8 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1998–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Markegard v. Markegardgreen2 sentences2025In Markegard v. Markegard, 189 Mont. 374, 376-77 , 616 P.2d 323, 324-25 (1980), this Court acknowledged that Title 40, chapter 4, MCA, and related case law require trial courts to consider each parent’s ability to meet the child’s needs, without applying a blanket presumption favoring one parent solely because the child is of “tender years.” See also Czapranski v. Czapranski, 2003 MT 14, ¶ 22 , 314 Mont. 55 , 63 P.3d 499 . 2025In Markegard v. Markegard, 189 Mont. 374, 376-77 , 616 P.2d 323, 324-25 (1980), this Court acknowledged that Title 40, chapter 4, MCA, and related case law require trial courts to consider each parent’s ability to meet the child’s needs, without applying a blanket presumption favoring one parent solely because the child is of “tender years.” See also Czapranski v. Czapranski, 2003 MT 14, ¶ 22 , 314 Mont. 55 , 63 P.3d 499 . | 1 | 1 |
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bargreen2 sentences2012Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786 (1975)). ¶49 In Goldfarb , the United States Supreme Court abolished this blanket immunity, holding that a minimum-fee schedule imposed by the Virginia State Bar constituted a “classic illustration of price fixing” in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 2012Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 775, 783 . | 1 | 1 |
Whalen v. Snellgreen2 sentences2009Savage and Torgerson respond that the District Court ‘fundamentally misapplied the ‘concurrence of breach and damages’ language discussed in Whalen v. Snell ... and its progeny [including Circle S Seeds], purporting to establish a new blanket rule for venue that allows a plaintiff to file a lawsuit in any county in which he claims to have experienced damages.” ¶14 In Whalen v. Snell, 205 Mont. 299, 302 , 667 P.2d 436, 437 (1983), we stated that ‘[fjor the purposes of venue, a tort is committed where there is a concurrence of breach of obligation and the occasion of damages.” However, we have d 2009Savage and Torgerson respond that the District Court ‘fundamentally misapplied the ‘concurrence of breach and damages’ language discussed in Whalen v. Snell ... and its progeny [including Circle S Seeds], purporting to establish a new blanket rule for venue that allows a plaintiff to file a lawsuit in any county in which he claims to have experienced damages.” ¶14 In Whalen v. Snell, 205 Mont. 299, 302 , 667 P.2d 436, 437 (1983), we stated that ‘[fjor the purposes of venue, a tort is committed where there is a concurrence of breach of obligation and the occasion of damages.” However, we have d | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Mazurek v. District Court of Montana Fourth Judicial Districtgreen2 sentences1998In balancing the rights of victims and the rights of the defendant we have stated that: “The Sixth Amendment is not absolute, and ‘may bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.’ The rape shield statute has been upheld as a legitimate interest justifying curtailment of the constitutional right to confront witnesses.” Mazurek, 277 Mont. at 354-55 , 922 P.2d at 478 (citations omitted). ¶24 The constitution does not require a blanket exception to rape shield statutes for all evidence related to motive to fabricate. 1998In balancing the rights of victims and the rights of the defendant we have stated that: “The Sixth Amendment is not absolute, and ‘may bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.’ The rape shield statute has been upheld as a legitimate interest justifying curtailment of the constitutional right to confront witnesses.” Mazurek, 277 Mont. at 354-55 , 922 P.2d at 478 (citations omitted). ¶24 The constitution does not require a blanket exception to rape shield statutes for all evidence related to motive to fabricate. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Richards v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2019Richards , 520 U.S. at 393 , 117 S. Ct. at 1421 , n. 5 . ¶94 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce rule, stating: [T]he fact that felony drug investigations may frequently present ***39 circumstances warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce in a particular case. 2019Richards , 520 U.S. at 393 , 117 S. Ct. at 1421 , n. 5 . ¶94 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce rule, stating: [T]he fact that felony drug investigations may frequently present ***39 circumstances warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce in a particular case. | 3 | 2004–2019 |
Czapranski v. Czapranski
green
2 sentences2025In Markegard v. Markegard, 189 Mont. 374, 376-77 , 616 P.2d 323, 324-25 (1980), this Court acknowledged that Title 40, chapter 4, MCA, and related case law require trial courts to consider each parent’s ability to meet the child’s needs, without applying a blanket presumption favoring one parent solely because the child is of “tender years.” See also Czapranski v. Czapranski, 2003 MT 14, ¶ 22 , 314 Mont. 55 , 63 P.3d 499 . 2025In Markegard v. Markegard, 189 Mont. 374, 376-77 , 616 P.2d 323, 324-25 (1980), this Court acknowledged that Title 40, chapter 4, MCA, and related case law require trial courts to consider each parent’s ability to meet the child’s needs, without applying a blanket presumption favoring one parent solely because the child is of “tender years.” See also Czapranski v. Czapranski, 2003 MT 14, ¶ 22 , 314 Mont. 55 , 63 P.3d 499 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2021Speculative or unsupported allegations are insufficient to tip the scales in favor of a defendant’s right to present a defense and against the victim’s rights under the rape shield statute.” State v. Johnson, 1998 MT 107, ¶ 24 , 288 Mont. 513 , 958 P.2d 1182 (emphasis added). 2021Speculative or unsupported allegations are insufficient to tip the scales in favor of a defendant’s right to present a defense and against the victim’s rights under the rape shield statute.” State v. Johnson, 1998 MT 107, ¶ 24 , 288 Mont. 513 , 958 P.2d 1182 (emphasis added). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Howard v. Dooner Laboratories, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009In Howard v. Dooner Laboratories, Inc., 211 Mont. 312 , 688 P.2d 279 (1984), a doctor prescribed medication in Yellowstone County and the patient later took the medication in Fergus County, experiencing adverse reactions and sustaining injury there. 2009In Howard v. Dooner Laboratories, Inc., 211 Mont. 312 , 688 P.2d 279 (1984), a doctor prescribed medication in Yellowstone County and the patient later took the medication in Fergus County, experiencing adverse reactions and sustaining injury there. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.