sound rule in Oklahoma

1997The five (5) representatives shall be selected at a meeting of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the industrial customers of the Grand River Dam Authority. 82 O.S. 1991 , § 863[ 82-863 ] (A). ¶ 2 You have asked this office to determine whether the above-highlighted language limits nominating committee membership to cooperatives located within the State of Oklahoma which directly or indirectly receive power from the Authority or alternatively, if the language is intended to include any rural electric cooperative regardless of the source from which it receives its power and regardless of its location

1995Davis v. State, 300 P.2d 1000 (Okla.Crim. 1956).

1986The Court applied the test formulated in Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 462 , 63 N.E. 1068 -69 (1902): has the settlor in good faith divested himself of ownership in the property or has an illusory transfer been made?

1986The Court applied the test formulated in Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 462 , 63 N.E. 1068 -69 (1902): has the settlor in good faith divested himself of ownership in the property or has an illusory transfer been made?

1986The Court applied the test formulated in Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 462 , 63 N.E. 1068 -69 (1902): has the settlor in good faith divested himself of ownership in the property or has an illusory transfer been made?

1986The Court applied the test formulated in Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 462 , 63 N.E. 1068 -69 (1902): has the settlor in good faith divested himself of ownership in the property or has an illusory transfer been made?

1961I think that Union National Bank of Lowell v. Nesmith et al., 238 Mass. 247 , 130 N.E. 251 , lays down the sound rule of law to follow in the case at bar.

1961I think that Union National Bank of Lowell v. Nesmith et al., 238 Mass. 247 , 130 N.E. 251 , lays down the sound rule of law to follow in the case at bar.

1961The majority opinion cites Rothschild et al. v. Wolf et al., 20 Cal.2d 17 , 123 P.2d 483 , 154 A.L.R. 75 , as sustaining its position.

1961The majority opinion cites Rothschild et al. v. Wolf et al., 20 Cal.2d 17 , 123 P.2d 483 , 154 A.L.R. 75 , as sustaining its position.

1959The latter is true, although the state may own the stock or property of such a corporation, for by engaging in business operations through a corporation the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits against the corporation. * * * ” In Bank of United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. 904 , 6 L.Ed. 244 , as early as 1824, Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering an opinion on “sovereign immunity,” said: “It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as conce

1959The latter is true, although the state may own the stock or property of such a corporation, for by engaging in business operations through a corporation the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits against the corporation. * * * ” In Bank of United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. 904 , 6 L.Ed. 244 , as early as 1824, Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering an opinion on “sovereign immunity,” said: “It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as conce

1951In Moody v. Wagner, 167 Okla. 99 , 23 P. 2d 633 , in the fourth paragraph of the syllabus said the court: “A tenant in common, producing oil and gas from the common property, is liable to account to his cotenants ■for their proportionate share of the market value of the oil and gas produced, less the reasonable and necessary costs of developing, extracting and marketing the same.” Under this sound rule the defendant may recover his expenditures in development of the lease in equal amount as if vested with the whole leasehold estate.

1951In Moody v. Wagner, 167 Okla. 99 , 23 P. 2d 633 , in the fourth paragraph of the syllabus said the court: “A tenant in common, producing oil and gas from the common property, is liable to account to his cotenants ■for their proportionate share of the market value of the oil and gas produced, less the reasonable and necessary costs of developing, extracting and marketing the same.” Under this sound rule the defendant may recover his expenditures in development of the lease in equal amount as if vested with the whole leasehold estate.

1948If such fact existed, — if the defendant did, in fact, during the disputed time, have a fixed, permanent residence within the territory, — that fact was peculiarly within his knowledge, and would be easily susceptible of proof by him; and we think it would be a sound rule only which would require him to make such proof.” In Rea v. State, supra [ 3 Okla.

1948Cr. 281 , 105 P. 386 ], this court held: “The statute of limitations does not negative a single element of the crime with which a defendant may be charged.

1947Wyatt v. C. & P. Telephone Co., 158 Va. 470 , 163 S. E. 370 , 82 A.L.R. 386 ; St.

1947Wyatt v. C. & P. Telephone Co., 158 Va. 470 , 163 S. E. 370 , 82 A.L.R. 386 ; St.

