvious’ when either this court or a division of the court of appeals has previously rejected an argument being advanced by a subsequent party who is asserting plain error.”); Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 2020 CO 66, ¶ 30 (“Statutes are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers, through which ‘the judiciary respects the roles of the legislature and the executive in the enactment of laws.’”) (quoting City of

2020Statutes are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers, through which “the judiciary respects the roles of the legislature and the executive in the enactment of laws.” City of Greenwood Vill. v. Petitioners for the Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 440 (Colo. 2000).

2025However, the separation of powers doctrine “does not require a complete division of authority among the three branches.” Bondurant, ¶ 19, 296 P.3d at 207 (quoting Crowe, 126 P.3d at 205 ).

2021As our supreme court noted in Crowe, the separation of powers doctrine does not require absolute division of authority among the branches of government. 126 P.3d at 205-06 .

1994Article III of the Colorado Constitution provides "[t]he powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments,—the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted." This court has stated "[t]he fundamental meaning of the separation of powers doctrine is that the three branches of government are separate, coordinate, and equal

1994Article III of the Colorado Constitution provides "[t]he powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments,—the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted." This court has stated "[t]he fundamental meaning of the separation of powers doctrine is that the three branches of government are separate, coordinate, and equal

2021Assembly v. Lamm , 704 P.2d 1371, 1378 ( Colo. 1985 ) , in order to honor the doctrine of separation of powers, Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe , 810 P.2d 201, 205 ( Colo. 1991 ) ( citing Colo. Const. art.

2021Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1378 (Colo. 1985), in order to honor the doctrine of separation of powers, Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201, 205 (Colo. 1991) (citing Colo. Const. art.

2004The first prong is necessary under the separation of powers doctrine in article III of the Colorado Constitution. 2 Conrad, 656 P.2d at 668 .

1985As this court observed in Conrad v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo.1982): The “injury-in-fact” requirement is dictated by the need to assure that an actual controversy exists so that the matter is a proper one for judicial resolution, for consistent with the separation of powers doctrine embodied in Article III of the Colorado Constitution, “[cjourts cannot, under the pretense of an actual case, assume powers vested in either the executive or the legislative branches of government.” [Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 16 .7, 570 P.2d 535, 538 (1977).] The requirement tha

2016Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168 , 570 P.2d 536 , 539 (1977); accord Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 855 ; If the plaintiff cannot establish both, “no relief can be afforded, and the case should be dismissed for lack of standing.” Wimberly, 194 Colo. at 168 , 570 P.2d at 539 . ¶ 11 The first prong maintains the separation of powers doctrine and prevents a court from invading the legislative and executive spheres.

2016Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168 , 570 P.2d 536 , 539 (1977); accord Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 855 ; If the plaintiff cannot establish both, “no relief can be afforded, and the case should be dismissed for lack of standing.” Wimberly, 194 Colo. at 168 , 570 P.2d at 539 . ¶ 11 The first prong maintains the separation of powers doctrine and prevents a court from invading the legislative and executive spheres.

2008The Hearing Board notes, "Prosecutorial discretion is a hallmark of our criminal justice system that flows from the doctrine of separation of powers." People in Interest of J.A.L., 761 P.2d 1137 (Colo.1988).

2006See People in Interest of J.A.L., 761 P.2d 1137 (Colo.1988).

2025Crabtree, ¶ 42; see also People v. Taylor, 2021 COA 133 , ¶ 15 (“Statutes are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers, through which ‘the judiciary respects the roles of the legislature and the executive in the enactment of laws.’” (quoting Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 2020 CO 66, ¶ 30 )).

2025Crabtree, ¶ 42; see also People v. Taylor, 2021 COA 133 , ¶ 15 (“Statutes are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers, through which ‘the judiciary respects the roles of the legislature and the executive in the enactment of laws.’” (quoting Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 2020 CO 66, ¶ 30 )).

2021Assembly v. Lamm , 704 P.2d 1371, 1378 ( Colo. 1985 ) , in order to honor the doctrine of separation of powers, Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe , 810 P.2d 201, 205 ( Colo. 1991 ) ( citing Colo. Const. art.

2021Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1378 (Colo. 1985), in order to honor the doctrine of separation of powers, Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201, 205 (Colo. 1991) (citing Colo. Const. art.

2016Spedding v. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd. , 931 P.2d 480, 485 (Colo. App. 1996); see also Denver Ctr. for the Performing Arts v. Briggs , 696 P.2d 299 , 305 n.5 (Colo. 1985).

2016Spedding v. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd., 931 P.2d 480, 485 (Colo.App.1996); see also Denver Ctr. for the Performing Arts v. Briggs, 696 P.2d 299 , 305 n. 5 (Colo.1985).

2016Spedding v. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd. , 931 P.2d 480, 485 (Colo. App. 1996); see also Denver Ctr. for the Performing Arts v. Briggs , 696 P.2d 299 , 305 n.5 (Colo. 1985).

2016Spedding v. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd., 931 P.2d 480, 485 (Colo.App.1996); see also Denver Ctr. for the Performing Arts v. Briggs, 696 P.2d 299 , 305 n. 5 (Colo.1985).

