separation of powers doctrine in New Mexico

2005In Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 312 , 551 P.2d at 1359 , we found a legislatively created privilege to be an unconstitutional incursion upon the doctrine of separation of powers.

2005In Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 312 , 551 P.2d at 1359 , we found a legislatively created privilege to be an unconstitutional incursion upon the doctrine of separation of powers.

2012See Mowrer, 95 N.M. at 52 , 618 P.2d at 890 (“The parameters of the separation of powers doctrine presents a recurring problem of great public interest.”); Pub.

2012See Mowrer, 95 N.M. at 52 , 618 P.2d at 890 (“The parameters of the separation of powers doctrine presents a recurring problem of great public interest.”); Pub.

2014See Mascarenas v. Kennedy, 1964-NMSC-179 , ¶ 4, 74 N.M. 665 , 397 P.2d 312 (“We are firmly committed to the doctrine that the Workmen’s Compensation Act is remedial legislation and must be liberally construed to effect its purpose.”); Avila v. Pleasuretime Soda, Inc., 1977-NMCA-079 , ¶ 10, 90 N.M. 707 , 568 P.2d 233 (“It requires no citation of authority that the Workmen’s Compensation Actmustbe liberally construed to accomplish beneficent purposes for which it was enacted, and that all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of employees.”).

2014See Mascarenas v. Kennedy, 1964-NMSC-179 , ¶ 4, 74 N.M. 665 , 397 P.2d 312 (“We are firmly committed to the doctrine that the Workmen’s Compensation Act is remedial legislation and must be liberally construed to effect its purpose.”); Avila v. Pleasuretime Soda, Inc., 1977-NMCA-079 , ¶ 10, 90 N.M. 707 , 568 P.2d 233 (“It requires no citation of authority that the Workmen’s Compensation Actmustbe liberally construed to accomplish beneficent purposes for which it was enacted, and that all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of employees.”).

2024See Switzer 9 v. Wood, 35 Cal. App. 5th 116, 129 (2019). 10 {20} The following is the process we use to analyze a statute for specific and 11 general absurdity.

2024See Switzer v. Wood, 35 Cal. App. 5th 116, 129 (2019). {20} The following is the process we use to analyze a statute for specific and general absurdity.

2010Dep't, 118 N.M. 753, 761 , 887 P.2d 747, 755 (1994) (stating that "[t]he right to sue the government is a statutory right and the [L]egislature can reasonably restrict that right"); see also Best, 228 Ill.Dec. 636 , 689 N.E.2d at 1072 n. 3 (stating that when considering rights founded in statute, the "[L]egislature's right to limit the maximum recovery could not be questioned"). {47} The Wachockis overstate the breadth of the separation of powers clause.

2010Dep't, 118 N.M. 753, 761 , 887 P.2d 747, 755 (1994) (stating that "[t]he right to sue the government is a statutory right and the [L]egislature can reasonably restrict that right"); see also Best, 228 Ill.Dec. 636 , 689 N.E.2d at 1072 n. 3 (stating that when considering rights founded in statute, the "[L]egislature's right to limit the maximum recovery could not be questioned"). {47} The Wachockis overstate the breadth of the separation of powers clause.

2010Dep't, 118 N.M. 753, 761 , 887 P.2d 747, 755 (1994) (stating that "[t]he right to sue the government is a statutory right and the [L]egislature can reasonably restrict that right"); see also Best, 228 Ill.Dec. 636 , 689 N.E.2d at 1072 n. 3 (stating that when considering rights founded in statute, the "[L]egislature's right to limit the maximum recovery could not be questioned"). {47} The Wachockis overstate the breadth of the separation of powers clause.

2010Dep't, 118 N.M. 753, 761 , 887 P.2d 747, 755 (1994) (stating that "[t]he right to sue the government is a statutory right and the [L]egislature can reasonably restrict that right"); see also Best, 228 Ill.Dec. 636 , 689 N.E.2d at 1072 n. 3 (stating that when considering rights founded in statute, the "[L]egislature's right to limit the maximum recovery could not be questioned"). {47} The Wachockis overstate the breadth of the separation of powers clause.

