sound rule in Pennsylvania

2026In Witman, a panel of this Court concluded “that a sound exception to the warrant requirement must exist where a defendant has summoned police and set the tone for the initial investigation.” Witman, 750 A.2d at 335 .

2020In Witman, supra, this Court first addressed the issue of implied consent to search and held, after examining the law of our sister states,4 that “a sound exception to the warrant requirement must exist where a defendant has summoned police and set the tone for the initial investigation.” Id. at 335 .

1956It is a sound rule of construction that “A codicil should not be held to interfere with any of the specific provisions of a will, unless its language naturally and obviously produce such result, or the terms of the codicil expressly recognize the alteration” ’: Baugh’s Est., 288 Pa. 308, 311 , and cases there cited.” As was said in Conner’s Estate, 346 Pa. 271 , at page 273: “While this is a layman’s will in the handwriting of testatrix, and it is proper to explore the four corners of the will in the light of the circumstances under which it was written to discover her testamentary intent, we

1943It is a sound rule of construction that “A codicil should not be held to interfere with any of the. specific provisions of a will, unless its language naturally and obviously produce such result, or the terms of the codicil expressly recognize the alteration” ’: Baugh’s Est., 288 Pa. 308, 311 , and cases there cited.” See also, Chauncey’s Est., 335 Pa. 73, 76 , 5 A. 2d 795 .

2023In Falcone v. Branker, 135 N.J.Super. 137 , 342 A.2d 875 (1975), the Superior Court of New Jersey employed a sound analysis for determining when a scar constitutes permanent serious disfigurement for purposes of its statutory equivalent to the limited tort option of the MVFRL.

2023In Falcone v. Branker, 135 N.J.Super. 137 , 342 A.2d 875 (1975), the Superior Court of New Jersey employed a sound analysis for determining when a scar constitutes permanent serious disfigurement for purposes of its statutory equivalent to the limited tort option of the MVFRL.

2018See Chenot, supra ; Wagner, supra ; St.

2018See Chenot, supra; Wagner, supra; St.

2004They rest on the sound doctrine, expressed in Menges v. Dentler, [ 33 Pa. at 495 ] and repeated in Kay v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 65 Pa. 269 , that the law of the case at that time when it became complete is an inherent element in it; and, if changed or annulled, the law is annulled, justice denied, and the due course of law is violated.

2004They rest on the sound doctrine, expressed in Menges v. Dentler, [ 33 Pa. at 495 ] and repeated in Kay v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 65 Pa. 269 , that the law of the case at that time when it became complete is an inherent element in it; and, if changed or annulled, the law is annulled, justice denied, and the due course of law is violated.

2004They rest on the sound doctrine, expressed in Menges v. Dentler, [ 33 Pa. at 495 ] and repeated in Kay v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 65 Pa. 269 , that the law of the case at that time when it became complete is an inherent element in it; and, if changed or annulled, the law is annulled, justice denied, and the due course of law is violated.

2004They rest on the sound doctrine, expressed in Menges v. Dentler, [ 33 Pa. at 495 ] and repeated in Kay v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 65 Pa. 269 , that the law of the case at that time when it became complete is an inherent element in it; and, if changed or annulled, the law is annulled, justice denied, and the due course of law is violated.

1999Chapman v. Federal Power Comm., 345 U.S. 153 , 73 S.Ct. 609 , 97 L.Ed. 918 (1953), to be "a sound principle" for resolving whether a Pennsylvania governmental agency had statutory standing); William Penn Parking Garage v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 192 , 346 A.2d 269, 281 (1975) (citing federal cases to support Pennsylvania standing requirements); Dwyer v. Dilworth, 392 Pa. 123 , 127 n. 7, 139 A.2d 653 , 655 n. 7 (1958)(citing "case or controversy" requirement in Article III of U.S. Constitution to support Pennsylvania standing requirements). [11] The operative language in Article III st

1999Chapman v. Federal Power Comm., 345 U.S. 153 , 73 S.Ct. 609 , 97 L.Ed. 918 (1953), to be "a sound principle" for resolving whether a Pennsylvania governmental agency had statutory standing); William Penn Parking Garage v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 192 , 346 A.2d 269, 281 (1975) (citing federal cases to support Pennsylvania standing requirements); Dwyer v. Dilworth, 392 Pa. 123 , 127 n. 7, 139 A.2d 653 , 655 n. 7 (1958)(citing "case or controversy" requirement in Article III of U.S. Constitution to support Pennsylvania standing requirements). [11] The operative language in Article III st

1999Chapman v. Federal Power Comm., 345 U.S. 153 , 73 S.Ct. 609 , 97 L.Ed. 918 (1953), to be "a sound principle" for resolving whether a Pennsylvania governmental agency had statutory standing); William Penn Parking Garage v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 192 , 346 A.2d 269, 281 (1975) (citing federal cases to support Pennsylvania standing requirements); Dwyer v. Dilworth, 392 Pa. 123 , 127 n. 7, 139 A.2d 653 , 655 n. 7 (1958)(citing "case or controversy" requirement in Article III of U.S. Constitution to support Pennsylvania standing requirements). [11] The operative language in Article III st

