sound principle in Hawaii

2023In State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai#i 433, 896 P.2d 889 (1995), the supreme court adopted the federal concept of inevitable discovery, stating that "the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule is a sound principle, which prevents the setting aside of convictions that would have been obtained in the absence of police misconduct." Id. at 451, 896 P.2d at 907 .

2023In State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai#i 433, 896 P.2d 889 (1995), the supreme court adopted the federal concept of inevitable discovery, stating that "the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule is a sound principle, which prevents the setting aside of convictions that would have been obtained in the absence of police misconduct." Id. at 451, 896 P.2d at 907 .

1996(Territory v. Kinoshita, 38 Haw. 335 (1949)).

1953(Territory v. Kinoshita, 38 Haw. 335 .) Here, with the defendant still under the influence of liquor, having begun his drinking at 5:30 p.m. on November 5, 1949, having consumed approximately three-fourths of a quart, having administered approximately fourteen different beatings upon the victim between the hours of 8:30 p.m. to 4:30 a.m., it cannot be said that the judge erred in holding that the statements made to the police officer were made under the exciting influence of said events, reasonably contemporaneous thereto and without prior opportunity for deliberation or manufacture.

1999In contrast to the United States Supreme Court, which requires the prosecution to satisfy the preponderance of evidence burden of proof before allowing evidence to be admitted under the inevitable discovery rule, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), the Hawaii Supreme Court “require[s] the prosecution to present clear and convincing evidence that any evidence obtained in violation of article I, section 7 9 [of the Hawaii State Constitution], would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means before such evidence may be admitted under the inevitable di

1999In contrast to the United States Supreme Court, which requires the prosecution to satisfy the preponderance of evidence burden of proof before allowing evidence to be admitted under the inevitable discovery rule, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), the Hawaii Supreme Court “require[s] the prosecution to present clear and convincing evidence that any evidence obtained in violation of article I, section 7 9 [of the Hawaii State Constitution], would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means before such evidence may be admitted under the inevitable di

1997This fact is significant in light of “the sound presumption of appellate practice that jurors are reasonable and generally follow the instructions that they are given,” State v. Loa, 83 Hawai'i 335, 359 , 926 P.2d 1258, 1282 (1996) (quoting State v. Holbron, 80 Hawai'i 27, 46 , 904 P.2d 912, 931 , reconsideration denied, 80 Hawai'i 187 , 907 P.2d 773 (1995)) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

1997This fact is significant in light of “the sound presumption of appellate practice that jurors are reasonable and generally follow the instructions that they are given,” State v. Loa, 83 Hawai'i 335, 359 , 926 P.2d 1258, 1282 (1996) (quoting State v. Holbron, 80 Hawai'i 27, 46 , 904 P.2d 912, 931 , reconsideration denied, 80 Hawai'i 187 , 907 P.2d 773 (1995)) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

1997This fact is significant in light of “the sound presumption of appellate practice that jurors are reasonable and generally follow the instructions that they are given,” State v. Loa, 83 Hawai'i 335, 359 , 926 P.2d 1258, 1282 (1996) (quoting State v. Holbron, 80 Hawai'i 27, 46 , 904 P.2d 912, 931 , reconsideration denied, 80 Hawai'i 187 , 907 P.2d 773 (1995)) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

1997This fact is significant in light of “the sound presumption of appellate practice that jurors are reasonable and generally follow the instructions that they are given,” State v. Loa, 83 Hawai'i 335, 359 , 926 P.2d 1258, 1282 (1996) (quoting State v. Holbron, 80 Hawai'i 27, 46 , 904 P.2d 912, 931 , reconsideration denied, 80 Hawai'i 187 , 907 P.2d 773 (1995)) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

1993Although the holding of Yamaguchi , which is immaterial to the present case, was disapproved in Rana v. Bishop Ins. of Hawaii, Inc., 6 Haw App. 1, 9-10, 713 P.2d 1363 , 1369 —70, aff'd, 68 Haw. 269 , 713 P.2d 1363 (1985), the proposition cited above remains a sound rule of statutory construction.