1997See People v. Montgomery, 669 P.2d 1387 (Colo.1983) (the fundamental underlying purpose of the separation of powers doctrine is the orderly distribution of power among the three branches of state government).

1993See, e.g., People v. Montgomery, 669 P.2d 1387 (Colo.1983); People ex rel.

2000The Colorado Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the doctrine of separation of powers compels separation of the judicial and prosecutorial functions: `The prohibition against judicial intervention in or control of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion flows from the doctrine of separation of powers.' People v. Thorpe , 641 P.2d 935 , 938 (Colo. 1982).

2000In People v. Thorpe , 641 P.2d 935 , 939 (Colo. 1982), the Colorado Supreme Court found that the district attorney, even though an officer of the court, is "nevertheless a member of the executive department and acting as such when exercising his discretion in choosing what charges to file and in what court they should be filed." Because of the doctrine of separation of powers, the Colorado Supreme Court has consistently held that district attorneys, although elected from judicial districts, are members of the executive branch of government.

1995See Kort v. Hufnagel, 729 P.2d 370, 373 (Colo.1986) ("The doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the judiciary a proscription against interfering with the executive or legislative branches and operates to prohibit the judiciary from preempting an executive agency from exercising powers properly within its own sphere."); In re Alamance County Court Facilities, 405 S.E.2d at 133 ("The inherent power of the court must be exercised with as much concern for its potential to usurp the powers of another branch as for the usurpation it is intended to correct.").

1995The doctrine of separation of powers, however, operates to prohibit a court from exercising its inherent powers in a manner that would preempt an executive agency from “exercising powers properly within its own sphere.” Kort v. Hufnagel, supra, 729 P.2d at 371 .

2025Standard of Review and Applicable Law ¶ 11 “Whether a rule adopted by the supreme court is constitutional is a question of law that we review de novo.” People v. Eason, 2022 COA 54 , ¶ 16; see People v. Pennington, 2021 COA 9, ¶ 25 (we review a separation of powers challenge de novo). ¶ 12 The Colorado Constitution vests the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government with distinct powers.

2022See People v. Pennington, 2021 COA 9, ¶ 25 (we review a separation of powers challenge de novo); People v. Reyes, 2016 COA 98, ¶ 23 (same). 2.

2025See People v. Torrez, 2013 COA 37, ¶ 88 ; People v. Dash, 104 P.3d 286, 290-93 (Colo. App. 2004) (Lifetime Supervision Act does not violate the procedural or substantive prongs of the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment, or the doctrine of separation of powers); People v. Strean, 74 P.3d 387, 393-95 (Colo. App. 2002) 5 (Lifetime Supervision Act does not violate the procedural or substantive prongs of the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or the doctrine of separation of powers).

2013See, eg., People v. Dash, 104 P.3d 286, 290-93 (Colo.App.2004) does not violate the procedural or substantive prongs of the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Eight Amendment's prohibition of eruel and unusual punishment, or the doctrine of separation of powers); People v. Oglethorpe, 87 P.3d 129, 183-36 (Colo.App.2003) (defendants charged as sex offenders under SOLSA are not entitled to have a jury determine whether they are likely to reoffend; SOLSA does not violate the procedural or substantive prongs of the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Eighth Amend

2025See People v. Torrez, 2013 COA 37, ¶ 88 ; People v. Dash, 104 P.3d 286, 290-93 (Colo. App. 2004) (Lifetime Supervision Act does not violate the procedural or substantive prongs of the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment, or the doctrine of separation of powers); People v. Strean, 74 P.3d 387, 393-95 (Colo. App. 2002) 5 (Lifetime Supervision Act does not violate the procedural or substantive prongs of the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or the doctrine of separation of powers).

2013See, eg., People v. Dash, 104 P.3d 286, 290-93 (Colo.App.2004) does not violate the procedural or substantive prongs of the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Eight Amendment's prohibition of eruel and unusual punishment, or the doctrine of separation of powers); People v. Oglethorpe, 87 P.3d 129, 183-36 (Colo.App.2003) (defendants charged as sex offenders under SOLSA are not entitled to have a jury determine whether they are likely to reoffend; SOLSA does not violate the procedural or substantive prongs of the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Eighth Amend

2021The judiciary retains jurisdiction to evaluate the constitutionality of executive conduct — including actions taken under the CDEA, Ritchie, ¶ 1 — and here, Plaintiffs allege a violation of “a fundamental constitutional right affecting [their] current conditions of confinement.” See, e.g., Richardson v. Hesse, 823 P.2d 150 (Colo. 1992); Deason v. Kautzky, 786 P.2d 420 (Colo. 1990); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 489, 514 (1969) (rejecting the 11 defendants’ separation of powers argument and holding that federal courts had subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the House

1993See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 512 , 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1959 , 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). *869 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction The subject matter jurisdiction conferred on the district courts of this state is set forth in section 9 of article VI of the Colorado Constitution: District courts—jurisdiction. (1) The district courts shall be trial courts of record with general jurisdiction, and shall have original jurisdiction in all civil, probate, and criminal cases, except as otherwise provided herein, and shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law.