1999Chapman v. Federal Power Comm., 345 U.S. 153 , 73 S.Ct. 609 , 97 L.Ed. 918 (1953), to be "a sound principle" for resolving whether a Pennsylvania governmental agency had statutory standing); William Penn Parking Garage v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 192 , 346 A.2d 269, 281 (1975) (citing federal cases to support Pennsylvania standing requirements); Dwyer v. Dilworth, 392 Pa. 123 , 127 n. 7, 139 A.2d 653 , 655 n. 7 (1958)(citing "case or controversy" requirement in Article III of U.S. Constitution to support Pennsylvania standing requirements). [11] The operative language in Article III st

1936The cases are legion, and from many courts, in which this sound rule of equity and common honesty has been enforced’......‘A corporation may not avail itself even of ultra vires as a defense where a contract has been entered into and executed in good faith by the other party and the corporation has received the benefit of the performance.’ ” If the defendant cannot avail itself of this defense, neither can the plaintiff as the rights of an attaching creditor cannot rise higher than those which defendant had against the garnishee, and the liability of the latter is measured by his responsibilit

1936The cases are legion, and from many courts, in which this sound rule of equity and common honesty has been enforced’......‘A corporation may not avail itself even of ultra vires as a defense where a contract has been entered into and executed in good faith by the other party and the corporation has received the benefit of the performance.’ ” If the defendant cannot avail itself of this defense, neither can the plaintiff as the rights of an attaching creditor cannot rise higher than those which defendant had against the garnishee, and the liability of the latter is measured by his responsibilit

1936The cases are legion, and from many courts, in which this sound rule of equity and common honesty has been enforced’......‘A corporation may not avail itself even of ultra vires as a defense where a contract has been entered into and executed in good faith by the other party and the corporation has received the benefit of the performance.’ ” If the defendant cannot avail itself of this defense, neither can the plaintiff as the rights of an attaching creditor cannot rise higher than those which defendant had against the garnishee, and the liability of the latter is measured by his responsibilit

1936The cases are legion, and from many courts, in which this sound rule of equity and common honesty has been enforced’......‘A corporation may not avail itself even of ultra vires as a defense where a contract has been entered into and executed in good faith by the other party and the corporation has received the benefit of the performance.’ ” If the defendant cannot avail itself of this defense, neither can the plaintiff as the rights of an attaching creditor cannot rise higher than those which defendant had against the garnishee, and the liability of the latter is measured by his responsibilit

1930In the case last cited Mr. Justice Elkin said, at page 183: “We think the sound rule is, especially as to acts which provide for the assessment and collection of annual taxes, that a statute repealing former laws on the same subject does not abolish all rights and remedies under the repealed acts, if the legislative intent not to abolish them appeared.” In Hickory Tree Road, 43 Pa. 139, 143 , Chief Justice Lowrie said: “And the distinction adopted by us, that proceedings fall on the repeal of the jurisdiction, and continue on the repeal or change of the remedy, appears often in our books as on

1909This view of the law finds ample support in Hickory Tree Road, 43 Pa. 139 ; Telegraph Company v. Com., 66 Pa. 70 , and Wright v. Oakley, 46 Mass. 400 .

2025See Buksa, supra; Rush, supra. We instruct the parties to attach a copy of Judge DeFino-Nastasi’s decision in the event of further proceedings.

2020See Conway, supra; Boyd, supra. Additionally, Appellant’s oral and written plea colloquies confirm Appellant’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.1 See Fluharty, supra. See also Moser, supra; Pollard, supra. Concerning Appellant’s claim that counsel “abandoned him” by refusing to file a petition to withdraw the guilty plea on Appellant’s behalf, the court considered Appellant’s pro se motion and denied it on the grounds asserted.

2020See Conway, supra; Boyd, supra. Additionally, Appellant’s oral and written plea colloquies confirm Appellant’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.1 See Fluharty, supra. See also Moser, supra; Pollard, supra. Concerning Appellant’s claim that counsel “abandoned him” by refusing to file a petition to withdraw the guilty plea on Appellant’s behalf, the court considered Appellant’s pro se motion and denied it on the grounds asserted.

2020See Conway, supra; Boyd, supra. Additionally, Appellant’s oral and written plea colloquies confirm Appellant’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.1 See Fluharty, supra. See also Moser, supra; Pollard, supra. Concerning Appellant’s claim that counsel “abandoned him” by refusing to file a petition to withdraw the guilty plea on Appellant’s behalf, the court considered Appellant’s pro se motion and denied it on the grounds asserted.

2020We find no error in the trial court’s sound analysis, and therefore, Appellants have not stated a claim for relief on this basis.3 See Kuznik, supra; Frank, supra. Having concluded the deed of easement expressly created a reservation of right for the grantors’, their heirs and assigns, and this reservation is not a personal right, but one appurtenant to the grantors’ property, we note there ____________________________________________ 3 We note Appellants make a claim in their brief that equity requires the grantors’ assigns and heirs be prohibited from using the easement for ingress, egress,