1993Although the holding of Yamaguchi , which is immaterial to the present case, was disapproved in Rana v. Bishop Ins. of Hawaii, Inc., 6 Haw App. 1, 9-10, 713 P.2d 1363 , 1369 —70, aff'd, 68 Haw. 269 , 713 P.2d 1363 (1985), the proposition cited above remains a sound rule of statutory construction.

1993Although the holding of Yamaguchi , which is immaterial to the present case, was disapproved in Rana v. Bishop Ins. of Hawaii, Inc., 6 Haw App. 1, 9-10, 713 P.2d 1363 , 1369 —70, aff'd, 68 Haw. 269 , 713 P.2d 1363 (1985), the proposition cited above remains a sound rule of statutory construction.

1982Territory v. Lewis, 39 Haw. 635 (1953).

1980Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 465 F.2d 934 (9th Cir.1972); Mason v. National Flood Insurer's Association, 361 F. Supp. 939 (D.Haw. 1973); Retherford v. Kama, 52 Haw. 91 , 470 P.2d 517 (1970).

1980Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 465 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1972); Mason v. National Flood Insurer’s Association, 361 F. Supp. 939 (D.

1980Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 465 F.2d 934 (9th Cir.1972); Mason v. National Flood Insurer's Association, 361 F. Supp. 939 (D.Haw. 1973); Retherford v. Kama, 52 Haw. 91 , 470 P.2d 517 (1970).

1980Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 465 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1972); Mason v. National Flood Insurer’s Association, 361 F. Supp. 939 (D.

1980Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 465 F.2d 934 (9th Cir.1972); Mason v. National Flood Insurer's Association, 361 F. Supp. 939 (D.Haw. 1973); Retherford v. Kama, 52 Haw. 91 , 470 P.2d 517 (1970).

1980Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 465 F.2d 934 (9th Cir.1972); Mason v. National Flood Insurer's Association, 361 F. Supp. 939 (D.Haw. 1973); Retherford v. Kama, 52 Haw. 91 , 470 P.2d 517 (1970).

1966As stated in Pires v. Kanahuna, 26 Haw. 376, 380 , the test of the admissibility of expert evidence is whether the jurors are incompetent to draw their own conclusions from the facts without the aid of such evidence.

1966As stated in Pires v. Kanahuna, 26 Haw. 376, 380 , the test of the admissibility of expert evidence is whether the jurors are incompetent to draw their own conclusions from the facts without the aid of such evidence.

1939L. 15, 166 Atl. 76 , was an action for damages for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff when struck by an automobile owned by the Courier-Post Company, one of the defendants, the operation of which the owner had entrusted to the defendant Pickering.

1931In Brewster v. Weston, 235 Mass. 14, 16 , the court said: “While some confusion has arisen by reason of the use of. the terms ‘void’ and ‘voidable,’ it is settled in this CommonAvealth that the deed of an insane person is not void, but voidable, and may, after the grantor is restored to his right mind, be adopted and ratified.” After a careful examination of many cases we are convinced that this is the prevailing doctrine in this country and that it is a sound doctrine. *883 It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that in the instant case there is no real distinction, so far as the rights

1930Co., 93 Fed. 166, 167 , the court said: “It is the duty of every one to exercise ordinary care to ascertain the boundaries of his *325 own property, and to refrain from injuring tlie property of others; and a jury may lawfully infer that a trespasser had knowledge of the right and title of the owner of the property upon which he entered, and that he intended to violate that right, and to appropriate the property to his own use, from his reckless disregard of the OAvner’s right and title, or from his failure to exercise ordinary cafe to discover and protect them.” Many authorities are cited by

1926“It is a sound rule of construction that a statute should have a prospective operation only, unless its terms show clearly a legislative intention that it should operate retrospectively.” Cooley, Const. Lim., 7th ed., p. 529. ' “It is the proclamation of both” (principle and authority) “that a statute should not be given a retrospective operation unless its words make that imperative.” Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529, 537 .

1917Hohn v. Shideler, 164 Ind. 242 ; Hinton v. Stanton, 165 S. W.

1889Even in the United States, where it is a general rule that no court can make a direct judgment or decree against the Government for costs and expenses in a suit to which the United States- is a party (The Antelope, 12 Wheat., 546 ), the Government is sometimes liable for its own costs in cases where it is the plaintiff (U. S. vs.