sound principle in Nevada

1994For example, in Myers v. County of Orange, 86 Cal.Rptr. 198 (Ct.App. 1970), the trial court found that a one-year claims limitations statute on plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim had expired, even though the plaintiff had previously pursued an administrative remedy.

1972(See 87 Nev. 285 , 486 P.2d 493 ) The majority places undue weight upon facts brought before this Court for the first time by respondents at their requested rehearing.

1972(See 87 Nev. 285 , 486 P.2d 493 ) The majority places undue weight upon facts brought before this Court for the first time by respondents at their requested rehearing.

1970In In re Fay’s Estate, 78 P. 340 (Cal. 1904), it was stated: “An olographic will must be dated for the reason that the Legislature has said so, but we do not think it would be a sound rule to hold that any mistake or error in the date would invalidate the will.

1968It finds its support in the sound principle that when courts have announced, for the guidance and government of individuals and the public, certain controlling principles of law or have given a construction to statutes upon which individuals and the public have relied in making contracts, they ought not, after these principles have been promulgated and after these constructions have been published, to withdraw or overrule them, thereby disturbing contract rights that had been entered into and property rights that had been acquired upon the faith and credit that the principle announced or the c

1968It finds its support in the sound principle that when courts have announced, for the guidance and government of individuals and the public, certain controlling principles of law or have given a construction to statutes upon which individuals and the public have relied in making contracts, they ought not, after these principles have been promulgated and after these constructions have been published, to withdraw or overrule them, thereby disturbing contract rights that had been entered into and property rights that had been acquired upon the faith and credit that the principle announced or the c

1968It finds its support in the sound principle that when courts have announced, for the guidance and government of individuals and the public, certain controlling principles of law or have given a construction to statutes upon which individuals and the public have relied in making contracts, they ought not, after these principles have been promulgated and after these constructions have been published, to withdraw or overrule them, thereby disturbing contract rights that had been entered into and property rights that had been acquired upon the faith and credit that the principle announced or the c

1968It finds its support in the sound principle that when courts have announced, for the guidance and government of individuals and the public, certain controlling principles of law or have given a construction to statutes upon which individuals and the public have relied in making contracts, they ought not, after these principles have been promulgated and after these constructions have been published, to withdraw or overrule them, thereby disturbing contract rights that had been entered into and property rights that had been acquired upon the faith and credit that the principle announced or the c

1946It is a sound principle of law, which has been heretofore approved by this court (as stated on page 11 of respondent’s brief), that: “A person of sound mind and discretion may be presumed to intend all the natural, probable and usual consequences of his act; and when one person assaults another violently, with a deadly weapon, in a manner reasonably calculated to produce death, and the life of the party assaulted is actually destroyed in consequence of such assault, a jury is entitled to presume that death was intended, unless from a consideration of all the evidence, [they] entertain a reason

1946It is a sound principle of law, which has been heretofore approved by this court (as stated on page 11 of respondent’s brief), that: “A person of sound mind and discretion may be presumed to intend all the natural, probable and usual consequences of his act; and when one person assaults another violently, with a deadly weapon, in a manner reasonably calculated to produce death, and the life of the party assaulted is actually destroyed in consequence of such assault, a jury is entitled to presume that death was intended, unless from a consideration of all the evidence, [they] entertain a reason

1946It is a sound principle of law, which has been heretofore approved by this court (as stated on page 11 of respondent’s brief), that: “A person of sound mind and discretion may be presumed to intend all the natural, probable and usual consequences of his act; and when one person assaults another violently, with a deadly weapon, in a manner reasonably calculated to produce death, and the life of the party assaulted is actually destroyed in consequence of such assault, a jury is entitled to presume that death was intended, unless from a consideration of all the evidence, [they] entertain a reason

1946It is a sound principle of law, which has been heretofore approved by this court (as stated on page 11 of respondent’s brief), that: “A person of sound mind and discretion may be presumed to intend all the natural, probable and usual consequences of his act; and when one person assaults another violently, with a deadly weapon, in a manner reasonably calculated to produce death, and the life of the party assaulted is actually destroyed in consequence of such assault, a jury is entitled to presume that death was intended, unless from a consideration of all the evidence, [they] entertain a reason

1925The opinions of several other distinguished jurists are noticed, and the court says: `When it appears that the party proposed to be examined is not responsible for the costs of the suit, and has no interest in the subject in dispute, and is willing to be sworn, he is not within the operation of the general rule.'" In Paine v. Tilden, 20 Vt. 554 , the court said: "The mere objection, that the witness is a party to the record, when he has no interest in the event of the suit, or is called to testify against his interest, has been too often decided by this court to be of no force to be again brou