blanket rule in California

2026In this context, the word “discretion” does not have its literal meaning. ( Johnson, 15 supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 787–788.) Discretionary act immunity applies to “fundamental decisions within the executive or administrative authority of [an] agency or official.” (Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 983, fn. 5 (Caldwell.) To be subject to immunity, the decision must rise to the level of a “basic policy decision[ ]” that has been “committed to [a] coordinate branch[ ] of government,” and is sufficiently sensitive to justify a blanket rule that courts “will not entertain a tort action allegi

2026In this context, the word “discretion” does not have its literal meaning. ( Johnson, 15 supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 787–788.) Discretionary act immunity applies to “fundamental decisions within the executive or administrative authority of [an] agency or official.” (Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 983, fn. 5 (Caldwell.) To be subject to immunity, the decision must rise to the level of a “basic policy decision[ ]” that has been “committed to [a] coordinate branch[ ] of government,” and is sufficiently sensitive to justify a blanket rule that courts “will not entertain a tort action allegi

2026In this context, the word “discretion” does not have its literal meaning. ( Johnson, 15 supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 787–788.) Discretionary act immunity applies to “fundamental decisions within the executive or administrative authority of [an] agency or official.” (Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 983, fn. 5 (Caldwell.) To be subject to immunity, the decision must rise to the level of a “basic policy decision[ ]” that has been “committed to [a] coordinate branch[ ] of government,” and is sufficiently sensitive to justify a blanket rule that courts “will not entertain a tort action allegi

1998As we stated in Johnson , this immunity is usually extended to the "planning" rather than the "operational" levels of decisionmaking, i.e., "those areas of quasi-legislative policy-making which are sufficiently sensitive to justify a blanket rule that courts will not entertain a tort action alleging that careless conduct contributed to the governmental decision." ( Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 794 , 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352 , fn. omitted; see also Caldwell v. Montoya, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 979-984, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 , 897 P.2d 1320 ; Nunn v. State of California, supra, 35 Cal.3d

2016(Id. at pp. 763-764.) The appellate court recognized that the “reasonableness” standard applicable to such claims “ ‘must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’ ” (Id. at p. 762.) And since “ ‘the standard is not defined by the generic—a reasonable person—but rather by the specific—a reasonable officer—it is more likely that [the] line between common and specialized knowledge has been crossed.’ ” (Id. at p. 763, quoting Kopf v. Skyrm (4th Cir. 1993) 993 F.2d 374, 378 (Kopf).) However, “ ‘a blanket rule that expert t

2016In rebuttal, the plaintiffs sought to offer the expert testimony of a use-of-force expert who proposed to testify that the officers, in fact, violated departmental use-of-force policy and did not follow their training. {Kopf at pp. 376-377.) The trial court excluded the plaintiff’s expert, and on appeal a panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. ( Kopf supra, 993 F.2d at p. 375.) The court of appeals faulted the trial court for applying what appeared to be “a blanket rule that expert testimony is generally inappropriate in excessive force cases . . . .” (Id. at p. 378.) “The fact

1971People v. DeSantiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 28 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 453 P.2d 353 ]; People v. Gastelo (1967) 67 Cal.2d 586, 589 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 432 P.2d 706 ]. “[C]ompliance with the applicable knock- and-notice provision is excused not because of a blanket rule based on the type of crime involved but because the particular circumstances of the case give rise to a reasonable belief that immediate action is necessary to prevent the destruction of physical evidence.” People v. De Santiago, supra, 71 Cal.2d at page 29.

1971People v. DeSantiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 28 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 453 P.2d 353 ]; People v. Gastelo (1967) 67 Cal.2d 586, 589 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 432 P.2d 706 ]. “[C]ompliance with the applicable knock- and-notice provision is excused not because of a blanket rule based on the type of crime involved but because the particular circumstances of the case give rise to a reasonable belief that immediate action is necessary to prevent the destruction of physical evidence.” People v. De Santiago, supra, 71 Cal.2d at page 29.

2025(See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1025 [“A breach of contract claim can arise from protected activity if the action allegedly breaching the contract is itself protected”]; Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581, 597, fn. 11 [our Supreme Court has “rejected the blanket rule . . . that the anti-SLAPP statute ‘categorically excludes any particular type of action [e.g., breach of contract claims] from its operation’ ”].) Accordingly, HBT has carried its first-step burden of establishing that claim 5 arises from protected activity it engaged in.

2025(See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1025 [“A breach of contract claim can arise from protected activity if the action allegedly breaching the contract is itself protected”]; Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581, 597, fn. 11 [our Supreme Court has “rejected the blanket rule . . . that the anti-SLAPP statute ‘categorically excludes any particular type of action [e.g., breach of contract claims] from its operation’ ”].) Accordingly, HBT has carried its first-step burden of establishing that claim 5 arises from protected activity it engaged in.

2024Proc., § 657, subd. (1) [ground for new trial 13 [withdrawal of counsel]; Marriage of Falcone, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 823 [continuances].) A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling “‘exceed[s] the bounds of reason’” (Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1283 (Gamet)) or when it fails to balance the pertinent factors and instead relies on a blanket rule of “no continuances” (Marriage of Tara, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 874, 881-882; Vann, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at pp. 195, 198-199; Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1395 ).

