sound principle in Florida

2009In adopting this standard, the majority not only has gone beyond what is warranted by the statute but also has departed from the sound principle that “the reviewing attitude that [an appellate court] takes toward a [trial] court decision should depend upon ‘the respective institutional advantages of trial and appellate courts, not upon what standard of review will more likely produce a particular substantive result.’ ” First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 948 , 115 S.Ct. 1920 , 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995) (quoting Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 , 111 S.Ct. 121

2009In adopting this standard, the majority not only has gone beyond what is warranted by the statute but also has departed from the sound principle that “the reviewing attitude that [an appellate court] takes toward a [trial] court decision should depend upon ‘the respective institutional advantages of trial and appellate courts, not upon what standard of review will more likely produce a particular substantive result.’ ” First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 948 , 115 S.Ct. 1920 , 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995) (quoting Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 , 111 S.Ct. 121

2009In adopting this standard, the majority not only has gone beyond what is warranted by the statute but also has departed from the sound principle that “the reviewing attitude that [an appellate court] takes toward a [trial] court decision should depend upon ‘the respective institutional advantages of trial and appellate courts, not upon what standard of review will more likely produce a particular substantive result.’ ” First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 948 , 115 S.Ct. 1920 , 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995) (quoting Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 , 111 S.Ct. 121

2009In adopting this standard, the majority not only has gone beyond what is warranted by the statute but also has departed from the sound principle that “the reviewing attitude that [an appellate court] takes toward a [trial] court decision should depend upon ‘the respective institutional advantages of trial and appellate courts, not upon what standard of review will more likely produce a particular substantive result.’ ” First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 948 , 115 S.Ct. 1920 , 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995) (quoting Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 , 111 S.Ct. 121

1945See International Lubricant Corp. v. Grant, 128 Fla. 670 , 175 So. 727 ; Atlantic Greyhound Lines v. Lovett, 134 Fla. 505 , 184 So. 133 .

1945See International Lubricant Corp. v. Grant, 128 Fla. 670 , 175 So. 727 ; Atlantic Greyhound Lines v. Lovett, 134 Fla. 505 , 184 So. 133 .

1926In the case of Merchants’ National Bank v. Grunthal, 39 Fla. 388 , 22 So. 685 , an effort was made at a subsequent term, on a second application for rehearing, to have this court grant a rehearing and in connection therewith issue a certiorari to the lower court to send up the record of certain papers which had not been properly exhibited by the transcript upon which the original action of the court had been taken.

1926In the case of Merchants' National Bank v. Grunthal, 39 Fla. 388 , 22 So. 685 , an effort was made at a subsequent term, on a second application for rehearing, to have this court grant a rehearing and in connection therewith issue a certiorari to the lower court to send up the record of certain papers which had not been properly exhibited by the *Page 746 transcript upon which the original action of the court had been taken.

2000See Francis v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir.1983); Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642 (6th Cir.1981); Jones v. State, 110 Nev. 730 , 877 P.2d 1052 (1994); State v. Anaya, 134 N.H. 346 , 592 A.2d 1142 (1991); State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175 , 337 S.E.2d 504 (1995).

2000See Francis v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir.1983); Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642 (6th Cir.1981); Jones v. State, 110 Nev. 730 , 877 P.2d 1052 (1994); State v. Anaya, 134 N.H. 346 , 592 A.2d 1142 (1991); State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175 , 337 S.E.2d 504 (1995).

2000See Francis v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir.1983); Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642 (6th Cir.1981); Jones v. State, 110 Nev. 730 , 877 P.2d 1052 (1994); State v. Anaya, 134 N.H. 346 , 592 A.2d 1142 (1991); State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175 , 337 S.E.2d 504 (1995).

2000See Francis v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir.1983); Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642 (6th Cir.1981); Jones v. State, 110 Nev. 730 , 877 P.2d 1052 (1994); State v. Anaya, 134 N.H. 346 , 592 A.2d 1142 (1991); State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175 , 337 S.E.2d 504 (1995).

