sound principle in Delaware

2022Super. 1936) (“It is a sound principle that he who prevents a thing being done shall not avail himself of the non-performance that he has occasioned.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 22 those obligations within the specified time, unless prevented from doing so by the defendant.”114 Under the prevention doctrine, a party’s duty to perform a condition of a contract is excused if the other party’s actions contributed materially to the non- occurrence of the condition.115 “It is an established principle of contract law that ‘[w]here a party’s breach by non-performance contribut

1999Thus evidence that the sale was fair and for the best price obtainable is not admissible."). (footnotes omitted); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 cmt. b (1959) ("It is immaterial that the trustee acts in good faith in purchasing trust property for himself, and that he pays a fair consideration."). [32] Vredenburgh v. Jones, 349 A.2d at 33 ; Eberhardt, 81 A. at 778 ; 76 Am.Jur.2d Trusts § 580 (1992); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 cmt. b (1959). [33] Oberly v. Kirby , 592 A.2d at 466 ; Vredenburgh v. Jones, 349 A.2d at 33 . [34] Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, Del.Supr., 280 A.2d 717,

1999Thus evidence that the sale was fair and for the best price obtainable is not admissible."). (footnotes omitted); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 cmt. b (1959) ("It is immaterial that the trustee acts in good faith in purchasing trust property for himself, and that he pays a fair consideration."). [32] Vredenburgh v. Jones, 349 A.2d at 33 ; Eberhardt, 81 A. at 778 ; 76 Am.Jur.2d Trusts § 580 (1992); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 cmt. b (1959). [33] Oberly v. Kirby , 592 A.2d at 466 ; Vredenburgh v. Jones, 349 A.2d at 33 . [34] Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, Del.Supr., 280 A.2d 717,

1999Thus evidence that the sale was fair and for the best price obtainable is not admissible."). (footnotes omitted); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 cmt. b (1959) ("It is immaterial that the trustee acts in good faith in purchasing trust property for himself, and that he pays a fair consideration."). [32] Vredenburgh v. Jones, 349 A.2d at 33 ; Eberhardt, 81 A. at 778 ; 76 Am.Jur.2d Trusts § 580 (1992); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 cmt. b (1959). [33] Oberly v. Kirby , 592 A.2d at 466 ; Vredenburgh v. Jones, 349 A.2d at 33 . [34] Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, Del.Supr., 280 A.2d 717,

1999Thus evidence that the sale was fair and for the best price obtainable is not admissible."). (footnotes omitted); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 cmt. b (1959) ("It is immaterial that the trustee acts in good faith in purchasing trust property for himself, and that he pays a fair consideration."). [32] Vredenburgh v. Jones, 349 A.2d at 33 ; Eberhardt, 81 A. at 778 ; 76 Am.Jur.2d Trusts § 580 (1992); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 cmt. b (1959). [33] Oberly v. Kirby , 592 A.2d at 466 ; Vredenburgh v. Jones, 349 A.2d at 33 . [34] Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, Del.Supr., 280 A.2d 717,

1991If there are two doubtful constructions of the meaning of an instrument, “one consistent and the other repugnant to the law, the former will be adopted, but if the meaning is clear” the rule must be observed “since it is founded upon a sound principle of public policy and must be rigidly enforced.” Id.

1991In projecting the prospect of vesting “[i]t is not enough that the future interests may, or even that it will in all probability, vest within the limits; it must necessarily so vest.” Id.

1979Where the facts are essentially different, stare decisis does not apply, because a sound principle applied to one set of facts may be entirely inappropriate when applied to slightly varied set of facts. 20 Am.Jur.2d, Courts § 191 citing Ward v. Baskin, Fla.Sup., 94 So.2d 859 (1957).

1958Chrysler invokes the principle announced in Universal Products Co. v. Emerson, 6 W.W.Harr. 553 , 36 Del. 553, 569 , 179 A. 387, 394 , 100 A.L.R. 956 : "Where it is clearly understood that the terms of a proposed contract, though tentatively agreed on, shall be reduced to writing and signed before it shall be considered as complete and binding on the parties, there is no final contract until that is done." This is a sound principle of law; but whether in any particular case involving oral negotiations it is "clearly understood" that the proposed contract is tentative *132 only is a question of

1958Chrysler invokes the principle announced in Universal Products Co. v. Emerson, 6 W.W.Harr. 553 , 36 Del. 553, 569 , 179 A. 387, 394 , 100 A.L.R. 956 : "Where it is clearly understood that the terms of a proposed contract, though tentatively agreed on, shall be reduced to writing and signed before it shall be considered as complete and binding on the parties, there is no final contract until that is done." This is a sound principle of law; but whether in any particular case involving oral negotiations it is "clearly understood" that the proposed contract is tentative *132 only is a question of

1939The case of The Harrisburg was said not to be controlling, as the precise point was not dealt with in that case; and that the case of Platt v. Wilmot, 193 U. S. 602 , 24 S. Ct. 542 , 48 L.

1939The case of The Harrisburg was said not to be controlling, as the precise point was not dealt with in that case; and that the case of Platt v. Wilmot, 193 U. S. 602 , 24 S. Ct. 542 , 48 L.

1934The plaintiff, however, further contends that it is not necessary to determine whether her right of action is such a vested right as may not be taken from her by a subsequent statute, such as the Act of 1933, for the reason that this Act must be held to operate prospectively only, as it conveys neither express evidence of the legislative intent that it should operate retroactively, nor is there such a compellable inference to be drawn therefrom, and in support of her contention cites, Friedmann v. McGowan, 1 Penn. 436 , 42 A. 723, 724 , holding that, “It is a sound rule of construction that a

1934The plaintiff, however, further contends that it is not necessary to determine whether her right of action is such a vested right as may not be taken from her by a subsequent statute, such as the Act of 1933, for the reason that this Act must be held to operate prospectively only, as it conveys neither express evidence of the legislative intent that it should operate retroactively, nor is there such a compellable inference to be drawn therefrom, and in support of her contention cites, Friedmann v. McGowan, 1 Penn. 436 , 42 A. 723, 724 , holding that, “It is a sound rule of construction that a

1913The case of McCarty v. Houston, etc., Co., 21 Tex. Civ.