29 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1896–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Durham Construction Co. v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2001Co. v. Wright, 189 N.C. 456, 459 , 127 S.E. 580, 582 (1925). 2001Co. v. Wright, 189 N.C. 456, 459 , 127 S.E. 580, 582 (1925). | 1 | 3 |
Burgess Ex Rel. Burgess v. Gibbsgreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., Burgess v. Gibbs , 262 N.C. 462 , 465, 137 S.E.2d 806 , 808 (1964) ("When the trial judge in the absence of the jury heard and decided all questions relating to the court's jurisdiction to entertain the instant action, he followed the sound rule that every court necessarily has inherent judicial power to inquire into, hear and determine the questions of its own jurisdiction, whether of law or fact, the decision of which is necessary to determine the questions of its jurisdiction."). 2018See, e.g., Burgess v. Gibbs , 262 N.C. 462 , 465, 137 S.E.2d 806 , 808 (1964) ("When the trial judge in the absence of the jury heard and decided all questions relating to the court's jurisdiction to entertain the instant action, he followed the sound rule that every court necessarily has inherent judicial power to inquire into, hear and determine the questions of its own jurisdiction, whether of law or fact, the decision of which is necessary to determine the questions of its jurisdiction."). | 1 | 1 |
West Virginia Board of Education v. Hechlergreen2 sentences2017See West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Hechler, 180 W. 2017See West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Hechler , 180 W. | 1 | 1 |
Wade v. Carolina Telephone & Telegraph Co.green2 sentences2000The principles underlying the Fourth Circuit’s refusal to prohibit testimony as to separate components of condemned property was explained in United States v. 25.406 Acres of Land, 172 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1949): Certainly such matters would be considered by any business man in selling, buying or valuing the property; and when the court adopts the standards of the market place in making valuations there is no reason why it should close its eyes to how the market place arrives at and applies the standards It is difficult to perceive why testimony, which experience has taught is generally found to 2000The principles underlying the Fourth Circuit’s refusal to prohibit testimony as to separate components of condemned property was explained in United States v. 25.406 Acres of Land, 172 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1949): Certainly such matters would be considered by any business man in selling, buying or valuing the property; and when the court adopts the standards of the market place in making valuations there is no reason why it should close its eyes to how the market place arrives at and applies the standards It is difficult to perceive why testimony, which experience has taught is generally found to | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Wisegreen1 sentence2000The principles underlying the Fourth Circuit’s refusal to prohibit testimony as to separate components of condemned property was explained in United States v. 25.406 Acres of Land, 172 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1949): Certainly such matters would be considered by any business man in selling, buying or valuing the property; and when the court adopts the standards of the market place in making valuations there is no reason why it should close its eyes to how the market place arrives at and applies the standards It is difficult to perceive why testimony, which experience has taught is generally found to | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. North Carolina Department of Natural & Economic Resourcesgreen2 sentences1998“In sum, the sound principle that judicial resources should be focused on problems which are real and present rather than dissipated on abstract, hypothetical or remote questions is fully applicable to the Declaratory Judgment Act.” Adams v. Dept. of N.E.R., 295 N.C. 683, 703 , 249 S.E.2d 402, 414 (1978). 1998“In sum, the sound principle that judicial resources should be focused on problems which are real and present rather than dissipated on abstract, hypothetical or remote questions is fully applicable to the Declaratory Judgment Act.” Adams v. Dept. of N.E.R., 295 N.C. 683, 703 , 249 S.E.2d 402, 414 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mills v. . McRae
neutral
2 sentences1945Construction Co. v. Wright, 189 N. C., 456 , 127 S. E., 580 ; Mills v. McRae, 187 N. C., 707 , 122 S. E., 762 . 1925In Mills v. McRae, 187 N. C., 707 , Justice Stacy (now Chief justice) uses this impressive language: “It is a sound principle of law, and certainly approved in morals, that one who is injured in his person or property by the wrongful or negligent act of another, whether arising ex delicto or ex contractu, is required to protect himself from loss, if he can do so with reasonable exertion, or at trifling expense; and ordinarily he will be allowed to recover from the delinquent party only such damages as he could not, with reasonable effort, have avoided.” While the burden is on the defendant to | 3 | 1925–1945 |
