sound principle in Ohio

1993Kobelt, v. Baker (1940), 137 Ohio St. 337 , 18 O.O. 521 , 29 N.E.2d 960 .” (Emphasis added.) There seems to be no good reason in this case to violate this sound rule.

1993Kobelt, v. Baker (1940), 137 Ohio St. 337 , 18 O.O. 521 , 29 N.E.2d 960 .” (Emphasis added.) There seems to be no good reason in this case to violate this sound rule.

1989Co. (1969), 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 116 , 49 O.O. 2d 435, 440, 254 N.E. 2d 10, 15 , 41 A.L.R. 3d 526 , 534: “In our opinion, the existing Ohio requirement that there be an identity of parties or their privies is founded upon the sound principle that all persons are entitled to their day in court.

1989Co. (1969), 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 116 , 49 O.O. 2d 435, 440, 254 N.E. 2d 10, 15 , 41 A.L.R. 3d 526 , 534: “In our opinion, the existing Ohio requirement that there be an identity of parties or their privies is founded upon the sound principle that all persons are entitled to their day in court.

2023No. CA2013-12-228, 2014-Ohio-4174, ¶ 21 .

2014If there was then Petitioner would have a sound claim for relief based on the Missouri v. Frye, [ 132 S.Ct. 1399 , 182 L.Ed.2d 379 , 80 USLW 4253 (2012)] 2012 U.S. LEXIS 2321 and Lafler v. Cooper, [ 132 S.Ct. 1376 , 182 L.Ed.2d 398 , 80 USLW 4244 (2012)] 2012 U.S. LEXIS 2322 criterion in his first post-conviction petition.

2014If there was then Petitioner would have a sound claim for relief based on the Missouri v. Frye, [ 132 S.Ct. 1399 , 182 L.Ed.2d 379 , 80 USLW 4253 (2012)] 2012 U.S. LEXIS 2321 and Lafler v. Cooper, [ 132 S.Ct. 1376 , 182 L.Ed.2d 398 , 80 USLW 4244 (2012)] 2012 U.S. LEXIS 2322 criterion in his first post-conviction petition.

2014If there was then Petitioner would have a sound claim for relief based on the Missouri v. Frye, [ 132 S.Ct. 1399 , 182 L.Ed.2d 379 , 80 USLW 4253 (2012)] 2012 U.S. LEXIS 2321 and Lafler v. Cooper, [ 132 S.Ct. 1376 , 182 L.Ed.2d 398 , 80 USLW 4244 (2012)] 2012 U.S. LEXIS 2322 criterion in his first post-conviction petition.

2014If there was then Petitioner would have a sound claim for relief based on the Missouri v. Frye, [ 132 S.Ct. 1399 , 182 L.Ed.2d 379 , 80 USLW 4253 (2012)] 2012 U.S. LEXIS 2321 and Lafler v. Cooper, [ 132 S.Ct. 1376 , 182 L.Ed.2d 398 , 80 USLW 4244 (2012)] 2012 U.S. LEXIS 2322 criterion in his first post-conviction petition.

2002We are concerned here only with the rare case that has important significance to the public at large. {¶ 29} The Ohio Supreme Court adheres to the sound principle that “if it is reasonably possible, validly enacted legislation must be construed in a manner ‘which will avoid rather than * * * raise serious questions as to its constitutionality.’ ” Akron v. Rowland, 67 Ohio St.3d 374, 380 , 618 N.E.2d 138 , quoting Cooperative Legislative Commt. of the Transp.

2002We are concerned here only with the rare case that has important significance to the public at large. {¶ 29} The Ohio Supreme Court adheres to the sound principle that “if it is reasonably possible, validly enacted legislation must be construed in a manner ‘which will avoid rather than * * * raise serious questions as to its constitutionality.’ ” Akron v. Rowland, 67 Ohio St.3d 374, 380 , 618 N.E.2d 138 , quoting Cooperative Legislative Commt. of the Transp.

2000Co. (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 108 , 115 modified by Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379 , at syllabus.

1999LaBarbera v. Batsch (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 106 , 113 .

1986I write separately to address criticism raised by the minority herein concerning, inter alia, this court’s definition of the term “intentional tort” in Jones v. VIP Development Co. (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 90 .

1986While we find Erie County and Bigelow to be relatively correct enunciations of the proper standard to be applied in causes asserting absolute privilege in a judicial proceeding, we believe that the majority rule articulates a more workable standard for deciding when the doctrine of absolute privilege should apply, while recognizing the public policy considerations referred to in Erie County, supra, at 214-215 . 1 Thus, we hold that as a matter of public policy, under the doctrine of absolute privilege in a judicial proceeding, a claim alleging that a defamatory statement was made in a written

