blanket rule in Ohio

2007Id." Summers v. Slivinsky , 141 Ohio App.3d 82 , 86-87 , 2001-Ohio-3169 (overruled on other grounds), Allied Erecting Dismantling Co., Inc. v. Youngstown , 151 Ohio App.3d 16 , 2002-Ohio-5179 . {¶ 12} Under the first tier, Doolittle concedes that the Board of Health is a political subdivision pursuant to R.C. 2744.01 (F) and thus, is entitled to the blanket immunity as set forth in R.C. 2744.02 (A)(1).

2007Id." Summers v. Slivinsky, 141 Ohio App.3d 82 , 86-87 , 2001-Ohio-3169 (overruled on other grounds), Allied Erecting Dismantling Co., Inc. v. Youngstown, 151 Ohio App.3d 16 , 2002-Ohio-5179 . {¶ 12} Under the first tier, Doolittle concedes that the Board of Health is a political subdivision pursuant to R.C. 2744.01 (F) and thus, is entitled to the blanket immunity as set forth in R.C. 2744.02 (A)(1).

2007Id." Summers v. Slivinsky , 141 Ohio App.3d 82 , 86-87 , 2001-Ohio-3169 (overruled on other grounds), Allied Erecting Dismantling Co., Inc. v. Youngstown , 151 Ohio App.3d 16 , 2002-Ohio-5179 . {¶ 12} Under the first tier, Doolittle concedes that the Board of Health is a political subdivision pursuant to R.C. 2744.01 (F) and thus, is entitled to the blanket immunity as set forth in R.C. 2744.02 (A)(1).

2007Id." Summers v. Slivinsky, 141 Ohio App.3d 82 , 86-87 , 2001-Ohio-3169 (overruled on other grounds), Allied Erecting Dismantling Co., Inc. v. Youngstown, 151 Ohio App.3d 16 , 2002-Ohio-5179 . {¶ 12} Under the first tier, Doolittle concedes that the Board of Health is a political subdivision pursuant to R.C. 2744.01 (F) and thus, is entitled to the blanket immunity as set forth in R.C. 2744.02 (A)(1).

2005Furthermore, this Court has previously held that a governmental entity "need not have been acting in a discretionary manner in order to invoke the broad blanket immunity provided by R.C. 2744.02 (A)(1)." Feitshans v. Darke County (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 14 , 22 , 686 N.E.2d 536 .

2005Furthermore, this Court has previously held that a governmental entity "need not have been acting in a discretionary manner in order to invoke the broad blanket immunity provided by R.C. 2744.02 (A)(1)." Feitshans v. Darke County (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 14 , 22 , 686 N.E.2d 536 .

2002A blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to compensate for what is taken.” (Emphasis added and citations omitted.) Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626-628 , 121 S.Ct. at 2462-2463 , 150 L.Ed.2d at 613-614 .

2002A blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to compensate for what is taken.” (Emphasis added and citations omitted.) Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626-628 , 121 S.Ct. at 2462-2463 , 150 L.Ed.2d at 613-614 .

2000R.C. 2744.03 (A) (6) (a-c); Harris v. Kennedy (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 687 , 691 .

1999R.C. § 2744.03 (A)(6) (a-c); Harris v. Kennedy (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 687 , 691 .

2026Notably, perceivability was absent from the “physical defect” definition set out in Hoskins. 3 The School District argues, in its appellate brief, “[o]ne cannot determine or perceive the ‘hardness’ of [the sand in the pit] simply by feeling on one’s skin that the ambient air temperature is cold and observing that the surface of the sand may not have been raked.” (Emphasis added.) 2026-Ohio-1225, at ¶ 16 .

2025Instead, in determining whether a juror was actually biased, a reviewing court must consider the entire record and determine whether it demonstrates that the juror was actually biased against the defendant. {¶ 55} In support of his argument, Rogers relies on three cases—Johnson v. Armontrout, 961 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1992), Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2001), and Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992)—in which courts in other contexts found collective responses by prospective jurors inadequate, by themselves, to ensure impartiality.

2025Instead, in determining whether a juror was actually biased, a reviewing court must consider the entire record and determine whether it demonstrates that the juror was actually biased against the defendant. {¶ 55} In support of his argument, Rogers relies on three cases—Johnson v. Armontrout, 961 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1992), Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2001), and Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992)—in which courts in other contexts found collective responses by prospective jurors inadequate, by themselves, to ensure impartiality.

2025Instead, in determining whether a juror was actually biased, a reviewing court must consider the entire record and determine whether it demonstrates that the juror was actually biased against the defendant. {¶ 55} In support of his argument, Rogers relies on three cases—Johnson v. Armontrout, 961 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1992), Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2001), and Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992)—in which courts in other contexts found collective responses by prospective jurors inadequate, by themselves, to ensure impartiality.

2022State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 142 , 689 N.E.2d 929 (1998) (determining that the admission of hearsay was “[n]onconstitutional error”5 even though there was no Confrontation Clause violation because the declarant testified).

2022State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 142 , 689 N.E.2d 929 (1998) (determining that the admission of hearsay was “[n]onconstitutional error”5 even though there was no Confrontation Clause violation because the declarant testified).

2021In re B.E., 102 Ohio St.3d 388 , 2004-Ohio-3361 . {¶19} The supreme court rejected the blanket rule that an App.R. 9(C) statement may never be used where a court fails to comply with its recording obligation.

2019See, e.g., Civ.R. 64 (preserving remedies providing “for seizure of person or property” for the purposes of securing satisfaction of judgment during course of an action); Civ.R. 65 (providing for preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders); Sauer v. Cox, 5 Ohio N.P. 460 , 7 Ohio Dec. 507 , 508, 1897 Ohio Misc.

2018Group, 113 Ohio St.3d 323 , 2007-Ohio- 2071, ¶7, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1149 (8th Ed.2004). {¶27} In adopting appellees’ position regarding the parol evidence rule, the trial court essentially established a blanket rule that all the elements must be satisfied within the document in every case.

2018Gessner v. Vore , 123 Ohio St.3d 96 , 2009-Ohio-4150 , 914 N.E.2d 376 , ¶ 5. " 'It is well established that pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures and that they are held to the same standard as litigants who are represented by counsel.' " (Italics sic.) State ex rel.

2018Gessner v. Vore , 123 Ohio St.3d 96 , 2009-Ohio-4150 , 914 N.E.2d 376 , ¶ 5. " 'It is well established that pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures and that they are held to the same standard as litigants who are represented by counsel.' " (Italics sic.) State ex rel.

2017Id. {¶ 25} White was a death penalty case in which the Kentucky Supreme Court originally found no error in the trial court’s denial, during the sentencing phase, of a blanket instruction that the defendant was “ ‘not compelled to testify and the fact that the defendant did not testify should not prejudice him in any way.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 1704.

2017Miami No. 2015-CA-28, 2016-Ohio-5647 , 2016 WL 4591377 , ¶ 9 ; see also R.C. 2953.08(D)(1).

2014Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542 , 552-553, 130 S. Ct. 1662 , 176 L.

2014Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542 , 552-553, 130 S. Ct. 1662 , 176 L.

2014Portage No. 2002-P-0109, 2003-Ohio-6685, ¶ 18 . {¶28} We are mindful that a blanket rule requiring a hearing every time an objecting party invokes the talismanic words of Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) could lead to an abuse of that rule.

2012No. 94649, 2011-Ohio-3380, ¶ 16 , citing Bedford v. Clark, 8th Dist.