blanket rule in Kansas

2019In Brand, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's decision not to include the distributions from a Subchapter S corporation in the father's income for child support purposes because the mother had not shown that the father, as a minority shareholder, had "manipulated corporate assets, decreased the amount of his salary to increase retained earnings, or acted in any way to shield income." 273 Kan. at 355 .

2018In Brand , the Supreme Court upheld the district court's decision not to include the distributions from a Subchapter S corporation in the father's income for child support purposes because the mother had not shown that the father, as a minority shareholder, had "manipulated corporate assets, decreased the amount of his salary to increase retained earnings, or acted in any way to shield income." 273 Kan. at 355 , 44 P.3d 321 .

2025Unlike a criminal defendant who "can invoke a blanket privilege not to testify at their own trial, a compelled witness may only assert the privilege on a question-by-question basis and must establish a legitimate risk of incrimination to justify silence." State v. Showalter, 319 Kan. 147 , 155, 553 P.3d 276 (2024) (citing generally 3 Crim.

2019Indeed, our Supreme Court has stated as a general proposition: "When even one factor relied upon by the sentencing court is substantial and compelling, the departure sentence should be upheld." Bird, 298 Kan. at 398 .

2018Our Supreme Court has made clear that "a tribunal abuses its discretion by applying a blanket rule without consideration of other factors in an individual case." 290 Kan. at 570 , 232 P.3d 856 .

2018Our Supreme Court has made clear that "a tribunal abuses its discretion by applying a blanket rule without consideration of other factors in an individual case." 290 Kan. at 570 , 232 P.3d 856 .

2013The Leon Court recognized four circumstances in which the good-faith exception would not apply: (1) the judicial officer issuing the warrant has been misled by information the author of the affidavit knew or should have known to be false; (2) the judicial officer has “wholly abandoned” the role of a detached and neutral official and has merely rubberstamped the request for a warrant; (3) the affidavit is “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable’ ”; or (4) the warrant itself is patently deficient, for example, in describing w

2013Osterhaus rejected this blanket waiver-of-reliance argument as to all of the defendants in that case, which included the agent and his brokerage. 291 Kan. at 785 .

2012Roth, 120 N.J. at 676 ; Estate of Schuldt, 428 N.W.2d at 258-59 .

2012Roth, 120 N.J. at 676 ; Estate of Schuldt, 428 N.W.2d at 258-59 .

2008Furthermore, citing State v. McGee, 280 Kan. 890, 891-92 , 126 P.3d 1110 (2006), our Supreme Court in State v. Adams, 283 Kan. *784 365, 368, 153 P.3d 512 (2007), stated: “Resolution of a statutory speedy trial issue is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Moreover, when a dispute is not with the trial court’s factual finding but with the conclusion of law drawn from those facts, appellate review of that question is unlimited.

2008Furthermore, citing State v. McGee, 280 Kan. 890, 891-92 , 126 P.3d 1110 (2006), our Supreme Court in State v. Adams, 283 Kan. *784 365, 368, 153 P.3d 512 (2007), stated: “Resolution of a statutory speedy trial issue is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Moreover, when a dispute is not with the trial court’s factual finding but with the conclusion of law drawn from those facts, appellate review of that question is unlimited.

2008Furthermore, citing State v. McGee, 280 Kan. 890, 891-92 , 126 P.3d 1110 (2006), our Supreme Court in State v. Adams, 283 Kan. *784 365, 368, 153 P.3d 512 (2007), stated: “Resolution of a statutory speedy trial issue is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Moreover, when a dispute is not with the trial court’s factual finding but with the conclusion of law drawn from those facts, appellate review of that question is unlimited.

2001Cir. 1999), cert. denied 530 U.S. 1213 (2000), the court noted that the equities between the producers and “their customers” did not justify a blanket waiver of interest because of FERC’s delays in deciding the issue. 196 F.3d at 1268 .

2001Cir. 1999), cert. denied 530 U.S. 1213 (2000), the court noted that the equities between the producers and “their customers” did not justify a blanket waiver of interest because of FERC’s delays in deciding the issue. 196 F.3d at 1268 .

2000App. 114, 118-19 , 991 P.2d563 (1999) (referring to Alden and considering the defendant’s immunity claims under the Eleventh Amendment); Whittington v. State, 128 N.M. 338 , 992 P.2d 889 (1999) (vacating the earlier Whittington decision in light of Alden and holding that states enjoy immunity from FLSA lawsuits even when the suit is brought in state court); Jacoby v. Arkansas Dep’t of Education, 338 Ark. 505, 506 , 995 S.W.2d 353 (1999) (ordering a rebriefing on the issue of immunity following the decision in Alden); and Allen v. Fauver, 327 N.J.

2000App. 114, 118-19 , 991 P.2d563 (1999) (referring to Alden and considering the defendant’s immunity claims under the Eleventh Amendment); Whittington v. State, 128 N.M. 338 , 992 P.2d 889 (1999) (vacating the earlier Whittington decision in light of Alden and holding that states enjoy immunity from FLSA lawsuits even when the suit is brought in state court); Jacoby v. Arkansas Dep’t of Education, 338 Ark. 505, 506 , 995 S.W.2d 353 (1999) (ordering a rebriefing on the issue of immunity following the decision in Alden); and Allen v. Fauver, 327 N.J.

