sound defense in Tennessee

1996Id.

1996Id.

1929For a long period of years, by courts and text-writers, it has been recognized as a sound rule that ‘a settled judicial construction put upon a statute has almost the same authority as the statute itself; although the courts have the power to overrule their decisions and change the construction, they will not do- so, except for a most urgent reason.’ Black on Interpretation of Law, section 142; Hammond v. Anderson, 4 Bos. & P., 69; King v. Younger, 5 Durn. & E., 449; King v. Inhabitants of Eccleston, 2 East, 299; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y., 50 ; Beck v. Brady, 7 La.

1903For a long period of years, by courts and text-writers, it has been recognized as a sound rule that “a settled judicial construction put upon a statute has almost the same authority as the statute itself although the courts have the power to overrule their decisions and change the construction, they will not do so except for a most urgent reason.” Black on Interpretation of Law, section 142; Hammond v. Anderson, 4 Bos. & P., 69; King v. Younger, 5 Durn. & E., 449; King v. Inhabitants of Eccleston, 2 East, 299; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y., 50 ;, Beck v. Brady, 7 La.

1929For a long period of years, by courts and text-writers, it has been recognized as a sound rule that ‘a settled judicial construction put upon a statute has almost the same authority as the statute itself; although the courts have the power to overrule their decisions and change the construction, they will not do- so, except for a most urgent reason.’ Black on Interpretation of Law, section 142; Hammond v. Anderson, 4 Bos. & P., 69; King v. Younger, 5 Durn. & E., 449; King v. Inhabitants of Eccleston, 2 East, 299; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y., 50 ; Beck v. Brady, 7 La.

1903For a long period of years, by courts and text-writers, it has been recognized as a sound rule that “a settled judicial construction put upon a statute has almost the same authority as the statute itself although the courts have the power to overrule their decisions and change the construction, they will not do so except for a most urgent reason.” Black on Interpretation of Law, section 142; Hammond v. Anderson, 4 Bos. & P., 69; King v. Younger, 5 Durn. & E., 449; King v. Inhabitants of Eccleston, 2 East, 299; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y., 50 ;, Beck v. Brady, 7 La.

1929Ann., 1 ; Seale v. Mitchell, 5 Cal., 401 . *194 “No sound reason has been assigned why there shonldi be a departure from a construction so long' adhered to; rather, in fact, the same reason exists for a rigid enforcement of this statute as was given by the court in Duncan v. McGee, supra, and that is, to bring- the cause to a speedy trial.

1903Ann., 1 ; Seale v. Mitchell, 5 Cal., 401 .

2021Co., 525 P.2d 88 , 92 (1974); Sturdy Concrete Corp. v. Nab Constr.

2016As this Court explained in Boyce v. LPP Mortgage Ltd., 435 S.W.3d 758 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013): The sound principle of stare decisis requires us to uphold our prior precedents to promote consistency in the law and to promote confidence in this Court‟s decisions.

2011The Carter Court quoted McClain wherein it was stated: “Requiring notice is a sound rule designed to allow the defaulting party to repair the defective work, to reduce the damages, to avoid additional defective performance, and to promote the informal settlement of disputes.” Carter, 916 S.W.2d at 935 (quoting McClain, 806 S.W.2d at 198 ).

1977Likewise in Wiley v. State, 64 Tenn. 662 (1875), a reversal was granted because of failure of the trial judge to charge that an acquittal should follow if proof of alibi raised a reasonable doubt of guilt.

1977This is a sound rule, and ought to be given to the jury in direct and unequivocal language.” 64 Tenn. at 612 .

1976Section 1346 (a)(1), which specifically authorizes repayment of a “penalty claimed to have been collected without authority . under the internal-revenue laws.” See, e. g., DeCecco v. United States, 485 F.2d 372 (1st Cir. 1973).

1976Section 1346 (a)(1), which specifically authorizes repayment of a "penalty claimed to have been collected without authority ... under the internal-revenue laws." See, e.g., DeCecco v. United States, 485 F.2d 372 (1st Cir.1973).

1969App. (1928), 5 S.W.2d 754, 756 , the court said: “ (1) To permit one to invoke the exercise of a jurisdiction within the general powers of a court and then to reverse its orders upon the ground that it had no jurisdiction would be to allow one to trifle with the courts.” In Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal.App.2d 657 , 161 P.2d 490 (1945) the court said: “ (2) The principle [opposing such action] is one of estoppel in the interest of a sound administration of the laws whereby the regularity or even validity of an act procured by one himself cannot be raised — not that the act is valid, for it may not

1969App. (1928), 5 S.W.2d 754, 756 , the court said: “ (1) To permit one to invoke the exercise of a jurisdiction within the general powers of a court and then to reverse its orders upon the ground that it had no jurisdiction would be to allow one to trifle with the courts.” In Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal.App.2d 657 , 161 P.2d 490 (1945) the court said: “ (2) The principle [opposing such action] is one of estoppel in the interest of a sound administration of the laws whereby the regularity or even validity of an act procured by one himself cannot be raised — not that the act is valid, for it may not

1969App. (1928), 5 S.W.2d 754, 756 , the court said: “ (1) To permit one to invoke the exercise of a jurisdiction within the general powers of a court and then to reverse its orders upon the ground that it had no jurisdiction would be to allow one to trifle with the courts.” In Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal.App.2d 657 , 161 P.2d 490 (1945) the court said: “ (2) The principle [opposing such action] is one of estoppel in the interest of a sound administration of the laws whereby the regularity or even validity of an act procured by one himself cannot be raised — not that the act is valid, for it may not

1964The only case we have found holding opposite to the position we have taken above is that of Skinner v. Hulsey, 103 Fla. 713 , 138 So. 769 .