Madry v. Town of Scotland Neck
green
2 sentences1945Asheville v. Herbert, 190 N. C., 732 , 130 S. E., 861 ; Madry v. Scotland Neck, 214 N. C., 461 , 199 S. E., 618 . 1945Asheville v. Herbert, 190 N. C., 732 , 130 S. E., 861 ; Madry v. Scotland Neck, 214 N. C., 461 , 199 S. E., 618 . | 2 | 1945–1945 |
City of Asheville v. Herbert
green
2 sentences1945Asheville v. Herbert, 190 N. C., 732 , 130 S. E., 861 ; Madry v. Scotland Neck, 214 N. C., 461 , 199 S. E., 618 . 1945Asheville v. Herbert, 190 N. C., 732 , 130 S. E., 861 ; Madry v. Scotland Neck, 214 N. C., 461 , 199 S. E., 618 . | 2 | 1945–1945 |
Sorrells v. United States
green
2 sentences1935In Sorrells v. U.S. , 287 U.S. 435 (441-2), Chief Justice Hughes lays down this sound doctrine in law and morals: "It is clear that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the act for which defendant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohibition agent, that it was the creature of his purpose, that defendant had no previous disposition to commit it, but was an industrious, law-abiding citizen, and that the agent lured defendant, otherwise innocent, to its commission by repeated and persistent solicitation in which he succeeded by taking advantage of the sentiment aroused by rem 1935In Sorrells v. U. S., 287 U. S., 435 (441-2), Qhief Justice Hughes lays down this sound doctrine in law and morals: “It is clear that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the act for which defendant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohibition agent, that it was the creature of his purpose, that defendant had no previous disposition to commit it, but was an industrious, law-abiding citizen, and that the agent lured defendant, otherwise innocent, to its commission by repeated and persistent solicitation in which he succeeded by taking-advantage of the sentiment aroused by r | 2 | 1935–1935 |
United States v. 5139.5 Acres of Land, in Aiken and Barnwell Counties, S. C., Tract No. D-308
green
1 sentence2000The court in that case stated, “The principal reason given by the trial judge for excluding the evidence . . . that the land and timber should be valued as a whole and not separately, while a sound rule of law, was no reason for excluding the evidence as to the separate value of the timber, which was a matter to be considered in valuing the two together.” Id. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
United States v. 25.406 ACRES OF LAND, ETC.
green
2 sentences2000The principles underlying the Fourth Circuit’s refusal to prohibit testimony as to separate components of condemned property was explained in United States v. 25.406 Acres of Land, 172 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1949): Certainly such matters would be considered by any business man in selling, buying or valuing the property; and when the court adopts the standards of the market place in making valuations there is no reason why it should close its eyes to how the market place arrives at and applies the standards It is difficult to perceive why testimony, which experience has taught is generally found to 2000The principles underlying the Fourth Circuit’s refusal to prohibit testimony as to separate components of condemned property was explained in United States v. 25.406 Acres of Land, 172 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1949): Certainly such matters would be considered by any business man in selling, buying or valuing the property; and when the court adopts the standards of the market place in making valuations there is no reason why it should close its eyes to how the market place arrives at and applies the standards It is difficult to perceive why testimony, which experience has taught is generally found to | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences1987Id. at 96-97 , 337 S.E. 2d at 847 . *191 The six-part inquiry is very useful when an appellate court reviews the admission of hearsay under Rule 804(b)(5) or 803(24). 1987Id. at 96-97 , 337 S.E. 2d at 847 . *191 The six-part inquiry is very useful when an appellate court reviews the admission of hearsay under Rule 804(b)(5) or 803(24). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Ferrell
green
2 sentences1981We are in full accord with the sound principle of law on self-defense enunciated in State v. Ferrell, 300 N.C. 157 , 265 S.E. 2d 210 (1980) and in State v. Marsh, 293 N.C. 353 , 237 S.E. 2d 745 (1977). 1981We are in full accord with the sound principle of law on self-defense enunciated in State v. Ferrell, 300 N.C. 157 , 265 S.E. 2d 210 (1980) and in State v. Marsh, 293 N.C. 353 , 237 S.E. 2d 745 (1977). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Marsh
green
2 sentences1981We are in full accord with the sound principle of law on self-defense enunciated in State v. Ferrell, 300 N.C. 157 , 265 S.E. 2d 210 (1980) and in State v. Marsh, 293 N.C. 353 , 237 S.E. 2d 745 (1977). 1981We are in full accord with the sound principle of law on self-defense enunciated in State v. Ferrell, 300 N.C. 157 , 265 S.E. 2d 210 (1980) and in State v. Marsh, 293 N.C. 353 , 237 S.E. 2d 745 (1977). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Town of Tryon v. Duke Power Co.
