86 California opinions name it 3 courts 1886–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bossgreen2 sentences2001In People v. Boss, supra, 210 Cal. 245 , the court explained, “It is a sound principle of law which inheres in common reason that where two or more persons engage in a conspiracy to commit robbery and an officer or citizen is murdered while in immediate pursuit of one of their number who is fleeing from the scene of the crime with the fruits thereof in his possession, or in the possession of a co-conspirator, the crime is not complete in the purview of the law, inasmuch as said conspirators have not won their way even momentarily to a place of temporary safety and the possession of the plunder 1981(See People v. Ramirez (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 714 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 94 ]; People v. Fuller (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 515 ].) In an early statement of felony-murder law, the Supreme Court in People v. Boss (1930) 210 Cal. 245, 250-251 [ 290 P. 881 ], rejected a contention that a killing during immediate flight with robbery loot was not in the “perpetration” of the robbery, stating inter alia: “It is a sound principle of law which inheres in common reason that where two or more persons engage in a conspiracy to commit robbery and an officer or citizen is murdered while in immedia | 4 | 7 |
Pacific Motor Transport Co. v. State Board of Equalizationgreen2 sentences1990We acknowledge that although courts may not read into a statute an exception not incorporated therein by the Legislature, they may find implied exceptions where it is reasonable and necessary to do so to avoid disregarding or overturning a sound rule of public policy (Pacific Motor Transport Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 230, 235 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 558 ]) or to avoid absurd and manifestly unjust consequences (Ex parte Lorenzen (1900) 128 Cal. 431, 439 [ 61 P. 68 ]). 1990We acknowledge that although courts may not read into a statute an exception not incorporated therein by the Legislature, they may find implied exceptions where it is reasonable and necessary to do so to avoid disregarding or overturning a sound rule of public policy (Pacific Motor Transport Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 230, 235 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 558 ]) or to avoid absurd and manifestly unjust consequences (Ex parte Lorenzen (1900) 128 Cal. 431, 439 [ 61 P. 68 ]). | 3 | 3 |
In Re Carpentergreen2 sentences2004Rather, as Justice Benke noted in her dissent in the Court of Appeal, according independent review to mixed questions of law and fact is based "on the sound principle that where a constitutional issue is involved, the law requires uniformity, [and] clarity of precedent." Thus, both People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561 , 582, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454 , 941 P.2d 87 , and In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 647, 658-659 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 ( Carpenter ), concluded that independent review applies to a determination of whether prejudice arose from juror misconduct. 2004Rather, as Justice Benke noted in her dissent in the Court of Appeal, according independent review to mixed questions of law and fact is based "on the sound principle that where a constitutional issue is involved, the law requires uniformity, [and] clarity of precedent." Thus, both People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561 , 582, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454 , 941 P.2d 87 , and In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 647, 658-659 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 ( Carpenter ), concluded that independent review applies to a determination of whether prejudice arose from juror misconduct. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Kendrickgreen2 sentences1963(People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 251 [ 290 P. 881 ]; People v. Dowell, 204 Cal. 109 [ 266 P. 807 ].) ” (People v. Rye (1949) 33 Cal.2d 688, 693 [ 203 P.2d 748 ].) A “killing . . . committed in connection with conduct intended to facilitate escape after the robbery and as part of one continuous transaction” constitutes “murder of the first degree by the terms of the statute,” (People v. Coefield (1951) 37 Cal.2d 865, 868-869 [ 236 P.2d 570 ]; see People v. Kendrick (1961) 56 Cal.2d 71, 90 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 363 P.2d 13 ].) Appellants Ketchel and Thomas Sears apparently attempt to bring themselve 1963(People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 251 [ 290 P. 881 ]; People v. Dowell, 204 Cal. 109 [ 266 P. 807 ].) ” (People v. Rye (1949) 33 Cal.2d 688, 693 [ 203 P.2d 748 ].) A “killing . . . committed in connection with conduct intended to facilitate escape after the robbery and as part of one continuous transaction” constitutes “murder of the first degree by the terms of the statute,” (People v. Coefield (1951) 37 Cal.2d 865, 868-869 [ 236 P.2d 570 ]; see People v. Kendrick (1961) 56 Cal.2d 71, 90 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 363 P.2d 13 ].) Appellants Ketchel and Thomas Sears apparently attempt to bring themselve | 2 | 2 |
People v. Aldaygreen2 sentences1986“Courts may not read into a statute an exception not incorporated therein by the Legislature [citation], unless such an exception must reasonably and necessarily be implied in order not to ‘ disregard or overturn a sound rule of public policy. ’ [Citation. ] ” (Pacific Motor Transport Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 230, 235 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 558 ].) A statute must be read “in light of both the objective it seeks to achieve and the evil it seeks to avert.” (People v. Alday (1973) 10 Cal.3d 392, 395 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 617 , 515 P.2d 1169 ].) Upholding “reasonable conditions” im 1986“Courts may not read into a statute an exception not incorporated therein by the Legislature [citation], unless such an exception must reasonably and necessarily be implied in order not to ‘ disregard or overturn a sound rule of public policy. ’ [Citation. ] ” (Pacific Motor Transport Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 230, 235 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 558 ].) A statute must be read “in light of both the objective it seeks to achieve and the evil it seeks to avert.” (People v. Alday (1973) 10 Cal.3d 392, 395 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 617 , 515 P.2d 1169 ].) Upholding “reasonable conditions” im | 2 | 2 |
