85 Texas opinions name it 5 courts 1929–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Crudupgreen2 sentences2016See Pope, 207 S.W.3d at 357-58 ; Woodruff, 330 S.W.3d at 728-29 . “[T]he work product privilege does not operate as a blanket privilege covering all decisions made by the DA’s Office.” In re Crudup, 179 S.W.3d 47, 50 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, orig. proceeding), mand. granted on other grounds sub nom. 2010However, the scope of the defense’s request was not limited solely to core work product. “[T]he work-product privilege does not operate as a blanket privilege covering all decisions made by the DA’s Office.” In re Crudup, 179 S.W.3d 47, 50 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, orig. proceeding), mand. granted on other grounds sub nom., In re Bexar County Crim. | 4 | 4 |
Richards v. Wisconsingreen2 sentences2002Were we to accept such a statement as a justification for a no-knock entry, we would effectively resurrect the blanket exception rejected by the Supreme Court in Richards . 520 U.S. at 387 B 88. 2002Other approaches provided for a blanket exception based on the assumption, usually viable in narcotics cases, that evidence could always be easily and rapidly discarded Two years after Wilson , in Richards v. Wisconsin , the Supreme Court adopted the first approach and rejected the latter, holding: In order to justify a A no-knock @ entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances , would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destru | 3 | 7 |
United States v. John Dohmgreen2 sentences2010But see United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 237 (1st Cir. 1987) (describing bail hearings as “a fundamentally different breed of cat” from suppression hearings in that the accused’s bail rights are not so contingent on his ability to speak without fear of the future use of his 27 testimony that he must be granted a blanket immunity from use of all statements made during an initial hearing, particularly as the information may in large part be concerned with the accused’s employment record, family status, ties to the community, and information about the charged crime can usually be obtained 2010But see United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 237 (1st Cir.1987) (describing bail hearings as “a fundamentally different breed of cat” from suppression hearings in that the accused’s bail rights are not so contingent on his ability to speak without fear of the future use of his testimony that he must be granted a blanket immunity from use of all statements made during an initial hearing, particularly as the information may in large part be concerned with the accused’s employment record, family status, ties to the community, and information about the charged crime can usually be obtained fro | 3 | 3 |
Ozuna v. Southwest Bio-Clinical Laboratoriesgreen2 sentences2005See Ozuna, 766 S.W.2d at 902-03 . 2005See Ozuna , 766 S.W.2d at 902-03 . | 3 | 3 |
Matter of Rlhgreen2 sentences1999See id. at 702-03 . 1999See id. at 702-03 . | 3 | 3 |
Broyles v. Lawrencegreen2 sentences2004Broyles v. Lawrence, 632 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, no writ) (holding purchase price in deed could be reformed after statute of limitations period had run because amount of land stated in deed was incorrect). 2004Broyles v. Lawrence , 632 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tex. App.--Austin 1982, no writ) (holding purchase price in deed could be reformed after statute of limitations period had run because amount of land stated in deed was incorrect). | 2 | 3 |
Lorenza Andre Sam v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See Hernandez v. State, No. 07-14-00417-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8054 , at *2 n.4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 30, 2015, order) (citing Sam v. State, 467 S.W.3d 685, 687-88 , (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). 2015See Sam v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 14-13-0840-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 5167 at *3 th (Tex. App.—Houston [14 Dist.] May 21, 2015, no pet.) (not yet released for publication); Chandler v. State, 988 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Water Exploration Co. v. Bexar Metropolitan Water Districtgreen2 sentences2011Water Exploration Co., 345 S.W.3d at 501 (in affirming grant of plea to jurisdiction, San Antonio reasoned, ―[h]ad the Legislature intended to waive immunity for all contracts entered into by the State, it would have so stated‖) (citing E. 2011Water Exploration Co., 345 S.W.3d at 501 (in affirming grant of plea to jurisdiction, San Antonio reasoned, “[h]ad the Legislature intended to waive immunity for all contracts entered into by the State, it would have so stated”) (citing E. | 2 | 2 |
City of Houston v. Gloria Esparzagreen2 sentences2011Esparza, 369 S.W.3d at 252 . 2011Espar-za, 369 S.W.3d at 250 . | 2 | 2 |
Heitman v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 , 690 n. 23 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). 2010See Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 , 690 n. 23 (Tex.Crim. | 2 | 2 |
In Re J.O.A.green2 sentences2009In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 339 (Tex. 2009). 2009In re J.O.A ., 283 S.W.3d 336, 339 (Tex. 2009). | 2 | 2 |
