sound presumption in District of Columbia

1987This sound presumption, designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute, reflects a “strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases.” Wheatley v. Adler, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 177, 183 , 407 F.2d 307, 313 (1968) (en banc), cited in Dunston, supra, 509 A.2d at 111 ; see Hensley v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 210 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 154 , 655 F.2d 264, 267 (1981) (the presumption is “but one indication of the ‘humanitarian nature’ of the Act generally”), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 904 , 102 S.Ct. 1749 , 72 L.Ed.2d 160 (1982).

1987This sound presumption, designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute, reflects a “strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases.” Wheatley v. Adler, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 177, 183 , 407 F.2d 307, 313 (1968) (en banc), cited in Dunston, supra, 509 A.2d at 111 ; see Hensley v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 210 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 154 , 655 F.2d 264, 267 (1981) (the presumption is “but one indication of the ‘humanitarian nature’ of the Act generally”), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 904 , 102 S.Ct. 1749 , 72 L.Ed.2d 160 (1982).

2008“This sound presumption, designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute, reflects a ‘strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases.’ ” Ferreira, supra, 531 A.2d at 655 (quoting Wheatley v. Adler, 132 U.SApp.

2008“This sound presumption, designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute, reflects a ‘strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases.’ ” Ferreira, supra, 531 A.2d at 655 (quoting Wheatley v. Adler, 132 U.SApp.

2016See Evans, 277 F.2d at 356 (admitting testimony from wife of deceased-that her husband would act “belligerent and in a really bellicose type of manner,” at least with her, when .drinking), However, they illustrate the sound principle that prior acts of violence have more probative value when they are similar in kind to the events on trial.

2016See Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 418-19 (D.C.1988) (“Evidence of other crimes may be relevant on purely logical grounds — an armed.robber is, other things being equal, statistically more likely than a law-abiding citizen to commit' a second similar crime.” (emphasis added)); H.

1997Thus, “[i]n considering [Mr. Kolson’s] argument that the [agency] decision is not supported by reliable, probative, substantial evidence in the record, see D.C.Code §§ l-1509(e), - 1510(a)(3)(E) (1992 Repl.), we begin with the premise that the agency’s decision ‘is presumed to be correct, so that the burden of demonstrating error is on the appellant or petitioner who challenges the decision.’” Robinson v. Smith, 683 A.2d 481, 487 (D.C. 1996) (quoting Cohen v. Rental Housing Comm’n, 496 A.2d 603, 605 (D.C.1985)).

1997Thus, “[i]n considering [Mr. Kolson’s] argument that the [agency] decision is not supported by reliable, probative, substantial evidence in the record, see D.C.Code §§ l-1509(e), - 1510(a)(3)(E) (1992 Repl.), we begin with the premise that the agency’s decision ‘is presumed to be correct, so that the burden of demonstrating error is on the appellant or petitioner who challenges the decision.’” Robinson v. Smith, 683 A.2d 481, 487 (D.C. 1996) (quoting Cohen v. Rental Housing Comm’n, 496 A.2d 603, 605 (D.C.1985)).

1996See Klieforth, supra, 642 A.2d at 1303-04 ; see also District of Columbia v. Patterson, 667 A.2d 1338 , 1343 n. 14 (D.C.1995) (“Supreme Court interpretations of general federal statutes are, of course, binding on all courts, state or federal.”) (citations omitted).

1996See Klieforth, supra, 642 A.2d at 1303-04 ; see also District of Columbia v. Patterson, 667 A.2d 1338 , 1343 n. 14 (D.C.1995) ("Supreme Court interpretations of general federal statutes are, of course, binding on all courts, state or federal.") (citations omitted).

1996See Klieforth, supra, 642 A.2d at 1303-04 ; see also District of Columbia v. Patterson, 667 A.2d 1338 , 1343 n. 14 (D.C.1995) (“Supreme Court interpretations of general federal statutes are, of course, binding on all courts, state or federal.”) (citations omitted).

1996See Klieforth, supra, 642 A.2d at 1303-04 ; see also District of Columbia v. Patterson, 667 A.2d 1338 , 1343 n. 14 (D.C.1995) (“Supreme Court interpretations of general federal statutes are, of course, binding on all courts, state or federal.”) (citations omitted).

1995See, e.g., Porter, 618 A.2d at 630-31 (remanding case, on basis of post-trial National Research Council Report, on question whether DNA testing has "requisite consensus” in scientific community); Jones, 548 A.2d at 39-47 (sustaining validity of EMIT drug testing system on basis of expert testimony in trial record of another D.C.

1995Its problems in determining what is a sound rule are much like those faced by the legislature. [22] See, e.g., Porter, 618 A.2d at 630-31 (remanding case, on basis of post-trial National Research Council Report, on question whether DNA testing has "requisite consensus" in scientific community); Jones, 548 A.2d at 39-47 (sustaining validity of EMIT drug testing system on basis of expert testimony in trial record of another D.C.