2000App. 114, 118-19 , 991 P.2d563 (1999) (referring to Alden and considering the defendant’s immunity claims under the Eleventh Amendment); Whittington v. State, 128 N.M. 338 , 992 P.2d 889 (1999) (vacating the earlier Whittington decision in light of Alden and holding that states enjoy immunity from FLSA lawsuits even when the suit is brought in state court); Jacoby v. Arkansas Dep’t of Education, 338 Ark. 505, 506 , 995 S.W.2d 353 (1999) (ordering a rebriefing on the issue of immunity following the decision in Alden); and Allen v. Fauver, 327 N.J.

2000App. 114, 118-19 , 991 P.2d563 (1999) (referring to Alden and considering the defendant’s immunity claims under the Eleventh Amendment); Whittington v. State, 128 N.M. 338 , 992 P.2d 889 (1999) (vacating the earlier Whittington decision in light of Alden and holding that states enjoy immunity from FLSA lawsuits even when the suit is brought in state court); Jacoby v. Arkansas Dep’t of Education, 338 Ark. 505, 506 , 995 S.W.2d 353 (1999) (ordering a rebriefing on the issue of immunity following the decision in Alden); and Allen v. Fauver, 327 N.J.

2000The court responded that a blanket claim of privilege would not be sufficient and that the court was rejecting the contrary holdings in In re Horn, 976 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Grand Jury Witness, 695 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1982); or Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Industries, Inc., 1996 WL 288511 (N.D.

2000Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that after Alden, states may “implement a blanket rule of sovereign immunity”); Commonwealth v. Luzik, 259 Va. 198, 208 , 524 S.E.2d 871 (2000) (applying Alden and holding that the state has sovereign immunity from FLSA claims even when the claim is brought in state court); Lawson v. University of Tennessee, 2000 WL 116312 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the state cannot be sued in an action pursuant to the FLSA even when the suit is brought in state court following the decision in Alden); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 164 Or.

2000The court responded that a blanket claim of privilege would not be sufficient and that the court was rejecting the contrary holdings in In re Horn, 976 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Grand Jury Witness, 695 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1982); or Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Industries, Inc., 1996 WL 288511 (N.D.

2000App. 114, 118-19 , 991 P.2d563 (1999) (referring to Alden and considering the defendant’s immunity claims under the Eleventh Amendment); Whittington v. State, 128 N.M. 338 , 992 P.2d 889 (1999) (vacating the earlier Whittington decision in light of Alden and holding that states enjoy immunity from FLSA lawsuits even when the suit is brought in state court); Jacoby v. Arkansas Dep’t of Education, 338 Ark. 505, 506 , 995 S.W.2d 353 (1999) (ordering a rebriefing on the issue of immunity following the decision in Alden); and Allen v. Fauver, 327 N.J.

2000Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that after Alden, states may “implement a blanket rule of sovereign immunity”); Commonwealth v. Luzik, 259 Va. 198, 208 , 524 S.E.2d 871 (2000) (applying Alden and holding that the state has sovereign immunity from FLSA claims even when the claim is brought in state court); Lawson v. University of Tennessee, 2000 WL 116312 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the state cannot be sued in an action pursuant to the FLSA even when the suit is brought in state court following the decision in Alden); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 164 Or.

2000Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that after Alden, states may “implement a blanket rule of sovereign immunity”); Commonwealth v. Luzik, 259 Va. 198, 208 , 524 S.E.2d 871 (2000) (applying Alden and holding that the state has sovereign immunity from FLSA claims even when the claim is brought in state court); Lawson v. University of Tennessee, 2000 WL 116312 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the state cannot be sued in an action pursuant to the FLSA even when the suit is brought in state court following the decision in Alden); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 164 Or.

1997“In a criminal trial, a defendant has the absolute right not to be called as a witness.” Nott, 234 Kan. at 36 .

1990In Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279 , 718 P.2d 1318 (1986), this court considered whether Orimune, which is a Sabin or live polio vaccine, was an "unavoidably unsafe product" that came within the protection of Comment k.

1990In Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279 , 718 P.2d 1318 (1986), this court considered whether Orimune, which is a Sabin or live polio vaccine, was an "unavoidably unsafe product" that came within the protection of Comment k.

1979The only exception to the blanket immunity of the statute is "except as is otherwise specifically provided by statute." In Brown v. Wichita State University, 219 Kan. 2 , 547 P.2d 1015 (1976) ( Brown II ), the new statute was attacked on the same ground as here, that it denied equal protection.

1979The only exception to the blanket immunity of the statute is "except as is otherwise specifically provided by statute." In Brown v. Wichita State University, 219 Kan. 2 , 547 P.2d 1015 (1976) ( Brown II ), the new statute was attacked on the same ground as here, that it denied equal protection.

1928Appellants reason that, because this contract might have protected the directors against a loss sustained by giving their pledge to the Hopewell bank years later if they had continued to borrow there, it is only equitable and fair that the same protection be orded when the loss occurred elsewhere, and cite the case of Canning Co. v. Hensley, 149 Ia. 168 , where the syllabus so indicates; but the opinion justifies that conclusion upon two facts — first, that the loan'was actually obtained from a local bank, which, however, procured another bank to carry it, and, second, because the language of