Jersey City Gaslight Co. v. Consumers Gas Co.green2 sentences1962(Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Fed. of S. Workers, 116 N.J.Esq. 146 [ 172 A. 551, 557-558 , 92 A.L.R. 1450 ]; Jersey City Gaslight Co. v. Consumers Gas Co., 40 N.J. 1962(Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Fed. of S. Workers, 116 N.J.Esq. 146 [ 172 A. 551, 557-558 , 92 A.L.R. 1450 ]; Jersey City Gaslight Co. v. Consumers Gas Co., 40 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Salasgreen2 sentences2022(See, e.g., People v. Salas (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 822 ; People v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 552, 559 .) Our Supreme court in Boss stated, “It is a sound principle of law which inheres in common reason that where two or more persons engage in a conspiracy to commit robbery and an officer or citizen is murdered while in immediate pursuit of one of their number who is fleeing from the scene of the crime with the fruits thereof in his possession, or in the possession of a co- conspirator, the crime is not complete in the purview of the law, inasmuch as said conspirators have not won their way ev 1995(People v. Kendrick (1961) 56 Cal.2d 71, 90 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 363 P.2d 13 ]; People v. Ketchel (1963) 59 Cal.2d 503, 524 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 538 , 381 P.2d 394 ]; People v. Salas (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 823-824 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 500 P.2d 7 , 58 A.L.R.3d 832 ].) In People v. Carroll (1970) 1 Cal.3d 581, 584-585 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 176 , 463 P.2d 400 ], the Supreme Court applied the concept of a “place of temporary safety” in a prosecution for robbery with the infliction of great bodily injury on the victim. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Landisgreen2 sentences1999The Bernal court concluded that because burglary can be committed without committing a theft and theft is not a lesser included offense of burglary “. . . the more sound analysis is to permit conviction of both crimes and apply Penal Code section 654 to avoid multiple punishment.” (Id. at p. 1458.) In People v. Landis (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1247 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 641 ], Division Four of the Second District held that a defendant can be convicted of burglary and receiving property taken during the burglary. 1999The Bernal court concluded that because burglary can be committed without committing a theft and theft is not a lesser included offense of burglary “. . . the more sound analysis is to permit conviction of both crimes and apply Penal Code section 654 to avoid multiple punishment.” (Id. at p. 1458.) In People v. Landis (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1247 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 641 ], Division Four of the Second District held that a defendant can be convicted of burglary and receiving property taken during the burglary. | 1 | 2 |
Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfsongreen2 sentences1984(Cf. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, at p. 734 ; In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d 205, at p. 215 .) Without the most cogent and convincing evidence, we cannot attribute to the Legislature such an intent. ( In re Cox, supra, at p. 215 ; see also, Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra . ) III. 1984(Cf. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, at p. 734 ; In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d 205, at p. 215 .) Without the most cogent and convincing evidence, we cannot attribute to the Legislature such an intent. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Wrightgreen1 sentence2015(People v. Wright (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 203, 210, fn. 17 ["A defendant can commit a battery indirectly by causing the force to be applied to the person of another [citation]."].) We 7 agree with this sound principle. | 1 | 1 |
| Crescent City Live Stock Co. v. Batchers' Union Slaughter-House Co.green | 1 | 1 |
Plumley v. Mockettgreen2 sentences2010Legal Tenability In Swat-Fame, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at page 626 , the Court of Appeal held, inter alia, “Because the allegations in the complaint were true to the best of the [lawyer-defendants’] knowledge at the time the complaint was filed, and because the trial court overruled Swat-Fame’s demurrer . . . , the lawyers necessarily had probable cause to bring the claim . . . .” This is a sound rule, for it is consistent with the principle that “[c]laims that have succeeded at a hearing on the merits ... are not so lacking in potential merit that a reasonable attorney or litigant would necess 2010Legal Tenability In Swat-Fame, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at page 626 , the Court of Appeal held, inter alia, “Because the allegations in the complaint were true to the best of the [lawyer-defendants’] knowledge at the time the complaint was filed, and because the trial court overruled Swat-Fame’s demurrer . . . , the lawyers necessarily had probable cause to bring the claim . . . .” This is a sound rule, for it is consistent with the principle that “[c]laims that have succeeded at a hearing on the merits ... are not so lacking in potential merit that a reasonable attorney or litigant would necess | 1 | 1 |
