blanket privilege in District of Columbia

1986We further noted that the privileges may not be deemed to have b¿en properly invoked by a witness where an examination of the circumstances reveals that "a narrower assertion" rather than “a blanket privilege ... will protect his rights.” Id. at 785 (citing Vaughn v. United States, 364 A.2d 1187, 1189 (D.C.1976). .

1985Vaughn v. United States, 364 A.2d 1187, 1189 (D.C. 1976).

1997Wilson, supra, 558 A.2d at 1142 ; Jackson v. United States, 490 A.2d 192, 196 (D.C.1985).

1991Jackson v. United States, 490 A.2d 192, 195 (D.C.1985). 2 *763 A. Appellant contends first, that the questions that defense counsel would have asked Hopkins would merely have established that Hopkins was on the scene when appellant was arrested, a fact already established by the police officers’ testimony, and would only have concerned Hopkins’ observations of appellant, such as where appellant was standing, whether Hopkins had noticed a weapon on appellant, and whether he had observed appellant throw anything.

1979Walker v. Follette, 311 F.Supp. 490, 495 (S.D.N.Y.1970), aff’d, 443 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1971): While “opening the door” on direct may not amount to a blanket waiver, where as a matter of trial strategy a defendant himself decides to open up a sensitive area — whether because he hopes to draw the sting out of the prosecution’s case or because he mistakenly believes he has nothing to fear — he cannot expect the same measure of protection from cross-examination as when the prosecution initiates the inquiry. [33] The trial court apparently was of the opinion that the confinement of such inquiry to t

1977Walker v. Follette, 311 F.Supp. 490, 495 (S.D.N.Y.1970), aff’d, 443 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1971): While “opening the door” on direct may not amount to a blanket waiver, where as a matter of trial strategy a defendant himself decides to open up a sensitive area — whether he hopes to draw the sting out of the prosecution’s case or because he mistakenly believes he has nothing to fear — he cannot expect the same measure of protection from cross-examination as when the prosecution initiates the inquiry.

2012"A blanket privilege may be granted to the witness only when it is evident to the court that anything less will not adequately protect him." Id. (citations omitted).

2012“A blanket privilege may be granted to the witness only when it is evident to the court that anything less will not adequately protect him.” Id. (citations omitted).

1984Id. at 486 , 71 S.Ct. at 818 (Fifth Amendment protection for witnesses must be confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 , 88 S.Ct. 697, 705 , 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Letsinger v. United States, 402 A.2d 411, 416 (D.C.1979); Vaughn v. United States, 364 A.2d 1187, 1189 (D.C.1976).

1983Letsinger v. United States, supra, 402 A.2d at 416 ; United States v. Reese, 183 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 7 , 561 F.2d 894, 900 (1977).

1979We recognize that the Fifth Amendment privilege of a witness is narrower than that of a defendant, Alston v. United States, supra; United States v. Reese, 183 U.S.App.D.C. 1 , 561 F.2d 894 (1977), and that a witness may not assert a blanket privilege where a narrower privilege would suffice to protect his interests.

1979We recognize that the Fifth Amendment privilege of a witness is narrower than that of a defendant, Alston v. United States, supra; United States v. Reese, 183 U.S.App.D.C. 1 , 561 F.2d 894 (1977), and that a witness may not assert a blanket privilege where a narrower privilege would suffice to protect his interests.

2025That is because such a rule would “leave swindlers free to extinguish their victims’ remedies simply by sticking in a bit of boilerplate.” Id. (quoting Whelan v. Abell, 48 F.3d 1247, 1258 (D.C.

2014In Russell, the time between the incident and identification was much longer (at least an hour and twenty minutes) and the location of arrest more distant (a number of blocks), and the witness had been drinking. 17 A.3d 581, 583-84 (D.C. 2011).

2012"In order for prior testimony to be admissible, it must appear (1) that direct testimony from the declarant is unavailable; (2) that the declarant, when giving the prior testimony, was under oath in a legal proceeding; (3) that the issues in the two proceedings are substantially similar; and (4) that the party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity to cross examine the declarant at the earlier proceeding." Dudley v. United States, 715 A.2d 866, 867 (D.C.1998).