1978Co. (1969), 24 N. Y. 2d 42, 246 NE 2d 713 ), and Georgia (Maryland Casually Co. v. Sammons (1940), 63 Ga. App. 323 , 11 S. E. 2d 89 ), as well as certain Minnesota decisions in refusing to award attorney fees in a declaratory judgment action unless there appeared on the part of the defendant some indication that he acted in “bad faith or fraudulently, or was stubbornly litigious.” We believe this to be a sound rule of interpretation, finding as we do that the intent of the statute affording further relief in declaratory judgment actions is to afford the trial court the power to enforce its dec

1978Co. (1969), 24 N. Y. 2d 42, 246 NE 2d 713 ), and Georgia (Maryland Casually Co. v. Sammons (1940), 63 Ga. App. 323 , 11 S. E. 2d 89 ), as well as certain Minnesota decisions in refusing to award attorney fees in a declaratory judgment action unless there appeared on the part of the defendant some indication that he acted in “bad faith or fraudulently, or was stubbornly litigious.” We believe this to be a sound rule of interpretation, finding as we do that the intent of the statute affording further relief in declaratory judgment actions is to afford the trial court the power to enforce its dec

1978Co. (1969), 24 N. Y. 2d 42, 246 NE 2d 713 ), and Georgia (Maryland Casually Co. v. Sammons (1940), 63 Ga. App. 323 , 11 S. E. 2d 89 ), as well as certain Minnesota decisions in refusing to award attorney fees in a declaratory judgment action unless there appeared on the part of the defendant some indication that he acted in “bad faith or fraudulently, or was stubbornly litigious.” We believe this to be a sound rule of interpretation, finding as we do that the intent of the statute affording further relief in declaratory judgment actions is to afford the trial court the power to enforce its dec

1975In Stilfield v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co. (1960), 25 Ill.

1934The loss in its final incidence will be borne where it is placed by the initial wrong.” We are inclined to the opinion that the more sound rule is that announced by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Ryan v Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., supra. It .is contended by counsel for defendant in error that the record herein discloses contributory negligence as a matter of law upon the part of the plaintiff, which would bar a recovery even though the defendant were liable under the rule of law.

1932It is held in Winchell v Village of Dennison, 5 Oh Ap, 103, 107, that a “petition presented to council was in the nature of the offer or proposition in a contract.” This is adopted as a sound principle in the more recent case of DeArmond v City of Hamilton, 27 Oh Ap, 258, 261, ( 6 Abs 292 ), 161 NE, 29 .

1932It is held in Winchell v Village of Dennison, 5 Oh Ap, 103, 107, that a “petition presented to council was in the nature of the offer or proposition in a contract.” This is adopted as a sound principle in the more recent case of DeArmond v City of Hamilton, 27 Oh Ap, 258, 261, ( 6 Abs 292 ), 161 NE, 29 .

1926Crane v. Buckley, 203 U. S., 441„ 27 S. Ct., 56 , 51 L.

1926Crane v. Buckley, 203 U. S., 441„ 27 S. Ct., 56 , 51 L.

1924The Supreme Court of that state (Mississippi) does not lose sight of the sound rule, however, because in Pollard v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 63 Miss., 244 , 56 Am.

1922This doctrine is fairly and fully stated in 8 Cyc., 727, as follows: “Whenever a constitutional provision or a statute gives a discretionary power, to be exercised when and under such circumstances as those who are charged with exercising such power may deem expedient, the construction given to all such provisions or statutes by those charged with such duties is conclusive and not subject to review by the judicial power, even though erroneous.” Justice Story, in Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat., 19 , lays down the same doctrine at page 31: “Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person

1906It does not suggest that the fir^t paragraph of the syllabus of the Harriman case, which has been heretofore quoted, is not good law, but shows that the law as so stated is not applicable to the facts in Ann Arbor Ry. v. Kinz, supra. Finally, no Ohio casé has been cited to us which holds a doctrine contrary to that quoted from the Harriman case.

1905Bostwick, In re, 6 Johns Ch. 100; Osborne v. Van Horn, 2 Fla. 360 .” And Otte v. Becton, 55 Mo. 99 , 101: ‘ ‘ The law seems to be well settled, that where the father or mother,, or a step-father, maintain infant children, they have no legal right to recover for past maintenance in an action at law,-unless it be upon an express promise to pay the same after their arrival at years of maturity.

1905Bostwick, In re, 6 Johns Ch. 100; Osborne v. Van Horn, 2 Fla. 360 .” And Otte v. Becton, 55 Mo. 99 , 101: ‘ ‘ The law seems to be well settled, that where the father or mother,, or a step-father, maintain infant children, they have no legal right to recover for past maintenance in an action at law,-unless it be upon an express promise to pay the same after their arrival at years of maturity.

1901In Railroad Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y., 30 , it was held: “Where the authority of an agent depends upon some fact outside the terms of his power, and which, from its nature, rests particularly within his knowledge, the principal is bound by the representations of the agent, although false, as to the existence of such fact.” This we regard as a sound principle of law, applicable to the facts of this case.

1849This question was settled by this court twenty-fiva years since in the case of Burgett v. Burgett, ( 1 Ohio Rep. 469 ,) in which it was held by a majority of the court, that such deed was not void except as to creditors and subsequent purchasers.