1995Superior Court case, coupled with judicial decisions from other jurisdictions, leaving open question whether appellate court may ascertain social/scientific facts "exclusively by reference to scientific and legal literature, absent relevant expert testimony of record"); Erickson, 574 P.2d at 4-7 (in determining pharmacological properties and psychological impact of cocaine, in connection with deciding whether cocaine was "narcotic" within meaning of criminal statute, appellate court properly could refer to scientific articles not considered by trial court in addition to expert testimony of rec

1995See, e.g., Porter, 618 A.2d at 630-31 (remanding case, on basis of post-trial National Research Council Report, on question whether DNA testing has "requisite consensus” in scientific community); Jones, 548 A.2d at 39-47 (sustaining validity of EMIT drug testing system on basis of expert testimony in trial record of another D.C.

1995Its problems in determining what is a sound rule are much like those faced by the legislature. [22] See, e.g., Porter, 618 A.2d at 630-31 (remanding case, on basis of post-trial National Research Council Report, on question whether DNA testing has "requisite consensus" in scientific community); Jones, 548 A.2d at 39-47 (sustaining validity of EMIT drug testing system on basis of expert testimony in trial record of another D.C.

1992“To the extent the claims are based merely on threats of divine retribution ..., they cannot stand.” Molko, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 1120 , 762 P.2d at 61 , 252 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38 ; see also Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church, 216 Cal.App.3d 297, 305 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 640, 644 (1989). 25 But although a sound claim of undue influence could rarely, if ever, 26 be founded solely upon the generalized invocation from the pulpit of the wrath of God, without one-on-one or similar pressures focused upon the complaining party rather than on the audience as a whole, it does not follow that a clergyman’s r

1992“To the extent the claims are based merely on threats of divine retribution ..., they cannot stand.” Molko, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 1120 , 762 P.2d at 61 , 252 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38 ; see also Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church, 216 Cal.App.3d 297, 305 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 640, 644 (1989). 25 But although a sound claim of undue influence could rarely, if ever, 26 be founded solely upon the generalized invocation from the pulpit of the wrath of God, without one-on-one or similar pressures focused upon the complaining party rather than on the audience as a whole, it does not follow that a clergyman’s r

1990Hairston v. United States, 497 A.2d 1097, 1103 (D.C.1985). (4) Abuse of discretion or error of law.

1990Hairston v. United States, 497 A.2d 1097, 1103 (D.C.1985). (4) Abuse of discretion or error of law.

1987This sound presumption, designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute, reflects a “strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases.” Wheatley v. Adler, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 177, 183 , 407 F.2d 307, 313 (1968) (en banc), cited in Dunston, supra, 509 A.2d at 111 ; see Hensley v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 210 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 154 , 655 F.2d 264, 267 (1981) (the presumption is “but one indication of the ‘humanitarian nature’ of the Act generally”), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 904 , 102 S.Ct. 1749 , 72 L.Ed.2d 160 (1982).

1987This sound presumption, designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute, reflects a “strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases.” Wheatley v. Adler, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 177, 183 , 407 F.2d 307, 313 (1968) (en banc), cited in Dunston, supra, 509 A.2d at 111 ; see Hensley v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 210 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 154 , 655 F.2d 264, 267 (1981) (the presumption is “but one indication of the ‘humanitarian nature’ of the Act generally”), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 904 , 102 S.Ct. 1749 , 72 L.Ed.2d 160 (1982).

1987This sound presumption, designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute, reflects a “strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases.” Wheatley v. Adler, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 177, 183 , 407 F.2d 307, 313 (1968) (en banc), cited in Dunston, supra, 509 A.2d at 111 ; see Hensley v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 210 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 154 , 655 F.2d 264, 267 (1981) (the presumption is “but one indication of the ‘humanitarian nature’ of the Act generally”), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 904 , 102 S.Ct. 1749 , 72 L.Ed.2d 160 (1982).

1987This sound presumption, designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute, reflects a “strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases.” Wheatley v. Adler, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 177, 183 , 407 F.2d 307, 313 (1968) (en banc), cited in Dunston, supra, 509 A.2d at 111 ; see Hensley v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 210 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 154 , 655 F.2d 264, 267 (1981) (the presumption is “but one indication of the ‘humanitarian nature’ of the Act generally”), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 904 , 102 S.Ct. 1749 , 72 L.Ed.2d 160 (1982).

1987This sound presumption, designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute, reflects a “strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases.” Wheatley v. Adler, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 177, 183 , 407 F.2d 307, 313 (1968) (en banc), cited in Dunston, supra, 509 A.2d at 111 ; see Hensley v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 210 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 154 , 655 F.2d 264, 267 (1981) (the presumption is “but one indication of the ‘humanitarian nature’ of the Act generally”), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 904 , 102 S.Ct. 1749 , 72 L.Ed.2d 160 (1982).