blanket exception in Georgia

2022See Jones, 274 Ga. at 117-118 ; Crosby v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 240 Ga. App. 857, 861 (3) (b) ( 524 SE2d 313 ) (1999) (“Product misuse 22 d[oes] not relieve the manufacturer from liability for a defective product when such misuse was known by the manufacturer or was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer, as alleged in this case.”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 273 Ga. 454 ( 543 SE2d 21 ) (2001); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 335-336 (2) ( 319 SE2d 470 ) (1984) (rejecting an argument that product “misuse” relieved an automobile manufacturer of its “legal duty” to

2022See Jones, 274 Ga. at 117-118 ; Crosby v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 240 Ga. App. 857, 861 (3) (b) ( 524 SE2d 313 ) (1999) (“Product misuse 22 d[oes] not relieve the manufacturer from liability for a defective product when such misuse was known by the manufacturer or was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer, as alleged in this case.”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 273 Ga. 454 ( 543 SE2d 21 ) (2001); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 335-336 (2) ( 319 SE2d 470 ) (1984) (rejecting an argument that product “misuse” relieved an automobile manufacturer of its “legal duty” to

2022See Jones, 274 Ga. at 117-118 ; Crosby v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 240 Ga. App. 857, 861 (3) (b) ( 524 SE2d 313 ) (1999) (“Product misuse 22 d[oes] not relieve the manufacturer from liability for a defective product when such misuse was known by the manufacturer or was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer, as alleged in this case.”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 273 Ga. 454 ( 543 SE2d 21 ) (2001); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 335-336 (2) ( 319 SE2d 470 ) (1984) (rejecting an argument that product “misuse” relieved an automobile manufacturer of its “legal duty” to

2022See Jones, 274 Ga. at 117-118 ; Crosby v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 240 Ga. App. 857, 861 (3) (b) ( 524 SE2d 313 ) (1999) (“Product misuse 22 d[oes] not relieve the manufacturer from liability for a defective product when such misuse was known by the manufacturer or was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer, as alleged in this case.”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 273 Ga. 454 ( 543 SE2d 21 ) (2001); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 335-336 (2) ( 319 SE2d 470 ) (1984) (rejecting an argument that product “misuse” relieved an automobile manufacturer of its “legal duty” to

2022See Jones, 274 Ga. at 117-118; Crosby v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 240 Ga. App. 857, 861 (3) (b) (524 SE2d 313) (1999) (“Product misuse 22 d[oes] not relieve the manufacturer from liability for a defective product when such misuse was known by the manufacturer or was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer, as alleged in this case.”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 273 Ga. 454 (543 SE2d 21) (2001); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 335-336 (2) (319 SE2d 470) (1984) (rejecting an argument that product “misuse” relieved an automobile manufacturer of its “legal duty” to reduce

2022See Jones, 274 Ga. at 117-118 ; Crosby v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 240 Ga. App. 857, 861 (3) (b) ( 524 SE2d 313 ) (1999) (“Product misuse 22 d[oes] not relieve the manufacturer from liability for a defective product when such misuse was known by the manufacturer or was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer, as alleged in this case.”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 273 Ga. 454 ( 543 SE2d 21 ) (2001); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 335-336 (2) ( 319 SE2d 470 ) (1984) (rejecting an argument that product “misuse” relieved an automobile manufacturer of its “legal duty” to

2022See Pearson v. Tippmann Pneumatics, Inc., 281 Ga. 740, 740-741, 744 (3) ( 642 SE2d 691 ) (2007) (holding in the context of a proximate-cause analysis that both a third party, who tortiously fired a paintball gun at the plaintiff’s eye while mistakenly believing the safety mechanism was engaged, and the paintball-gun manufacturer, who allegedly designed the safety mechanism with a defective “safe” indicator, could be liable for the resulting injury). (d) Contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals majority, our decisional law does not recognize a blanket exception to a manufacturer’s design

2022See Pearson v. Tippmann Pneumatics, Inc., 281 Ga. 740, 740-741, 744 (3) ( 642 SE2d 691 ) (2007) (holding in the context of a proximate-cause analysis that both a third party, who tortiously fired a paintball gun at the plaintiff’s eye while mistakenly believing the safety mechanism was engaged, and the paintball-gun manufacturer, who allegedly designed the safety mechanism with a defective “safe” indicator, could be liable for the resulting injury). (d) Contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals majority, our decisional law does not recognize a blanket exception to a manufacturer’s design

2012See also Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385, 393-394 (II) (117 SC 1416, 137 LE2d 615) (1997) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not permit a blanket exception for felony drug investigations to the knock-and-announce requirement; rather, in each case, the court must determine whether the particular facts and circumstances justified a “no-knock” entry).