2024Proc., § 657, subd. (1) [ground for new trial 13 [withdrawal of counsel]; Marriage of Falcone, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 823 [continuances].) A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling “‘exceed[s] the bounds of reason’” (Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1283 (Gamet)) or when it fails to balance the pertinent factors and instead relies on a blanket rule of “no continuances” (Marriage of Tara, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 874, 881-882; Vann, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at pp. 195, 198-199; Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1395 ).

2024Proc., § 657, subd. (1) [ground for new trial 13 [withdrawal of counsel]; Marriage of Falcone, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 823 [continuances].) A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling “‘exceed[s] the bounds of reason’” (Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1283 (Gamet)) or when it fails to balance the pertinent factors and instead relies on a blanket rule of “no continuances” (Marriage of Tara, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 874, 881-882; Vann, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at pp. 195, 198-199; Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1395 ).

2024Proc., § 657, subd. (1) [ground for new trial 13 [withdrawal of counsel]; Marriage of Falcone, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 823 [continuances].) A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling “‘exceed[s] the bounds of reason’” (Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1283 (Gamet)) or when it fails to balance the pertinent factors and instead relies on a blanket rule of “no continuances” (Marriage of Tara, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 874, 881-882; Vann, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at pp. 195, 198-199; Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1395 ).

2021Confidentiality as the Touchstone for Disclosure of Subdivision (g) Discovery Materials Under the statute, an agency’s disclosure obligations extend only to nonconfidential stenographer’s notes, reports, and complaints. (§ 3303, subd. (g) [“The public safety officer shall be entitled to a transcribed copy of any notes made by a stenographer or to any reports or complaints made by investigators or other persons, except those which are deemed by the investigating agency to be confidential,” italics added]; see also Gilbert, supra, 7 We recognize that a blanket rule permitting all notes, reports,

2021Confidentiality as the Touchstone for Disclosure of Subdivision (g) Discovery Materials Under the statute, an agency’s disclosure obligations extend only to nonconfidential stenographer’s notes, reports, and complaints. (§ 3303, subd. (g) [“The public safety officer shall be entitled to a transcribed copy of any notes made by a stenographer or to any reports or complaints made by investigators or other persons, except those which are deemed by the investigating agency to be confidential,” italics added]; see also Gilbert, supra, 7 We recognize that a blanket rule permitting all notes, reports,

2018In Concepcion , the United States Supreme Court cautioned that even when a court purports to apply a doctrine normally thought to be generally applicable, such as unconscionability, it may not " 'rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what ... the state legislature cannot.' [Citation.]" ( Concepcion, supra , 563 U.S. at p. 341, 131 S.Ct. 1740 .) According to our nation's high court, "[a]n obvious illustration of this point would be a case finding unconscionable or

2018In Concepcion , the United States Supreme Court cautioned that even when a court purports to apply a doctrine normally thought to be generally applicable, such as unconscionability, it may not " 'rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what ... the state legislature cannot.' [Citation.]" ( Concepcion, supra , 563 U.S. at p. 341, 131 S.Ct. 1740 .) According to our nation's high court, "[a]n obvious illustration of this point would be a case finding unconscionable or

2017(See, e.g., People v. Cervantes (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 281, 287 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 819 ] (Cervantes) [In this context, courts must navigate “ ‘between the Scylla of denying a defendant the right to determine his own fate and the Charybdis of violating his right to counsel by acceptance of an ineffectual waiver’ ”], disapproved on another ground in People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1219, fn. 1, 1222-1225 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 499 , 64 P.3d 788 ].) And, although the granting of a Faretta motion based on incomplete warnings can arguably be considered prejudicial per se because it results in an unkn

2017(See, e.g., People v. Cervantes (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 281, 287 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 819 ] (Cervantes) [In this context, courts must navigate “ ‘between the Scylla of denying a defendant the right to determine his own fate and the Charybdis of violating his right to counsel by acceptance of an ineffectual waiver’ ”], disapproved on another ground in People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1219, fn. 1, 1222-1225 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 499 , 64 P.3d 788 ].) And, although the granting of a Faretta motion based on incomplete warnings can arguably be considered prejudicial per se because it results in an unkn

2018Norton Co. at pp. 29-38, 160 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 603 P.2d 1306 .) After first emphasizing that the "principal purpose" of the ALRA was to enable agricultural workers to elect representatives " of their own choosing " ( id . at p. 30, 160 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 603 P.2d 1306 , italics in original), the Supreme Court explained as follows: "Although it is inconsistent with both the NLRA and ALRA to foster the delays that result from judicial review of frivolous election challenges, the policies of neither act support the application of a blanket rule for the imposition of make-whole relief.

2018Norton Co. at pp. 29-38, 160 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 603 P.2d 1306 .) After first emphasizing that the "principal purpose" of the ALRA was to enable agricultural workers to elect representatives " of their own choosing " ( id . at p. 30, 160 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 603 P.2d 1306 , italics in original), the Supreme Court explained as follows: "Although it is inconsistent with both the NLRA and ALRA to foster the delays that result from judicial review of frivolous election challenges, the policies of neither act support the application of a blanket rule for the imposition of make-whole relief.

