sound principle in Alabama

2014Alpha Coal Co. v. National Cement Co., 420 So.2d 275 (Ala.Civ.App.1982); Travelers Indem.

2007Alpha Coal Co. v. National Cement Co. , 420 So.2d 275 (Ala.Civ.App. 1982); Travelers Indem.

2003"This does not mean that the proprietor is an insurer against accidents to patrons resulting from their own missteps or disabilities, and not primarily from the unsafe condition of the premises or their appurtenances, nor against injuries resulting from invisible defects therein, not open to observation, nor discoverable by ordinary inspection. *Page 1057 This is the sound doctrine declared in Scott v. Univ. of Mich. Athletic Ass'n , 152 Mich. 684 , 116 N.W. 624 , 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 234, 125 Am.

2003"This does not mean that the proprietor is an insurer against accidents to patrons resulting from their own missteps or disabilities, and not primarily from the unsafe condition of the premises or their appurtenances, nor against injuries resulting from invisible defects therein, not open to observation, nor discoverable by ordinary inspection. *Page 1057 This is the sound doctrine declared in Scott v. Univ. of Mich. Athletic Ass'n , 152 Mich. 684 , 116 N.W. 624 , 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 234, 125 Am.

1987"It may be stated as a sound principle of law, if an owner of land in writing gives another an option on land for a valuable consideration, whether adequate or not, agreeing to sell it to him at a fixed price, if accepted within a specified time, it is binding upon the owner, and upon those who purchase from the owner with a knowledge of such agreement. — Moses v. McClain, 82 Ala. 370 ; [ Johnson v. Tripee ], 33 Fed.Rep. [530]; Maull v. Vaughan, 45 Ala. 134 , and authorities.

1890It may be stated as a sound principle of law, if an owner of land in writing gives another an option on it for a valuable •consideration, whether adequate or not, agreeing to sell it to him at a fixed price, if accepted within a specified time, it is binding upon the owner, and upon those who purchase from the owner with a knowledge of such agreement. — Moses v. McClain, 82 Ala. 370 ; 33 Fed.

2010Higdon v. McDuff, 233 Ala. 497 , 172 So. 636, 637 [(1937)]; Fisher v. McDuff, 233 Ala. 499 , 172 So. 637 [ (1937) ]; Ex Parte State, 200 Ala. 15 , 75 So. 327 [ (1917) ].”).

2010Higdon v. McDuff, 233 Ala. 497 , 172 So. 636, 637 [(1937)]; Fisher v. McDuff, 233 Ala. 499 , 172 So. 637 [ (1937) ]; Ex Parte State, 200 Ala. 15 , 75 So. 327 [ (1917) ].”).

2010Higdon v. McDuff, 233 Ala. 497 , 172 So. 636, 637 [(1937)]; Fisher v. McDuff, 233 Ala. 499 , 172 So. 637 [ (1937) ]; Ex Parte State, 200 Ala. 15 , 75 So. 327 [ (1917) ].”).

2010Higdon v. McDuff, 233 Ala. 497 , 172 So. 636, 637 [(1937)]; Fisher v. McDuff, 233 Ala. 499 , 172 So. 637 [ (1937) ]; Ex Parte State, 200 Ala. 15 , 75 So. 327 [ (1917) ].”).

2002This is in keeping with the sound principle of jurisprudence that some time, somewhere within reasonable limits, there must be an end to litigation.” Washington v. State, 92 Fla. 740, 745 , 110 So. 259, 260-61 (1926) (cited in Chapman, supra, 105 Fla. at 696-97 , 138 So. at 631-32) (citations omitted; emphasis added).

2002This is in keeping with the sound principle of jurisprudence that some time, somewhere within reasonable limits, there must be an end to litigation. " Washington v. State, 92 Fla. 740, 745 , 110 So. 259, 260-61 (1926) (cited in Chapman, *838 supra, 105 Fla. at 696-97 , 138 So. at 631-32) (citations omitted; emphasis added).

1999State obedience to an unconstitutional assumption of power by the judicial branch of government, and inaction by the Congress, cannot amend the Constitution by creating and establishing a new "feature of our constitutional system." No provision of the Constitution authorizes its amendment in this manner.' " Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 454-55 , 59 S.Ct. 325 , 83 L.Ed. 272 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting)." 718 So.2d at 42 -43 n. 10 (Lyons, J., concurring specially).

1999State obedience to an unconstitutional assumption of power by the judicial branch of government, and inaction by the Congress, cannot amend the Constitution by creating and establishing a new "feature of our constitutional system." No provision of the Constitution authorizes its amendment in this manner.' " Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 454-55 , 59 S.Ct. 325 , 83 L.Ed. 272 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting)." 718 So.2d at 42 -43 n. 10 (Lyons, J., concurring specially).

