sound rule in Michigan

1992There is nothing in the act itself from which we can gather any different intent, and it is a sound rule of construction that legislation is to have a prospective operation only, except where the contrary intent is expressly declared or is necessarily to be [inferred] from the terms employed.” 1 (Emphasis added.) A legislative intent to make Act 255 2 retrospective is neither expressly declared nor necessarily to be inferred from the terms employed. 3 Nor has there been adduced any other evidence of legislative intent._ Similarly, see McKisson v Davenport, 83 Mich 211, 215 ; 47 NW 100 (1890);

1992There is nothing in the act itself from which we can gather any different intent, and it is a sound rule of construction that legislation is to have a prospective operation only, except where the contrary intent is expressly declared or is necessarily to be [inferred] from the terms employed.” 1 (Emphasis added.) A legislative intent to make Act 255 2 retrospective is neither expressly declared nor necessarily to be inferred from the terms employed. 3 Nor has there been adduced any other evidence of legislative intent._ Similarly, see McKisson v Davenport, 83 Mich 211, 215 ; 47 NW 100 (1890);

2016Indeed, M Crim JI 3.11(6) was patterned on Handley2 and M Crim JI 3.11 is considered “a sound instruction . . . .” People v Pollick, 448 Mich 376, 386 ; 531 NW2d 159 (1995).

2016Indeed, M Crim JI 3.11(6) was patterned on Handley2 and M Crim JI 3.11 is considered “a sound instruction . . . .” People v Pollick, 448 Mich 376, 386 ; 531 NW2d 159 (1995).

1955Lawrence v. Bartling & Dull Co., 255 Mich 580 ; Corey v. Eartel, 216 Mich 675 ; * * * Baldwin, Personal Injuries (2d ed), p 138, §146.’ *489 “In the case of Engel v. Smith, 82 Mich 1, 7 (21 Am St Rep 549), we said: “ ‘It is a sound rule of law that it is not contributory negligence not to look out for danger when there is no reason to apprehend any.’ “See, also, Johnson v. City of Pontiac, 276 Mich 103 ; Grant v. Richardson, 276 Mich 151 ; Standard Oil Co. v. Burleson (CCA), 117 F2d 412.

1942Lawrence v. Bartling & Dull Co., 255 Mich. 580 ; Corey v. Hartel, 216 Mich. 675 ; * * * Baldwin, Personal Injuries (2d Ed.), p. 138, § 146.” In the case of Engel v. Smith, supra, p. 7 , we said: “It is a sound rule of law that it is not contributory negligence not to look out for danger when there is no reason to apprehend any.” See, also, Johnson v. City of Pontiac, 276 Mich. 103 ; Grant v. Richardson, 276 Mich. 151 ; Standard Oil Co. v. Burleson (C.

1955Lawrence v. Bartling & Dull Co., 255 Mich 580 ; Corey v. Eartel, 216 Mich 675 ; * * * Baldwin, Personal Injuries (2d ed), p 138, §146.’ *489 “In the case of Engel v. Smith, 82 Mich 1, 7 (21 Am St Rep 549), we said: “ ‘It is a sound rule of law that it is not contributory negligence not to look out for danger when there is no reason to apprehend any.’ “See, also, Johnson v. City of Pontiac, 276 Mich 103 ; Grant v. Richardson, 276 Mich 151 ; Standard Oil Co. v. Burleson (CCA), 117 F2d 412.

1942Lawrence v. Bartling & Dull Co., 255 Mich. 580 ; Corey v. Hartel, 216 Mich. 675 ; * * * Baldwin, Personal Injuries (2d Ed.), p. 138, § 146.” In the case of Engel v. Smith, supra, p. 7 , we said: “It is a sound rule of law that it is not contributory negligence not to look out for danger when there is no reason to apprehend any.” See, also, Johnson v. City of Pontiac, 276 Mich. 103 ; Grant v. Richardson, 276 Mich. 151 ; Standard Oil Co. v. Burleson (C.