2014In so concluding, we acknowledge the Colorado Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hickerson v. Vessels, 2014 CO 2, ¶¶ 9, 18 , 316 P.3d 620 , holding that the separation of powers doctrine does not bar application of the defense of laches to a debt collection action that was filed within the statute of limitations period.

2014In so concluding, we acknowledge the Colorado Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hickerson v. Vessels, 2014 CO 2, ¶¶ 9, 18 , 316 P.3d 620 , holding that the separation of powers doctrine does not bar application of the defense of laches to a debt collection action that was filed within the statute of limitations period.

2016Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168 , 570 P.2d 536 , 539 (1977); accord Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 855 ; If the plaintiff cannot establish both, “no relief can be afforded, and the case should be dismissed for lack of standing.” Wimberly, 194 Colo. at 168 , 570 P.2d at 539 . ¶ 11 The first prong maintains the separation of powers doctrine and prevents a court from invading the legislative and executive spheres.

2015As the supreme court explained in Hickenlooper, ¶ 9, 338 P.3d at 1006 (quoting Wimberly, 194 Colo. at 167 , 570 P.2d at 538 ), injury-in-fact requirement, maintains the separation of powers mandated by article III of the Colorado Constitution by preventing courts from invading legislative and executive spheres, Because judicial determination of an issue may result in disapproval of legislative or executive acts, this constitutional basis for standing ensures that judicial "determination may not *317 be had at the suit of any and all members of the public." ¶ 42 See also Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 8

1993The State contended that “had the trial court ordered the implementation of the remedial plan, its intervention in a resource allocation decision would have violated the separation of powers doctrine.” Id. at 799 .

1993The State contended that "had the trial court ordered the implementation of the remedial plan, its intervention in a resource allocation decision would have violated the separation of powers doctrine." Id. at 799 .

2006In re Interrogatories Propounded by Senate, 189 Colo. 1 , 536 P.2d 308 (1975).

2006In re Interrogatories Propounded by Senate, 189 Colo. 1 , 536 P.2d 308 (1975).

1994In construing Article III, we have held that the separation-of-powers doctrine “imposes on the judiciary both a proscription against interfering with the executive or legislative branches, and a duty to perform its constitutional and statutory obligations with complete independence.” People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Colo.1994); Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953, 956 (Colo.1984).

1994In construing Article III, we have held that the separation-of-powers doctrine "imposes on the judiciary both a proscription against interfering with the executive or legislative branches, and a duty to perform its constitutional and statutory obligations with complete independence." People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Colo.1994); Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953, 956 (Colo.1984).

2004People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234 (Colo.1994); People in Interest of R.W.V., 942 P.2d 1317 (Colo.App.1997); see Coffman v. State Farm Mut.

2003People in Interest of R.W.V., 942 P.2d 1317, 1320 (Colo.App.1997)(“absolute separation of government functions ' among the co-equal branches is neither required nor desirable to achieve the constitution’s ultimate goal of effective and efficient government”); Nev.

1982We held in People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452 , 611 P.2d 574 (1980), that the legislative postponement of the effective date of 1979 House Bill 1589 comported with the separation of powers doctrine under Article III of the Colorado Constitution, and that the prospective-only provision of section 25 of House Bill 1589 did not infringe upon the rule-making power of this court under Article VI, Section 21 of the Colorado Constitution.

1982We held in People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452 , 611 P.2d 574 (1980), that the legislative postponement of the effective date of 1979 House Bill 1589 comported with the separation of powers doctrine under Article III of the Colorado Constitution, and that the prospective-only provision of section 25 of House Bill 1589 did not infringe upon the rule-making power of this court under Article VI, Section 21 of the Colorado Constitution.

2022See People v. Pennington, 2021 COA 9, ¶ 25 (we review a separation of powers challenge de novo); People v. Reyes, 2016 COA 98, ¶ 23 (same). 2.

2021People v. Reyes, 2016 COA 98, ¶ 23 . ¶ 26 This issue was preserved for appeal.

2021People v. Graves , 2016 CO 15 , ¶ 9 , 368 P.3d 317 , 322 .

2020Because “declaring a statute unconstitutional is one of the gravest duties impressed upon the courts,” People v. Graves, 2016 CO 15, ¶ 9 , 368 P.3d 317, 322 (quoting City of Greenwood Vill., 3 P.3d at 440 ), this presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only if it is shown that the enactment is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, Colo. Union of Taxpayers Found. v. City of Aspen, 2018 CO 36, ¶ 13 , 418 P.3d 506, 511 ; Mosgrove v. Town of Fed.

2021Claim Appeals Off., 89 P.3d 430, 433 (Colo. App. 2003)). ¶ 12 Under the separation of powers doctrine, the judiciary cannot command Governors to do anything that lies exclusively within their sound discretion.

2006The separation-of-powers doctrine “does not require a complete division of authority among the three branches, however, and the powers exercised by different branches of government necessarily overlap.” Id.