blanket privilege in Louisiana

1989State v. Darby, 403 So.2d 44 (La.1981); State v. Wilson, supra. However, that rule is subject to exceptions.

1988State v. Wilson, 394 So.2d 254 (La.1981).

2002A few years later, in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997), the Court rejected the application of a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement in felony drug cases.

2002A few years later, in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997), the Court rejected the application of a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement in felony drug cases.

2000State v. Coleman, 406 So.2d 563 (La.1981).

1998State v. Coleman, 406 So.2d 563 (La.1981); State v. Roebuck, 532 So.2d 812 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988).

1998Coleman ; State v. Seaton, 604 So.2d 182 (La.

1994Coleman; State v. Seaton, 604 So.2d 182 (La.App. 4th Cir.1992).

2015In State v. Larpenteur, 93-1424, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/28/94), 636 So.2d 1103, 1107 , the fourth circuit applied the following harmless error analysis to the trial court’s allowance of a witness to invoke a blanket privilege: As in Coleman , even were the blanket privilege not proper in this case, the defendant was not prejudiced by the failure' of the witness to testify.

1994Recently, in State v. Kenneth Larpenteur, 636 So.2d 1103 (LaApp. 4th Cir. 93-KA-1424, April 28, 1994), this court relied on Adams and Coleman and concluded that the trial court’s decision to allow a witness to assert a blanket privilege was harmless error in that the defendant was not prejudiced by the witnesses’ failure to testify.

2007Moreover, in State v. Haddad, 99-1272, p. 5 (La.2/29/00), 767 So.2d 682, 686 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1070 , 121 S.Ct. 757 , 148 L.Ed.2d 660 (2001), the supreme court held that “[a]s a general proposition, when faced with resolving the tension between a witness’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, this court has consistently recognized the witness’s right not to incriminate himself.” The record shows that on the last day of trial, the defendant called Reinholdt as a witness.

2007Moreover, in State v. Haddad, 99-1272, p. 5 (La.2/29/00), 767 So.2d 682, 686 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1070 , 121 S.Ct. 757 , 148 L.Ed.2d 660 (2001), the supreme court held that “[a]s a general proposition, when faced with resolving the tension between a witness’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, this court has consistently recognized the witness’s right not to incriminate himself.” The record shows that on the last day of trial, the defendant called Reinholdt as a witness.

2007Moreover, in State v. Haddad, 99-1272, p. 5 (La.2/29/00), 767 So.2d 682, 686 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1070 , 121 S.Ct. 757 , 148 L.Ed.2d 660 (2001), the supreme court held that “[a]s a general proposition, when faced with resolving the tension between a witness’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, this court has consistently recognized the witness’s right not to incriminate himself.” The record shows that on the last day of trial, the defendant called Reinholdt as a witness.

2007Moreover, in State v. Haddad, 99-1272, p. 5 (La.2/29/00), 767 So.2d 682, 686 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1070 , 121 S.Ct. 757 , 148 L.Ed.2d 660 (2001), the supreme court held that "[a]s a general proposition, when faced with resolving the tension between a witness' Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, this court has consistently recognized the witness's right not to incriminate himself." The record shows that on the last day of trial, the defendant called Reinholdt as a witness.

2007Privilege Against Self-Incrimination The defendant contends that the “trial court denied [him] due process of law and the right to present witnesses in his defense when it permitted Steven James Reinholdt to enter a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” In State v. Darby, 403 So.2d 44, 48 (La.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1152 , 102 S.Ct. 1022 , 71 L.Ed.2d 308 (1982), the supreme court held that “[i]t is reversible error to allow a witness to claim a blanket privilege [against self-incrimination].” However, the supreme court concluded that given the facts and circumsta

2007Privilege Against Self-Incrimination The defendant contends that the "trial court denied [him] due process of law and the right to present witnesses in his defense when it permitted Steven James Reinholdt to enter a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." In State v. Darby, 403 So.2d 44, 48 (La.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1152 , 102 S.Ct. 1022 , 71 L.Ed.2d 308 (1982), the supreme court held that "[i]t is reversible error to allow a witness to claim a blanket privilege [against self-incrimination]." However, the supreme court concluded that given the facts and circumsta

2007Privilege Against Self-Incrimination The defendant contends that the “trial court denied [him] due process of law and the right to present witnesses in his defense when it permitted Steven James Reinholdt to enter a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” In State v. Darby, 403 So.2d 44, 48 (La.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1152 , 102 S.Ct. 1022 , 71 L.Ed.2d 308 (1982), the supreme court held that “[i]t is reversible error to allow a witness to claim a blanket privilege [against self-incrimination].” However, the supreme court concluded that given the facts and circumsta

2007Privilege Against Self-Incrimination The defendant contends that the "trial court denied [him] due process of law and the right to present witnesses in his defense when it permitted Steven James Reinholdt to enter a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." In State v. Darby, 403 So.2d 44, 48 (La.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1152 , 102 S.Ct. 1022 , 71 L.Ed.2d 308 (1982), the supreme court held that "[i]t is reversible error to allow a witness to claim a blanket privilege [against self-incrimination]." However, the supreme court concluded that given the facts and circumsta

