42 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1892–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lolos v. Berlingreen2 sentences2026It is founded on the sound principle that the right of a party to have this court consider a point entails a duty; that duty is to assist the court with argument and appropriate citation of authority.'" Cameron v. Carelli, 39 5 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 85-86 (1995), quoting Lolos v. Berlin, 338 Mass. 10, 14 (1958). 2025It is founded on the sound principle that the 6 right of a party to have this court consider a point entails a duty; that duty is to assist the court with argument and appropriate citation of authority.'" Cameron v. Carelli, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 85-86 (1995), quoting Lolos v. Berlin, 338 Mass. 10, 14 (1958). | 12 | 12 |
Cameron v. Carelligreen2 sentences2025It is founded on the sound principle that the right of a party to have this court consider a point entails a duty; that duty is to assist the court with argument and appropriate citation of authority.'" Cameron v. Carelli, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 85-86 (1995), quoting Lolos v. Berlin, 338 Mass. 10, 14 (1958). 2 Here, the husband's appellate arguments lack support of any case law or reference to any standard of review. 2025It is founded on the sound principle that the 6 right of a party to have this court consider a point entails a duty; that duty is to assist the court with argument and appropriate citation of authority.'" Cameron v. Carelli, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 85-86 (1995), quoting Lolos v. Berlin, 338 Mass. 10, 14 (1958). | 10 | 10 |
Assuncao's Casegreen2 sentences2026The plaintiff was a tenured civil servant entitled to the protection of the statute.1 Documents in the plaintiff's record appendix show that within one month of the dismissal of his complaint he was actively challenging his termination in proceedings before the Civil Service Commission (commission). 1 A Civil Service Commission decision included in the record appendix shows that he had successfully challenged certain disciplinary actions taken against him in the past. 3 The exhaustion doctrine "is a sound principle of law and jurisprudence aimed at preserving the integrity of both the administ 2026The plaintiff was a tenured civil servant entitled to the protection of the statute.1 Documents in the plaintiff's record appendix show that within one month of the dismissal of his complaint he was actively challenging his termination in proceedings before the Civil Service Commission (commission). 1 A Civil Service Commission decision included in the record appendix shows that he had successfully challenged certain disciplinary actions taken against him in the past. 3 The exhaustion doctrine "is a sound principle of law and jurisprudence aimed at preserving the integrity of both the administ | 7 | 8 |
Broderick's Casegreen2 sentences2014In the absence of such a requirement a court would be in the position of reviewing administrative proceedings in a piecemeal fashion, Broderick’s Case, 320 Mass. 149, 151 (1946) .... 2014In the absence of such a requirement a court would be in the position of reviewing administrative proceedings in a piecemeal fashion, Broderick's Case, 320 Mass. 149, 151 (1946) . . . . | 3 | 3 |
McKenney v. Commission on Judicial Conductgreen2 sentences2003See, e.g., McKenney v. Commission on Judicial Conduct, 380 Mass. 263, 266-67 (1980) (agency proceedings “should not be hampered by interlocutory appeals on preliminary matters, absent some extraordinary justification”); Assuncao’s Case, 372 Mass. 6, 9 (1977) (“The requirement that parties exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking review in this court is not a mere procedural device to trap the unwary litigant; rather, it is a sound principle of law and jurisprudence aimed at preserving the integrity of both the administrative and judicial processes”); Boston Edison Co. v. Brookline 1996See also McKenney v. Commission on Judicial Conduct, 380 Mass. 263, 266-67 (1980). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Rutherfordgreen1 sentence2024Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 646 (2017). 9 object and which he did not seek to redirect. | 1 | 1 |
Boston Edison Co. v. Brookline Realty & Investment Corp.green1 sentence2003Corp., 10 Mass.App.Ct. 63, 66-67 (1980) (discussing reasons for “the general rule that courts do not act on cases where administrative proceedings are incomplete”). | 1 | 1 |
Frick Co. v. New England Insulation Co.green1 sentence2000See Frick Co. v. New England Insulation Co., 347 Mass. 461, 467 (1964). | 1 | 1 |
Elias v. Unisys Corp.green1 sentence1998See Elias v. Unisys Corp., 410 Mass. 479, 482 (1991) (“Indemnity . . . allows someone who is without fault, compelled by operation of law to defend himself against the wrongful act of another, to recover from the wrongdoer the entire amount of his loss . . . .”)• It is hard to imagine how either Chaulk or its employees could be held derivatively or vicariously liable for any wrongful act of Ferno. | 1 | 1 |
Derman Rug Co. Inc. v. Rudermangreen1 sentence1996See Lolos v. Berlin, 338 Mass. 10, 13-14 (1958) (“a terse and very sketchy reference” to the issues is insufficient; requirement of argument “founded on the sound principle that the right of a party to have this court consider a point entails a duty; that duty is to assist the court with argument and appropriate citation of authority”); Derman Rug Co. v. Ruderman, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 437, 446 (1976) (“The four-sentence argument on this point. . . does not rise to the level of appellate argument and is of no assistance to us”). | 1 | 1 |
Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc.green1 sentence1992See also Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 501 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
1010 Potomac Associates v. Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc.green1 sentence1992That is a sound principle. “[I]t is unreasonable for a landlord to withhold consent to a sublease solely to extract an economic concession ■ of to improve its economic position.” 1010 Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs. of America, Inc., 485 A.2d 199, 209-210 (D.C. 1984). | 1 | 1 |
Nolle v. Thompsongreen1 sentence1992Indeed, estoppel by deed was applied to the equivalent of a quitclaim conveyance in Trull v. Eastman, 3 Met. 121, 124 (1841), a case involving a family arrangement in which it was understood that the title conveyed was later to be acquired by the grantor from his father’s will. | 1 | 1 |