1955Lawrence v. Bartling & Dull Co., 255 Mich 580 ; Corey v. Eartel, 216 Mich 675 ; * * * Baldwin, Personal Injuries (2d ed), p 138, §146.’ *489 “In the case of Engel v. Smith, 82 Mich 1, 7 (21 Am St Rep 549), we said: “ ‘It is a sound rule of law that it is not contributory negligence not to look out for danger when there is no reason to apprehend any.’ “See, also, Johnson v. City of Pontiac, 276 Mich 103 ; Grant v. Richardson, 276 Mich 151 ; Standard Oil Co. v. Burleson (CCA), 117 F2d 412.

1942Lawrence v. Bartling & Dull Co., 255 Mich. 580 ; Corey v. Hartel, 216 Mich. 675 ; * * * Baldwin, Personal Injuries (2d Ed.), p. 138, § 146.” In the case of Engel v. Smith, supra, p. 7 , we said: “It is a sound rule of law that it is not contributory negligence not to look out for danger when there is no reason to apprehend any.” See, also, Johnson v. City of Pontiac, 276 Mich. 103 ; Grant v. Richardson, 276 Mich. 151 ; Standard Oil Co. v. Burleson (C.

1955Lawrence v. Bartling & Dull Co., 255 Mich 580 ; Corey v. Eartel, 216 Mich 675 ; * * * Baldwin, Personal Injuries (2d ed), p 138, §146.’ *489 “In the case of Engel v. Smith, 82 Mich 1, 7 (21 Am St Rep 549), we said: “ ‘It is a sound rule of law that it is not contributory negligence not to look out for danger when there is no reason to apprehend any.’ “See, also, Johnson v. City of Pontiac, 276 Mich 103 ; Grant v. Richardson, 276 Mich 151 ; Standard Oil Co. v. Burleson (CCA), 117 F2d 412.

1942Lawrence v. Bartling & Dull Co., 255 Mich. 580 ; Corey v. Hartel, 216 Mich. 675 ; * * * Baldwin, Personal Injuries (2d Ed.), p. 138, § 146.” In the case of Engel v. Smith, supra, p. 7 , we said: “It is a sound rule of law that it is not contributory negligence not to look out for danger when there is no reason to apprehend any.” See, also, Johnson v. City of Pontiac, 276 Mich. 103 ; Grant v. Richardson, 276 Mich. 151 ; Standard Oil Co. v. Burleson (C.

2024Furthermore, even at trial, the prosecution, defense counsel, and the court were all under the impression that EC was SD’s aunt, as opposed to defendant’s cousin, until SD’s mother and defendant clarified the matter during the proceeding. -20- This Court has broadly determined that “[d]ecisions regarding what evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy, and this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy.” People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 368 ; 649 NW2d 94 (2002).

2024Furthermore, even at trial, the prosecution, defense counsel, and the court were all under the impression that EC was SD’s aunt, as opposed to defendant’s cousin, until SD’s mother and defendant clarified the matter during the proceeding. -20- This Court has broadly determined that “[d]ecisions regarding what evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy, and this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy.” People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 368 ; 649 NW2d 94 (2002).

2006I would settle the conflict in favor of Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp, 269 Mich App 586 ; 711 NW2d 448 (2006), vacated in part 269 Mich App 801 (2006).

2006I would settle the conflict in favor of Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp, 269 Mich App 586 ; 711 NW2d 448 (2006), vacated in part 269 Mich App 801 (2006).

2006I would settle the conflict in favor of Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp, 269 Mich App 586 ; 711 NW2d 448 (2006), vacated in part 269 Mich App 801 (2006).

2000“In order to preserve for appellate review the adequacy of jury instructions in a civil case, a party must make a request for a jury instruction before the instructions are given and must object to the alleged error after the jury has been instructed.” Zinchook v Turkewycz, 128 Mich App 513, 520 ; 340 NW2d 844 (1983).

2000“In order to preserve for appellate review the adequacy of jury instructions in a civil case, a party must make a request for a jury instruction before the instructions are given and must object to the alleged error after the jury has been instructed.” Zinchook v Turkewycz, 128 Mich App 513, 520 ; 340 NW2d 844 (1983).