1947Ward v. U. S. (Okla.) 139 F. 2d 79 .

1947Ward v. U.S. (Okla.) 139 F.2d 79 .

1938Felt v. Schaub (1928) 134 Okla. 193 , 272 P. 830 ; Treese v. Ferguson, supra; Cheney v. Cox (1927) 125 Okla. 108 , 256 P. 755 ; Eldridge v. Robertson (1907) 19 Okla. 165 , 92 P. 156 ; Kramer v. Smith (1909) 23 Okla. 381 , 100 P. 532 ; Turman v. Ingram (1921) 83 Okla. 198 , 202 P. 993 ; Dixon v. Bowlegs (1923) 93 Okla. 47 , 219 P. 665 ; Cochran v. Sullivan, supra; Price v. Mahoney (1935) 175 Okla. 355 , 53 P.2d 257 ; Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) secs. 1478, 1550, 1551; 61 C.

1938Felt v. Schaub (1928) 134 Okla. 193 , 272 P. 830 ; Treese v. Ferguson, supra; Cheney v. Cox (1927) 125 Okla. 108 , 256 P. 755 ; Eldridge v. Robertson (1907) 19 Okla. 165 , 92 P. 156 ; Kramer v. Smith (1909) 23 Okla. 381 , 100 P. 532 ; Turman v. Ingram (1921) 83 Okla. 198 , 202 P. 993 ; Dixon v. Bowlegs (1923) 93 Okla. 47 , 219 P. 665 ; Cochran v. Sullivan, supra; Price v. Mahoney (1935) 175 Okla. 355 , 53 P.2d 257 ; Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) secs. 1478, 1550, 1551; 61 C.

1938Felt v. Schaub (1928) 134 Okla. 193 , 272 P. 830 ; Treese v. Ferguson, supra; Cheney v. Cox (1927) 125 Okla. 108 , 256 P. 755 ; Eldridge v. Robertson (1907) 19 Okla. 165 , 92 P. 156 ; Kramer v. Smith (1909) 23 Okla. 381 , 100 P. 532 ; Turman v. Ingram (1921) 83 Okla. 198 , 202 P. 993 ; Dixon v. Bowlegs (1923) 93 Okla. 47 , 219 P. 665 ; Cochran v. Sullivan, supra; Price v. Mahoney (1935) 175 Okla. 355 , 53 P.2d 257 ; Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) secs. 1478, 1550, 1551; 61 C.

1938Felt v. Schaub (1928) 134 Okla. 193 , 272 P. 830 ; Treese v. Ferguson, supra; Cheney v. Cox (1927) 125 Okla. 108 , 256 P. 755 ; Eldridge v. Robertson (1907) 19 Okla. 165 , 92 P. 156 ; Kramer v. Smith (1909) 23 Okla. 381 , 100 P. 532 ; Turman v. Ingram (1921) 83 Okla. 198 , 202 P. 993 ; Dixon v. Bowlegs (1923) 93 Okla. 47 , 219 P. 665 ; Cochran v. Sullivan, supra; Price v. Mahoney (1935) 175 Okla. 355 , 53 P.2d 257 ; Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) secs. 1478, 1550, 1551; 61 C.

1938Felt v. Schaub (1928) 134 Okla. 193 , 272 P. 830 ; Treese v. Ferguson, supra; Cheney v. Cox (1927) 125 Okla. 108 , 256 P. 755 ; Eldridge v. Robertson (1907) 19 Okla. 165 , 92 P. 156 ; Kramer v. Smith (1909) 23 Okla. 381 , 100 P. 532 ; Turman v. Ingram (1921) 83 Okla. 198 , 202 P. 993 ; Dixon v. Bowlegs (1923) 93 Okla. 47 , 219 P. 665 ; Cochran v. Sullivan, supra; Price v. Mahoney (1935) 175 Okla. 355 , 53 P.2d 257 ; Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) secs. 1478, 1550, 1551; 61 C.

