sound rule in Iowa

1986In the District Township of Boomer case, our court cited numerous cases from the English common law tradition supporting the sound rule it adopted: [WJhere the party against whom a cause of action existed in favor of another, by fraud or actual fraudulent concealment prevented such other from obtaining knowledge thereof, the statute would only commence to run from the time the right of action was discovered, or might, by the use of diligence, have been discovered. 40 Iowa at 603 .

1986In the District Township of Boomer case, our court cited numerous cases from the English common law tradition supporting the sound rule it adopted: [W]here the party against whom a cause of action existed in favor of another, by fraud or actual fraudulent concealment prevented such other from obtaining knowledge thereof, the statute would only commence to run from the time the right of action was discovered, or might, by the use of diligence, have been discovered. 40 Iowa at 603 .

1974Co. v. Fachman, 255 Iowa 989, 992 , 125 N.W.2d 210, 212 , we do not believe it would be a sound rule to hold that demurrer is the only method by which to raise the constitutionality of a statute in all situations.

1974Co. v. Fachman, 255 Iowa 989, 992 , 125 N.W.2d 210, 212 , we do not believe it would be a sound rule to hold that demurrer is the only method by which to raise the constitutionality of a statute in all situations.

1966Watson v. Clutts, 262 N. C. 153, 159 , 136 S.E.2d 617, 621 , states: “Difficulty arises in attempting to state any hard and fast rule as to the extent of the disclosure required.

1966Watson v. Clutts, 262 N. C. 153, 159 , 136 S.E.2d 617, 621 , states: “Difficulty arises in attempting to state any hard and fast rule as to the extent of the disclosure required.

1961A sound rule to follow in such matters was announced in Murphy v. Albany Pecan Development Co., 169 Iowa 542 , 151 N.W. 500 , cited by defendant, to the effect that the agent must act as he judges the interest of his employer would induce the latter to act if he were present. 8 Am.

1958It is ordinary care, not the highest degree of care, that is required." Hull v. Bishop-Stoddard Cafeteria, supra [ 238 Iowa 650 , 26 N.W.2d 451 ]: "The issue of plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence should have been submitted to the jury.

1958Bank, supra [ 192 Iowa 1250 , 184 N.W. 726 ]: "It is a sound rule of law that it is not contributory negligence not to look out for danger when there is no reason to apprehend any." Tucker v. Tolerton & Warfield Co., supra [ 86 N.W.2d 825 ]: "As defendant also admits the issue becomes one of law for the court only in the exceptional case where plaintiff's want of reasonable care is so manifest and flagrant as to convince all fair minds plaintiff did not exercise the caution for his own safety which marks the conduct of ordinarily prudent men.

1955“Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 , 52 S. Ct. 607, 609 , 76 L.

1955“Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 , 52 S. Ct. 607, 609 , 76 L.

1954While we have found no cases in Iowa on the exact occasion involving a city council, in the case of Children v. Shinn, supra, 168 Iowa 531, 549 , 150 N.W. 864 , 869, we held that the privilege of a member of the board of supervisors, which is also a subordinate legislative body, was a qualified privilege.

1948A few of these authorities are: State v. Konzen, 186 Iowa 1057 -1065, 171 N. W. 137 ; State v. La Vere, 194 Iowa 1373, 1381 , 191 N. W. 93 ; State v. Vance, 119 Iowa 685, 687 , 94 N. W. 204 ; State v. Brady, 100 Iowa 191, 195-197 , 69 N. W. 290 , 36 L.

1948A few of these authorities are: State v. Konzen, 186 Iowa 1057 -1065, 171 N. W. 137 ; State v. La Vere, 194 Iowa 1373, 1381 , 191 N. W. 93 ; State v. Vance, 119 Iowa 685, 687 , 94 N. W. 204 ; State v. Brady, 100 Iowa 191, 195-197 , 69 N. W. 290 , 36 L.

1948A few of these authorities are: State v. Konzen, 186 Iowa 1057 -1065, 171 N. W. 137 ; State v. La Vere, 194 Iowa 1373, 1381 , 191 N. W. 93 ; State v. Vance, 119 Iowa 685, 687 , 94 N. W. 204 ; State v. Brady, 100 Iowa 191, 195-197 , 69 N. W. 290 , 36 L.

1948A few of these authorities are: State v. Konzen, 186 Iowa 1057 -1065, 171 N. W. 137 ; State v. La Vere, 194 Iowa 1373, 1381 , 191 N. W. 93 ; State v. Vance, 119 Iowa 685, 687 , 94 N. W. 204 ; State v. Brady, 100 Iowa 191, 195-197 , 69 N. W. 290 , 36 L.

1948A few of these authorities are: State v. Konzen, 186 Iowa 1057 -1065, 171 N. W. 137 ; State v. La Vere, 194 Iowa 1373, 1381 , 191 N. W. 93 ; State v. Vance, 119 Iowa 685, 687 , 94 N. W. 204 ; State v. Brady, 100 Iowa 191, 195-197 , 69 N. W. 290 , 36 L.