Roska Ex Rel. Roska v. Petersongreen2 sentences2002Other approaches provided for a blanket exception *362 based on the assumption, usually viable in narcotics cases, that evidence could always be easily and rapidly discarded Two years after Wilson⅝ in Richards v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court adopted the first approach and rejected the latter, holding: In order to justify a “no-knock” entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing then-presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruc 2002Other approaches provided for a blanket exception based on the assumption, usually viable in narcotics cases, that evidence could always be easily and rapidly discarded Two years after Wilson , in Richards v. Wisconsin , the Supreme Court adopted the first approach and rejected the latter, holding: In order to justify a A no-knock @ entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances , would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destru | 2 | 2 |
Travelers Insurance Company v. Woodardgreen2 sentences2001The trial court did not permit the defense to reveal her refusal to the jury, and the appellate court agreed, stating "we do not believe there is anything in the rules requiring a party to grant his adversary the right to have access to the files of his doctors and other witnesses, together with the right to interrogate them outside of his presence and hearing." 461 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex.Civ.App.Tyler 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 2001The trial court did not permit the defense to reveal her refusal to the jury, and the appellate court agreed, stating “we do not believe there is anything in the rules requiring a party to grant his adversary the right to have access to the files of his doctors and other witnesses, together with the right to interrogate them outside of his presence and hearing.” 461 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.). | 2 | 2 |
Zachry Construction Corporation v. Port of Houston Authority of Harris County, Texasgreen2 sentences2025Auth. of Harris Cty., 449 S.W.3d 98 , 109–111 (Tex. 2014) (“Zachry”), which confirms that the Act does not create a blanket waiver of immunity for any and all claims, damage theories, and relief that in any way “relate to” a contract that qualifies under the Act, but instead applies only to specific claims, for specific types of damages, and specific types of equitable relief. 2025Zachry, 449 S.W.3d at 109 . 19 The graphic below depicts the proper interrelationship of the statutory immunity waiver in the Act and its other limiting provisions: 20 Because the Act does not waive immunity for consequential damages or equitable relief that is not expressly listed in Section 271.153, the trial court erred when it denied the Fund’s Jurisdictional Plea and granted the College’s MSJ (and implicitly denied the jurisdictional arguments in the Fund’s MSJ). | 1 | 2 |
in Re Rsr Corporation and Quemetco Metals Limited, Inc.green1 sentence2026See Zaidi, 732 S.W.3d at 539 (“A disputed fact issue on intention precludes mandamus relief, as ‘we may not make factual determinations in mandamus proceedings.’” (quoting RSR I, 475 S.W.3d at 778 )); see also State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d at 604 . | 1 | 1 |
in Re State Farm Lloydsgreen1 sentence2026See Zaidi, 732 S.W.3d at 539 (“A disputed fact issue on intention precludes mandamus relief, as ‘we may not make factual determinations in mandamus proceedings.’” (quoting RSR I, 475 S.W.3d at 778 )); see also State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d at 604 . | 1 | 1 |
City of Galveston v. Stategreen1 sentence2025See Zachry, 449 S.W.3d at 106, 109-110 ; City of Galveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Tex. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
Texas Parks & Wildlife Department v. Sawyer Trustgreen1 sentence2025See Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011) (“The UDJA does not enlarge a trial court’s jurisdiction and does not waive immunity when the plaintiff seeks to impose liability on the State.”). | 1 | 1 |
Banker v. Bankergreen1 sentence2023See Banker, 517 S.W.3d at 878–80 (declining to adopt the rule that new evidence does not constitute newly discovered evidence and instead holding that the new evidence was cumulative). | 1 | 1 |
| Will v. Michigan Department of State Policegreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Rockwall v. Hughesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Texas a & M University System v. Koseoglugreen | 1 | 1 |
| Potka v. Potkagreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re the Marriage of Brandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rice v. Pinneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Medina v. Herreragreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pope v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jerome Delatorre v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. Hoffmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| PDK Laboratories Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement Administrationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| VanDevender v. Woodsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte Reedygreen | 1 | 1 |