2012See also Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385, 393-394 (II) (117 SC 1416, 137 LE2d 615) (1997) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not permit a blanket exception for felony drug investigations to the 4 knock-and-announce requirement; rather, in each case, the court must determine whether the particular facts and circumstances justified a “no-knock” entry).

2023While the reasonableness standard for a forceful entry is not high, that testimony is simply inadequate to establish reasonable grounds to believe that, in this case, forewarning would have either greatly increased the officers’ peril or led to the immediate destruction of the evidence.19 Significantly, this Court emphasized that, to find exigent circumstances under the facts of Poole “would amount to the adoption of a per se rule that once law enforcement officers realize that an occupant of the premises to be searched for drugs has discovered the officers’ presence outside the premises, the

2023While the reasonableness standard for a forceful entry is not high, that testimony is simply inadequate to establish reasonable grounds to believe that, in this case, forewarning would have either greatly increased the officers’ peril or led to the immediate destruction of the evidence.19 Significantly, this Court emphasized that, to find exigent circumstances under the facts of Poole “would amount to the adoption of a per se rule that once law enforcement officers realize that an occupant of the premises to be searched for drugs has discovered the officers’ presence outside the premises, the

2026Nevertheless, the Norman Court announced that Georgia’s prohibition on wrongful birth claims does not create a blanket immunity for reproductive service providers, and acknowledged that the appellants in that case may have adequately pled claims for relief that did not derive injury from their child’s life.8 See id. at 136 (2)(d).

2023The State argues that the presence of the no-knock provision in the search warrant is irrelevant because Hughes did not claim that there was an actual no-knock entry, and she was standing outside her residence and officers gave visual and verbal notice of their purpose and authority prior to entering.23 22 See Smith, 219 Ga. App. at 905-906 (holding that there was no evidence of exigent circumstances sufficient to dispense with the general requirement that officers give verbal notice of their authority and purpose, even though when officers arrived at the residence to execute the search warran

2023The State argues that the presence of the no-knock provision in the search warrant is irrelevant because Hughes did not claim that there was an actual no-knock entry, and she was standing outside her residence and officers gave visual and verbal notice of their purpose and authority prior to entering.23 22 See Smith, 219 Ga. App. at 905-906 (holding that there was no evidence of exigent circumstances sufficient to dispense with the general requirement that officers give verbal notice of their authority and purpose, even though when officers arrived at the residence to execute the search warran

2023The State argues that the presence of the no-knock provision in the search warrant is irrelevant because Hughes did not claim that there was an actual no-knock entry, and she was standing outside her residence and officers gave visual and verbal notice of their purpose and authority prior to entering.23 22 See Smith, 219 Ga. App. at 905-906 (holding that there was no evidence of exigent circumstances sufficient to dispense with the general requirement that officers give verbal notice of their authority and purpose, even though when officers arrived at the residence to execute the search warran

2023Because the holding of the Court of Appeals conflicts with these principles, and because the Maynards adequately alleged that Snap could reasonably foresee the particular risk of harm from the Speed Filter at issue here, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings.2 1 (Footnote omitted.) Maynard v. Snapchat, Inc., 313 Ga. 533, 533-534 ( 870 SE2d 739 ) (2022). 2 Id. at 534.

2023The State argues that the presence of the no-knock provision in the search warrant is irrelevant because Hughes did not claim that there was an actual no-knock entry, and she was standing outside her residence and officers gave visual and verbal notice of their purpose and authority prior to entering.23 22 See Smith, 219 Ga. App. at 905-906 (holding that there was no evidence of exigent circumstances sufficient to dispense with the general requirement that officers give verbal notice of their authority and purpose, even though when officers arrived at the residence to execute the search warran

2023The State argues that the presence of the no-knock provision in the search warrant is irrelevant because Hughes did not claim that there was an actual no-knock entry, and she was standing outside her residence and officers gave visual and verbal notice of their purpose and authority prior to entering.23 22 See Smith, 219 Ga. App. at 905-906 (holding that there was no evidence of exigent circumstances sufficient to dispense with the general requirement that officers give verbal notice of their authority and purpose, even though when officers arrived at the residence to execute the search warran

2021Indeed, we have cautioned against a formulaic approach to foreseeability and equated a blanket requirement of proof of a prior similar crime to establishing “the equivalent of a ‘one free bite rule.’”Wallace v. Boys Club of Albany, 211 Ga. App. 534, 536 (2), n. 2 ( 439 SE2d 746 ) (1993).

