sound rule in Connecticut

1994We disagree with the defendant’s assertion that “McPhail renders the duty to disclose Brady material prior to the [probable cause hearing] a hollow shell ...” and that the McPhail standar ds are irreconcilable with the recognition that “appellate review of the determination of probable cause is essential to fulfilling the purpose of amendment seventeen [article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution].” State v. Mitchell, 200 Conn. 323, 331 , 512 A.2d 140 (1986).

1994We disagree with the defendant’s assertion that “McPhail renders the duty to disclose Brady material prior to the [probable cause hearing] a hollow shell ...” and that the McPhail standar ds are irreconcilable with the recognition that “appellate review of the determination of probable cause is essential to fulfilling the purpose of amendment seventeen [article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution].” State v. Mitchell, 200 Conn. 323, 331 , 512 A.2d 140 (1986).

1988The court stated that “there is . . . the sound principle, based upon the assumption that one may not be held civilly or criminally liable for violating an invalid ordinance, that a proceeding for the violation of a municipal regulation is subject to any defense which will exonerate the defendant from liability, including a defense of the invalidity of the ordinance.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 260 .

1988The rule is that “[s]o long as local authorities institute an action, a defendant should be entitled to defend on the ground of the invalidity of the ordinance and to have the issue determined.” Id.

1975McNish v. American Brass Co., 139 Conn. 44, 53 .

1963Gilman’s Appeal, 115 Conn. 724, 725 , 161 A. 845 ; Livingston’s Appeal, 63 Conn. 68, 75, 26 A. 470 .

1963Gilman’s Appeal, 115 Conn. 724, 725 , 161 A. 845 ; Livingston’s Appeal, 63 Conn. 68, 75, 26 A. 470 .

1954Middlesex Theatre, Inc. v. Hickey, 128 Conn. 20, 23 , 20 A.2d 412 .

1954Middlesex Theatre, Inc. v. Hickey, 128 Conn. 20, 23 , 20 A.2d 412 .

1953Fanning v. Main, 77 Conn. 94, 99 , 58 A. 472 ; Hull v. Hull, 101 Conn. 481, 486 , 126 A. 699 ; Peyton v. Wehrhane, 125 Conn. 420, 426 , 6 A.2d 313 .

1953Fanning v. Main, 77 Conn. 94, 99 , 58 A. 472 ; Hull v. Hull, 101 Conn. 481, 486 , 126 A. 699 ; Peyton v. Wehrhane, 125 Conn. 420, 426 , 6 A.2d 313 .

1953Fanning v. Main, 77 Conn. 94, 99 , 58 A. 472 ; Hull v. Hull, 101 Conn. 481, 486 , 126 A. 699 ; Peyton v. Wehrhane, 125 Conn. 420, 426 , 6 A.2d 313 .

1953Fanning v. Main, 77 Conn. 94, 99 , 58 A. 472 ; Hull v. Hull, 101 Conn. 481, 486 , 126 A. 699 ; Peyton v. Wehrhane, 125 Conn. 420, 426 , 6 A.2d 313 .

1953Fanning v. Main, 77 Conn. 94, 99 , 58 A. 472 ; Hull v. Hull, 101 Conn. 481, 486 , 126 A. 699 ; Peyton v. Wehrhane, 125 Conn. 420, 426 , 6 A.2d 313 .

1953Fanning v. Main, 77 Conn. 94, 99 , 58 A. 472 ; Hull v. Hull, 101 Conn. 481, 486 , 126 A. 699 ; Peyton v. Wehrhane, 125 Conn. 420, 426 , 6 A.2d 313 .

1946In Gaskell v. Viquesny, 122 Ind. 244 , 23 N. E. 791 , *146 a junior mortgagee was omitted from a foreclosure proceeding as in the present case, and the above rule was applied, with the result that in an action he brought to redeem from a prior mortgagee he was denied the right to an accounting of the profits.

1946In Gaskell v. Viquesny, 122 Ind. 244 , 23 N. E. 791 , *146 a junior mortgagee was omitted from a foreclosure proceeding as in the present case, and the above rule was applied, with the result that in an action he brought to redeem from a prior mortgagee he was denied the right to an accounting of the profits.

1933This is the sound principle which underlies such cases as that of Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249 , 161 Atl. 385 , where a grocer was so held in selling corned beef tó a person to be used for food, even though the beef was in a sealed can when sold.

1933This is the sound principle which underlies such cases as that of Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249 , 161 Atl. 385 , where a grocer was so held in selling corned beef tó a person to be used for food, even though the beef was in a sealed can when sold.

1928Pease v. Cornell, 84 Conn. 391, 393, 396-400 , 80 Atl. 86 ; Allen v. Almy, 87 Conn. 517, 518, 522 , 89 Atl. 205 ; Hoadley v. Beardsley, 89 Conn. 270, 277 , 93 Atl. 535 ; Bristol v. Ontario Orphan Asylum, 60 Conn. 472, 476 , 22 Atl. 848 .

1928Pease v. Cornell, 84 Conn. 391, 393, 396-400 , 80 Atl. 86 ; Allen v. Almy, 87 Conn. 517, 518, 522 , 89 Atl. 205 ; Hoadley v. Beardsley, 89 Conn. 270, 277 , 93 Atl. 535 ; Bristol v. Ontario Orphan Asylum, 60 Conn. 472, 476 , 22 Atl. 848 .

1928Pease v. Cornell, 84 Conn. 391, 393, 396-400 , 80 Atl. 86 ; Allen v. Almy, 87 Conn. 517, 518, 522 , 89 Atl. 205 ; Hoadley v. Beardsley, 89 Conn. 270, 277 , 93 Atl. 535 ; Bristol v. Ontario Orphan Asylum, 60 Conn. 472, 476 , 22 Atl. 848 .

1928Pease v. Cornell, 84 Conn. 391, 393, 396-400 , 80 Atl. 86 ; Allen v. Almy, 87 Conn. 517, 518, 522 , 89 Atl. 205 ; Hoadley v. Beardsley, 89 Conn. 270, 277 , 93 Atl. 535 ; Bristol v. Ontario Orphan Asylum, 60 Conn. 472, 476 , 22 Atl. 848 .

1907Hillhouse v. Chester, 3 Day, 166, 211 ; Leavenworth v. Marshall, 19 Conn. 1, 4 .

1907Hillhouse v. Chester, 3 Day, 166, 211 ; Leavenworth v. Marshall, 19 Conn. 1, 4 .

1893Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat., 19, 29 , per Story, J.; Luther v. Borden, 7 Howard, 45 , per Taney, C.

1849The supreme court of the United States, in Michoud v. Girod & al., 4 Howard, 561 . in discussing this subject, say: “In a case of actual fraud, we believe no case can be found in the books, in which a court of equity has refused to give relief, in the life-time of either of the parties upon whom the fraud is proved.” The First Massachusetts Turnpike Co. v. Tidd, 3 Mass. R. 201 . was an early and well considered case, and has been noticed and approved, by many other cases in this country, in which the Chief Justice says; “If this knowledge is fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff, by the de

1839Hemstead, v. Reed, 6 Conn. Rep. 480 .