11 Delaware opinions name it 4 courts 1986–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co.green2 sentences2019Furthermore, such an approach ignores that the standard of proof is to a preponderance of the evidence 56 Id. at 694 . 57 See Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187, 188 (Ohio 1998) (holding that “[i]n Ohio, market-share liability is not an available theory of recovery in a products liability action”). 58 Nutt, 517 A.2d at 693 . 59 Richard E. 2019Furthermore, such an approach ignores that the standard of proof is to a preponderance of the evidence 56 Id. at 694 . 57 See Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187, 188 (Ohio 1998) (holding that “[i]n Ohio, market-share liability is not an available theory of recovery in a products liability action”). 58 Nutt, 517 A.2d at 693 . 59 Richard E. | 2 | 2 |
Murphy & Landon, P.A. v. Pernicgreen1 sentence2024Likewise, such a rule would often cut to the detriment of many employees by creating a “perverse incentive” for employers to prematurely terminate employees without fully considering available options.64 Namely, to bar an employer from relying on prior instances of misconduct could incentivize an employer to terminate an employee without providing the employer the opportunity to redeem herself.65 60 See Pernic, 121 A.3d at 1225 (holding that a warning is sufficient if it provides notice that a “general category of misconduct [is] unacceptable”). 61 See D.I. 13 (where Mr. Bull writes “[i]t is a | 1 | 1 |
Sanderson v. Cookegreen2 sentences1998CLApp., 256 N.Y. 73 , 175 N.E. 518, 520 (1931) (concluding that the right of inspection may be refused where purpose is improper); see also Schwartzberg, 685 A.2d at 373 -74 & nn. 14-15 (Del. 1998CLApp., 256 N.Y. 73 , 175 N.E. 518, 520 (1931) (concluding that the right of inspection may be refused where purpose is improper); see also Schwartzberg, 685 A.2d at 373 -74 & nn. 14-15 (Del. | 1 | 1 |
Schwartzberg v. Critef Associates Ltd. Partnershipgreen1 sentence1998CLApp., 256 N.Y. 73 , 175 N.E. 518, 520 (1931) (concluding that the right of inspection may be refused where purpose is improper); see also Schwartzberg, 685 A.2d at 373 -74 & nn. 14-15 (Del. | 1 | 1 |
Pendleton v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1988See Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky.Supr., 685 S.W.2d 549 (1985); State v. Burchfield, Tenn.Supr., 664 S.W.2d 284 (1984); Commonwealth v. Shively, Pa. Supr., 492 Pa. 411 , 424 A.2d 1257 (1981) (overruling prior case law); People v. Major, Mich.Supr., 407 Mich. 394 , 285 N.W.2d 660 (1979); State v. Curry, Ohio Supr., 43 Ohio St.2d 66 , 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Alaska Interstate Company v. McMilliangreen1 sentence1986See, e.g., Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, D.Del., 402 F.Supp. 532 (1975); Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., D.Del., 388 F.Supp. 812 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nutt v. AC & S. CO., INC.
green
2 sentences2019Furthermore, such an approach ignores that the standard of proof is to a preponderance of the evidence 56 Id. at 694 . 57 See Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187, 188 (Ohio 1998) (holding that “[i]n Ohio, market-share liability is not an available theory of recovery in a products liability action”). 58 Nutt, 517 A.2d at 693 . 59 Richard E. 2019Furthermore, such an approach ignores that the standard of proof is to a preponderance of the evidence 56 Id. at 694 . 57 See Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187, 188 (Ohio 1998) (holding that “[i]n Ohio, market-share liability is not an available theory of recovery in a products liability action”). 58 Nutt, 517 A.2d at 693 . 59 Richard E. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Lange v. California
green
2 sentences2026Lange moved to suppress all evidence obtained after the officer entered his garage, arguing that the warrantless entry violated his Fourth Amendment Rights.”* The issue before the Supreme Court in Lange was whether to impose a blanket exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 21 Often referred to as “fresh pursuit.” 2 Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295 (2021). 3 Td. 2026At 299. 4 Td. 23 Id. 26 Td. 27 Lange, 594 U.S. at 299 . 28 Td. 10 warrant requirement for the flight of a suspected misdemeanant.”’ It refused to do so. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Tonnessen v. Denver Publishing Co.
green
1 sentence2025Mot. at 98. 503 Id. 504 Id. at 98-118. 505 Id. at 99-103. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Midcap
green
1 sentence2024Co. v. Gallagher, 102 A.2d 538 (Del. 1954). 164 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Midcap, 893 A.2d 542 (Del. 2006) 58 The Opinion did not announce a blanket rule that “every potential litigant in Delaware [must] undergo the costly and invasive process of creating full forensic images of every potential custodian’s phones every time they anticipate litigation.”165 The Opinion reiterated the longstanding rule that (i) a party who anticipates litigation has a duty to preserve potentially relevant information—including text messages—and (ii) reckless noncompliance with that duty can lead to sanctions. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher
green
1 sentence2024Co. v. Gallagher, 102 A.2d 538 (Del. 1954). 164 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Midcap, 893 A.2d 542 (Del. 2006) 58 The Opinion did not announce a blanket rule that “every potential litigant in Delaware [must] undergo the costly and invasive process of creating full forensic images of every potential custodian’s phones every time they anticipate litigation.”165 The Opinion reiterated the longstanding rule that (i) a party who anticipates litigation has a duty to preserve potentially relevant information—including text messages—and (ii) reckless noncompliance with that duty can lead to sanctions. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp.