green
2 sentences1978An actual controversy between the parties is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgment Act in order to "preserve inviolate the ancient and sound juridic concept that the inherent function of judicial tribunals is to adjudicate genuine controversies between antagonistic litigants with respect to their rights, status, or other legal relations." Lide v. Mears, supra. As Justice Seawell stated in Tryon v. Power Co., 222 N.C. 200 , 22 S.E.2d 450 (1942): "The [Declaratory Judgment Act] does not require the court to give a purely advisory opinion which the parties 1978An actual controversy between the parties is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgment Act in order to "preserve inviolate the ancient and sound juridic concept that the inherent function of judicial tribunals is to adjudicate genuine controversies between antagonistic litigants with respect to their rights, status, or other legal relations." Lide v. Mears, supra. As Justice Seawell stated in Tryon v. Power Co., 222 N.C. 200 , 22 S.E.2d 450 (1942): "The [Declaratory Judgment Act] does not require the court to give a purely advisory opinion which the parties | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Brickell & Hite v. Earley
neutral
2 sentences1971The case of Brickell v. Earley, 115 Pa. 473 , 8 A. 623 (1887) appears to be somewhat similar and in denying relief as demanded by petitioner herein, the Pennsylvania court said: "In order to sustain a proposition of this kind, the plaintiffs are bound to show that [defendant] obtained his title in fraud of their right, or that their money was used in its acquisition." The undisputed facts in the instant case do not meet this sound principle. 1971The case of Brickell v. Earley, 115 Pa. 473 , 8 A. 623 (1887) appears to be somewhat similar and in denying relief as demanded by petitioner herein, the Pennsylvania court said: "In order to sustain a proposition of this kind, the plaintiffs are bound to show that [defendant] obtained his title in fraud of their right, or that their money was used in its acquisition." The undisputed facts in the instant case do not meet this sound principle. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Ellis v. Lindmark
green
2 sentences1967The Court, in sustaining a judgment for the plaintiff, said at page 977 of 269 Pac.: “The liability of the defendant rests upon the sound rule that a manufacturer or seller of an article inherently dangerous to life or property is liable for injuries to the ultimate consumer who has purchased through a middleman. 17 A.L.R. 674 , 683.” Ellis et al. v. Lindmark et al., 177 Minn. 390 , 225 N.W. 395 , involved injury to chickens caused by raw linseed oil negligently shipped by a wholesaler to a retailer as cod liver oil as ordered, and negligently sold by the retailer to chicken raisers for their 1967The Court, in sustaining a judgment for the plaintiff, said at page 977 of 269 Pac.: “The liability of the defendant rests upon the sound rule that a manufacturer or seller of an article inherently dangerous to life or property is liable for injuries to the ultimate consumer who has purchased through a middleman. 17 A.L.R. 674 , 683.” Ellis et al. v. Lindmark et al., 177 Minn. 390 , 225 N.W. 395 , involved injury to chickens caused by raw linseed oil negligently shipped by a wholesaler to a retailer as cod liver oil as ordered, and negligently sold by the retailer to chicken raisers for their | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Murphy v. Sioux Falls Serum Co.
neutral
2 sentences1967The Court held that, under the law, both wholesaler and retailer were liable, saying at page 397 of 225 N.W.: “That the negligence resulted in injury to property and not to the person should not prevent recovery.” In Murphy v. Sioux Falls Serum Co., 44 S.D. 421 , 184 N.W. 252 , the Court held that the plaintiff, who showed that hog cholera serum was properly administered by a veterinary, and that the hogs died, made out a prima facie case of negligence against the manufacturer of the serum. 1967The Court held that, under the law, both wholesaler and retailer were liable, saying at page 397 of 225 N.W.: “That the negligence resulted in injury to property and not to the person should not prevent recovery.” In Murphy v. Sioux Falls Serum Co., 44 S.D. 421 , 184 N.W. 252 , the Court held that the plaintiff, who showed that hog cholera serum was properly administered by a veterinary, and that the hogs died, made out a prima facie case of negligence against the manufacturer of the serum. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Gilbert v. David
green
1 sentence1964Jones v. Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328 , 162 S.E. 741 ; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126 , 193 S.E. 286 ; Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419 , 67 S.E. 2d 448 ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 , 59 L. ed. 360; Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F. 2d 446 ; Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F. 2d 671 ; Gill v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 209 Mo. App. 63 , 236 S.W. 1073 ; Dolese Bros. v. Tollett, 162 Okl. 158 , 19 P. 2d 570 ; Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1 , 132 S.E. 2d 18 ; Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 2d 337 ; 21 C. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Gill v. W.O.W.
