blanket rule in Massachusetts

2019There the court held that "[w]hile drug involvement certainly may be a relevant factor in assessment of threats to police safety, we are reluctant to adopt a blanket rule that all persons suspected of drug activity are to be presumed armed and dangerous for constitutional purposes." Washington , 449 Mass. at 482 -483 , 869 N.E.2d 605 .

2019There the court held that "[w]hile drug involvement certainly may be a relevant factor in assessment of threats to police safety, we are reluctant to adopt a blanket rule that all persons suspected of drug activity are to be presumed armed and dangerous for constitutional purposes." Washington , 449 Mass. at 482 -483 , 869 N.E.2d 605 .

2010Cf. Commonwealth v. Jimenez, 438 Mass. 213, 220 (2002) (general averment that it is common for drug dealers to possess firearms insufficient to establish probable cause for “no knock” search warrant); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 390-392 (1997).

2002After this “probable cause” standard was enshrined as oft-repeated dictum in the above cases, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Richards, supra. There, the Court was confronted with a State court decision that had created a blanket rule excepting all drug searches from the knock and announce requirement.

2009Cf. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 415 Mass. 447, 450 (1993) (fact that drugs are involved is not alone sufficient to give rise to probable cause to believe that police knocking and announcing their presence would endanger officer safety or lead to destruction of evidence).

2007See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 415 Mass. 447, 450 (1993) (fact that drugs are involved is insufficient, in itself, to justify “no-knock” warrant).

2024Rather, as explained in Cook v. Patient Edu, LLC, 465 Mass. 548, 553 (2013), that language "imposes individual liability" on the identified public officers if they fail to make payment of wages in accordance with the statute.

2024Rather, as explained in Cook v. Patient Edu, LLC, 465 Mass. 548, 553 (2013), that language "imposes individual liability" on the identified public officers if they fail to make payment of wages in accordance with the statute. 1 According to the amended complaint, Bucca "last worked as an Assisted Living Ombudsman" for the Executive Office of Health and Human Services.

1993We have recognized the importance to a prospective landlord of information about a DMH-referred tenant in Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, 408 Mass. 605, 613 (1990), S.C., 411 Mass. 657 (1992), wherein we held that the DMH has a duty to provide a landlord “with sufficient information [about a DMH client] to enable [the landlord] to protect his property.” Id. at 610.

1993We have recognized the importance to a prospective landlord of information about a DMH-referred tenant in Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, 408 Mass. 605, 613 (1990), S.C., 411 Mass. 657 (1992), wherein we held that the DMH has a duty to provide a landlord "with sufficient information [about a DMH client] to enable [the landlord] to protect his property." Id. at 610.

2024Such a waiver is limited to “what has been put at issue” in the case; it does not constitute “a blanket waiver of the entire attorney-client privilege.” Clair, 464 Mass. at 219 , quoting Darius, 433 Mass. at 283 .

2022"An 'at issue' waiver, in circumstances where it is recognized, should not be tantamount to a blanket waiver of the entire attorney-client privilege in the case." Darius, supra at 283 .

2024The MTCA, however, "is not a blanket waiver of protection." Shapiro v. Worcester, 464 Mass. 261, 270 (2013).

2021See Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Cambridge, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 495-496 ; Chongris v. Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 999 , 999 (1984).

2017However, it is not for this court to determine whether the present case, or other circumstances, 3 Although the defendant derived a benefit from the delay, the eighty-one day continuance was not prudent in view of the age of the case. 4 Where the defendant claimed on consecutive days that the composition of the jury venire deprived him of a fair trial and moved to dismiss the venire, he cannot claim that the benefit of the continuance was a "hindsight claim." See Rodgers, 448 Mass. at 547 ("Hindsight claims that a defendant benefited from delay should not override his express statement that he

2017However, it is not for this court to determine whether the present case, or other circumstances, 3 Although the defendant derived a benefit from the delay, the eighty-one day continuance was not prudent in view of the age of the case. 4 Where the defendant claimed on consecutive days that the composition of the jury venire deprived him of a fair trial and moved to dismiss the venire, he cannot claim that the benefit of the continuance was a "hindsight claim." See Rodgers, 448 Mass. at 547 ("Hindsight claims that a defendant benefited from delay should not override his express statement that he

2010Cf. Commonwealth v. Jimenez, 438 Mass. 213, 220 (2002) (general averment that it is common for drug dealers to possess firearms insufficient to establish probable cause for “no knock” search warrant); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 390-392 (1997).

2008“Under art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights], we apply broad standards, consistent with Federal standards, in determining whether a claim of privilege [against self-incrimination] is justified.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 502 (1996).

2001See Commonwealth v. Brito, 390 Mass. 112, 119 (1983) (“Once such a charge [of ineffectiveness of counsel] is made, the attorney-client privilege may be treated as waived at least in part, but trial counsel’s obligation may continue to preserve confidences whose disclosure is not relevant to the defense of the charge of his ineffectiveness as counsel”). c.

1999See Richter v. Analex Corp., 940 F. Supp. 353, 357-358 (D.D.C. 1996) (successor corporation purchased predecessor corporation’s assets and liabilities, including malpractice claims); Hedlund Mfg.