1964The only case we have found holding opposite to the position we have taken above is that of Skinner v. Hulsey, 103 Fla. 713 , 138 So. 769 .

1964Under the sound principle found in Cantrell v. Burnett & Henderson Co., 187 Tenn. 552 , 216 S.W.2d 307 (1948) this verdict cannot stand.

1964Under the sound principle found in Cantrell v. Burnett & Henderson Co., 187 Tenn. 552 , 216 S.W.2d 307 (1948) this verdict cannot stand.

1963In Moore v. Johnson, 75 Tenn. 580 , it was said that the election of a widow to take under her husband’s will does not estop her from afterwards contesting it if the part received by her has not exceeded her distributive interest if the will be set aside.

1961This very sound principle though is subject to numerous exceptions, one of which is set forth in the Court of Appeals’ opinion in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Lebanon Bank & Trust Co., 28 Tenn.App. 618 , 192 S.W.2d 245 , and is the case upon which the Chancellor pitched his conclusion.

1961This very sound principle though is subject to numerous exceptions, one of which is set forth in the Court of Appeals’ opinion in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Lebanon Bank & Trust Co., 28 Tenn.App. 618 , 192 S.W.2d 245 , and is the case upon which the Chancellor pitched his conclusion.

1957Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 126 Ky. 536 , 104 S.W. 345 , 13 L.R.A.,N.S., 511, 15 Ann.Cas. 1226, and cases cited.” (Emphasis supplied.) People v. O’Farrell, 247 Ill. 44 , 93 N.E. 136, 140 .

1957Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 126 Ky. 536 , 104 S.W. 345 , 13 L.R.A.,N.S., 511, 15 Ann.Cas. 1226, and cases cited.” (Emphasis supplied.) People v. O’Farrell, 247 Ill. 44 , 93 N.E. 136, 140 .

1957Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 126 Ky. 536 , 104 S.W. 345 , 13 L.R.A.,N.S., 511, 15 Ann.Cas. 1226, and cases cited.” (Emphasis supplied.) People v. O’Farrell, 247 Ill. 44 , 93 N.E. 136, 140 .

1957Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 126 Ky. 536 , 104 S.W. 345 , 13 L.R.A.,N.S., 511, 15 Ann.Cas. 1226, and cases cited.” (Emphasis supplied.) People v. O’Farrell, 247 Ill. 44 , 93 N.E. 136, 140 .

1955Counsel for the relator relies principally upon the case of Lee Lim v. Davis, 75 Utah 245 , 284 P. 323 , 76 A. L.

1955Counsel for the relator relies principally upon the case of Lee Lim v. Davis, 75 Utah 245 , 284 P. 323 , 76 A. L.

1955We recognize, also, that, “a fact may be proved by circumstantial evi- deuce, and from the fact thus proved another fact may be inferred, without contravening the rule that an inference cannot he based upon an inference.” Nashville Gas & Heating Co. v. Phillips, 17 Tenn. App. 648 , 69 S. W. (2d) 914, 923 ; Adamant Stone & Roofing Co. v. Vaughn, 7 Tenn. App. 170 .

1955We recognize, also, that, “a fact may be proved by circumstantial evi- deuce, and from the fact thus proved another fact may be inferred, without contravening the rule that an inference cannot he based upon an inference.” Nashville Gas & Heating Co. v. Phillips, 17 Tenn. App. 648 , 69 S. W. (2d) 914, 923 ; Adamant Stone & Roofing Co. v. Vaughn, 7 Tenn. App. 170 .

1955There is a clear distinction between courts of law and courts of equity in this regard. “ ‘Nor do we intend to depart from the sound doctrine that sworn pleadings cannot he amended without explanation, and as a matter of course. “ ‘We simply hold that on this record, and under the facts disclosed, we cannot say that the chancellor abused his discretion in allowing the amendment.’ “Likewise, in the instant case, the question involved is that of abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment, and, after fully considering the case, we have concluded that there was no such abuse.” Carter v. Pickwic

1955There is a clear distinction between courts of law and courts of equity in this regard. “ ‘Nor do we intend to depart from the sound doctrine that sworn pleadings cannot he amended without explanation, and as a matter of course. “ ‘We simply hold that on this record, and under the facts disclosed, we cannot say that the chancellor abused his discretion in allowing the amendment.’ “Likewise, in the instant case, the question involved is that of abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment, and, after fully considering the case, we have concluded that there was no such abuse.” Carter v. Pickwic

1955We recognize, also, that, “a fact may be proved by circumstantial evi- deuce, and from the fact thus proved another fact may be inferred, without contravening the rule that an inference cannot he based upon an inference.” Nashville Gas & Heating Co. v. Phillips, 17 Tenn. App. 648 , 69 S. W. (2d) 914, 923 ; Adamant Stone & Roofing Co. v. Vaughn, 7 Tenn. App. 170 .