blanket claim in Colorado

2021However, for the reasons discussed below, we answer this question in the affirmative. ¶ 32 It is well established that the privilege against self- incrimination “is an option of a refusal, not a prohibition of inquiry,” and thus it “may not be asserted as a blanket claim in 17 advance of the questions actually propounded.” Ruch, ¶ 23, 379 P.3d at 313 (quoting People v. Austin, 159 Colo. 445, 450 , 412 P.2d 425, 427 (1966)).

2021However, for the reasons discussed below, we answer this question in the affirmative. ¶ 32 It is well established that the privilege against self- incrimination “is an option of a refusal, not a prohibition of inquiry,” and thus it “may not be asserted as a blanket claim in 17 advance of the questions actually propounded.” Ruch, ¶ 23, 379 P.3d at 313 (quoting People v. Austin, 159 Colo. 445, 450 , 412 P.2d 425, 427 (1966)).

2016See Austin, 412 P.2d at 427 ; Feigin, 789 P.2d at 480 ; see also Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013) (plurality opinion) (noting that a witness who desires the privilege’s protection generally must claim the privilege at the time he or she relies on it); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682, 685 (5th Cir. 1974) (“A ‘blanket’ refusal to answer all questions is unacceptable.”) (collecting cases); 2A Charles Alan Wright & Peter J.

2016See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2179 (plurality opinion); Malnik, 489 F.2d at 685 ; Austin, 412 P.2d at 427 ; Feigin, 789 P.2d at 480 .

2016See Austin, 412 P.2d at 427 ; Feigin, 789 P.2d at 480 ; see also Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013) (plurality opinion) (noting that a witness who desires the privilege’s protection generally must claim the privilege at the time he or she relies on it); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682, 685 (5th Cir. 1974) (“A ‘blanket’ refusal to answer all questions is unacceptable.”) (collecting cases); 2A Charles Alan Wright & Peter J.

2016See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2179 (plurality opinion); Malnik, 489 F.2d at 685 ; Austin, 412 P.2d at 427 ; Feigin, 789 P.2d at 480 .

2016See People v. Porter, 2015 CO 34, 19 , 348 P.3d 922, 924 (noting that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions prevent a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal); Ez Parte Critchlow, 11 Cal.2d 751 , 81 P.2d 966, 971 (1938) ("The petitioner may not invoke the constitutional privilege [against self-incrimination] when the answers she might give would reveal an offense of which she had been acquitted, for the reason necessarily that the testimony could not [sic] longer incriminate her, and she is not excused from answering."). 182 For these reaso

2016See People v. Porter, 2015 CO 34, ¶ 9 , 348 P.3d 922, 924 (noting that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions prevent a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal); Ex Parte Critchlow, 81 P.2d 966, 971 (Cal. 1938) (“The petitioner may not invoke the constitutional privilege [against self-incrimination] when the answers she might give would reveal an offense of which she had been acquitted, for the reason necessarily that the testimony could not [sic] longer incriminate her, and she is not excused from answering.”). ¶32 For these reasons, we con

2016See People v. Porter, 2015 CO 34, ¶ 9 , 348 P.3d 922, 924 (noting that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions prevent a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal); Ex Parte Critchlow, 81 P.2d 966, 971 (Cal. 1938) (“The petitioner may not invoke the constitutional privilege [against self-incrimination] when the answers she might give would reveal an offense of which she had been acquitted, for the reason necessarily that the testimony could not [sic] longer incriminate her, and she is not excused from answering.”). ¶32 For these reasons, we con

2016See People v. Porter, 2015 CO 34, ¶ 9 , 348 P.3d 922, 924 (noting that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions prevent a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal); Ex Parte Critchlow, 81 P.2d 966, 971 (Cal. 1938) (“The petitioner may not invoke the constitutional privilege [against self-incrimination] when the answers she might give would reveal an offense of which she had been acquitted, for the reason necessarily that the testimony could not [sic] longer incriminate her, and she is not excused from answering.”). ¶32 For these reasons, we con

2016Henning, Federal Practice & Procedure: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure § 407, at 71 & n.39 (4th ed.2009) (same) 2 < 24 Allowing the Fifth Amendment privilege to be asserted as a blanket claim in anticipation of questions actually propounded would 'impermissibly convert the privilege from a constitutionally justified option of refusal into a prohibition against inquiry, Feigin, 789 P.2d at 480 . 1 25 Here, the People assert that the division below erred in concluding that requiring Ruch to attend sex offender treatment violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

2016See Austin, 412 P.2d at 427 ; Feigin, 789 P.2d at 480 ; see also Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013) (plurality opinion) (noting that a witness who desires the privilege’s protection generally must claim the privilege at the time he or she relies on it); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682, 685 (5th Cir. 1974) (“A ‘blanket’ refusal to answer all questions is unacceptable.”) (collecting cases); 2A Charles Alan Wright & Peter J.