2006D.C. 29, 34, 733 F.2d 121, 126 (1984) (emphasis in original).

2000Under Milkovich , “statements of opinion can be actionable if they imply a provably false fact, or rely upon stated facts that are provably false.” Moldea II, supra, 306 U.S.App.D.C. at 10 , 22 F.3d at 313 . “[B]ut if it is plain that a speaker is expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in possession of objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable.” Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1227 (7th Cir.1993). “[A] statement of opinion is actionable only if it has an explicit or implicit factual foundat

2000Under Milkovich , “statements of opinion can be actionable if they imply a provably false fact, or rely upon stated facts that are provably false.” Moldea II, supra, 306 U.S.App.D.C. at 10 , 22 F.3d at 313 . “[B]ut if it is plain that a speaker is expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in possession of objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable.” Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1227 (7th Cir.1993). “[A] statement of opinion is actionable only if it has an explicit or implicit factual foundat

1993Cf. United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 850 (8th Cir.1992) (“a blanket rule permitting no-knock search warrants in all drug cases ... is patently unjustifiable and would invite unnecessarily violent and intrusive execution of many search warrants") 21 .

1993The [knock and announce] statute does not contain the seeds of such far-reaching self-destruction.”), quoted in Meyer v. United States, 386 F.2d 715, 717-18 (9th Cir.1967); Commonwealth v. Grubb, 407 Pa.Super. 78 , 595 A.2d 133, 136 (1991) (”[T]o accept the Commonwealth’s argument is to recognize a presumption whereby exigent circumstances sufficient to do away with the knock and announce rule would exist any time a search for drugs is conducted....

1993See People v. Gástelo, 67 Cal.2d 586 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 10, 12 , 432 P.2d 706, 708 (1967) (en banc) ("Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has held that unannounced forcible entries may be authorized by a blanket rule based on the type of crime or evidence involved....

1993See People v. Gástelo, 67 Cal.2d 586 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 10, 12 , 432 P.2d 706, 708 (1967) (en banc) ("Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has held that unannounced forcible entries may be authorized by a blanket rule based on the type of crime or evidence involved....

1993The [knock and announce] statute does not contain the seeds of such far-reaching self-destruction.”), quoted in Meyer v. United States, 386 F.2d 715, 717-18 (9th Cir.1967); Commonwealth v. Grubb, 407 Pa.Super. 78 , 595 A.2d 133, 136 (1991) (”[T]o accept the Commonwealth’s argument is to recognize a presumption whereby exigent circumstances sufficient to do away with the knock and announce rule would exist any time a search for drugs is conducted....

1993The [knock and announce] statute does not contain the seeds of such far-reaching self-destruction.”), quoted in Meyer v. United States, 386 F.2d 715, 717-18 (9th Cir.1967); Commonwealth v. Grubb, 407 Pa.Super. 78 , 595 A.2d 133, 136 (1991) (”[T]o accept the Commonwealth’s argument is to recognize a presumption whereby exigent circumstances sufficient to do away with the knock and announce rule would exist any time a search for drugs is conducted....

1991See Holbert v. United States, 513 A.2d 825, 829 (D.C.1986).

1984Id. at 486 , 71 S.Ct. at 818 (Fifth Amendment protection for witnesses must be confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 , 88 S.Ct. 697, 705 , 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Letsinger v. United States, 402 A.2d 411, 416 (D.C.1979); Vaughn v. United States, 364 A.2d 1187, 1189 (D.C.1976).

1984Id. at 486 , 71 S.Ct. at 818 (Fifth Amendment protection for witnesses must be confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 , 88 S.Ct. 697, 705 , 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Letsinger v. United States, 402 A.2d 411, 416 (D.C.1979); Vaughn v. United States, 364 A.2d 1187, 1189 (D.C.1976).

1979See Newman v. United States, 331 F.2d 968, 972-73 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 975 , 85 S.Ct. 672 , 13 L.Ed.2d 566 (1965).

1979See Newman v. United States, 331 F.2d 968, 972-73 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 975 , 85 S.Ct. 672 , 13 L.Ed.2d 566 (1965).