1987"It may be stated as a sound principle of law, if an owner of land in writing gives another an option on land for a valuable consideration, whether adequate or not, agreeing to sell it to him at a fixed price, if accepted within a specified time, it is binding upon the owner, and upon those who purchase from the owner with a knowledge of such agreement. — Moses v. McClain, 82 Ala. 370 ; [ Johnson v. Tripee ], 33 Fed.Rep. [530]; Maull v. Vaughan, 45 Ala. 134 , and authorities.

1890Rep., supra; Maull v. Vaughan, 45 Ala. 134 , and authorities.

1963Abramson v. Hard, 229 Ala. 2 , 155 So. 590 .” Acts Nos. 672 and 673 (appvd.

1948Abramson v. Hard, 229 Ala. 2 , 155 So. 590 .

1963Abramson v. Hard, 229 Ala. 2 , 155 So. 590 .” Acts Nos. 672 and 673 (appvd.

1948Abramson v. Hard, 229 Ala. 2 , 155 So. 590 .

1858In that case we said, “Itis a sound principle, that "when a debtor engaged in the mercantile business, in contemplation of insolvency, executes a deed as a security to a creditor, conveying his entire stock of goods, but reserves the possession of the goods and the right to continue to carry on the business as he had carried it on before, and to sell the goods in an undefined way, accounting only for the proceeds of such sales; and the creditor is aware of the contemplated insolvency, this reservation creates the presumption of fraud, which, if not rebutted by other facts and circumstances, is

1857It is a sound principle, that when a debtor engaged in the mercantile business, in contemplation of insolvency, executes a deed as a security to a creditor, conveying his entire stock of goods, but reserves the possession of the goods, and the right to continue to .carry on the business as he had carried it on before, and to sell the goods in an undefined way, accounting only for the proceeds of such sales; and the creditor is aware of the contemplated insolvency, — this reservation creates the presumption of fraud, which, if not rebutted by other facts and circumstances, is sufficient, in law

2012Co. v. State Highway Dep’t, 568 So.2d 784, 788 (Ala.1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Ex parte Alabama Dep’t of Transp., 978 So.2d 17, 23 (Ala.2007), quoting in turn 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 178 (1964) (emphasis omitted))); Turner v. Merchants’ Bank, 126 Ala. 397, 403 , 28 So. 469 , 471 (1900) (noting that the “implied prohibition” under which usurious contracts “are held to be vitiated in toto is that they contravene a penal statute, and the enforcement by the courts of such contracts when relief is sought upon them, would be in derogation of a sound principle, necessary to be main

2012Co. v. State Highway Dep’t, 568 So.2d 784, 788 (Ala.1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Ex parte Alabama Dep’t of Transp., 978 So.2d 17, 23 (Ala.2007), quoting in turn 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 178 (1964) (emphasis omitted))); Turner v. Merchants’ Bank, 126 Ala. 397, 403 , 28 So. 469 , 471 (1900) (noting that the “implied prohibition” under which usurious contracts “are held to be vitiated in toto is that they contravene a penal statute, and the enforcement by the courts of such contracts when relief is sought upon them, would be in derogation of a sound principle, necessary to be main

2012Co. v. State Highway Dep’t, 568 So.2d 784, 788 (Ala.1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Ex parte Alabama Dep’t of Transp., 978 So.2d 17, 23 (Ala.2007), quoting in turn 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 178 (1964) (emphasis omitted))); Turner v. Merchants’ Bank, 126 Ala. 397, 403 , 28 So. 469 , 471 (1900) (noting that the “implied prohibition” under which usurious contracts “are held to be vitiated in toto is that they contravene a penal statute, and the enforcement by the courts of such contracts when relief is sought upon them, would be in derogation of a sound principle, necessary to be main

2012Co. v. State Highway Dep’t, 568 So.2d 784, 788 (Ala.1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Ex parte Alabama Dep’t of Transp., 978 So.2d 17, 23 (Ala.2007), quoting in turn 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 178 (1964) (emphasis omitted))); Turner v. Merchants’ Bank, 126 Ala. 397, 403 , 28 So. 469 , 471 (1900) (noting that the “implied prohibition” under which usurious contracts “are held to be vitiated in toto is that they contravene a penal statute, and the enforcement by the courts of such contracts when relief is sought upon them, would be in derogation of a sound principle, necessary to be main

2009In my view, the dispositive principle in this case is the long-established and sound principle I noted at the outset: an indemnity contract should not be “extended to losses or damages neither expressly within its terms, nor of such character that it may reasonably be inferred that the parties intended to covenant against them.” Pyle v. Pizitz, 215 Ala. at 401 , 110 So. at 824 .

2009In my view, the dispositive principle in this case is the long-established and sound principle I noted at the outset: an indemnity contract should not be “extended to losses or damages neither expressly within its terms, nor of such character that it may reasonably be inferred that the parties intended to covenant against them.” Pyle v. Pizitz, 215 Ala. at 401 , 110 So. at 824 .