| California Teachers Ass'n v. Governing Board of Rialto Unified School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. One 1940 Ford V-8 Coupe, Engine No. 18-5601077green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Hoddinottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ketchelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Carrollgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Richardson v. Marshgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reed v. Normangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte Lorenzengreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bowkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Kellyred | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Webb v. Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burg v. Municipal Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Roscoegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hoover v. Agriform Chemical Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Reedergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Fullergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stockton Savings & Loan Bank v. Massanetgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Longshore v. County of Venturagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ogle v. Heimgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Appenfelder v. Security Trust & Savings Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bartos v. United States District Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Andrews v. California Trust Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hale v. Bohannongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cobbs v. Cobbsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ryegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sinz v. Owensgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cooke v. Bangs
green
2 sentences1959The appellate court in affirming stated: “ [I] t is clear from the complaint and exhibits that Judge Miehelsen was acting as superior judge in a matter over which he had jurisdiction, that the proceeding was regular in all respects, and that there would be no basis for any action against him, even if he were not entitled to immunity from civil liability under the well-established and sound rule of public policy so well expressed by Justice Brewer of the U. S. Supreme Court, sitting as a circuit justice in Cooke v. Bangs, 31 F. 640, 642 , as follows: ‘With respect to all judicial officers . . . 1951Notwithstanding the apparent effort of plaintiff to keep from alleging that defendant Twain Michelsen was a judge of the superior court and was acting as such in the proceeding complained of, it is clear from the complaint and the exhibits that Judge Michelsen was acting as superior judge in a matter over which he had jurisdiction, that the proceeding was regular in all respects, and that there would be no basis for any action against him, even if he were not entitled to immunity from civil liability under the well-established and sound rule of public policy so well expressed by Justice Brewer | 3 | 1951–1959 |
People v. Nesler
green
2 sentences2004Rather, as Justice Benke noted in her dissent in the Court of Appeal, according independent review to mixed questions of law and fact is based "on the sound principle that where a constitutional issue is involved, the law requires uniformity, [and] clarity of precedent." Thus, both People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561 , 582, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454 , 941 P.2d 87 , and In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 647, 658-659 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 ( Carpenter ), concluded that independent review applies to a determination of whether prejudice arose from juror misconduct. 2004Rather, as Justice Benke noted in her dissent in the Court of Appeal, according independent review to mixed questions of law and fact is based "on the sound principle that where a constitutional issue is involved, the law requires uniformity, [and] clarity of precedent." Thus, both People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561 , 582, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454 , 941 P.2d 87 , and In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 647, 658-659 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 ( Carpenter ), concluded that independent review applies to a determination of whether prejudice arose from juror misconduct. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club v. Ohio Casualty Insurance
green
2 sentences1989Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 142 , 152 *90 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 373 P.2d 640 ].) Without the most cogent and convincing evidence, a court will never attribute to the Legislature the intent to disregard or overturn a sound rule of policy. 1989Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 142 , 152 *90 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 373 P.2d 640 ].) Without the most cogent and convincing evidence, a court will never attribute to the Legislature the intent to disregard or overturn a sound rule of policy. | 2 | 1970–1989 |
In Re Cox
green
2 sentences1984(Cf. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, at p. 734 ; In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d 205, at p. 215 .) Without the most cogent and convincing evidence, we cannot attribute to the Legislature such an intent. 1984(Cf. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, at p. 734 ; In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d 205, at p. 215 .) Without the most cogent and convincing evidence, we cannot attribute to the Legislature such an intent. | 2 | 1984–1984 |
Rix v. Reeves
green
2 sentences1981Accord: Rix v. Reeves, 23 Ariz.App. 243 , 532 P.2d 185 (1975). [Fns. omitted.]’” ( 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 282 .) Tauber-Arons concludes that “[a]s regards defects created by the original manufacturer, Tillman states a sound rule limiting liability of dealers in used equipment.... 1981Accord: Rix v. Reeves, 23 Ariz.App. 243 , 532 P.2d 185 (1975). [Fns. omitted.]’” ( 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 282 .) Tauber-Arons concludes that “[a]s regards defects created by the original manufacturer, Tillman states a sound rule limiting liability of dealers in used equipment.... | 2 | 1980–1981 |