2021Indeed, we have cautioned against a formulaic approach to foreseeability and equated a blanket requirement of proof of a prior similar crime to establishing “the equivalent of a ‘one free bite rule.’”Wallace v. Boys Club of Albany, 211 Ga. App. 534, 536 (2), n. 2 ( 439 SE2d 746 ) (1993).

2020The court ultimately “decline[d] to adopt a blanket rule that an arbitration clause in an attorney-client contract is unconscionable and against public policy if the attorney did not explain the potential disadvantages of the clause to his prospective client before execution of the contract.” Id. at 597 .

2020Thus, our decision in this case would not have a disciplinary effect on Summerville. public policy, ultimately “declin[ing] to adopt a blanket rule that an arbitration clause in an attorney-client contract is unconscionable and against public policy if the attorney did not explain the potential disadvantages of the clause to his prospective client before execution of the contract.” Summerville, 349 Ga. App. at 597 (emphasis added).

2012See also OCGA § 50-13-10; IBM v. Evans, 265 Ga. 215, 216 (1) ( 453 SE2d 706 ) (1995) (finding that sovereign immunity did not protect Department of Administrative Services from injunctive relief); Drury, 263 Ga. at 432 (1) (finding that declaratory judgment is authorized as to validity of agency rules); Undercofler v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 114 Ga. App. 739 ( 152 SE2d 768 ) (1966) (involving declaratory-judgment action by property owner against Revenue 8 of the case sub judice, the State has waived its sovereign immunity to Gold’s declaratory-judgment claim.

2012See also OCGA § 50-13-10; IBM v. Evans, 265 Ga. 215, 216 (1) ( 453 SE2d 706 ) (1995) (finding that sovereign immunity did not protect Department of Administrative Services from injunctive relief); Drury, 263 Ga. at 432 (1) (finding that declaratory judgment is authorized as to validity of agency rules); Undercofler v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 114 Ga. App. 739 ( 152 SE2d 768 ) (1966) (involving declaratory-judgment action by property owner against Revenue 8 of the case sub judice, the State has waived its sovereign immunity to Gold’s declaratory-judgment claim.

2012Our Constitution and statutes do not provide for a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity in declaratory-judgment actions; and this Court has found that “sovereign immunity is applicable to protect state agencies in declaratory judgment actions . . . .”16 On the other hand, as our Supreme Court recently noted in Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie,17 declaratory actions against the State have nevertheless been recognized in certain contexts.18 Accordingly, we must decide whether, in the context 15 The amended complaint was filed on June 16, 2011. 16 Live Oak Consulting, Inc. v. Dep’t of Cmty. Heal

2012Our Constitution and statutes do not provide for a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity in declaratory-judgment actions; and this Court has found that “sovereign immunity is applicable to protect state agencies in declaratory judgment actions . . . .”16 On the other hand, as our Supreme Court recently noted in Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie,17 declaratory actions against the State have nevertheless been recognized in certain contexts.18 Accordingly, we must decide whether, in the context 15 The amended complaint was filed on June 16, 2011. 16 Live Oak Consulting, Inc. v. Dep’t of Cmty. Heal

2012See also OCGA § 50-13-10; IBM v. Evans, 265 Ga. 215, 216 (1) ( 453 SE2d 706 ) (1995) (finding that sovereign immunity did not protect Department of Administrative Services from injunctive relief); Drury, 263 Ga. at 432 (1) (finding that declaratory judgment is authorized as to validity of agency rules); Undercofler v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 114 Ga. App. 739 ( 152 SE2d 768 ) (1966) (involving declaratory-judgment action by property owner against Revenue 8 of the case sub judice, the State has waived its sovereign immunity to Gold’s declaratory-judgment claim.

1990Co., 126 Ga. App. 140, 142 ( 190 SE2d 110 ) (1972) (“the fact that ten years previously the insurance company had paid a similar claim where the [notice provisions of the policy were not followed] . . . cannot be relied upon as a blanket waiver of written notice in all future claims”); Globe &c.

1990Co., 126 Ga. App. 140, 142 ( 190 SE2d 110 ) (1972) (“the fact that ten years previously the insurance company had paid a similar claim where the [notice provisions of the policy were not followed] . . . cannot be relied upon as a blanket waiver of written notice in all future claims”); Globe &c.