2000See Francis v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir.1983); Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642 (6th Cir.1981); Jones v. State, 110 Nev. 730 , 877 P.2d 1052 (1994); State v. Anaya, 134 N.H. 346 , 592 A.2d 1142 (1991); State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175 , 337 S.E.2d 504 (1995).

2000See Francis v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir.1983); Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642 (6th Cir.1981); Jones v. State, 110 Nev. 730 , 877 P.2d 1052 (1994); State v. Anaya, 134 N.H. 346 , 592 A.2d 1142 (1991); State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175 , 337 S.E.2d 504 (1995).

2000See Francis v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir.1983); Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642 (6th Cir.1981); Jones v. State, 110 Nev. 730 , 877 P.2d 1052 (1994); State v. Anaya, 134 N.H. 346 , 592 A.2d 1142 (1991); State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175 , 337 S.E.2d 504 (1995).

1991In Preston v. State, 531 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1988), we explained that under the Hallman standard, if the sole prosecution witness recanted his testimony, a petition for coram nobis could be granted.

1991Id.

1991The Court elected, on the basis of their supervisory powers, to adopt a per se rule, `conclud[ing] that as a sound rule of practice it is reversible error to repeat an Allen charge in a federal prosecution in [the Ninth] circuit after a jury has reported itself deadlocked and has not itself requested a repetition of the instruction.' 550 F.2d at 1163 .

1987It is no answer that such a power may be abused, for there is no power which is not susceptible of abuse." Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 31 , 6 L.Ed. 537 (1827) (e.s.).

1987It is no answer that such a power may be abused, for there is no power which is not susceptible of abuse." Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 31 , 6 L.Ed. 537 (1827) (e.s.).

1983Co. v. McKinley, 288 F.2d 262 (6th Cir.1961); Andrews v. Gulfstream Ventures, Inc., 411 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 419 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 1982); cf. Haddigan v. Harkins, 441 F.2d 844 (3d Cir.1970) (failure of plaintiff to introduce such evidence results in reversal on defendant's appeal). [3] Not only is there apparently no reported decision to the contrary of this proposition, we are convinced, viewing the matter independently, that it represents a sound rule.

1983Co. v. McKinley, 288 F.2d 262 (6th Cir.1961); Andrews v. Gulfstream Ventures, Inc., 411 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 419 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 1982); cf. Haddigan v. Harkins, 441 F.2d 844 (3d Cir.1970) (failure of plaintiff to introduce such evidence results in reversal on defendant's appeal). [3] Not only is there apparently no reported decision to the contrary of this proposition, we are convinced, viewing the matter independently, that it represents a sound rule.

1983Co. v. McKinley, 288 F.2d 262 (6th Cir.1961); Andrews v. Gulfstream Ventures, Inc., 411 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 419 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 1982); cf. Haddigan v. Harkins, 441 F.2d 844 (3d Cir.1970) (failure of plaintiff to introduce such evidence results in reversal on defendant's appeal). [3] Not only is there apparently no reported decision to the contrary of this proposition, we are convinced, viewing the matter independently, that it represents a sound rule.

1982Brewer v. State, 413 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) [1982 FLW 820], upheld an information that incompletely alleged the essential element of mental intent in a theft case where the allegation was "within intent to deprive" rather than the correct "with intent to permanently deprive." In Green v. State, 414 So.2d 1171 , No. 81-1013 (Fla. 5th DCA June 9, 1982) [1982 FLW 1241], a robbery case, the information alleged that Green did rob and steal by force and it was held that the word "steal" was an incomplete allegation of all of the elements of larceny and included the mental intent to permanent

1982Brewer v. State, 413 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) [1982 FLW 820], upheld an information that incompletely alleged the essential element of mental intent in a theft case where the allegation was "within intent to deprive" rather than the correct "with intent to permanently deprive." In Green v. State, 414 So.2d 1171 , No. 81-1013 (Fla. 5th DCA June 9, 1982) [1982 FLW 1241], a robbery case, the information alleged that Green did rob and steal by force and it was held that the word "steal" was an incomplete allegation of all of the elements of larceny and included the mental intent to permanent

1980This is a sound principle, for litigants and courts alike must be able to determine with certainty a time when a dispute has come to an end.” Id., 371 So.2d at 484-485 .