sound rule in Illinois

2019DeHart v. DeHart, 2013 IL 114137, ¶ 20 , 986 N.E.2d 85 (defining the “natural objects of one’s bounty”).

2018DeHart v. DeHart , 2013 IL 114137 , ¶ 20, 369 Ill.Dec. 136 , 986 N.E.2d 85 (defining the "natural objects of one's bounty").

1958Co., 374 Ill. 136 , 28 N.E.2d 86 .’ This is a sound rule.

1958Co., 374 Ill. 136 , 28 N.E.2d 86 .’ This is a sound rule.

2025While the cases may not be binding precedent, they certainly are persuasive.” Brayboy, 2024 IL App (1st) 221846, ¶ 36 . ¶ 227 We agree with the sound analysis of our First District colleagues in Brayboy.

2025While the cases may not be binding precedent, they certainly are persuasive.” Brayboy, 2024 IL App (1st) 221846, ¶ 36 . ¶ 227 We agree with the sound analysis of our First District colleagues in Brayboy.

1980Ed. 2d 42 , 100 S. Ct. 64 ; People v. Gilbert (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 252, 258-59 , 369 N.E.2d 849 .) The record before us shows that the trial court expressly enumerated the properly recognized areas of mitigation and aggravation which he had considered.

1979Under these circumstances there is no reason to deviate from the sound presumption that the court in a bench trial relies only on proper evidence in reaching a determination on the merits (People v. Gilbert (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 252, 258-59 ; People v. Pelegri (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 568, 574-75 ; People v. Delno (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 159, 162 ).

1980In this type of situation, we are constrained to rely upon “the sound presumption that the court in a bench trial relies only on proper evidence in reaching a determination on the merits.” (People v. Berland (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 286, 310 , 385 N.E.2d 649 , cert. denied (1979),_U.S__, 62 L.

1980In this type of situation, we are constrained to rely upon “the sound presumption that the court in a bench trial relies only on proper evidence in reaching a determination on the merits.” (People v. Berland (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 286, 310 , 385 N.E.2d 649 , cert. denied (1979),_U.S__, 62 L.

1968(People v. Hood, 50 Cal App2d 197, 309 P2d 856 ; Gonzales v. People, 128 Colo 522, 264 P2d 508 .) We are of the opinion that these cases express a sound rule.

1960(People v. Hood, 50 Cal. App. 2d 197 , 309 P.2d 856 ; Gonzales v. People, 128 Colo. 522 , 264 P.2d 508 .) We are of the opinion that these cases express a sound rule.

1968(People v. Hood, 50 Cal App2d 197, 309 P2d 856 ; Gonzales v. People, 128 Colo 522, 264 P2d 508 .) We are of the opinion that these cases express a sound rule.

1960(People v. Hood, 50 Cal. App. 2d 197 , 309 P.2d 856 ; Gonzales v. People, 128 Colo. 522 , 264 P.2d 508 .) We are of the opinion that these cases express a sound rule.

2025People v. Little, 2021 IL App (1st) 181984 , ¶ 52 (generally, counsel’s choice of which defense theory to pursue is a matter of trial strategy). ¶ 78 b.

2012Id. ¶ 35 We find that there is no reason to depart from the sound analysis provided by the Brookbank court in this case.

2010We further note People v. Camp, 352 Ill.

1999Guel, 127 Ill.App.3d at 40 , 82 Ill.Dec. 264 , 468 N.E.2d at 814 .

1999Guel, 127 Ill.App.3d at 40 , 82 Ill.Dec. 264 , 468 N.E.2d at 814 .

1980Ed. 2d 42 , 100 S. Ct. 64 ; People v. Gilbert (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 252, 258-59 , 369 N.E.2d 849 .) The record before us shows that the trial court expressly enumerated the properly recognized areas of mitigation and aggravation which he had considered.

1980In this type of situation, we are constrained to rely upon “the sound presumption that the court in a bench trial relies only on proper evidence in reaching a determination on the merits.” (People v. Berland (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 286, 310 , 385 N.E.2d 649 , cert. denied (1979),_U.S__, 62 L.

1979Under these circumstances there is no reason to deviate from the sound presumption that the court in a bench trial relies only on proper evidence in reaching a determination on the merits (People v. Gilbert (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 252, 258-59 ; People v. Pelegri (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 568, 574-75 ; People v. Delno (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 159, 162 ).