2002Id. 332 U.S. 194, 196 , 67 S.Ct. 1575 , 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947); see Atlixco, 1998-NMCA-134, ¶ 20 , 125 N.M. 786 , 965 P.2d 370 ("[f]or the court to supply reasons for the [agency] in this manner is not consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers because it `foists upon the court what is essentially a function of the Executive Branch of government.' ") (quoting McGonigel's, Inc. v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 663 A.2d 890, 893 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1995)); see also Tenneco Oil Co. v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Comm'n, 107 N.M. 469, 474 , 760 P.2d 161, 166 (Ct.App.1987) (stating that courts are

2002Id. 332 U.S. 194, 196 , 67 S.Ct. 1575 , 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947); see Atlixco, 1998-NMCA-134, ¶ 20 , 125 N.M. 786 , 965 P.2d 370 (“[f]or the court to supply reasons for the [agency] in this manner is not consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers because it ‘foists upon the court what is essentially a function of the Executive Branch of government.’ ”) (quoting McGonigel’s, Inc. v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 663 A.2d 890, 893 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1995)); see also Tenneco Oil Co. v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Comm’n, 107 N.M. 469, 474 , 760 P.2d 161, 166 (Ct.App.1987) (stating that courts are

2013In addition, unlike our 18 review of district court decisions, the separation of powers doctrine prevents courts 19 from providing a rationale for a decision when the administrative body fails to do so. 5 1 Atlixco Coal. v. Maggiore, 1998-NMCA-134, ¶ 20 , 125 N.M. 786 , 965 P.2d 370 (“For 2 the court to supply reasons for the [s]ecretary . . . is not consistent with the doctrine 3 of separation of powers because it foists upon the court what is essentially the function 4 of the Executive Branch of government.” (internal quotation marks and citation 5 omitted)).

2013In addition, unlike our 18 review of district court decisions, the separation of powers doctrine prevents courts 19 from providing a rationale for a decision when the administrative body fails to do so. 5 1 Atlixco Coal. v. Maggiore, 1998-NMCA-134, ¶ 20 , 125 N.M. 786 , 965 P.2d 370 (“For 2 the court to supply reasons for the [s]ecretary . . . is not consistent with the doctrine 3 of separation of powers because it foists upon the court what is essentially the function 4 of the Executive Branch of government.” (internal quotation marks and citation 5 omitted)).

2025See Cobb v. State 16 Canvassing Bd., 2006-NMSC-034, ¶ 41 , 140 N.M. 77 , 140 P.3d 498 .

2025See Cobb v. State 16 Canvassing Bd., 2006-NMSC-034, ¶ 41 , 140 N.M. 77 , 140 P.3d 498 .

2025As also discussed, for a separation-of-powers challenge to an 11 executive order pursuant to the PHERA, “[t]he operative question is whether the . . . 12 [o]rder disrupts the proper balance between the executive and legislative branches 13 and infringes on the legislative branch,” Romero, 2021-NMSC-009, ¶ 34 (internal 14 quotation marks and citation omitted), and “the proper inquiry [for such a disruption] 15 focuses on the extent to which the action by one branch prevents another branch 16 from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions,” Clark, 1995-NMSC- 17 048, ¶ 34 (brackets, i

2024See Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 2009-NMCA-095, ¶ 56 , 146 N.M. 853 , 215 P.3d 791 (“In order to preserve an issue for appeal, [an appellant] must have made a timely and specific objection that apprised the district court of the nature of the claimed error and that allows the district court to make an intelligent ruling thereon.”). {24} Plaintiffs also did not develop an argument regarding equal protection or due process in their motion to amend the judgment.

2024See Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 2009-NMCA-095, ¶ 56 , 146 N.M. 853 , 215 P.3d 791 (“In order to preserve an issue for appeal, [an appellant] must have made a timely and specific objection that apprised the district court of the nature of the claimed error and that allows the district court to make an intelligent ruling thereon.”). {24} Plaintiffs also did not develop an argument regarding equal protection or due process in their motion to amend the judgment.