2003Co. [, supra,] 34 Cal.3d [at p.] 58, 192 Cal.Rptr. 857 , 665 P.2d 947 ; Rosh v. Cave Imaging Systems, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1236 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 136 ), instead adopting the view that'"[i]f the realizable likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes [the] actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby."' ( Richardson v. Ham (1955) 44 Cal.2d 772, 777 , 285 P.2d 269 , citing Rest.

2003Co. [, supra,] 34 Cal.3d [at p.] 58, 192 Cal.Rptr. 857 , 665 P.2d 947 ; Rosh v. Cave Imaging Systems, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1236 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 136 ), instead adopting the view that'"[i]f the realizable likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes [the] actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby."' ( Richardson v. Ham (1955) 44 Cal.2d 772, 777 , 285 P.2d 269 , citing Rest.

2003Co. [, supra,] 34 Cal.3d [at p.] 58, 192 Cal.Rptr. 857 , 665 P.2d 947 ; Rosh v. Cave Imaging Systems, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1236 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 136 ), instead adopting the view that'"[i]f the realizable likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes [the] actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby."' ( Richardson v. Ham (1955) 44 Cal.2d 772, 777 , 285 P.2d 269 , citing Rest.

2003Co. [, supra,] 34 Cal.3d [at p.] 58, 192 Cal.Rptr. 857 , 665 P.2d 947 ; Rosh v. Cave Imaging Systems, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1236 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 136 ), instead adopting the view that'"[i]f the realizable likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes [the] actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby."' ( Richardson v. Ham (1955) 44 Cal.2d 772, 777 , 285 P.2d 269 , citing Rest.

2003Co. [, supra,] 34 Cal.3d [at p.] 58, 192 Cal.Rptr. 857 , 665 P.2d 947 ; Rosh v. Cave Imaging Systems, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1236 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 136 ), instead adopting the view that'"[i]f the realizable likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes [the] actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby."' ( Richardson v. Ham (1955) 44 Cal.2d 772, 777 , 285 P.2d 269 , citing Rest.

2003Co. [, supra,] 34 Cal.3d [at p.] 58, 192 Cal.Rptr. 857 , 665 P.2d 947 ; Rosh v. Cave Imaging Systems, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1236 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 136 ), instead adopting the view that'"[i]f the realizable likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes [the] actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby."' ( Richardson v. Ham (1955) 44 Cal.2d 772, 777 , 285 P.2d 269 , citing Rest.

2021(People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 861 (Crandell), overruled on another ground by People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346 , 364–365.) Factors for the court to consider include the defendant’s education, familiarity with the criminal justice system, and demonstrated legal abilities; the defendant’s reasons for seeking advisory counsel, including evidence of a manipulative purpose; the seriousness of the charges; and the complexity of the issues.

1992On the contrary, we have specifically held that cocounsel status, advisory counsel and other forms of "hybrid" representation are not constitutionally guaranteed. ( People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1218 .) Thus, as with other matters requiring the exercise of discretion, "as long as there exists a reasonable or even fairly debatable justification, under the law, for the action taken, such action will not be here set aside.... [Citations.]" ( People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d 833, 863 , internal quotation marks omitted.) The record here, unlike in Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d 731 , does

2018In Navellier , the Supreme Court simply rejected the blanket rule some Courts of Appeal had stated-which was that the anti-SLAPP statute "categorically excludes any particular type of action [e.g., breach of contract claims] from its operation." (See Navellier , supra , 29 Cal.4th at p. 92, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 .) Having found section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) to apply, we need not, and do not, decide whether section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) also applies.

2018In Navellier , the Supreme Court simply rejected the blanket rule some Courts of Appeal had stated-which was that the anti-SLAPP statute "categorically excludes any particular type of action [e.g., breach of contract claims] from its operation." (See Navellier , supra , 29 Cal.4th at p. 92, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 .) Having found section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) to apply, we need not, and do not, decide whether section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) also applies.

2017It does not provide a blanket immunity to government entities under all circumstances, however. ( De La Rosa v. City of San Bernardino (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 739 , 746, 94 Cal.Rptr. 175 ["although a public entity is not liable for failure to install traffic signs or signals ..., when it undertakes to do so and invites public reliance upon them, it may be held liable for creating a dangerous condition in so doing"].) Moreover, defendant did not cite, nor have we located, any authority to extend this statutory immunity to a private entity alleged to have been negligent.

2017It does not provide a blanket immunity to government entities under all circumstances, however. ( De La Rosa v. City of San Bernardino (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 739 , 746, 94 Cal.Rptr. 175 ["although a public entity is not liable for failure to install traffic signs or signals ..., when it undertakes to do so and invites public reliance upon them, it may be held liable for creating a dangerous condition in so doing"].) Moreover, defendant did not cite, nor have we located, any authority to extend this statutory immunity to a private entity alleged to have been negligent.