1938Felt v. Schaub (1928) 134 Okla. 193 , 272 P. 830 ; Treese v. Ferguson, supra; Cheney v. Cox (1927) 125 Okla. 108 , 256 P. 755 ; Eldridge v. Robertson (1907) 19 Okla. 165 , 92 P. 156 ; Kramer v. Smith (1909) 23 Okla. 381 , 100 P. 532 ; Turman v. Ingram (1921) 83 Okla. 198 , 202 P. 993 ; Dixon v. Bowlegs (1923) 93 Okla. 47 , 219 P. 665 ; Cochran v. Sullivan, supra; Price v. Mahoney (1935) 175 Okla. 355 , 53 P.2d 257 ; Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) secs. 1478, 1550, 1551; 61 C.

1938Felt v. Schaub (1928) 134 Okla. 193 , 272 P. 830 ; Treese v. Ferguson, supra; Cheney v. Cox (1927) 125 Okla. 108 , 256 P. 755 ; Eldridge v. Robertson (1907) 19 Okla. 165 , 92 P. 156 ; Kramer v. Smith (1909) 23 Okla. 381 , 100 P. 532 ; Turman v. Ingram (1921) 83 Okla. 198 , 202 P. 993 ; Dixon v. Bowlegs (1923) 93 Okla. 47 , 219 P. 665 ; Cochran v. Sullivan, supra; Price v. Mahoney (1935) 175 Okla. 355 , 53 P.2d 257 ; Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) secs. 1478, 1550, 1551; 61 C.

1938Felt v. Schaub (1928) 134 Okla. 193 , 272 P. 830 ; Treese v. Ferguson, supra; Cheney v. Cox (1927) 125 Okla. 108 , 256 P. 755 ; Eldridge v. Robertson (1907) 19 Okla. 165 , 92 P. 156 ; Kramer v. Smith (1909) 23 Okla. 381 , 100 P. 532 ; Turman v. Ingram (1921) 83 Okla. 198 , 202 P. 993 ; Dixon v. Bowlegs (1923) 93 Okla. 47 , 219 P. 665 ; Cochran v. Sullivan, supra; Price v. Mahoney (1935) 175 Okla. 355 , 53 P.2d 257 ; Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) secs. 1478, 1550, 1551; 61 C.

1938Felt v. Schaub (1928) 134 Okla. 193 , 272 P. 830 ; Treese v. Ferguson, supra; Cheney v. Cox (1927) 125 Okla. 108 , 256 P. 755 ; Eldridge v. Robertson (1907) 19 Okla. 165 , 92 P. 156 ; Kramer v. Smith (1909) 23 Okla. 381 , 100 P. 532 ; Turman v. Ingram (1921) 83 Okla. 198 , 202 P. 993 ; Dixon v. Bowlegs (1923) 93 Okla. 47 , 219 P. 665 ; Cochran v. Sullivan, supra; Price v. Mahoney (1935) 175 Okla. 355 , 53 P.2d 257 ; Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) secs. 1478, 1550, 1551; 61 C.

1938Felt v. Schaub (1928) 134 Okla. 193 , 272 P. 830 ; Treese v. Ferguson, supra; Cheney v. Cox (1927) 125 Okla. 108 , 256 P. 755 ; Eldridge v. Robertson (1907) 19 Okla. 165 , 92 P. 156 ; Kramer v. Smith (1909) 23 Okla. 381 , 100 P. 532 ; Turman v. Ingram (1921) 83 Okla. 198 , 202 P. 993 ; Dixon v. Bowlegs (1923) 93 Okla. 47 , 219 P. 665 ; Cochran v. Sullivan, supra; Price v. Mahoney (1935) 175 Okla. 355 , 53 P.2d 257 ; Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) secs. 1478, 1550, 1551; 61 C.

1938Felt v. Schaub (1928) 134 Okla. 193 , 272 P. 830 ; Treese v. Ferguson, supra; Cheney v. Cox (1927) 125 Okla. 108 , 256 P. 755 ; Eldridge v. Robertson (1907) 19 Okla. 165 , 92 P. 156 ; Kramer v. Smith (1909) 23 Okla. 381 , 100 P. 532 ; Turman v. Ingram (1921) 83 Okla. 198 , 202 P. 993 ; Dixon v. Bowlegs (1923) 93 Okla. 47 , 219 P. 665 ; Cochran v. Sullivan, supra; Price v. Mahoney (1935) 175 Okla. 355 , 53 P.2d 257 ; Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) secs. 1478, 1550, 1551; 61 C.