2024See State v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 21 , 278 P.3d 1031 (stating that appellate courts are under no obligation to review unclear or undeveloped arguments); see also State v. Duttle, 2017-NMCA-001, ¶ 15 , 387 P.3d 885 (“For this Court to rule on an inadequately briefed constitutional issue would essentially require it to do the work on behalf of [the d]efendant.”); State v. Clifford, 1994-NMSC-048 , ¶ 19, 117 N.M. 508 , 873 P.2d 254 (reminding counsel that the appellate courts are not required to do their research). {8} Finally, Defendant argues that the plea agreement violates the separation

2024See State v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 21 , 278 P.3d 1031 (stating that appellate courts are under no obligation to review unclear or undeveloped arguments); see also State v. Duttle, 2017-NMCA-001, ¶ 15 , 387 P.3d 885 (“For this Court to rule on an inadequately briefed constitutional issue would essentially require it to do the work on behalf of [the d]efendant.”); State v. Clifford, 1994-NMSC-048 , ¶ 19, 117 N.M. 508 , 873 P.2d 254 (reminding counsel that the appellate courts are not required to do their research). {8} Finally, Defendant argues that the plea agreement violates the separation

2023See Mowrer v. Rusk, 1980-NMSC-113 , ¶ 15, 95 N.M. 48 , 618 P.2d 886 (separation of powers); Republican Party of N.M., 2012-NMSC-026, ¶ 11 (executive privilege); see also id. ¶ 10 (“A case presents an issue of substantial public interest if it involves a constitutional question or affects a fundamental right such as voting.”).

2020Here, the district court imposed a sentence upon Defendant, and then delegated the specification of the terms of Defendant’s probation to the probation officer. [MIO 3] The probation officer did not “impose” a criminal sentence upon Defendant, as argued in Defendant’s MIO. [MIO 10] Indeed, the fact that “the terms and conditions set by the probation officer were not spelled out in the order itself did not establish that those terms and conditions were not imposed by the court.” Green, 2015-NMCA-007, ¶ 12 (citing Leon, 2013-NMCA-011, ¶ 26 ); see State v. Martinez, 1972-NMCA-135 , ¶ 7, 84 N.M. 2

2020See Green, 2015-NMCA-007, ¶ 14 .

2020See State v. Moore, 1989-NMCA- 073, ¶¶ 41-42, 109 N.M. 119 , 782 P.2d 91 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Salgado, 1991-NMCA-044 , ¶ 2, 112 N.M. 537 , 817 P.2d 730 ; State v. Rael, 1983- NMCA-081, ¶¶ 15-16, 100 N.M. 193 , 668 P.2d 309 .

2020See State v. Moore, 1989-NMCA- 073, ¶¶ 41-42, 109 N.M. 119 , 782 P.2d 91 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Salgado, 1991-NMCA-044 , ¶ 2, 112 N.M. 537 , 817 P.2d 730 ; State v. Rael, 1983- NMCA-081, ¶¶ 15-16, 100 N.M. 193 , 668 P.2d 309 .

2020See State v. Aragon, 1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 10 , 127 N.M. 393 , 981 P.2d 1211 (stating that there is a presumption of correctness in the rulings or decisions of the trial court); Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-100 , ¶ 8, 111 N.M. 6 , 800 P.2d 1063 (stating that the burden is on the appellant to clearly demonstrate that the trial court erred). {5} Defendant additionally seeks to raise a new argument by virtue of his motion to amend, that the probation officer did not have authority to implement the restrictions under the sex offender behavior contract because the district c

2020See State v. Aragon, 1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 10 , 127 N.M. 393 , 981 P.2d 1211 (stating that there is a presumption of correctness in the rulings or decisions of the trial court); Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-100 , ¶ 8, 111 N.M. 6 , 800 P.2d 1063 (stating that the burden is on the appellant to clearly demonstrate that the trial court erred). {5} Defendant additionally seeks to raise a new argument by virtue of his motion to amend, that the probation officer did not have authority to implement the restrictions under the sex offender behavior contract because the district c

2020See State v. Moore, 1989-NMCA- 073, ¶¶ 41-42, 109 N.M. 119 , 782 P.2d 91 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Salgado, 1991-NMCA-044 , ¶ 2, 112 N.M. 537 , 817 P.2d 730 ; State v. Rael, 1983- NMCA-081, ¶¶ 15-16, 100 N.M. 193 , 668 P.2d 309 .

2020See State v. Moore, 1989-NMCA- 073, ¶¶ 41-42, 109 N.M. 119 , 782 P.2d 91 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Salgado, 1991-NMCA-044 , ¶ 2, 112 N.M. 537 , 817 P.2d 730 ; State v. Rael, 1983- NMCA-081, ¶¶ 15-16, 100 N.M. 193 , 668 P.2d 309 .