1947Further therein the court said: “There is no rule by which failure to look out for or discover danger, when there is no reason to apprehend any, can rightfully be held contributory negligence, as a matter of law.” In support of such rule, see LaSell v. Tri-States Theatre Corp., 233 Iowa 929, 957 , 11 N. W. 2d 36 .

1947Further therein the court said: “There is no rule by which failure to look out for or discover danger, when there is no reason to apprehend any, can rightfully be held contributory negligence, as a matter of law.” In support of such rule, see LaSell v. Tri-States Theatre Corp., 233 Iowa 929, 957 , 11 N. W. 2d 36 .

1947Bk. v. Todd, 47 Conn. 190 , 219: “‘An estoppel was never intended to work a positive gain to a party, but its whole office is to protect him from a loss * * ” We think this sound doctrine.

1947Rep. 549 , as follows: “ It is a sound rule of law that it is not contributory negligence not to look out for danger when there is no reason to apprehend any.” In the case of Spiker v. City of Ottumwa, 193 Iowa 844, 849 , 186 N. W. 465 , 467, the rule above stated was approved.

1945I quote from the headnote [ 2 P. 2d 332 , headnote 2] that is accurate: “Provisions of court rule following substantially language theretofore used in repealed law are to be interpreted in same manner.” It is a sound rule of construction.

1944State v. Beebe, 66 Wash. 463 , 120 P. 122, 124,125 , and citations; McCabe v. State, 149 Ark. 585 , 233 S. W. 771 ; 3 Bishop’s New Criminal Procedure, Second Ed., 1230, sections 13(4), 14.

1944State v. Beebe, 66 Wash. 463 , 120 P. 122, 124,125 , and citations; McCabe v. State, 149 Ark. 585 , 233 S. W. 771 ; 3 Bishop’s New Criminal Procedure, Second Ed., 1230, sections 13(4), 14.

1942As Justice Grier of the United States Supreme Court said, almost a hundred years ago, in Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. 344, 349 ,- 15 L.

1942As Justice Grier of the United States Supreme Court said, almost a hundred years ago, in Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. 344, 349 ,- 15 L.

1942I am persuaded that the court, in the case of Mills Novelty Co. v. Farrell, 2 Cir., Conn., 64 F. 2d 476, 478 , announced a sound rule when it stated: “One may not suppose that a person desiring to gamble would put up money in the hope of obtaining tokens which can be used only to produce insignificant humorous sayings.

1939On the contrary, it is of the very essence of the claim itself. ’ ’ For later confirmation of this sound principle see In re Estate of Palmer, 212 Iowa 21 , 236 N. W. 58 ; First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Terbell, 217 Iowa 624 , 252 N. W. 769 ; Bates v. Remley, 223 Iowa 654 , 273 N. W. 180 .

1939On the contrary, it is of the very essence of the claim itself. ’ ’ For later confirmation of this sound principle see In re Estate of Palmer, 212 Iowa 21 , 236 N. W. 58 ; First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Terbell, 217 Iowa 624 , 252 N. W. 769 ; Bates v. Remley, 223 Iowa 654 , 273 N. W. 180 .

1939On the contrary, it is of the very essence of the claim itself. ’ ’ For later confirmation of this sound principle see In re Estate of Palmer, 212 Iowa 21 , 236 N. W. 58 ; First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Terbell, 217 Iowa 624 , 252 N. W. 769 ; Bates v. Remley, 223 Iowa 654 , 273 N. W. 180 .

1939On the contrary, it is of the very essence of the claim itself. ’ ’ For later confirmation of this sound principle see In re Estate of Palmer, 212 Iowa 21 , 236 N. W. 58 ; First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Terbell, 217 Iowa 624 , 252 N. W. 769 ; Bates v. Remley, 223 Iowa 654 , 273 N. W. 180 .

1939On the contrary, it is of the very essence of the claim itself. ’ ’ For later confirmation of this sound principle see In re Estate of Palmer, 212 Iowa 21 , 236 N. W. 58 ; First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Terbell, 217 Iowa 624 , 252 N. W. 769 ; Bates v. Remley, 223 Iowa 654 , 273 N. W. 180 .

1939On the contrary, it is of the very essence of the claim itself. ’ ’ For later confirmation of this sound principle see In re Estate of Palmer, 212 Iowa 21 , 236 N. W. 58 ; First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Terbell, 217 Iowa 624 , 252 N. W. 769 ; Bates v. Remley, 223 Iowa 654 , 273 N. W. 180 .

1921“It is a sound rule of law that it is not contributory negligence not to look out for danger when there is no reason to apprehend any.” Engel v. Smith, 82 Mich. 1 ( 46 N. W. 21 ).

1921“It is a sound rule of law that it is not contributory negligence not to look out for danger when there is no reason to apprehend any.” Engel v. Smith, 82 Mich. 1 ( 46 N. W. 21 ).

1907This is sound doctrine when applied to the owners abutting on the highway as appears from Buch v. Flanders, 119 Iowa, 164 , and Klinlcefus v. Vanmeter, 122 Iowa, 412 .