2007Privilege Against Self-Incrimination The defendant contends that the “trial court denied [him] due process of law and the right to present witnesses in his defense when it permitted Steven James Reinholdt to enter a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” In State v. Darby, 403 So.2d 44, 48 (La.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1152 , 102 S.Ct. 1022 , 71 L.Ed.2d 308 (1982), the supreme court held that “[i]t is reversible error to allow a witness to claim a blanket privilege [against self-incrimination].” However, the supreme court concluded that given the facts and circumsta

2007Privilege Against Self-Incrimination The defendant contends that the "trial court denied [him] due process of law and the right to present witnesses in his defense when it permitted Steven James Reinholdt to enter a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." In State v. Darby, 403 So.2d 44, 48 (La.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1152 , 102 S.Ct. 1022 , 71 L.Ed.2d 308 (1982), the supreme court held that "[i]t is reversible error to allow a witness to claim a blanket privilege [against self-incrimination]." However, the supreme court concluded that given the facts and circumsta

2007Moreover, in State v. Haddad, 99-1272, p. 5 (La.2/29/00), 767 So.2d 682, 686 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1070 , 121 S.Ct. 757 , 148 L.Ed.2d 660 (2001), the supreme court held that “[a]s a general proposition, when faced with resolving the tension between a witness’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, this court has consistently recognized the witness’s right not to incriminate himself.” The record shows that on the last day of trial, the defendant called Reinholdt as a witness.

2007Moreover, in State v. Haddad, 99-1272, p. 5 (La.2/29/00), 767 So.2d 682, 686 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1070 , 121 S.Ct. 757 , 148 L.Ed.2d 660 (2001), the supreme court held that "[a]s a general proposition, when faced with resolving the tension between a witness' Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, this court has consistently recognized the witness's right not to incriminate himself." The record shows that on the last day of trial, the defendant called Reinholdt as a witness.

1998State v. Coleman, 406 So.2d 563 (La.1981); State v. Roebuck, 532 So.2d 812 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988).

1994State v. Coleman, 406 So.2d 563 (La.1981); State v. Roebuck, 532 So.2d 812 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988).

2024The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Ballard, 98-2198 (La. 10/19/99), 747 So. 2d 1077 , eliminated the blanket rule that law enforcement officers are incompetent jurors in criminal cases, stating: 7 Law enforcement officers are sworn to uphold the laws of the state, which laws include the provision of a fair trial to each and every defendant.

2016Id. at 746 .

2015Finally, in Bright, 776 So.2d 1134 , the supreme court upheld a blanket assertion of the privilege by a co-defendant of whom Bright sought to ask questions concerning the co-defendant’s acquaintance with Bright, the co-defendant’s knowledge of Bright’s whereabouts the night of the murder, and the co-defendant’s contact with Bright on the day of the murder.

2015In P.71., 970 So.2d 1255 , this court engaged in a harmless error type analysis even though it did not expressly state it was doing so.

2015In Edwards, 419 So.2d 881 , the supreme court allowed the assertion of a blanket privilege by two co-defendants of whom [^Edwards sought to ask questions concerning the night of the murders.

2015In Edwards, 419 So.2d 881 , the supreme court allowed the assertion of a blanket privilege by two co-defendants of whom [^Edwards sought to ask questions concerning the night of the murders.

2014While, Mutual did make a blanket claim of all provisions in the policy, it was still required to specifically plead the affirmative defense of offset because it was a new matter not raised by Mr. Hyatt.' See Sher, 988 So.2d 186 .

2014The history of sovereign immunity in Louisiana was well explained in Chamberlain, 624 So.2d at 880-81 .

2014The history of sovereign immunity in | ^Louisiana was well explained in Chamberlain, 624 So.2d at 880-81 .

2013State v. Lewis, 01-1084 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/13/02) ; 815 So.2d 166, 174 , writ denied, 02-1053 (La.11/15/02); 829 So.2d 424 .

2013State v. Lewis, 01-1084 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/13/02) ; 815 So.2d 166, 174 , writ denied, 02-1053 (La.11/15/02); 829 So.2d 424 .

2012In resolving this issue, the viability of Jones v. City of Kenner, 338 So.2d 606 (La.1976), has again been raised, and thus, we must further determine whether a bifurcated trial is necessary in a suit against a political subdivision and its insurer if the political subdivision has not waived the prohibition, the insurer’s liability is vicarious, not independent, and there are no other nongovernmental defendants.

2012Although our decision in Kimball v. Allstate Insurance Co., 97-2885 (La.4/14/98); 712 So.2d 46 , concerned a blanket waiver by a political subdivision rather than a waiver for a specific case, its reasoning concerning the application of Article III, § 12(A) is relevant to the present matter.

2012Such a reading would render an essential portion of the statute “meaningless.” Id., 97-1542 at 15; 729 So.2d at 1123 ; see SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 00-1695, p. 12 (La.6/29/01); 808 So.2d 294, 302 . (“Courts should give effect to all parts of a statute and should not adopt a statutory construction that makes any part superfluous or meaningless”). | ^Defendants maintain the statute actually provides for two different scenarios: (1) a waiver occurs in a single case, and only the political subdivision can request a jury; or (2) a blanket waiver occurs and both the political subdiv

2012This reading of the statute is supported by our decision in Beauclaire v. Greenhouse, 05-0765 (La.2/22/06); 922 So.2d 501 .

2012Arshad, 95 So.3d at 486-87 .

2008The decision must be made on a case by case basis, Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 00-0445 p. 11 (La.11/28/00), 774 So.2d 84, 93-4 .