1979Because of its disposition of the cause, the appellate court did not reach all the issues presented to it, but as noted in Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp. (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 69, 112-13 , “it has frequently been indicated that where this court acquires jurisdiction for any reason, it has jurisdiction to pass upon all questions, except those requiring a weighing of the evidence, proper to be passed upon and disposed of in the case.

1979Under these circumstances there is no reason to deviate from the sound presumption that the court in a bench trial relies only on proper evidence in reaching a determination on the merits (People v. Gilbert (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 252, 258-59 ; People v. Pelegri (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 568, 574-75 ; People v. Delno (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 159, 162 ).

1979App.3d 356 , 340 N.E.2d 68 .) A cause of action once adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be tried again in new proceedings, before the same or a different tribunal, except in a direct action to set aside the prior adjudication. ( People v. Kidd (1947), 398 Ill. 405 , 75 N.E.2d 851 ; Schoenbrod v. Rosenthal (1962), 36 Ill.

1979App.3d 356 , 340 N.E.2d 68 .) A cause of action once adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be tried again in new proceedings, before the same or a different tribunal, except in a direct action to set aside the prior adjudication. ( People v. Kidd (1947), 398 Ill. 405 , 75 N.E.2d 851 ; Schoenbrod v. Rosenthal (1962), 36 Ill.

1979App.3d 356 , 340 N.E.2d 68 .) A cause of action once adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be tried again in new proceedings, before the same or a different tribunal, except in a direct action to set aside the prior adjudication. ( People v. Kidd (1947), 398 Ill. 405 , 75 N.E.2d 851 ; Schoenbrod v. Rosenthal (1962), 36 Ill.

1979We see the threshold issue before us as whether the action filed in 1975 was barred by the principles of res judicata, and therefore properly dismissed on the defendant's motion. • 1 Res judicata is a doctrine of judicial origin; it reflects the sound requirement of public policy that litigation must cease after each party has had a full and fair opportunity to present all the pertinent facts. ( Johnson v. Johnson (1975), 34 Ill.

1979(Johnson v. Johnson (1975), 34 Ill.

1977App. 3d 488, 490 , we said: “The courts are mindful that stability in a child’s environment is a weighty factor [citation], and, in that concern, a sound principle of law has evolved: custody will not be altered unless there has been a change in circumstance which involves the child’s welfare. [Citations.] One of the factors to be considered in a change of custody action is the preference of the child involved [citation], although it has been repeatedly stated by the Illinois courts that the child’s preference for a change of custodial parent, without showing that the welfare of the child is a

1976(In re Sciara, 21 Ill.

1976While it is true that that court created a case-by-case approach in the application of the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine, it also accepted the sound principle that an appeal should be held moot only where there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will result. ( In re Sciara, 21 Ill.

1976City of Aurora v. Meyer, 38 Ill. 2d 131 , 230 N.E.2d 200 , cited by defendants, sets out a sound rule of law, but contrary to defendants’ contentions, the requirements of that rule have been fully met.

1976City of Aurora v. Meyer, 38 Ill. 2d 131 , 230 N.E.2d 200 , cited by defendants, sets out a sound rule of law, but contrary to defendants’ contentions, the requirements of that rule have been fully met.

1975The court stated what we deem to be the sound rule governing the applicability of discovery motions to the statute and the rule's rationale ( 13 Ill.

1975The court stated what we deem to be the sound rule governing the applicability of discovery motions to the statute and the rule’s rationale ( 13 Ill.App.3d 620, 630 ): “Motions for discoveiy may or may not require time to comply with them.

1974He adhered to his testimony in a prior case in which he had said “that as density increases the compatibility and relationship of dwelling units is lost; that the detriment increases in direct proportion to the density, and that density affects the number of people in an area, the traffic, the transportation, and all the public utilities provided within the city, such as sewer, water, electricity and gas.” (Lapkus Builders, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill.2d 304, 308 .) However, he attempted to explain that his statement in Lapkus was based on his examination of the proposed population density

1964Co. of New York, 405 Ill 599, 92 NE2d 103 , as follows: “Ambiguous provisions or equivocal expressions whereby an insurer seeks to limit its liability will be construed most strongly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.” This is a sound rule and recognizes the realities of the transaction, that is, that the provisions of an insurance policy are not the product of negotiations between insurer and insured, but are written by the insurer and submitted for acceptance without change.