| CITY OF NORTH RICHLAND HILLS v. Friendgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jane Uche Amadi, Constance Nnadi, and World Anointing Center Ministries, Inc. v. City of Houstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ramirez v. Fifth Club, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Dupree v. Piggly Wiggly Shop Rite Foods, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Blanco v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| King v. Grahamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Robert Christopher Ingraham A/K/A Arthur Robert MacKeilgreen2 sentences2010But see United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 237 (1st Cir. 1987) (describing bail hearings as “a fundamentally different breed of cat” from suppression hearings in that the accused’s bail rights are not so contingent on his ability to speak without fear of the future use of his 27 testimony that he must be granted a blanket immunity from use of all statements made during an initial hearing, particularly as the information may in large part be concerned with the accused’s employment record, family status, ties to the community, and information about the charged crime can usually be obtained 2010But see United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 237 (1st Cir.1987) (describing bail hearings as “a fundamentally different breed of cat” from suppression hearings in that the accused’s bail rights are not so contingent on his ability to speak without fear of the future use of his testimony that he must be granted a blanket immunity from use of all statements made during an initial hearing, particularly as the information may in large part be concerned with the accused’s employment record, family status, ties to the community, and information about the charged crime can usually be obtained fro | 3 | 3 |
Spencer v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2010But see United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 237 (1st Cir. 1987) (describing bail hearings as “a fundamentally different breed of cat” from suppression hearings in that the accused’s bail rights are not so contingent on his ability to speak without fear of the future use of his 27 testimony that he must be granted a blanket immunity from use of all statements made during an initial hearing, particularly as the information may in large part be concerned with the accused’s employment record, family status, ties to the community, and information about the charged crime can usually be obtained 2010But see United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 237 (1st Cir.1987) (describing bail hearings as “a fundamentally different breed of cat” from suppression hearings in that the accused’s bail rights are not so contingent on his ability to speak without fear of the future use of his testimony that he must be granted a blanket immunity from use of all statements made during an initial hearing, particularly as the information may in large part be concerned with the accused’s employment record, family status, ties to the community, and information about the charged crime can usually be obtained fro | 3 | 3 |
| Iron Boy v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whaley v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kirby Lake Development, Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Authority
green
2 sentences2011It also cited the bill analysis, in which supporters of the bill had explained that a local governmental entity’s blanket immunity from breach of contract claims had “create[d] a fundamentally unfair situation that denie[d] redress, for example, to a contractor who completed a project for a city that refused to pay.” Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd., 320 S.W.3d at 838 n. 2 (citing House Research Organization, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B.2039, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005)). 2010It also cited the bill analysis, in which supporters of the bill had explained that a local governmental entity’s blanket immunity from breach of contract claims had “create[d] a fundamentally unfair situation that denie[d] redress, for example, to a contractor who completed a project for a city that refused to pay.” Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. , 320 S.W.3d at 838 n.2 (citing House Research Organization, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2039, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005)). | 2 | 2010–2011 |
Gregg v. State
green
2 sentences2009Instead, we read Gregg as holding that, in light of the flagrant and coercive misconduct of the law-enforcement personnel, Gregg’s confession could not be said to have been “the product of a free will.” See Gregg, 667 S.W.2d at 129 ; Brown, 422 U.S. at 603 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 . 2009Instead, we read Gregg as holding that, in light of the flagrant and coercive misconduct of the law-enforcement personnel, Gregg = s confession could not be said to have been A the product of a free will. @ See Gregg , 667 S.W.2d at 129 ; Brown , 422 U.S. at 603 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Brown v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2009However, Gregg did not announce a blanket rule that, as a matter of law, confronting an accused with untainted incriminating evidence cannot be a legitimate intervening event in any ease. 4 After all, whether a confession was produced by free will must be answered upon the facts of each case and does not rely on a “talismanic test.” See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 . 2009However, Gregg did not announce a blanket rule that, as a matter of law, confronting an accused with untainted incriminating evidence cannot be a legitimate intervening event in any ease. 4 After all, whether a confession was produced by free will must be answered upon the facts of each case and does not rely on a “talismanic test.” See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Alexander v. State
green
