sound rule in Idaho

1990The Court of Appeals in Challis observed an accepted proximate cause instruction found in Smith v. Sharp, 82 Idaho 420 , 354 P.2d 172 (1960): Proximate cause, in the sense of cause in fact, has been defined as a cause `which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which the result would not have occurred.' That is a sound instruction which has well served Idaho juries.

1990The Court of Appeals in Challis observed an accepted proximate cause instruction found in Smith v. Sharp, 82 Idaho 420 , 354 P.2d 172 (1960): Proximate cause, in the sense of cause in fact, has been defined as a cause `which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which the result would not have occurred.' That is a sound instruction which has well served Idaho juries.

1986While Kinney v. Smith, 95 Idaho 328 , 508 P.2d 1234 (1973), is not directly on point with the question here presented, it established a sound rule regarding multiple negligence theories offered against a party vicariously liable for injuries suffered in a collision of motor vehicles.

1986While Kinney v. Smith, 95 Idaho 328 , 508 P.2d 1234 (1973), is not directly on point with the question here presented, it established a sound rule regarding multiple negligence theories offered against a party vicariously liable for injuries suffered in a collision of motor vehicles.

1952The false premise upon which the courts seem to think that by constant repetition of an erroneous rule of law, it thereby becomes a sound rule of law, is the failure to distinguish between the character of the different causes of action and what is sought to be recovered, as for example, Lynch v. Bencini, 17 Cal.2d 521 , 110 P.2d 662 .

1952The false premise upon which the courts seem to think that by constant repetition of an erroneous rule of law, it thereby becomes a sound rule of law, is the failure to distinguish between the character of the different causes of action and what is sought to be recovered, as for example, Lynch v. Bencini, 17 Cal.2d 521 , 110 P.2d 662 .

1923It is a sound rule of construction that a statute should have a prospective operation only, unless its terms show clearly a legislative intention that it should operate retrospectively.” (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 529.) “Statutes should not be construed retrospectively, unless it is clear that such was the legislative intention.” (In re Frees’ Estate, 187 Cal. 150 , 201 Pac. 112 .) The motion to dismiss is therefore not well taken.

1923It is a sound rule of construction that a statute should have a prospective operation only, unless its terms show clearly a legislative intention that it should operate retrospectively.” (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 529.) “Statutes should not be construed retrospectively, unless it is clear that such was the legislative intention.” (In re Frees’ Estate, 187 Cal. 150 , 201 Pac. 112 .) The motion to dismiss is therefore not well taken.

1921(Childs v. Childs, 49 Wash. 27 , 94 Pac. 660 .) We think the sound rule to be that the instructions have no connection with the pleadings except through the evidence.

1921(Childs v. Childs, 49 Wash. 27 , 94 Pac. 660 .) We think the sound rule to be that the instructions have no connection with the pleadings except through the evidence.

1914The case of Haman v. Sanford (Or.), 137 Pac. 772 , cited and relied on by appellant, states a sound principle of law but is hardly applicable to the facts of the ease at bar.