neutral
2 sentences1964Jones v. Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328 , 162 S.E. 741 ; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126 , 193 S.E. 286 ; Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419 , 67 S.E. 2d 448 ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 , 59 L. ed. 360; Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F. 2d 446 ; Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F. 2d 671 ; Gill v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 209 Mo. App. 63 , 236 S.W. 1073 ; Dolese Bros. v. Tollett, 162 Okl. 158 , 19 P. 2d 570 ; Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1 , 132 S.E. 2d 18 ; Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 2d 337 ; 21 C. 1964Jones v. Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328 , 162 S.E. 741 ; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126 , 193 S.E. 286 ; Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419 , 67 S.E. 2d 448 ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 , 59 L. ed. 360; Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F. 2d 446 ; Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F. 2d 671 ; Gill v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 209 Mo. App. 63 , 236 S.W. 1073 ; Dolese Bros. v. Tollett, 162 Okl. 158 , 19 P. 2d 570 ; Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1 , 132 S.E. 2d 18 ; Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 2d 337 ; 21 C. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co.
green
1 sentence1964Jones v. Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328 , 162 S.E. 741 ; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126 , 193 S.E. 286 ; Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419 , 67 S.E. 2d 448 ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 , 59 L. ed. 360; Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F. 2d 446 ; Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F. 2d 671 ; Gill v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 209 Mo. App. 63 , 236 S.W. 1073 ; Dolese Bros. v. Tollett, 162 Okl. 158 , 19 P. 2d 570 ; Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1 , 132 S.E. 2d 18 ; Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 2d 337 ; 21 C. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Dellinger v. Clark
green
2 sentences1964Jones v. Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328 , 162 S.E. 741 ; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126 , 193 S.E. 286 ; Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419 , 67 S.E. 2d 448 ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 , 59 L. ed. 360; Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F. 2d 446 ; Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F. 2d 671 ; Gill v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 209 Mo. App. 63 , 236 S.W. 1073 ; Dolese Bros. v. Tollett, 162 Okl. 158 , 19 P. 2d 570 ; Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1 , 132 S.E. 2d 18 ; Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 2d 337 ; 21 C. 1964Jones v. Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328 , 162 S.E. 741 ; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126 , 193 S.E. 286 ; Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419 , 67 S.E. 2d 448 ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 , 59 L. ed. 360; Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F. 2d 446 ; Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F. 2d 671 ; Gill v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 209 Mo. App. 63 , 236 S.W. 1073 ; Dolese Bros. v. Tollett, 162 Okl. 158 , 19 P. 2d 570 ; Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1 , 132 S.E. 2d 18 ; Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 2d 337 ; 21 C. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co.
green
2 sentences1964Jones v. Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328 , 162 S.E. 741 ; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126 , 193 S.E. 286 ; Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419 , 67 S.E. 2d 448 ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 , 59 L. ed. 360; Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F. 2d 446 ; Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F. 2d 671 ; Gill v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 209 Mo. App. 63 , 236 S.W. 1073 ; Dolese Bros. v. Tollett, 162 Okl. 158 , 19 P. 2d 570 ; Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1 , 132 S.E. 2d 18 ; Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 2d 337 ; 21 C. 1964Jones v. Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328 , 162 S.E. 741 ; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126 , 193 S.E. 286 ; Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419 , 67 S.E. 2d 448 ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 , 59 L. ed. 360; Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F. 2d 446 ; Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F. 2d 671 ; Gill v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 209 Mo. App. 63 , 236 S.W. 1073 ; Dolese Bros. v. Tollett, 162 Okl. 158 , 19 P. 2d 570 ; Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1 , 132 S.E. 2d 18 ; Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 2d 337 ; 21 C. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Irmgard M. Prack v. Sherman Weissinger
green
1 sentence1964Jones v. Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328 , 162 S.E. 741 ; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126 , 193 S.E. 286 ; Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419 , 67 S.E. 2d 448 ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 , 59 L. ed. 360; Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F. 2d 446 ; Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F. 2d 671 ; Gill v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 209 Mo. App. 63 , 236 S.W. 1073 ; Dolese Bros. v. Tollett, 162 Okl. 158 , 19 P. 2d 570 ; Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1 , 132 S.E. 2d 18 ; Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 2d 337 ; 21 C. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Jones v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1964Jones v. Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328 , 162 S.E. 741 ; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126 , 193 S.E. 286 ; Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419 , 67 S.E. 2d 448 ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 , 59 L. ed. 360; Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F. 2d 446 ; Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F. 2d 671 ; Gill v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 209 Mo. App. 63 , 236 S.W. 1073 ; Dolese Bros. v. Tollett, 162 Okl. 158 , 19 P. 2d 570 ; Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1 , 132 S.E. 2d 18 ; Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 2d 337 ; 21 C. 1964Jones v. Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328 , 162 S.E. 741 ; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126 , 193 S.E. 286 ; Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419 , 67 S.E. 2d 448 ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 , 59 L. ed. 360; Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F. 2d 446 ; Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F. 2d 671 ; Gill v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 209 Mo. App. 63 , 236 S.W. 1073 ; Dolese Bros. v. Tollett, 162 Okl. 158 , 19 P. 2d 570 ; Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1 , 132 S.E. 2d 18 ; Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 2d 337 ; 21 C. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Miller v. . Roberts
green
2 sentences1964Jones v. Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328 , 162 S.E. 741 ; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126 , 193 S.E. 286 ; Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419 , 67 S.E. 2d 448 ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 , 59 L. ed. 360; Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F. 2d 446 ; Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F. 2d 671 ; Gill v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 209 Mo. App. 63 , 236 S.W. 1073 ; Dolese Bros. v. Tollett, 162 Okl. 158 , 19 P. 2d 570 ; Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1 , 132 S.E. 2d 18 ; Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 2d 337 ; 21 C. 1964Jones v. Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328 , 162 S.E. 741 ; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126 , 193 S.E. 286 ; Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419 , 67 S.E. 2d 448 ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 , 59 L. ed. 360; Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F. 2d 446 ; Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F. 2d 671 ; Gill v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 209 Mo. App. 63 , 236 S.W. 1073 ; Dolese Bros. v. Tollett, 162 Okl. 158 , 19 P. 2d 570 ; Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1 , 132 S.E. 2d 18 ; Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 2d 337 ; 21 C. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co.
green
1 sentence1964Jones v. Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328 , 162 S.E. 741 ; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126 , 193 S.E. 286 ; Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419 , 67 S.E. 2d 448 ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 , 59 L. ed. 360; Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F. 2d 446 ; Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F. 2d 671 ; Gill v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 209 Mo. App. 63 , 236 S.W. 1073 ; Dolese Bros. v. Tollett, 162 Okl. 158 , 19 P. 2d 570 ; Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1 , 132 S.E. 2d 18 ; Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 2d 337 ; 21 C. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Dolese Bros. v. Tollett
neutral
2 sentences1964Jones v. Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328 , 162 S.E. 741 ; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126 , 193 S.E. 286 ; Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419 , 67 S.E. 2d 448 ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 , 59 L. ed. 360; Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F. 2d 446 ; Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F. 2d 671 ; Gill v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 209 Mo. App. 63 , 236 S.W. 1073 ; Dolese Bros. v. Tollett, 162 Okl. 158 , 19 P. 2d 570 ; Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1 , 132 S.E. 2d 18 ; Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 2d 337 ; 21 C. 1964Jones v. Oil Co., 202 N.C. 328 , 162 S.E. 741 ; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126 , 193 S.E. 286 ; Dellinger v. Clark, 234 N.C. 419 , 67 S.E. 2d 448 ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 , 59 L. ed. 360; Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F. 2d 446 ; Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F. 2d 671 ; Gill v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 209 Mo. App. 63 , 236 S.W. 1073 ; Dolese Bros. v. Tollett, 162 Okl. 158 , 19 P. 2d 570 ; Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1 , 132 S.E. 2d 18 ; Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 190 N.Y.S. 2d 337 ; 21 C. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
McKinney v. Deneen
green
2 sentences1952McKinney v. Deneen, 231 N.C. 540 , 58 S.E.2d 107 . 1952McKinney v. Deneen, 231 N.C. 540 , 58 S.E.2d 107 . | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Howard v. Durand green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Rivers v. Town of Wilson neutral | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Fitzgerald v. Concord. green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Lowdermilk v. . Butler green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Watkins v. City of Raleigh neutral | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Briscoe v. Henderson Lighting & Power Co. green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Gammon v. . Johnson neutral | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Orange County v. . Wilson green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Price v. . Slagle green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Jones v. . Williams green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Rexford v. . Phillips green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| West v. Coos County green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Mayo v. . Blount neutral | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Harper v. Anderson. neutral | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Harper v. Anderson. neutral | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Dill-Cramer-Truitt Corp. v. Jacksonville Lumber Co. green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.