2 sentences1981App., 478 S.W.2d 958 (1972); Kemp v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 158 , 247 S.W.2d 398 ; Alexander v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 476 S.W.2d 10 (1972).’ “In the case at bar the testimony quoted above constituted a blanket claim that appellant had never asked Green to buy any LSD at the pool hall in Jacksonville, thus authorizing evidence of an extraneous delivery of LSD at that pool hall in rebuttal. ... ” Id. at 123 and 124. 1981App., 478 S.W.2d 958 (1972); Kemp v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 158 , 247 S.W.2d 398 ; Alexander v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 476 S.W.2d 10 (1972).’ “In the case at bar the testimony quoted above constituted a blanket claim that appellant had never asked Green to buy any LSD at the pool hall in Jacksonville, thus authorizing evidence of an extraneous delivery of LSD at that pool hall in rebuttal. ... ” Id. at 123 and 124. | 2 | 1980–1981 |
Davis v. State
green
2 sentences1981App., 478 S.W.2d 958 (1972); Kemp v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 158 , 247 S.W.2d 398 ; Alexander v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 476 S.W.2d 10 (1972).’ “In the case at bar the testimony quoted above constituted a blanket claim that appellant had never asked Green to buy any LSD at the pool hall in Jacksonville, thus authorizing evidence of an extraneous delivery of LSD at that pool hall in rebuttal. ... ” Id. at 123 and 124. 1980Davis v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 478 S.W.2d 958 (1972); Kemp v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 158 , 247 S.W.2d 398 ; Alexander v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 476 S.W.2d 10 (1972).” In the case at bar the testimony quoted above constituted a blanket claim that appellant had never asked Green to buy any LSD at the pool hall in Jacksonville, 1 thus authorizing evidence of an extraneous delivery of LSD at that pool hall in rebuttal. | 2 | 1980–1981 |
Hamilton v. State
green
2 sentences1981There, it was stated: “In Hamilton v. State, 480 S.W.2d 685 [Tex.Cr.App.], this Court stated the rule applicable to the situation presented in the instant case: *552 “ ‘On direct examination, appellant made the blanket claim that he had “never been inside a burglary before, I didn’t know nothing about how to rob or nothing.” On cross-examination he reiterated this statement whereupon the prosecutor questioned him concerning other robberies in which he was identified as a participant. 1980“A. No, sir.” In Hamilton v. State, 480 S.W.2d 685 , this Court stated the rule applicable to the situation presented in the instant case: “On direct examination, appellant made the blanket claim that he had ‘never been inside a burglary before, I didn’t know nothing about how to rob or nothing.’ On cross-examination he reiterated this statement whereupon the prosecutor questioned him concerning other robberies in which he was identified as a participant. | 2 | 1980–1981 |
Kemp v. State
green
2 sentences1981App., 478 S.W.2d 958 (1972); Kemp v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 158 , 247 S.W.2d 398 ; Alexander v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 476 S.W.2d 10 (1972).’ “In the case at bar the testimony quoted above constituted a blanket claim that appellant had never asked Green to buy any LSD at the pool hall in Jacksonville, thus authorizing evidence of an extraneous delivery of LSD at that pool hall in rebuttal. ... ” Id. at 123 and 124. 1981App., 478 S.W.2d 958 (1972); Kemp v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 158 , 247 S.W.2d 398 ; Alexander v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 476 S.W.2d 10 (1972).’ “In the case at bar the testimony quoted above constituted a blanket claim that appellant had never asked Green to buy any LSD at the pool hall in Jacksonville, thus authorizing evidence of an extraneous delivery of LSD at that pool hall in rebuttal. ... ” Id. at 123 and 124. | 2 | 1980–1981 |
Ridge Oil Co., Inc. v. Guinn Investments, Inc.
green
1 sentence2026The Court declined to recognize bad-faith washout by a co-lessee as “a blanket rule of law.” Id. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Click v. Tyra
green
1 sentence2025Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Sabine Towing & Transportation Co. v. Holliday Insurance Agency, Inc. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Cole v. State green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Woodruff v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| In Re Texas Farmers Insurance Exchange green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Chandler v. State green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Unknown Heirs of Holloway v. Whatley green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Sun Oil Co. v. Burns green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Sun Oil Co. v. Bennett green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Gulf Pro. Co. v. Angus Spear green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| In Re Alford Chevrolet-Geo green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Sullivan v. Bickel & Brewer green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Brown v. General Brick Sales Co., Inc. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Wilson v. Arkansas green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Calder v. Jones green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Belyeu v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Mosley v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Ross v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Terrell green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Rector v. State green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Coleman v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Florio v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Grange v. Kayser green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Strong v. Garrett green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State Mortgage Corp. v. Ludwig green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.