green
2 sentences2019This decision merely concludes that the absence of MFW procedural protections might contribute to a credible basis. 90 Pl.’s Opening Br. at 25–26. 17 2017. 91 In 2016 alone, her direct compensation totaled almost $4.65 million— almost 60 percent of that amount came in the form of performance deferred share units (“PDSUs”) and stock options, as part of RBC’s mid and long-term incentive plan.92 RBC disclosed that, “[i]n light of her decision to retire early in 2017, Ms. Fukakusa elected to receive her equity award in the form of PDSUs.” 93 After she retired from her position at RBC, Ms. Fukakusa 2019This decision merely concludes that the absence of MFW procedural protections might contribute to a credible basis. 90 Pl.’s Opening Br. at 25–26. 17 2017. 91 In 2016 alone, her direct compensation totaled almost $4.65 million— almost 60 percent of that amount came in the form of performance deferred share units (“PDSUs”) and stock options, as part of RBC’s mid and long-term incentive plan.92 RBC disclosed that, “[i]n light of her decision to retire early in 2017, Ms. Fukakusa elected to receive her equity award in the form of PDSUs.” 93 After she retired from her position at RBC, Ms. Fukakusa | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Richards v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences1997More recently in Richards v. Wisconsin, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997), the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a blanket exception to the knock and announce rule existed for felony drug investigations. 1997More recently in Richards v. Wisconsin, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997), the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a blanket exception to the knock and announce rule existed for felony drug investigations. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Major
green
2 sentences1988See Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky.Supr., 685 S.W.2d 549 (1985); State v. Burchfield, Tenn.Supr., 664 S.W.2d 284 (1984); Commonwealth v. Shively, Pa. Supr., 492 Pa. 411 , 424 A.2d 1257 (1981) (overruling prior case law); People v. Major, Mich.Supr., 407 Mich. 394 , 285 N.W.2d 660 (1979); State v. Curry, Ohio Supr., 43 Ohio St.2d 66 , 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975). 1988See Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky.Supr., 685 S.W.2d 549 (1985); State v. Burchfield, Tenn.Supr., 664 S.W.2d 284 (1984); Commonwealth v. Shively, Pa. Supr., 492 Pa. 411 , 424 A.2d 1257 (1981) (overruling prior case law); People v. Major, Mich.Supr., 407 Mich. 394 , 285 N.W.2d 660 (1979); State v. Curry, Ohio Supr., 43 Ohio St.2d 66 , 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Commonwealth v. Shively
green
2 sentences1988See Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky.Supr., 685 S.W.2d 549 (1985); State v. Burchfield, Tenn.Supr., 664 S.W.2d 284 (1984); Commonwealth v. Shively, Pa. Supr., 492 Pa. 411 , 424 A.2d 1257 (1981) (overruling prior case law); People v. Major, Mich.Supr., 407 Mich. 394 , 285 N.W.2d 660 (1979); State v. Curry, Ohio Supr., 43 Ohio St.2d 66 , 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975). 1988See Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky.Supr., 685 S.W.2d 549 (1985); State v. Burchfield, Tenn.Supr., 664 S.W.2d 284 (1984); Commonwealth v. Shively, Pa. Supr., 492 Pa. 411 , 424 A.2d 1257 (1981) (overruling prior case law); People v. Major, Mich.Supr., 407 Mich. 394 , 285 N.W.2d 660 (1979); State v. Curry, Ohio Supr., 43 Ohio St.2d 66 , 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. Burchfield
green
1 sentence1988See Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky.Supr., 685 S.W.2d 549 (1985); State v. Burchfield, Tenn.Supr., 664 S.W.2d 284 (1984); Commonwealth v. Shively, Pa. Supr., 492 Pa. 411 , 424 A.2d 1257 (1981) (overruling prior case law); People v. Major, Mich.Supr., 407 Mich. 394 , 285 N.W.2d 660 (1979); State v. Curry, Ohio Supr., 43 Ohio St.2d 66 , 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. Curry
green
2 sentences1988See Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky.Supr., 685 S.W.2d 549 (1985); State v. Burchfield, Tenn.Supr., 664 S.W.2d 284 (1984); Commonwealth v. Shively, Pa. Supr., 492 Pa. 411 , 424 A.2d 1257 (1981) (overruling prior case law); People v. Major, Mich.Supr., 407 Mich. 394 , 285 N.W.2d 660 (1979); State v. Curry, Ohio Supr., 43 Ohio St.2d 66 , 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975). 1988See Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky.Supr., 685 S.W.2d 549 (1985); State v. Burchfield, Tenn.Supr., 664 S.W.2d 284 (1984); Commonwealth v. Shively, Pa. Supr., 492 Pa. 411 , 424 A.2d 1257 (1981) (overruling prior case law); People v. Major, Mich.Supr., 407 Mich. 394 , 285 N.W.2d 660 (1979); State v. Curry, Ohio Supr., 43 Ohio St.2d 66 , 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Denison Mines Limited v. Fibreboard Corporation
green
1 sentence1986See, e.g., Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, D.Del., 402 F.Supp. 532 (1975); Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., D.Del., 388 F.Supp. 812 (1974). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.