blanket exception in Indiana

2004John's Health Care Corp., 582 N.E.2d 464 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), we addressed a trial court's grant of a blanket claim of "peer review" privilege regarding hospital documents, holding that "the trial court should have conducted an in camera review on a document-by-document basis to determine whether the materials sought were protected by the peer review privilege." Id. at 474 .

2004John's Health Care Corp., 582 N.E.2d 464 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), we addressed a trial court's grant of a blanket claim of "peer review" privilege regarding hospital documents, holding that "the trial court should have conducted an in camera review on a document-by-document basis to determine whether the materials sought were protected by the peer review privilege." Id. at 474 .

2010Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997).

2010Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997).

2025As for exigent circumstances, Poland argues that they did not exist, that Mitchell does not create a blanket rule permitting warrantless blood draws in every case, and that the Court in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 , 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), “rejected a categorical rule that alcohol 12 In L.W., this Court addressed an accident involving a fatality and a juvenile who consented to a blood draw without being informed she had a right to consult with her mother. 199 N.E.3d at 1228.

2025As for exigent circumstances, Poland argues that they did not exist, that Mitchell does not create a blanket rule permitting warrantless blood draws in every case, and that the Court in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 , 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), “rejected a categorical rule that alcohol 12 In L.W., this Court addressed an accident involving a fatality and a juvenile who consented to a blood draw without being informed she had a right to consult with her mother. 199 N.E.3d at 1228.

2019At issue here is the interplay between Indiana Code Section 35-35-3-3(e) and Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-17(l). [7] Indiana Code Section 35-35-3-3(e) states: "If the court accepts a plea agreement, [the court] shall be bound by its terms." Berry v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1243 , 1246 (Ind. 2014) ; see Vaughn v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1071 , 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) ("A plea agreement is contractual in nature, binding the defendant, the State and the trial court."). [8] When Lopez filed his motion for sentence modification in January 2018, Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-17, which governs reduction or suspe

2019Id. [6] Lopez argues that, by finding that the plea agreement precluded modification of his sentence until 2021, the trial court permitted a blanket waiver of his right to sentence modification in violation of Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-17.

2016Instead, the court provided that autopsy reports may be testimonial “in the unusual case in which the police play a direct role ... and the purpose of the autopsy is clearly to provide evidence for use in a prosecution.” Id.

2007Instead, the Hartford court analyzed the totality of the circumstances in that case and concluded that because the insurer had provided the opposing party with the majority of the requested discovery and the privilege log sufficiently established the privileged nature of the remaining items, “it cannot be said that [the insurer] was asserting a blanket claim of privilege.” Id.

2004Therefore, in Kefalidis, we held that the trial court was obliged to consider the witnesses' claim of privilege in camera and on a question-by-question basis. - Kefalidis, 714 N.E.2d at 250 .

2002Id. *83 In examining the immunity provision relied upon by the school we determined that although the immunity did indeed apply to making an inadequate or negligent inspection of the grain elevator, this blanket immunity could not be "stretched far enough to cover the [school for any breach of duty owed to the children independent of an inspection." Id.

2002Id. *83 In examining the immunity provision relied upon by the school we determined that although the immunity did indeed apply to making an inadequate or negligent inspection of the grain elevator, this blanket immunity could not be "stretched far enough to cover the [school for any breach of duty owed to the children independent of an inspection." Id.

2001Purdy, 708 N.E.2d at 28-24 .

1999Exchange, 112 F.R.D. 699 (D.Mont.1986), where the court seemingly did apply a blanket exception to the attorney-client privilege in a first-party claim of bad faith against an insurer.

1999Id. at 404 .

1991A claim of the work product privilege must be asserted on a document by document basis, and a party "may not rely upon a blanket claim of privilege for all documents contained in its file." Burr, supra, 560 N.E.2d at 1255 .

1991A claim of the work product privilege must be asserted on a document by document basis, and a party "may not rely upon a blanket claim of privilege for all documents contained in its file." Burr, supra, 560 N.E.2d at 1255 .

1990UFB claims the recent Indiana case of Petersen v. U.S. Reduction Co. (1989), Ind.App., 547 N.E.2d 860 , holds a blanket claim of protection for the work product privilege is adequate.

1990Taroli, supra. Submitting a voluminous batch of documents for in camera review does not satisfy a proponent's burden of establishing some or all of the documents deserve work product protection.

1974Moreover, since our decision in Campbell v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 55 , 284 N. E. 2d 733 , restricts the blanket immunity once available to a government defendant, it is evident that the question of whether the defense is applicable *609 at all may well turn on the facts of a case and the specific position, responsibilities and duties of the particular defendants.