Price v. Shell Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1981The ordinary used products dealer ... will not be strictly liable for such defects created by the manufacturer.” ( 101 Cal.App. 3d at p. 282 .) “The rule stated in Tillman is consistent with the policy underlying the doctrine of strict liability as developed in this state and most recently announced by our Supreme Court in Price v. Shell Oil Co., supra, 2 Cal.3d 245 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 178 , 466 P.2d 722 ]. 1981The ordinary used products dealer ... will not be strictly liable for such defects created by the manufacturer.” ( 101 Cal.App. 3d at p. 282 .) “The rule stated in Tillman is consistent with the policy underlying the doctrine of strict liability as developed in this state and most recently announced by our Supreme Court in Price v. Shell Oil Co., supra, 2 Cal.3d 245 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 178 , 466 P.2d 722 ]. | 2 | 1980–1981 |
Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Federation of Silk Workers
green
2 sentences1962(Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Fed. of S. Workers, 116 N.J.Esq. 146 [ 172 A. 551, 557-558 , 92 A.L.R. 1450 ]; Jersey City Gaslight Co. v. Consumers Gas Co., 40 N.J. 1962(Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Fed. of S. Workers, 116 N.J.Esq. 146 [ 172 A. 551, 557-558 , 92 A.L.R. 1450 ]; Jersey City Gaslight Co. v. Consumers Gas Co., 40 N.J. | 2 | 1962–1962 |
Hale v. Hale
green
2 sentences1941(Hale v. Hale, 6 Cal.App.2d 661 [45 PaCal.2d 246]; Atlass v. Atlass, 112 Cal.App. 514 [ 297 P. 53 ].)" Here the children are of age, and it certainly would do violence to the policy of our state founded on natural justice and basic social principles to permit the establishment of the Missouri decree requiring appellant to make payments to the wife in the future. 1941(Hale v. Hale, 6 Cal. App. (2d) 661 [ 45 Pac. (2d) 246 ]; Atlass v. Atlass, 112 Cal. App. 514 [ 297 Pac. 53 ].)" Here the children are of age, and it certainly would do violence to the policy of our state founded on natural justice and basic social principles to permit the establishment of the Missouri decree requiring appellant to make payments to the wife in the future. | 2 | 1939–1941 |
Atlass v. Atlass
green
2 sentences1941(Hale v. Hale, 6 Cal.App.2d 661 [45 PaCal.2d 246]; Atlass v. Atlass, 112 Cal.App. 514 [ 297 P. 53 ].)" Here the children are of age, and it certainly would do violence to the policy of our state founded on natural justice and basic social principles to permit the establishment of the Missouri decree requiring appellant to make payments to the wife in the future. 1941(Hale v. Hale, 6 Cal.App.2d 661 [45 PaCal.2d 246]; Atlass v. Atlass, 112 Cal.App. 514 [ 297 P. 53 ].)" Here the children are of age, and it certainly would do violence to the policy of our state founded on natural justice and basic social principles to permit the establishment of the Missouri decree requiring appellant to make payments to the wife in the future. | 2 | 1939–1941 |
Mintz v. Blue Cross of California
green
1 sentence2023As stated in Mintz, “there is no ‘financial advantage’ exception to the rule that a corporate agent cannot be liable for interfering with its principal’s contract.” (Mintz, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1606 .) The Mintz court explained this rule “makes good sense” because “[e]very agent, in one way or another, acts for its own financial advantage when it acts for its principal, because the agent is compensated by its principal, and conduct in furtherance of the principal’s interest will necessarily serve the agent’s interests as well.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, a “ ‘financial advantage’ exception t | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Communications Satellite Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board
green
1 sentence2023However, “[a]n expert witness may not properly testify on questions of law or the interpretation of a statute.” (Communications Satellite Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 726, 747 ; see California Shoppers, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2022(See, e.g., People v. Salas (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 822 ; People v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 552, 559 .) Our Supreme court in Boss stated, “It is a sound principle of law which inheres in common reason that where two or more persons engage in a conspiracy to commit robbery and an officer or citizen is murdered while in immediate pursuit of one of their number who is fleeing from the scene of the crime with the fruits thereof in his possession, or in the possession of a co- conspirator, the crime is not complete in the purview of the law, inasmuch as said conspirators have not won their way ev | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Pfeiffer v. City of Sunnyvale City Council
green
1 sentence2022(See Pfeiffer v. City of Sunnyvale City Coun- cil (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1563 .) 22 The City and real parties tell us that it is the City, not Friends “or the courts, [which] is in the best position to interpret the appropriate application of its own Specific Plan.” In general this is a sound principle, one that courts ordinarily respect. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. O'Dell
green
1 sentence2016(See, e.g., People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574-1577 .) We see no reason to depart from the sound analysis of O’Dell concluding the instruction is not constitutionally infirm. 3. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Frye
green
1 sentence2015However, Fullbright's "claim of insufficient evidence requires us to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 953 .) We conclude it could not. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In Re Zeth S.