1938Felt v. Schaub (1928) 134 Okla. 193 , 272 P. 830 ; Treese v. Ferguson, supra; Cheney v. Cox (1927) 125 Okla. 108 , 256 P. 755 ; Eldridge v. Robertson (1907) 19 Okla. 165 , 92 P. 156 ; Kramer v. Smith (1909) 23 Okla. 381 , 100 P. 532 ; Turman v. Ingram (1921) 83 Okla. 198 , 202 P. 993 ; Dixon v. Bowlegs (1923) 93 Okla. 47 , 219 P. 665 ; Cochran v. Sullivan, supra; Price v. Mahoney (1935) 175 Okla. 355 , 53 P.2d 257 ; Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) secs. 1478, 1550, 1551; 61 C.

1938Felt v. Schaub (1928) 134 Okla. 193 , 272 P. 830 ; Treese v. Ferguson, supra; Cheney v. Cox (1927) 125 Okla. 108 , 256 P. 755 ; Eldridge v. Robertson (1907) 19 Okla. 165 , 92 P. 156 ; Kramer v. Smith (1909) 23 Okla. 381 , 100 P. 532 ; Turman v. Ingram (1921) 83 Okla. 198 , 202 P. 993 ; Dixon v. Bowlegs (1923) 93 Okla. 47 , 219 P. 665 ; Cochran v. Sullivan, supra; Price v. Mahoney (1935) 175 Okla. 355 , 53 P.2d 257 ; Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) secs. 1478, 1550, 1551; 61 C.

1938Felt v. Schaub (1928) 134 Okla. 193 , 272 P. 830 ; Treese v. Ferguson, supra; Cheney v. Cox (1927) 125 Okla. 108 , 256 P. 755 ; Eldridge v. Robertson (1907) 19 Okla. 165 , 92 P. 156 ; Kramer v. Smith (1909) 23 Okla. 381 , 100 P. 532 ; Turman v. Ingram (1921) 83 Okla. 198 , 202 P. 993 ; Dixon v. Bowlegs (1923) 93 Okla. 47 , 219 P. 665 ; Cochran v. Sullivan, supra; Price v. Mahoney (1935) 175 Okla. 355 , 53 P.2d 257 ; Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) secs. 1478, 1550, 1551; 61 C.

1936It is true, that by reason of their dif *560 ferences of fact no one case becomes an exact precedent for another, yet a uniform principle pervades them all.” The remark contained in U. S. v. Beebee, 17 Fed. 36 , exactly fits this case: “In my judgment, the doctrine that a couft of equity will not entertain a claim so stale as to be not capable of satisfactory proof, must stand as one applicable alike to all suitors; it rests not upon any statute of limitations, nor upon any doctrine of laches alone, although the fact of laches may always appear; it rests rather upqn the sound rule that no cour

1936It is true, that by reason of their dif *560 ferences of fact no one case becomes an exact precedent for another, yet a uniform principle pervades them all.” The remark contained in U. S. v. Beebee, 17 Fed. 36 , exactly fits this case: “In my judgment, the doctrine that a couft of equity will not entertain a claim so stale as to be not capable of satisfactory proof, must stand as one applicable alike to all suitors; it rests not upon any statute of limitations, nor upon any doctrine of laches alone, although the fact of laches may always appear; it rests rather upqn the sound rule that no cour

1936It is true, that by reason of their dif *560 ferences of fact no one case becomes an exact precedent for another, yet a uniform principle pervades them all.” The remark contained in U. S. v. Beebee, 17 Fed. 36 , exactly fits this case: “In my judgment, the doctrine that a couft of equity will not entertain a claim so stale as to be not capable of satisfactory proof, must stand as one applicable alike to all suitors; it rests not upon any statute of limitations, nor upon any doctrine of laches alone, although the fact of laches may always appear; it rests rather upqn the sound rule that no cour

1935It is a sound rule of law that a marriage, when shown to exist, is presumed to be> legal, and the btirden is on the party attacking it to prove otherwise, but, as stated by Justice Cochran in the case of Madison v. Steckleberg, 101 Okla. 237 , 224 P. 961 ; "The effect of this presumption is to place the burden of proof upon the opposite side to introduce some evidence in regard to the fact of the removal of the obstacle.