2025See Ardolino, 69 P.3d at 77 . 6 To the extent that Finch contests the postconviction court’s quoted findings, he argues that, as a blanket rule, a hearing is necessary so that his counsel and an unnamed expert could testify about whether counsel’s performance was deficient.

2024Brooks doesn’t present any evidence or argument challenging CDOC’s reasoning. 5 ¶ 16 And while a blanket rule barring inmate access to video evidence in all cases likely wouldn’t pass constitutional muster, see Lennear, 937 F.3d at 270-71 (inmate rights to access videos must be assessed on an individualized basis, and categorical or absolute prohibitions don’t satisfy due process), we discern no due process violation in this case.

2021Rather, as the Colorado Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he proper procedure” when invoking the privilege “is to wait until a question which tends to be incriminating has been asked and then decline to answer.” Austin, 159 Colo. at 450 , 412 P.2d at 427 ; accord People in Interest of I.O., 713 P.2d 396, 397 (Colo. App. 1985).

2017Id. at 46, 49 .

2016See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1968). ¶ 34 But we think that this concern can be accommodated without subjecting police officers to substantial risk of serious injury or death when transporting a person in a police vehicle by focusing, like the courts in the cases discussed above, on the circumstances of the encounter between the police officer and the individual.

2012See, e.g., United States v. Glenn, 152 F.3d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir.1998) ("An officer's decision to place a traffic offender. in the back of a patrol car does not create a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a pat-down search that the circumstances would not otherwise allow."); Wilson v. State, 745 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ind.2001) (declining to hold that the Fourth Amendment allows police routinely to place traffic stop detainees in a police vehicle if this necessarily subjects the detainee to a pat-down search); State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn.1998) (rejecting a blanket rule that

2012See, e.g., United States v. Glenn, 152 F.3d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir.1998) ("An officer's decision to place a traffic offender. in the back of a patrol car does not create a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a pat-down search that the circumstances would not otherwise allow."); Wilson v. State, 745 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ind.2001) (declining to hold that the Fourth Amendment allows police routinely to place traffic stop detainees in a police vehicle if this necessarily subjects the detainee to a pat-down search); State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn.1998) (rejecting a blanket rule that

2012See, e.g., United States v. Glenn, 152 F.3d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir.1998) ("An officer's decision to place a traffic offender. in the back of a patrol car does not create a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a pat-down search that the circumstances would not otherwise allow."); Wilson v. State, 745 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ind.2001) (declining to hold that the Fourth Amendment allows police routinely to place traffic stop detainees in a police vehicle if this necessarily subjects the detainee to a pat-down search); State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn.1998) (rejecting a blanket rule that

2012See, e.g., United States v. Glenn, 152 F.3d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir.1998) ("An officer's decision to place a traffic offender. in the back of a patrol car does not create a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a pat-down search that the circumstances would not otherwise allow."); Wilson v. State, 745 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ind.2001) (declining to hold that the Fourth Amendment allows police routinely to place traffic stop detainees in a police vehicle if this necessarily subjects the detainee to a pat-down search); State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn.1998) (rejecting a blanket rule that

2005See Krahn, 538 N.E.2d at 1062 (“We reject the suggestion that a proximate cause analysis can be eliminated and replaced by a rule of thumb based on whether the malpractice plaintiff has succeeded in overturning the underlying criminal conviction.”). *137 Having determined that the existing elements of a malpractice claim do not dictate that a criminal defendant must obtain post-conviction relief before he or she can maintain suit, we now consider whether other reasons compel adoption of such a requirement.

2005Mountain States Tel., 780 P.2d at 543 -44 (quoting League v. Vanice, 221 Neb. 34, 44 , 374 N.W.2d 849, 856 (1985)).

2005Mountain States Tel., 780 P.2d at 543 -44 (quoting League v. Vanice, 221 Neb. 34, 44 , 374 N.W.2d 849, 856 (1985)).