Kilbride v. Kilbridegreen1 sentence1991See In re Marriage of Gillmore, 29 Cal.3d 418, 426 (1981); Kilbride v. Kilbride, 172 Mich. App. 421, 437-438 (1988); Mattox v. Mattox, 105 N.M. 479, 483-484 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Mattox v. Mattoxgreen1 sentence1991See In re Marriage of Gillmore, 29 Cal.3d 418, 426 (1981); Kilbride v. Kilbride, 172 Mich. App. 421, 437-438 (1988); Mattox v. Mattox, 105 N.M. 479, 483-484 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Gillmoregreen1 sentence1991See In re Marriage of Gillmore, 29 Cal.3d 418, 426 (1981); Kilbride v. Kilbride, 172 Mich. App. 421, 437-438 (1988); Mattox v. Mattox, 105 N.M. 479, 483-484 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Helfantgreen2 sentences1990I write with the hope that one day the court will reverse the “sharp retrogression in its sensitivity to the unfairness of admitting in a criminal case evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts,” see Commonwealth v. Helfant, supra at 238 (O’Connor, J., dissenting), except in the rare circumstances accommodated in our pre-Helfant and King cases. 1990I write with the hope that one day the court will reverse the "sharp retrogression in its sensitivity to the unfairness of admitting in a criminal case evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts," see Commonwealth v. Helfant, supra at 238 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), except in the rare circumstances accommodated in our pre- Helfant and King cases. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Scalisegreen1 sentence1989This is the prophylactic proposition of Commonwealth v. Scalise, 387 Mass. 413, 420 (1982): “We conclude it to be a sound principle that the decision whether to dispense with the requirement of announcement should be left to judicial officers, whenever police have sufficient information at the time of application for a warrant to justify such a request.” See also Commonwealth v. Manni, 398 Mass. 741, 742-743 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Mannigreen1 sentence1989This is the prophylactic proposition of Commonwealth v. Scalise, 387 Mass. 413, 420 (1982): “We conclude it to be a sound principle that the decision whether to dispense with the requirement of announcement should be left to judicial officers, whenever police have sufficient information at the time of application for a warrant to justify such a request.” See also Commonwealth v. Manni, 398 Mass. 741, 742-743 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Parkergreen1 sentence1982Accord, State v. Parker, 283 Minn. 127 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Robertsgreen1 sentence1973It is founded on the sound principle that the right of a party to have this court consider a point entails a duty; that duty is to assist the court with argument and appropriate citation of authority.” Accord, Commonwealth v. Martin, 358 Mass. 282 (1970); Commonwealth v. Roberts, 362 Mass. 357, 369 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Nassargreen1 sentence1973Cf. Commonwealth v. Nassar, 351 Mass. 37, 41 (1966). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Utica Mutual Insurance v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2003L. c. 152, § 15A, which provide “a procedure for resolution by the board of controversies between insurers as to which is liable to pay a claim,” Utica, supra at 265 , we noted that “[t]he requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . [is] ‘a sound principle of law and jurisprudence aimed at preserving the integrity of both the administrative and judicial processes.’ ” Id. at 264 , quoting from Assuncao’s Case, 372 Mass. 6, 8 (1977). 2003L. c. 152, § 15A, which provide “a procedure for resolution by the board of controversies between insurers as to which is liable to pay a claim,” Utica, supra at 265 , we noted that “[t]he requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . [is] ‘a sound principle of law and jurisprudence aimed at preserving the integrity of both the administrative and judicial processes.’ ” Id. at 264 , quoting from Assuncao’s Case, 372 Mass. 6, 8 (1977). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Michigan v. Long
green
1 sentence1984Where the Supreme Court has never held that probable cause and exigent circumstances alone cannot justify a search of a person; where it has expressed the view that its own prior decisions do not foreclose that rationale for a search (see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1035 n.1); where a contrary view would have no significant impact in curtailing searches but rather a tendency to increase arrests; and where the facts of the present case preclude sustaining the validity of the search on any more widely accepted basis; we must proceed on what we regard to be the sound rule. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Kargman v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1977In the absence of such a requirement a court would be in the position of reviewing administrative proceedings in a piecemeal fashion, Broderick’s Case, 320 Mass. 149, 151 (1946), and thus departing from the usual appellate practice of reviewing only final, and not interlocutory, decrees, Kargman v. Superior Court, 371 Mass. 324 (1976). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Commonwealth v. Martin
green
1 sentence1973It is founded on the sound principle that the right of a party to have this court consider a point entails a duty; that duty is to assist the court with argument and appropriate citation of authority.” Accord, Commonwealth v. Martin, 358 Mass. 282 (1970); Commonwealth v. Roberts, 362 Mass. 357, 369 (1972). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Hamlen v. Rednalloh Co.
green
1 sentence1960Hamlen v. Rednelloh, 291 Mass. 119, 123 ; 17 CJS 730, §312. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Gulda v. Second National Bank
green
1 sentence1950This sound principle was most recently stated by us, with the citation of many cases, in Gulda v. Second National Bank, 323 Mass. 100, 102-103 . | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Moore v. Quirk
neutral
1 sentence1937In Moore v. Quirk, 105 Mass. 49, 51 , it was said that “according to the well settled practice, the excepting party, by arguing the exceptions allowed, waived his petition to establish the truth of different exceptions.” That is a sound principle of practice. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Pinkham v. Inhabitants of Chelmsford
green
1 sentence1933Pinkham v. Chelmsford, 109 Mass. 225, 229 . | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Yick Wo v. Hopkins green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Merrill v. Monticello green | 1 | 1892–1892 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.