1992There is nothing in the act itself from which we can gather any different intent, and it is a sound rule of construction that legislation is to have a prospective operation only, except where the contrary intent is expressly declared or is necessarily to be [inferred] from the terms employed.” 1 (Emphasis added.) A legislative intent to make Act 255 2 retrospective is neither expressly declared nor necessarily to be inferred from the terms employed. 3 Nor has there been adduced any other evidence of legislative intent._ Similarly, see McKisson v Davenport, 83 Mich 211, 215 ; 47 NW 100 (1890);

1992There is nothing in the act itself from which we can gather any different intent, and it is a sound rule of construction that legislation is to have a prospective operation only, except where the contrary intent is expressly declared or is necessarily to be [inferred] from the terms employed.” 1 (Emphasis added.) A legislative intent to make Act 255 2 retrospective is neither expressly declared nor necessarily to be inferred from the terms employed. 3 Nor has there been adduced any other evidence of legislative intent._ Similarly, see McKisson v Davenport, 83 Mich 211, 215 ; 47 NW 100 (1890);

1992There is nothing in the act itself from which we can gather any different intent, and it is a sound rule of construction that legislation is to have a prospective operation only, except where the contrary intent is expressly declared or is necessarily to be [inferred] from the terms employed.” 1 (Emphasis added.) A legislative intent to make Act 255 2 retrospective is neither expressly declared nor necessarily to be inferred from the terms employed. 3 Nor has there been adduced any other evidence of legislative intent._ Similarly, see McKisson v Davenport, 83 Mich 211, 215 ; 47 NW 100 (1890);

1992There is nothing in the act itself from which we can gather any different intent, and it is a sound rule of construction that legislation is to have a prospective operation only, except where the contrary intent is expressly declared or is necessarily to be [inferred] from the terms employed.” 1 (Emphasis added.) A legislative intent to make Act 255 2 retrospective is neither expressly declared nor necessarily to be inferred from the terms employed. 3 Nor has there been adduced any other evidence of legislative intent._ Similarly, see McKisson v Davenport, 83 Mich 211, 215 ; 47 NW 100 (1890);

1992There is nothing in the act itself from which we can gather any different intent, and it is a sound rule of construction that legislation is to have a prospective operation only, except where the contrary intent is expressly declared or is necessarily to be [inferred] from the terms employed.” 1 (Emphasis added.) A legislative intent to make Act 255 2 retrospective is neither expressly declared nor necessarily to be inferred from the terms employed. 3 Nor has there been adduced any other evidence of legislative intent._ Similarly, see McKisson v Davenport, 83 Mich 211, 215 ; 47 NW 100 (1890);

1992There is nothing in the act itself from which we can gather any different intent, and it is a sound rule of construction that legislation is to have a prospective operation only, except where the contrary intent is expressly declared or is necessarily to be [inferred] from the terms employed.” 1 (Emphasis added.) A legislative intent to make Act 255 2 retrospective is neither expressly declared nor necessarily to be inferred from the terms employed. 3 Nor has there been adduced any other evidence of legislative intent._ Similarly, see McKisson v Davenport, 83 Mich 211, 215 ; 47 NW 100 (1890);

1992There is nothing in the act itself from which we can gather any different intent, and it is a sound rule of construction that legislation is to have a prospective operation only, except where the contrary intent is expressly declared or is necessarily to be [inferred] from the terms employed.” 1 (Emphasis added.) A legislative intent to make Act 255 2 retrospective is neither expressly declared nor necessarily to be inferred from the terms employed. 3 Nor has there been adduced any other evidence of legislative intent._ Similarly, see McKisson v Davenport, 83 Mich 211, 215 ; 47 NW 100 (1890);

1992See also Ferris v Beecher, 85 Mich App 208, 214 ; 270 NW2d 658 (1978); Pryber v Marriott Corp, 98 Mich App 50, 55 ; 296 NW2d 597 (1980).

1992See also Ferris v Beecher, 85 Mich App 208, 214 ; 270 NW2d 658 (1978); Pryber v Marriott Corp, 98 Mich App 50, 55 ; 296 NW2d 597 (1980).

1992There is nothing in the act itself from which we can gather any different intent, and it is a sound rule of construction that legislation is to have a prospective operation only, except where the contrary intent is expressly declared or is necessarily to be [inferred] from the terms employed.” 1 (Emphasis added.) A legislative intent to make Act 255 2 retrospective is neither expressly declared nor necessarily to be inferred from the terms employed. 3 Nor has there been adduced any other evidence of legislative intent._ Similarly, see McKisson v Davenport, 83 Mich 211, 215 ; 47 NW 100 (1890);

1983In accordance with the sound analysis in Randall, supra, we believe that a decision by DSS as to an applicant’s eligibility for governmental benefits and payment of benefits in accordance with such decision is basic to the operation of the Department of Social Services and the discharge of its duties under the Social Welfare Act.