green
1 sentence2013And courts must not lose sight of the purpose of the dependency system in the first place. „[T]he paramount concern of the appellate court in all dependency proceedings is for the protection and welfare of the child.‟ ” (In re Jayson T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 75, 88 , disapproved on another point in In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413-414 .) Section 7612, subdivision (c), as the Legislature wrote it, is a sound rule. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
In Re Jayson T.
green
1 sentence2013And courts must not lose sight of the purpose of the dependency system in the first place. „[T]he paramount concern of the appellate court in all dependency proceedings is for the protection and welfare of the child.‟ ” (In re Jayson T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 75, 88 , disapproved on another point in In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413-414 .) Section 7612, subdivision (c), as the Legislature wrote it, is a sound rule. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Swat-Fame, Inc. v. Goldstein
green
2 sentences2010Legal Tenability In Swat-Fame, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at page 626 , the Court of Appeal held, inter alia, “Because the allegations in the complaint were true to the best of the [lawyer-defendants’] knowledge at the time the complaint was filed, and because the trial court overruled Swat-Fame’s demurrer . . . , the lawyers necessarily had probable cause to bring the claim . . . .” This is a sound rule, for it is consistent with the principle that “[c]laims that have succeeded at a hearing on the merits ... are not so lacking in potential merit that a reasonable attorney or litigant would necess 2010Legal Tenability In Swat-Fame, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at page 626 , the Court of Appeal held, inter alia, "Because the allegations in the complaint were true to the best of the [lawyer-defendants'] knowledge at the time the complaint was filed, and because the trial court overruled Swat-Fame's demurrer ..., the lawyers necessarily had probable cause to bring the claim ...." This is a sound rule, for it is consistent with the principle that "[c]laims that have succeeded at a hearing on the merits ... are not so lacking in potential merit that a reasonable attorney or litigant would necessarily | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester
red
2 sentences2010Legal Tenability In Swat-Fame, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at page 626 , the Court of Appeal held, inter alia, “Because the allegations in the complaint were true to the best of the [lawyer-defendants’] knowledge at the time the complaint was filed, and because the trial court overruled Swat-Fame’s demurrer . . . , the lawyers necessarily had probable cause to bring the claim . . . .” This is a sound rule, for it is consistent with the principle that “[c]laims that have succeeded at a hearing on the merits ... are not so lacking in potential merit that a reasonable attorney or litigant would necess 2010Legal Tenability In Swat-Fame, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at page 626 , the Court of Appeal held, inter alia, “Because the allegations in the complaint were true to the best of the [lawyer-defendants’] knowledge at the time the complaint was filed, and because the trial court overruled Swat-Fame’s demurrer . . . , the lawyers necessarily had probable cause to bring the claim . . . .” This is a sound rule, for it is consistent with the principle that “[c]laims that have succeeded at a hearing on the merits ... are not so lacking in potential merit that a reasonable attorney or litigant would necess | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Kerr's Catering Service v. Department of Industrial Relations green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Bernal green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Griffin v. United States green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Gray green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Bacon v. Carlin green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Burg v. Municipal Court for the Santa Clara Judicial District of Santa Clara County green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Fleming green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Mitchell v. . Reed green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Ramirez green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Washington green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| In Re Dampier green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| State v. McClaugherty green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| People ex rel. Black v. Smith neutral | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Tostevin v. Douglas green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| People v. Batsford green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| People v. Dowell green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.