1935It is a sound rule of law that a marriage, when shown to exist, is presumed to be> legal, and the btirden is on the party attacking it to prove otherwise, but, as stated by Justice Cochran in the case of Madison v. Steckleberg, 101 Okla. 237 , 224 P. 961 ; "The effect of this presumption is to place the burden of proof upon the opposite side to introduce some evidence in regard to the fact of the removal of the obstacle.

1932Ellis v. State, 8 Okla.

1927In the opinion of the Young Case it is said: “It follows as a sound rule of statutory construction that, when a statute enacted by Congress is literally adopted by the Legislature of this state, the judicial construction already placed u,pon it by the Supreme Court of the United States accompanies the statute, and is to be treated as incorporated therein, unless such construction would be in derogation of some general law.” In the case of Burtner v. State, 20 Okla.

1927Cr. 469 , 204 P. 135 , it is held that: “A conspiracy to defraud the state, as defined by statute (chapter 260, Sess.

1923Justice Dunn, in the case of Oapps v. Hensley, 23 Okla. 311 , 100 Pac. 515 , made a distinction between the words “ratify” and “adopt,” saying that, though they have been used «synonymously in an indiscriminate manner, they are really not synonymous.

1923Justice Dunn, in the case of Oapps v. Hensley, 23 Okla. 311 , 100 Pac. 515 , made a distinction between the words “ratify” and “adopt,” saying that, though they have been used «synonymously in an indiscriminate manner, they are really not synonymous.

1921Co., 73 N.Y. 452 , holding that a breach of a condition in a policy of insurance by placing incumbrances on buildings did not avoid the policy as to chattels in the buildings which were separately valued, the court in its reasoning points out the considerations which are determinative as to the divisibility of insurance contracts. 'There is nothing to show that an Incumbrance upon the buildings would have been an objection to a risk on the chattel property, or that the opportunity of insuring on the buildings was the inducement to taking a risk also on the chattels.

1920The case of People v. Cowan, 1 Cal. App. 411 , 82 Pac. 339 , appears to be directly in point on this question in *316 which it was held by the Court of Appeals of California that— “The membership of a witness in the same labor union as the party for whom he is testifying may be shown to affect his credibility.” While the exact question has never been passed upon by this court, it has been held that upon cross-examination, a witness may be asked any question which would tend to test his bias, prejudice,' or interest' in the case.

1920The case of People v. Cowan, 1 Cal. App. 411 , 82 Pac. 339 , appears to be directly in point on this question in *316 which it was held by the Court of Appeals of California that— “The membership of a witness in the same labor union as the party for whom he is testifying may be shown to affect his credibility.” While the exact question has never been passed upon by this court, it has been held that upon cross-examination, a witness may be asked any question which would tend to test his bias, prejudice,' or interest' in the case.

1920We reaffirm the doctrine of Edwards v. Smith, 42 Okla. 544 , holding that "a judgment is not void in the legal sense for want of jurisdiction, unless its invalidity and want of jurisdiction appear on the record; it is voidable merely." This is a sound doctrine, well supported by the text-writers and adjudicated cases.

1919It is aptly stated and the sound rule is laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 128 , 3 L.

1919It is aptly stated and the sound rule is laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 128 , 3 L.

1919The plaintiff in error cites and relies upon the case of Wilson v. Wood, 10 Okla. 279 , 61 Pac. 1045 , but this was a case where an individual had purchased the tax certificate and the money was paid into the county treasurer, and under those conditions the court held that the land was not delinquent for the reason that the taxes had been paid. *192 The purchaser of a certificate had a lien upon the land, and after two years from the date of the certificate, upon giving notice to the owner of the land and the party in possession, if he failed to redeem the same the purchaser could receive a ta

1919The plaintiff in error cites and relies upon the case of Wilson v. Wood, 10 Okla. 279 , 61 Pac. 1045 , but this was a case where an individual had purchased the tax certificate and the money was paid into the county treasurer, and under those conditions the court held that the land was not delinquent for the reason that the taxes had been paid. *192 The purchaser of a certificate had a lien upon the land, and after two years from the date of the certificate, upon giving notice to the owner of the land and the party in possession, if he failed to redeem the same the purchaser could receive a ta