1982Over 50 years ago, our Court in Collins v Gerhardt, 237 Mich 38 ; 211 NW 115 (1926), rededicated itself to the sound principle enunciated long before in Moore that navigable waters of this state are protected for public use by a high, solemn, and perpetual trust.

1982Over 50 years ago, our Court in Collins v Gerhardt, 237 Mich 38 ; 211 NW 115 (1926), rededicated itself to the sound principle enunciated long before in Moore that navigable waters of this state are protected for public use by a high, solemn, and perpetual trust.

1979If his exercise of the privilege was meritorious, and there is no reason on this record to conclude that it was not, then he needed counsel who could show him how to exercise his privilege without waiving it. 10 "If there exists a reasonable likelihood that the civil contempt proceedings by their very nature involve matters of such factual, procedural or substantive complexity that it must be concluded that without the assistance of counsel the defendant is unlikely to be capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings, articulating his position or appreciating the options available to

1979If his exercise of the privilege was meritorious, and there is no reason on this record to conclude that it was not, then he needed counsel who could show him how to exercise his privilege without waiving it. 10 "If there exists a reasonable likelihood that the civil contempt proceedings by their very nature involve matters of such factual, procedural or substantive complexity that it must be concluded that without the assistance of counsel the defendant is unlikely to be capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings, articulating his position or appreciating the options available to

1977Judge Brennan stated in Ryan v Ore Lake, 56 Mich App 162, 167 ; 223 NW2d 637 (1974): "It has repeatedly been asserted that the appellate courts of this state will not reach constitutional questions when the case under consideration can fairly be disposed of on other grounds.

1977Judge Brennan stated in Ryan v Ore Lake, 56 Mich App 162, 167 ; 223 NW2d 637 (1974): "It has repeatedly been asserted that the appellate courts of this state will not reach constitutional questions when the case under consideration can fairly be disposed of on other grounds.

1976Seligman v Friedlander, 199 NY 373 [ 92 NE 1047 (1910)].

1976Seligman v Friedlander, 199 NY 373 [ 92 NE 1047 (1910)].

1976It is a sound rule of construction that in the absence of express language, it will be presumed that the Legislature did not intend to defeat the main purpose and object of another legislative enactment relating to the same subject ( People ex rel Wood v Lacombe, 99 NY 43 [ 1 NE 599 (1885)]), nor to make a radical change in long-established rules.

1976It is a sound rule of construction that in the absence of express language, it will be presumed that the Legislature did not intend to defeat the main purpose and object of another legislative enactment relating to the same subject ( People ex rel Wood v Lacombe, 99 NY 43 [ 1 NE 599 (1885)]), nor to make a radical change in long-established rules.

1974They rest on the sound doctrine, expressed in Menges v Dentler, 33 Pa 495 (75 Am Dec 616) [1859], * * * that the law of the case at that time when it became complete is an inherent element in it; and, if changed or annulled, the law is annulled, justice denied, and the due course of law is violated.’ "The above case is cited to the text of 25 RCL 938. " 'The repeal of a statute does not take away a right of action for damages which have already accrued’.” Minty v Board of State Auditors, 336 Mich 370, 390 ; 58 NW2d 106 (1953). *574 See also Cusick v Feldpausch, 259 Mich 349, 353 ; 243 NW 226 (

1974They rest on the sound doctrine, expressed in Menges v Dentler, 33 Pa 495 (75 Am Dec 616) [1859], * * * that the law of the case at that time when it became complete is an inherent element in it; and, if changed or annulled, the law is annulled, justice denied, and the due course of law is violated.’ "The above case is cited to the text of 25 RCL 938. " 'The repeal of a statute does not take away a right of action for damages which have already accrued’.” Minty v Board of State Auditors, 336 Mich 370, 390 ; 58 NW2d 106 (1953). *574 See also Cusick v Feldpausch, 259 Mich 349, 353 ; 243 NW 226 (